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The purpose of this research is to develop a best practice framework of voluntary 
disclosure for family-controlled companies in Malaysia. This study identifies the 
level of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian listed family-controlled companies, and 
reviews and discusses the voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia from the 
perspectives of stakeholders. The study contends that the level of voluntary 
disclosure practices by listed family-controlled companies is lower than that of 
nonfamily-controlled companies. It is found that factors such as family ownership 
structure and values are the main influences that contribute to the level of voluntary 
disclosure in listed family-controlled companies’ annual reports. Malaysian listed 
family-controlled companies’ decision to disclose voluntarily is not only complex 
but also is influenced by the family’s governance structure and relationships. This 
situation accounts for the differences in the level of voluntary disclosure between 
family-controlled companies and other listed companies.  
This study adopts a mixed methods approach (i.e., quantitative and qualitative 
methodology) in order to achieve its objectives. A voluntary disclosure index 
consisting of 61 items is developed using a Delphi process with 40 panel members. 
The index is then applied on to 30 Malaysian listed companies’ annual reports for 
the years 2009-2013. The collected data is quantified and analysed to determine the 
differing levels of voluntary disclosure practices between family-controlled and 
nonfamily-controlled companies. In addition, factors that might influence the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the companies’ annual reports are examined. Taking a 
qualitative approach, 41 corporate managers are interviewed to identify their 
experiences of using voluntary disclosure information within annual reports.  
The research outcome showed that the current level of voluntary disclosure by 
family-controlled companies falls below the stakeholders’ expectations. The most 
frequently disclosed items within the annual reports are general corporate and 
strategic information, and financial information. However, the forward-looking and 
risk review management category had lower disclosure in the annual reports, and 
fell short of stakeholders’ expectation. One important finding in this study is that, 
compared to previous studies in the Malaysian context, voluntary disclosure 
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regarding Islamic values in areas such as halal certification, zakat, and waqf within 
the companies’ annual reports is improving.   
This study also identifies that the number of family members involved in the 
management of a family-controlled business, the generations to which members of 
the family belong, and the education level of family members are positively 
significant in terms of the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
family-controlled companies. Furthermore, the data from the discussions with and 
opinions expressed by the interview participants indicate that the family-controlled 
companies in Malaysia are progressing towards better voluntary disclosure 
practices. It is believed that the findings of this research can assist in the 
improvement of family-controlled company governance and the development of 
voluntary disclosure practice guidelines applicable to the Malaysian family 
business context.    
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, Malaysia, family-controlled business, mixed 
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS  
1.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 provides the context for this thesis and focuses on the voluntary 1 
disclosure practices of listed family-controlled companies in Malaysia. Scholarly 
literature on voluntary disclosure has long been characterised by notions of what 
influences a company’s board of directors (i.e., managers) to provide additional 
information voluntarily. That is, consistent with the objective of quality corporate 
reporting, researchers have made a number of attempts to discover both the factors 
that influence voluntary disclose and the level of that voluntary disclosure. 
Researchers such as Elsayed and Hoque (2010), and Qu, Cooper, Wise, and Leung 
(2012) contended that voluntary disclosure practices are influenced not only by 
corporate-specific attributes such as firm size, listing status, ownership, 
profitability, and liquidity factors, but also by environmental factors. 
The issue of voluntary disclosure has been widely and empirically studied not only 
in developed countries (see, for example, Italy ─ Boesso and Kumar (2007); the US 
─ Beattie and Jones (2001); and, the United Kingdom  ─ Brammer and Pavelin 
(2006), but also in developing or emerging countries   (see, for example, Hong Kong  
─ Chau and Gray (2002) Fiji ─ Sharma and Davey (2013) Bangladesh ─ Rouf and 
Harun (2011), and in other United Arab Emirates countries, for example, Al-Janadi 
and Rahman (2012). Nevertheless, the literature on voluntary disclosure continues 
predominantly to represent a notion that variations in disclosure are due to a 
country’s region and background, regulatory changes, companies’ corporate 
governance system, companies’ size, listing status, as well as social environment 
factors. Moreover, these factors have been assumed to apply globally. Indeed, it can 
be said that differences in the corporate governance model between countries have 
normalised the perception that voluntary disclosure practice involves the board of 
directors’ strategic and efficient decision-making in a market-driven reporting 
                                                 
1 Voluntary disclosure refers to any additional information provided in companies’ annual reports 
that goes beyond disclosures explicitly required by Malaysia’s mandatory regulations, Companies’ 




environment. However, the major controllers of the company are subject to multiple 
influences, and their different societal contexts will differently shaping their 
voluntary disclosure practices.  
Voluntary disclosure practice is an increasingly important area in corporate 
reporting. The growing globalisation of the business environment has fostered the 
need for additional information, so that stakeholders in particular can make wise 
economic decisions (Qu et al., 2012). The practice of disclosing information 
voluntarily is encompassed in the tenets of corporate governance which impose an 
obligation on management to report adequate information on their company’s 
performance and activities (Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010). Scholars such as 
Elsayed and Hoque (2010), Ho and Taylor (2013), Omaima, Gianluigi, Peter, and 
David (2011), (Elsayed & Hoque, 2010; Ho & Taylor, 2013; Omaima et al., 2011); 
Sharma and Davey (2013) have found that, because of their size and the availability 
of resources, large listed companies tend to disclose more information because of 
the relationship between value and level of disclosure, and because they are prone 
to shareholders’ and regulators’ scrutiny.  
Studies on voluntary disclosure in developed and developing countries have 
focused on companies listed on the stock market in general. Specification of 
company’s ownership is, however, limited. Given that rich variations exist between 
countries, regions, societies, environments, backgrounds, and unique capital 
markets, research in the area of voluntary disclosure continues. This situation offers 
researchers not only an opportunity to focus on the level of disclosure in relation to 
companies’ corporate governance systems and structure, but also to investigate the 
effect of ownership structure on disclosure practices by listed family-controlled 
companies in particular. According to Chau and Gray (2010), a company’s 
ownership plays a contributing role in shaping the company’s corporate 
governance, and, therefore, shapes the voluntary disclosure practice by public listed 
companies. Malaysia presents an interesting site for this research in several ways. 
First, as an emerging market, Malaysia has embarked on industrialising and 
modernising its society while nourishing Islamic values. The country also 




competitive in the global marketplace, as stipulated in Malaysia’s Vision 2020 
(Siddiqui, 2012).  
Second, globalisation and financial liberation have resulted in market integration 
which has been found to contribute to increased global mobility in resources utilised 
in business activities. Consequently, this market integration has improved the 
investment opportunities through the diversification of the international portfolio. 
Some of these investment opportunities exist in emerging markets including those 
of Malaysia. Therefore, investment in these markets requires a considerable 
understanding of a number of issues, not least their accounting and reporting 
behaviours.  
Third, global market integration has also resulted in markets being more vulnerable 
and riskier due to contagion effects. The consequences of market frictions in one 
part of the global economy can spread quite quickly to another part (i.e., a financial 
crisis). One of the causes of financial friction relates to reporting misbehaviour, for 
example, accounting for financial instruments, and asset valuation (Arnold, 2009; 
Chor & Manova, 2012). This activity is not only complex in design. Measurements, 
recognition, and subsequent disclosures also remain insufficient. Given the 
situation where some of these reporting problems need to be addressed, a broad 
understanding of reporting and disclosure practices in different market systems, 
including the market in Malaysia, is crucial in preventing future reporting crises. 
Fourth, with regard to company ownership, 40% of the family-controlled 
businesses in Malaysia are large-scale businesses and listed on the main board of 
Malaysia’s Stock Exchange. The main activity of these family businesses is 
manufacturing. In 2008, it was reported that 27 of the 40 richest people in Malaysia 
were from family-based businesses. These family-based companies were reported 
to control 34% of Malaysia’s market capitalisation (Ibrahim & Samad, 2010). 
Furthermore, family-controlled flagship companies such as YTL Brothers, IOI 
Group, and Berjaya Group have contributed to Malaysia’s  economic development 
and growth (Ibrahim & Samad, 2010). One might, therefore, ponder how the 
voluntary disclosure practices of these family-controlled companies differ from 




Fifth, Malaysia is seen as a society divided by various ethnic, religious, and cultural 
differences. The present multiethnic climate of Malaysia is marked by the 
prominence of the Chinese in business activities, the Malays2 in the public sector 
and political sphere, and the Indians in the diversified sector. It is important to note 
that the majority of the large and prominent companies on the Malaysian Stock 
Exchange are owned by Chinese families (Ibrahim & Samad, 2010; Shamsir Jasani, 
2002). Although the Chinese and the Malays have economic disparities, it is 
believed that the political influence of the Malays curtails the economic power of 
the Chinese (Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006; Hui & Jomo, 2010). It is worth 
noting also that the composition of Malay directorship in Malaysian family-
controlled companies could prove vital in improving the level of voluntary 
disclosure reporting in family-controlled companies.  
While it is commonly argued that the ownership structure of family-controlled 
companies differs from that of other types of ownership structure, and also that 
family-controlled companies provide less voluntary disclosure in their annual 
reports, understanding the actual level of the voluntary disclosure practice of 
family-controlled companies in an emerging country has the potential to add new 
dimensions to the field of accounting studies. Consequently, this research 
investigates the type of additional information that is being disclosed voluntarily, 
and investigates the factors that drive family-controlled companies to practise 
voluntary disclosure at the intersection of family values and market-driven 
reporting.  
In this research, companies’ annual reports are used as the source of information 
about voluntary disclosure practices for the following reasons. First, according to 
the Ninth Schedule of the Malaysia Company Act 1965, all listed companies must 
produce an annual report accompanied by a statutory auditor’s report (Akhtaruddin, 
Hossain, Hossain, & Yao, 2009). Second, management have control over the 
amount of information voluntarily disclosed in annual reports (Campbell, 2000; 
Rahman, 2001). Third, annual reports have been identified as an important medium 
                                                 




of communication with investors and other stakeholders (Campbell & Abdul 
Rahman, 2010; Omaima & Marston, 2010).  
This introductory chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 presents a brief 
background to voluntary disclosure reporting, and section 1.3 sets out the 
motivation for this research. Section 1.4 describes the purposes and objectives of 
the research. The research contribution is introduced in section 1.5. Section 1.6 
outlines the structure of the thesis. Section 1.7 concludes the chapter by outlining 
the scope and limitations of the study, and section 1.8 summarises the chapter. 
1.2 Background to voluntary disclosure 
Corporate disclosures in the form of annual reports comprise both financial and 
nonfinancial information. These disclosures can be divided into statutory and 
nonstatutory or voluntary disclosures (Bhojraj, Blacconiere, & D'Souza, 2004; 
Broberg, Tagesson, & Collin, 2010). Statutory disclosures are mandated by 
regulations in the form of Companies’ Acts and Securities’ Acts. Any additional 
information provided beyond the mandatory disclosure is unregulated and disclosed 
voluntarily by management. This information can take the form of text, tables or 
figures, graphs and/or photographs that enhance and complement the financial 
information. Some common forms of nonfinancial information include, but are not 
limited to, the corporate statement and strategy, social and environmental reports, 
risk disclosures, and corporate governance information (Bhojraj et al., 2004; Ho & 
Taylor, 2013; Qu, Leung, & Cooper, 2013). Since voluntary information goes 
beyond the regulatory requirements, and may be more detailed in terms of the 
information available, such disclosures are often known as self-regulated practices 
(Deegan, 2009).  
Most large 3  companies use corporate reports as a way to disclose positive 
information about their operations and their assurance practice to increase their 
opportunity to access external finance and resources (Francis, Khurana, & Pereira, 
2005). Core’s study (2001), as cited by Uyar and Kılıç (2012), claims that the 
information disclosed can provide assurance to investors that the company is 
performing well. A number of studies show that information within the annual 
                                                 




report is an important source of information for economic decision-making 
(Rahman, 2001; Stanton & Stanton, 2002; Yuthas, Rogers, & Dillard, 2002). 
However, while the content of voluntary disclosure seems to be an important source 
to complement the statutory disclosure, it offers little to facilitate a deeper 
understanding of the complexities underpinning the actual practice of providing 
voluntary disclosure (Chau & Gray, 2002; Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008). A 
number of studies (see for example, Omaima et al., 2011; Uyar & Kılıç, 2012; 
Wang, Ali, & Al-Akra, 2013) found that in the context of management willingness 
to provide additional information, the level of voluntary disclosure content is 
subject to the managers’ perceptions of the importance of such information in terms 
of benefits of their companies.  
A number of prior studies suggest that voluntary disclosure can be presented in 
various forms. Voluntary disclosure can be measured in three ways: 1) as 
quantitative monetary disclosures; 2) as quantitative nonmonetary disclosures; and, 
3) as qualitative disclosures (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Broberg et al., 2010). 
Quantitative monetary information is represented fiscally, such as in currency 
value, while quantitative nonmonetary information is conveyed in numbers, for 
example, in units of production or ratios. Qualitative disclosures can take a narrative 
form (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Broberg et al., 2010; Healy & Palepu, 2001) or be 
shown in pictures and graphics (such as tables, charts, and figures) (Beattie & Jones, 
2001; Leventis & Weetman, 2004). According to Leventis and Weetman (2004), 
images are often used as a form of information presentation in a company’s annual 
reports to summarise or highlight the main indicators of the company’s position and 
performance in the market. Both narrative and monetary forms of information are 
important for users, as such information can clarify as well as simplify complicated 
corporate information for the wider stakeholder group. (Beattie & Jones, 2001; 
Watson, Shrives, & Marston, 2002). Some companies may, however, prefer a 
narrative form of reporting. The disclosure can give the companies’ operational, 
structural, and financial picture of the company to the stakeholders. Prior research 
shows that large companies are prone to providing a narrative form of disclosure 
such as a general statement or discussion on particular areas (Beattie, McInnes, & 
Fearnley, 2004; Campbell, 2000; Deegan, Rankin, & Tobin, 2002). On the other 




company’s financial situation. For instance, profitability, total assets, and liquidity 
ratios can represent an important indicator of a company’s performance and growth 
(Watson et al., 2002).  
According to Healy and Palepu (2001), strategic utilisation of quality information 
may increase a firm’s value. The extent of the quantity and quality of information 
disclosed by companies plays a substantial role in stakeholders’ economic decision-
making. The information also allows market participants to evaluate the company’s 
activities and risk management practices in the business environment (Bushman & 
Smith, 2003). Noting the benefits of quality information, Qu et al. (2012) for 
example, emphasise that companies become less exposed to crisis if they are 
supported by quality additional information which is characterised by reliability and 
useful disclosure that meets the stakeholders’ expectations (see also, Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006; Wang et al., 2013). The willingness of such companies to provide 
additional information offers an opportunity for them to repair or maintain the 
company’s image. In other words, the information represents the company’s 
responsibility in managing the business performance in a given situation.  
Differences in voluntary disclosure practices and reporting often emanate from the 
different social, economic, and legal systems that prevail within countries (Elsayed 
& Hoque, 2010; Omaima et al., 2011; Qu et al., 2012). Disclosure issues such as 
the provision of inadequate and irrelevant information can lead to low quality 
corporate reports. Bushman and Smith (2003), for example, argued that low quality 
voluntary disclosure can lead to issues regarding the accountability and 
transparency of companies. This concern was also raised at the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) discussion forum on financial reporting 
disclosure held in London in January 2013 (International Accounting Standards 
Board, 2013). The discussion committee was concerned that many companies were 
adopting a ’tick box‘ approach to disclosure which was contributing to the decrease 
in the level of financial and nonfinancial information disclosed in annual reports 
(Bushman & Smith, 2003; International Accounting Standards Board, 2013).  
Another reason for differences in voluntary disclosure practices relates to the 
managers’ authority to make decisions (Lundholm & Winkle, 2006). A manager’s 




by the company’s position and performance in a given market situation. Since the 
amount of information to be disclosed depends on the companies’ objectives and to 
whom the information is addressed, managers have the prerogative to disclose or 
not disclose information voluntarily. 
1.3 Voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia 
In relation to corporate reporting in the context of Malaysia, voluntary disclosure is 
used to reduce criticism about the lack of transparency in an organisation (Ghazali 
& Weetman, 2006). Ghazali and Weetman (2006) found that the regulations 
implemented after the 1997 financial crisis made managers aware of the need to 
improve the level of additional financial and nonfinancial information provided in 
corporate reporting (see also, Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Boesso & Kumar, 2007). 
Several studies suggest that sufficient and quality disclosure provided by companies 
can restore and improve the degree of accountability and transparency of an 
organisation (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Ghazali, 
2008; Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2007). Through the Malaysia New Economic 
Policy in 1971, and the adoption of a disclosure-based regime in 19964, Malaysia 
encourages listed companies to improve their level of voluntary disclosure in their 
published annual reports. According to Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), voluntary 
disclosure practices by companies’ are a vital contributory factor in Malaysia’s 
economy. 
However, although previous studies acknowledge the importance of voluntary 
disclosure as complementary information for stakeholders, research in Malaysia has 
found that the level or extent of information disclosed voluntarily is deemed less 
than is desirable (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). These scholars speculate that the 
situation derives from the unique features of the ownership structure of Malaysian 
companies, particularly family-controlled companies. The diversified and 
conflicting interests of substantial shareholders and those of other shareholders 
have led to a situation in which family members dominate/control the decision- 
making. Since the majority shareholders are the families themselves, the amount of 
additional information to be disclosed is not their major concern (Akhtaruddin & 
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Hasnah, 2010; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011; Ibrahim, 
Abdul Samad, & Amir, 2008).  
1.4 Motivation for the research 
The growth of family-controlled companies in the Malaysian market is generating 
much public interest in both voluntary disclosure reporting and in the need to 
increase market transparency (Hashim, 2011). A study by Ibrahim and Samad 
(2010) documented that 67.5% of the top 40 richest people in Malaysia derive their 
wealth from a family-based business that is listed publicly on the Malaysia Stock 
Exchange. Together with the growth of family businesses on the Stock Exchange, 
this situation offers another contributing factor to foster the development of the 
capital market growth for globalisation. Conceding that business activities and 
trading are diversified, it is, therefore, vital to have an effective flow of information 
content for stakeholders’ economic decision-making.  Since Malaysia’s 
convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2012, the 
business environment and the investment climate have changed. This change has 
increased competition between family-controlled companies and nonfamily-
controlled companies in various sectors of the Malaysian market (Hashim, 2011). 
Family-business-specific attributes present an interesting subject within the field of 
accounting and business (see, for example, Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; 
Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Hutton, 2007; Salvato & Moores, 2010; Wan 
Nordin, 2009). A number of earlier studies such as Ali et al. (2007), Salvato and 
Moores (2010), and Wan Nordin (2009) highlighted two competing effects 
influencing the effectiveness of corporate governance structure with regard to 
disclosure reporting. The first effect is the entrenchment effect which can lead to a 
positive association between family ownership and weaknesses in internal controls. 
The second is the alignment effect; this creates the intention to preserve the family 
reputation.  Ali et al. (2007) revealed that the challenges of corporate reporting 
faced by family-controlled companies are due to the familial relationships, the 
family members’ engagement with the companies, and the risks to their wealth and 




Previous studies such as Faccio and Lang (2002), Claessens et al. (2000), and 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) have documented that family-controlled companies 
appear to be among the commonest form of ownership control in most capital 
markets worldwide, and Malaysia is no exception. As noted earlier, most prior 
empirical studies have focused on voluntary disclosure by listed companies. 
Furthermore, the factors that drive the amount of information disclosed voluntarily 
in the annual reports of Malaysian listed family-controlled companies have not as 
yet been adequately addressed in the academic disclosure literature.  
In recent years, studies in Malaysia show the number of family businesses has 
increased and contributed to the economic growth of the country (Amran, 2011; 
Ho, 2008; Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011). Many of these companies are prominent 
in a wide range of diverse sectors. According to Amran (2011), as at 2007, about 
40% of companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange were family-
controlled companies. It is argued that the diversity of the sectors family-controlled 
companies in Malaysia involve themselves in seems to be one of the factors that 
leads to their being competitive in the market (Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011). 
However, a company’s listing status and the length of its listing are constraints due 
to the company’s market value or performance in the capital market. In comparison 
with other types of company, not many family-controlled companies listed on the 
main board of Malaysia’s Stock Exchange were found to have lasted for more than 
20 consecutive years. One criticism levelled by scholars and practitioners at family-
controlled companies is their typical corporate governance system in terms of 
transparency and accountability to external stakeholders. A number of studies such 
as Hashim (2011), Chau and Gray (2010), and Wan Nordin (2009) conjecture that 
family-controlled companies should improve the level of voluntary disclosure 
provided in their annual reports because of the relationship between corporate 
performance, corporate governance, and the level of voluntary disclosure.  
In Malaysia, prior studies such as Hashim (2011), Ibrahim and Abdul Samad 
(2011), Ho (2008), and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) have investigated family-
controlled companies’ governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure. These 
studies examined the relationship between board mechanisms such as board 




on the level of disclosure provided. Less focus was given to examining the 
differences in, and the amount of, information provided voluntarily by family-
controlled companies. Furthermore, the empirical evidence from Hashim (2011), 
Ibrahim and Abdul Samad (2011), and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) does not 
explicitly discuss or consider the concept of the family-controlled companies.  
1.5 Research purposes and objectives 
The purpose of this study is to develop a best practice model of voluntary disclosure 
for family-controlled Malaysian listed companies. The study aims to develop and 
apply a voluntary disclosure framework applicable to the context of the listed 
Malaysian family-controlled companies. To achieve this purpose, the study has the 
following objectives:  
a. To develop a disclosure index, from users and preparers’ perspectives, for 
assessing the nature and extent of information disclosed in Malaysian listed 
family-controlled companies’ annual reports, and to incorporate a voluntary 
disclosure framework within the disclosure index 
b. To identify the level of voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysian listed 
family-controlled companies from 2009 to 2013  
c. To discuss the findings and assess the voluntary disclosure practices in 
Malaysia from users and preparers’ perspectives.  
 
In order to develop the best practice framework of voluntary disclosures, three 
research questions are explored: 1) What information should be voluntarily 
disclosed in the companies’ annual reports? 2) Is there a difference in the level of 
voluntarily disclosed information in family-firms’ annual reports compared to those 
of other listed companies? and, 3) What factors influence family firms to provide 
voluntary disclosure? 
1.5.1 Focus of the study 
To investigate the level of voluntary disclosure in family-controlled companies, a 
comparative analysis of the extent of voluntary disclosures of family-controlled and 
nonfamily-controlled companies was performed. A mixed-methods (i.e., 




adopted. This research has a three-part structure. Part one examines the importance 
of voluntary information, from the stakeholders’ perspectives. This first part 
contributes to the construction of the disclosure index in this research. To meet its 
objective, the study investigates the differences between different users’ 
perceptions, including those of fund managers, investment analysts, financiers, 
accountants, corporate advisors, and business owners, on the importance of 
information disclosure in the Malaysian listed family-controlled companies’ annual 
reports. 
In order to gather data across a number of years, a longitudinal research strategy 
was also adopted. According to Campbell and Abdul Rahman (2010), a longitudinal 
study enables the researcher to examine change processes within a particular social, 
economic, and political context. The scope of this study is evaluation of voluntary 
disclosure in 150 annual reports published by Malaysian listed companies over a 
period of time. The study is confined to annual reports published in the period 2009 
to 2013. The sample comprises the annual reports of 30 Malaysian listed companies 
(i.e., 15 listed family-controlled companies and 15 nonfamily-controlled companies 
over the 5-year period).  
The final part of this study investigates the motivating factors that influence the 
decision of managers’ of listed-family owned companies to provide voluntary 
disclosure. In this phase, the data collection involved conducting semistructured, 
face-to-face interviews designed to meet the third research objective. A face-to-face 
interview was conducted with eight different groups of managers involved directly 
in preparing and utilising the information from annual reports. 
1.6 Research contribution 
This thesis extends voluntary disclosure reporting research by focusing on the level 
of voluntary information provided in the annual reports of listed family-controlled 
companies in Malaysia. To date, only a limited number of studies on voluntary 
disclosure (see, for example, Ghazali, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hashim & 
Mohd Salleh, 2007) have investigated Malaysia’s listed family-owned companies.  
This study, therefore, provides recent empirical evidence and addresses the dearth 




practices. Furthermore, in order to externally validate the findings of previous 
empirical studies on the relationship between corporate-specific attributes and the 
level of voluntary disclosures, more empirical studies into different types of 
ownership are needed, particularly in the area of family businesses (Melin et al., 
2013; Salvato & Moores, 2010). The empirical findings of the current study are 
expected to offer significant knowledge and benefits for studies conducted in 
voluntary disclosure areas.  
This research also contributes to the voluntary disclosure domain through the 
creation of a viable index instrument for future application. This index makes an 
important contribution because various stakeholder groups have an increasing 
demand for reliable and relevant information (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). 
Furthermore, this research will provide descriptive and critical analysis on the 
extent and quality of voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of listed family-
controlled companies in Malaysia using both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Importantly, this research also presents a framework that explains the internal 
factors such as demographic background and individual norms and belief, between 
managers (or the board of directors) and voluntary disclosure practices within the 
Malaysian socioeconomic and political context. 
In addition, the empirical findings of this up-to-date study will provide significant 
information for regulators, government agencies, investors’ relation managers, 
business owners, and potential local and foreign investors. It will enable them to 
assess the amount of information needed and available from listed family-
controlled companies for their decision-making processes. In addition, the findings 
from this study are expected to provide capital market investors and other 
stakeholders with insights when investing in family-controlled companies. For the 
capital market regulators, the empirical findings reported in this study may provide 
insight when conducting effective regulation and supervision of information 
transparency among listed companies on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange. 
Moreover, the findings of this study may help the capital regulators to improve the 




1.7 Organisation of thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1, the introductory chapter, provides an 
overview of the scholarly developments in voluntary disclosure that encompass 
voluntary disclosure research. It also summarises core concepts of the voluntary 
disclosure area and highlights the research’s contributions to knowledge. Finally, 
motivations for conducting the research are outlined. 
Chapter 2 explores the institutional setting perspectives of Malaysia. It includes a 
review of background information on Malaysia, an overview of the overall 
landscape of Malaysia’s social and economic background, and changes in  
accounting systems and the regulatory environment (such as the disclosure-based 
regime and corporate governance best practices). This chapter explores the 
development and growth of Malaysia, along with government’s affirmative action 
in supporting changes to the economic, social, and political environment. The focus 
then moves to a discussion on voluntary disclosure practices and the level of such 
information in Malaysian listed companies. The future direction for voluntary 
disclosure-integrated reporting is also considered. The chapter concludes with a 
brief explanation on the Malaysian socioeconomic and the financial reporting 
environment in order to help readers to obtain a general understanding of the 
background of this research. 
Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature on the level of voluntary disclosure and 
factors affecting its stances. The chapter categorises the literature into three themes. 
These include: 1) the effect of regulatory changes in emerging countries on 
disclosure levels; 2) voluntary disclosure as an embedded phenomenon (i.e., at the 
organisational and institutional level); and, 3) not only factors affecting the level in 
the annual reports, but also indices measurement used by prior scholars. This 
chapter also sets out the current status of voluntary disclosure in emerging 
countries, particularly Malaysia, and the issue of the low level of voluntary 
disclosure in family-owned companies. The chapter concludes with a critical 
reflection on the literature review in order to identify the knowledge gap and ways 




Chapter 4 presents the background of researcher, her philosophy, and the 
methodology that underpins this thesis. Chapter 2 is divided into two main sections. 
The first section delineates the philosophical position, research paradigm, and 
stance of the thesis. It also describes the mixed-methods employed to achieve the 
research’s objectives. This section also offers a summary of the researcher’s 
methodological decision-making in terms of the overall procedures carried out in 
this thesis. The second section delineates the research design and explains the three 
distinct procedural phases involved in the data collection and information analysis. 
Section two of chapter 4 considers and discusses several methods and techniques 
(such as questionnaire surveys, face-to-face interview/discussions, and documents 
search). Pilot studies are then highlighted and their purposes in this thesis are 
discussed. The chapter also describes the process used to develop disclosure indices 
as an instrument to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in the companies’ 
annual reports. The next section of the chapter presents the reliability and validity 
procedures employed in the research in order to obtain a feasible research tool and 
outcomes. The chapter also illustrates the ethical considerations process for this 
research. The chapter concludes with a summary the mixed-methods procedures 
employed in the study. 
Chapter 5 explicates the development of the disclosure index instrument and its 
associated coding scheme. This chapter discusses the research methods employed 
in this phase. It explains how the Delphi technique was utilised in this research, and 
presents the data analysis that resulted from that approach. Finally, this chapter 
presents the method of scoring the voluntary disclosure items for the annual reports 
analysed in this study. 
Chapter 6 details the discussion of the results and analysis. The focus of this chapter 
is on presenting the outcomes and results from the content analysis and the 
discovery of differences between listed family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled 
companies. This chapter reveals the differences in voluntary disclosure items, and 
the amount (level) of voluntary information these companies reveal. This chapter 
also examines the types of information that the companies provide in their annual 
reports. It suggests reasons for variations that were found, and their links to the 




Chapter 7 presents the relationship between company attributes and the level of 
voluntary disclosures practices. This chapter details the importance of the family-
controlled corporate governance structure as a factor that influences the level of 
voluntary disclosure practices. Here, the level of voluntary disclosure provided by 
family-controlled companies was examined from three perspectives, namely 
comparison between companies’ attributes, comparison between family-controlled 
companies and others, and comparison between family-controlled companies.  
Chapter 8 explores the views and perceptions of Malaysian annual reports users in 
relation to current voluntary disclosure issues. It focuses on the reporting and 
discussion of the results of the semistructured interviews with 41 executives. The 
aim of this chapter is to address the third research question by defining the factors 
that influence managers to provide additional information voluntarily.  
Chapter 9 reports and discusses the study’s empirical findings on the level of 
voluntary disclosure provided by listed family-controlled companies.  
Chapter 10, the last chapter of the thesis, is designed to give a brief summary of the 
research. The chapter revisits the research methodology and methods, the main 
conclusions of the current research, and indicates its contributions, implications, 
and limitations. Suggestions for further research are also provided in this chapter. 
1.8 Scope and limitations 
This research focuses on large and well-established family-controlled companies 
listed on Malaysia’s main stock exchange, the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange). A voluntary disclosure index framework was 
developed through a Delphi technique. Forty panel experts from selected sectors 
were consulted. The disclosure index framework that resulted from this consultation 
process was used to examine 150 annual reports over the 5 years from 2009 to 2013. 
To enhance the breadth and depth of understanding about voluntary disclosure 
practices, interviews were also conducted. The research aims to provide a 
significant platform for further research, and has implications for voluntary 




This research may be constrained by certain issues. First, the study’s field of 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure is broad, and the scope of this study 
encompasses the amount of information disclosed in the annual reports of the 
selected companies. The aims of this research are to investigate (a) the differences 
in the level of information disclosed voluntarily by family-controlled companies, 
and, (b) the factors that drive managers to practise voluntary disclosure. Other 
aspects of corporate governance (such as corruption, corporate governance 
committee, risk management, and legal compliance) are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
Second, this study focuses on a specific geographical region, and the sample in this 
study is limited to listed family-controlled companies in Malaysia. Therefore, the 
results reflect only what was happening in that region to a specific sample within a 
specific timeframe. Finally, as annual reports' disclosures are the main focus of this 
study, other forms of media used for disclosure purposes are beyond the scope of 
this research.  
1.9 Chapter summary 
Chapter 1 lays the foundation for this research. It presented an introduction to the 
study, the background of the research field, the research propositions, and identifies 
the research issues and objectives. The motivation driving the research and the 
contribution of the study were discussed with regard to prior studies and Malaysia’s 
current setting. An overview of the structure of the thesis concluded the chapter, 
along with a summary of the sections that follow. The next chapter will present the 






THE MALAYSIAN SOCIOECONOMIC AND THE 
FINANCIAL REPORTING ENVIRONMENT  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provides an explanation of the social, economic, and political 
environment in which this research is situated. An understanding of the Malaysian 
environment is relevant as this study embraces the social and economic perspectives 
within which the corporate reporting system operates in practice. The chapter 
provides a general overview of Malaysia in terms of its social and economic 
background, and significant developments. This chapter also describes the key 
elements of the regulatory process, developments in it, and their implications for 
the evolution of voluntary disclosure.  
This chapter is structured as follows. It begins by briefly introducing the social 
history of Malaysia. It then discusses the role of the government in the nation’s 
economic development through various policies. The chapter proceeds with an 
explanation about the legislative framework and the financial reporting framework 
in Malaysia’s capital market. It then outlines the role played by the regulators’ 
initiatives in relation to voluntary disclosure practices. The final section explores 
the development of voluntary disclosure. Here the emphasis is on corporate 
governance in Malaysia. Thereafter, the section introduces the concept of integrated 
reporting and discusses it as a future direction for achieving quality disclosure by 
listed companies. 
2.2 Socio and economic perspectives in Malaysia 
Malaysia was under British rule for 80 years before gaining its independence in 
1957 (Hui & Jomo, 2010; Lee, Gomez, & Yacob, 2012; Lim, 1987). The British 
influence on the Malaysian system was both pervasive and substantial. One 
particular consequence of colonial rule is the involvement of different ethnicities in 




Jomo, 2010; Lee et al., 2012; Siddiqui, 2012). Previous studies such as Siddiqui 
(2012), and Hui and Jomo (2010) reported that before independence the Malaysian 
economy revolved predominantly around farming and mining and the British 
encouraged an influx of Chinese and Indian labourers to work in the various tin 
mines and rubber estates (Lee et al., 2012; Siddiqui, 2012). The British colonial 
government introduced a divide and rule policy in the late 19th century before 
independence. This policy introduced a practice of segregating economic activity 
along racial lines and  resulted in a society that was very much multilayered, and 
economically and racially segregated (Lee et al., 2012).  
In 1957, Malay workers accounted about 52% of the workforce. Malays were 
mostly involved in the traditional and low income agricultural sector. The Chinese 
comprised approximately 37 % of the workforce population. They were mainly 
engaged in sectors such as banking, trade, and plantation management. The 
remaining population comprised Indians and other ethnicities engaged in general 
work such as labouring in mining and rubber plantations (Lee et al., 2012; Siddiqui, 
2012). As a result of these multicultural influences, Malaysia has become a 
diversified society comprised of a variety of ethnic groups with different affiliations 
and cultures. The principal ethnic groups are Malays, followed by Chinese and 
Indians. Other significant groups are the indigenous peoples of Sarawak and Sabah. 
They and the Malays are known as Bumiputera, which translates as ‘son of the soil’ 
(Fraser et al., 2006; Yunos, Ismail, & Smith, 2012). As of 2012, the population of 
Bumiputera (Malay) was 14,772,000. Other Bumiputera (i.e., those from Sarawak 
and Sabah) made up 3,479,300 of the population. There were 6,517,400 Chinese 
and 1,959,900 Indians (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2012).  
In the early stage of Malaysia’s economic revival, there was a structural imbalance 
between ethnicity and economy involvement. For example, most of the corporate 
and manufacturing industries were dominated by the Chinese. According to 
Siddiqui (2012), prior to Malaysian independence, Britain’s policy of divide and 
rule had created different forms of employment opportunities for different races. 
Hence, to restructure this social-economic imbalance, the Malaysian government 
introduced a new economic instrument called the New Economic Policy (1971-




distribution strategy. Its aim was to eradicate poverty and to enhance the economic 
status of the country (Fraser et al., 2006; Lim, 1987). The policy was also designed 
to encourage the indigenous population to participate in economic activities. The 
policy requires 30% of Bumiputera, 40% of other Malaysian, and 30% of foreigners 
to be involved in the corporate and business sector. The implementation of this 
policy has brought about an overall improvement in Malaysia’s economic growth, 
particularly for the manufacturing sector. According to Bank Negara Malaysia 
(2010), economic growth for the period 1987-2010 increased at an average of 6.0% 
annually.  
In addition to the New Economic Policy, the government has introduced a number 
of other important development policies intended to cultivate and support domestic 
enterprise over the past four decades. These included development of a number of 
other economic and social policies and plans to guide national development 
(Barlow, 2001; Hui & Jomo, 2010; Jesudason, 1989; Lee et al., 2012; Rasiah & 
Shari, 2001), for example, the National Development Policy (1991-2010), and the 
National Vision Policy (2001-2010) (Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000; Lee et al., 2012; 
Lee, Mohamad Yusof, & Ojo, 2011). These policies were established to promote 
balanced socioeconomic improvements. They also aimed to expand and modernise 
the economy so as to benefit all ethnic groups (Ali, Lee, & West, 2008; Hui & Jomo, 
2010; Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000; Lee et al., 2012).  
The continuous formulation of Malaysia’s economic policies appears to have 
encouraged business and corporate opportunities, especially among the 
Bumiputeras (Fraser et al., 2006; Haque, 2008). To strengthen the cultivation of 
Bumiputera participation, the Bursa Malaysia legislated that Bumiputera should 
hold 30% equity ownership in any listed company (Marimuthu, 2010; Securities 
Commission Malaysia, 2012a; Siddiqui, 2012). This equity ownership also can 
indicate the controlling power of a company, and can be segregated by race or 
ethnic group (Lee et al., 2012; Salleh, 2009; Siddiqui, 2012). However, a review of 
Malaysia’s corporate history over these past four decades reveals that no 
Bumiputera has ownership of a top 10 quoted company. The government presently 
has majority ownership of more than half of the top 10 publicly listed companies 




remainder are Chinese-held (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Hashim, 2012; Yunos et al., 
2012). Most companies in the top 100 are Chinese-owned. However, while these 
equity ownership and control outcomes are commendable, most Malay-owned or 
Bumiputera-owned companies are involved in construction, property development, 
and the telecommunications industry. 
2.3 Accounting perspective in Malaysia 
The growth of Malaysia’s economy and business activities has led to a call for 
companies to provide greater transparency and accountability for their business 
activities and their impact on the external stakeholders (Ho & Taylor, 2013; 
Muniandy & Ali, 2012). In the context of transparency and accountability, and the 
capital market advancement, Malaysia has experienced several changes to its 
accounting regulatory framework and capital market regime (Muniandy & Ali, 
2012). For the purpose of this research, discussion of the accounting system in 
Malaysia is based on the post-independence era, which began in 1957. To 
summarise, Table 1 below shows the accounting system initiatives undertaken in 
Malaysia between 1958 and 2012.  
Table 1. The accounting system in Malaysia after independence. 
Year Details 
1958 Formation of Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1966 Companies Act 1965 
1967 Accountants Act 1967 
- Establishment of Malaysian Institute of Accountants  
1978 Adoption of IAS 
1997 Financial Reporting Act 
- Establishment of Financial Reporting Foundation and 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
1999 Issuance of Malaysia Accounting Standards 





The real and enduring changes in Malaysia’s social and economic spheres have also 
affected the country’s corporate reporting and accounting information regulatory 
framework (Ali et al., 2008; Saudagaran & Diga, 2000; Selvaraj, 2005). Leaving 
aside a few facets of the new economic policy, the private sector is now considered 
as one of the engines of the economy as a result of the government’s beginning a 
series of programmes to facilitate the expansion of private sector businesses. These 
programmes included the implementation of various strategies to upgrade the 
regulatory framework such as accounting regulation, the listing requirement, 
operation of the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange, and amendments to the 
Companies Act 1985 (Ali, 2007; Saudagaran & Diga, 2000; Siddiqui, 2012). The 
government foresaw that these changes would play an important role in 
strengthening Malaysia’s economic resilience and competitiveness. They would 
also provide quality public information to the stakeholders. 
Accounting regulation in Malaysia was modelled on the British system (Ali et al., 
2008; Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000; Lee et al., 2011; Saudagaran & Diga, 2000; 
Selvaraj, 1999). During British rule, many of the audit and accounting firms that 
operated in Malaysia were international firms. These professional firms are still 
operating there. Their presence constituted a matter of much concern, especially 
since there was no local accounting profession at the time of independence. 
Malaysia, however, accepted the British professional model accounting.  One of the 
factors that contributed to Malaysia’s adoption of the British-style accounting 
regulatory framework lay in the country’s history (Ali et al., 2008). As stated by the 
American Accounting Association’s Committee on International Operations and 
Education (1977), most developing countries have ended up following the model 
of their former colonial ruler.  
The first professional body established in Malaysia was the Malaysian Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), and The Malaysia Companies Act was 
developed on the basis of the UK Companies Act 1908 (Ali, 2007; Lee et al., 2011; 
Selvaraj, 1999). Between 1978 and 1999, Malaysia adopted International 
Accounting Standards and enacted the Financial Reporting Act 1997. The 
enactment of the Financial Reporting Act 1997 led to the establishment of the 




development in line with economic and environmental changes (Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board, 2008).  
2.3.1 Development of accounting regulations in Malaysia 
Between 1957 and 1967, the accounting and reporting regulations were based on 
the Malaysia Companies Act 1965 (The Act), and Malaysian Association of 
Certified Public Accountants (MACPA) (Ali et al., 2008; Selvaraj, 1999; Sood, 
2006). These provide the main practical source of guidelines in preparing 
companies’ financial statements. The Act provides guidelines for the accounting 
process. They include record keeping, and minimal disclosure requirements for 
profit and loss, and the balance sheets of companies (Ali et al., 2008; Selvaraj, 1999; 
Sood, 2006). On the other hand, the Malaysian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants provides technical guidance, training, and examinations for its 
members (Ali et al., 2008; Selvaraj, 1999; Sood, 2006). Since the accounting system 
was founded mainly on the practices of foreign professional accounting bodies and 
Western multinational companies, the system had its limitations. Many of the 
accounting guidelines were not able to address specific accounting matters, for 
example, revaluation of assets, the creation of goodwill, and disclosure reporting 
(Ali et al., 2008; Muniandy & Ali, 2012; Selvaraj, 2005).  
In 1997, the Financial Reporting Act 1997 was passed. This Act led to the formation 
of the Financial Reporting Foundation and the Malaysian Accounting Standards 
Board. The Financial Reporting Foundation was created as a trust to oversee the 
operation of the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board. It was not involved with 
the standard setting process. The Financial Reporting Foundation has 19 members 
who include representatives from various government bodies, public listed 
companies, public accounting firms, and the main council of the Malaysian Institute 
of Accountants (Ali et al., 2008; Sood, 2006).  
The Malaysian Accounting Standards Board is an independent standard-setting 
body set up under the Financial Reporting Act 1997. The board consists of eight 
members who have knowledge and experience in the financial reporting field. The 
board consists of representatives from the accounting profession, government 
agencies, and tertiary institutions (Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000). The objective of 




that are consistent with international best practices. It seeks to contribute directly to 
the international development of financial reporting for the benefit of users, 
preparers, and auditors of financial reports (Ali, 2007; Sood, 2006). The Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board’s responsibilities include the issuance of approved 
accounting standards, statements of principles for financial reporting, developing a 
conceptual framework for the purpose of evaluating proposed accounting standards, 
and determining the scope and application of accounting standards for the country 
(Ali, 2007; Selvaraj, 1999).  
The Malaysian Accounting Standards Board has promulgated its own accounting 
standards since 1999 (Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000; Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board, 2008; Sood, 2006). These accounting standards were put word-
for-word (i.e., using similar and consistent meaning) to the International 
Accounting Standards Board (Malaysian Accounting Standards Board, 2008). 
Here, ‘similar and consistent’ refers to standards that have been adapted and made 
to accord with the Malaysian context. To clarify the standards’ application, the 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board provides explanations, guidance, technical 
bulletins, and examples for the preparers (Malaysian Accounting Standards Board, 
2008; Sood, 2006). Some of the initial accounting standards and changes in 
accounting regulation led Malaysia to adopt the International Financial Reporting 
Standards on 1st January, 2012 (Malaysia Institute of Accountants, 2012; Muniandy 
& Ali, 2012). The rationale for moving to the International Financial Reporting 
Standards is that they provide a common global accounting or reporting language 
(Leng, Lazar, & Othman, 2007). 
The changes in the Malaysian accounting system play a vital role in strengthening 
transparency and accountability (Liew, 2007; Muniandy & Ali, 2012). The 
accountability and transparency focus increasingly attracted attention from the 
regulators and, in turn, led to certain amendments to the Companies Act 1965 and 
corporate regulations (Liew, 2007; Muniandy & Ali, 2012). These amendments 
include disclosure requirements (for instance, disclosure of beneficial interests 
(Sec. 690,) and interests in contracts and property (Sec.131) by the board of 





2.3.2 Changes in capital market regulatory system 
The amendments made in the Act resulted in two major capital market regulatory 
framework changes. These were first, the shift from a disclosure-based regime 
(DBR) in the capital market regulation in 1996, and second, the introduction of 
corporate governance reforms in 2007. The Securities Commission had decided to 
move from a merit-based regime to a disclosure-based regime to further ensure high 
quality financial reporting. In the merit-based approach, market regulators have the 
sole right to assess each company’s viability, quality, capabilities, and its suitability 
for listing before approving any issuance proposal regarding the company’s 
securities,  because under the merit-based regulation  market regulators are 
expected to have more information than investors and, thus, need to protect the 
investors’ interests (Liew, 2007; Securities Commission Malaysia, 1999).  
However, the merit-based regulation was found to have some drawbacks (Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006; Liew, 2007). The system was inefficient. The increased cost of 
administration by regulators, and biased decisions by regulators in selecting 
investing companies for the public (morale hazard) proved problematic. Because 
the regulators, or the Securities Commission, approve the merits of a particular 
company, there was a danger that investors would perceive an approved corporation 
as a good investment (based on the Securities Commission approval) (Liew, 2007). 
In other words, information about companies was prepared by the Securities 
Commission with a view to the stakeholders, particularly the investors, and this 
circumstance led to adverse selection from the limited information provided by the 
Securities Commission (Liew, 2007).  
On the other hand, a DBR system enables the public or stakeholders to access the 
information provided by each listed company. Under this new disclosure system, 
all information publicly communicated to stakeholders must be accurate and 
relevant in accordance with accounting principles and corporate governance 
parameters required by the securities laws and regulations. The basic principle of 
disclosure-based regulation requires issuers and intermediaries offering securities 
to provide investors with sufficient, accurate, and timely disclosure of all relevant 
information such as a company’s business, prospects, finances, and the terms of the 




merits of their investment (Rusnah, Suhaily, Yazkhiruni, & Nurmazilah, 2009). The 
changes to this regime brought about two notable developments in Malaysia’s 
capital market. First, there was an improvement in corporate disclosures and 
second, corporate governance was enhanced especially through strengthening of the 
role and responsibility of directors (Liew, 2007; Loh & Zin, 2007; Mohd Hassan 
Che, Rashidah Abdul, & Sakthi, 2008; Zaimee, 2007).  
It is argued that corporate governance, lack of transparency, and a lack of 
accountability were among the major reasons for the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1998. These issues have become major issues for stakeholders, particularly 
investors. In the aftermath of the collapse of international companies such as Enron 
and WorlCom (USA), Parmalat and Royal Ahold (EU), Renong (Malaysia), and 
HIH Insurance (Australia) there has been a call for better corporate governance 
(Liew, 2007; Saudagaran & Diga, 2000; Shim, 2006). Better corporate governance 
is of particular importance as it is a way to strengthen the capital market, gain 
investors’ confidence, and improve the credibility and accountability of financial 
information produced by listed companies (Liew, 2007; Rahman & Ali, 2006).  
In order to gain the stakeholders’ confidence and the credibility of the Malaysia 
capital market, the securities regulators also has took an initiative to improve their 
listing requirements (Liew, 2007; Nathan, Chiew, & Soo, 2000; Salleh, 2009; 
Saudagaran & Diga, 2000). As a result, the Malaysian government revamped the 
corporate governance structure after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, and 
issued a Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG)5. Additional to the 
amendments to the code of corporate governance in 2007, the Malaysia Stock 
Exchange, Bursa Malaysia encouraged all listed companies to provide additional 
information voluntarily in their annual reports (Securities Commission Malaysia, 
2011). According to Y. Bhg Tan Sri Zarinah Anwar, the Securities Commission 
Malaysia’s Chairman, in AIF International Symposium 2011, “voluntary disclosure 
is perceived as in the best interests of a company and its people, and provides a 
good assessment to stakeholders and shareholders of the company’s potential to 
execute its business strategies successfully” (Bursa Malaysia, 2011). 
                                                 




Voluntary disclosure has been unveiled as an action plan to further drive greater 
transparency and accountability. Through the financial and nonfinancial 
information reported it provides deeper insights into overall business activities. A 
study by Ghazali and Weetman (2006) found that one of the benefits of disclosure 
is to help corporations strengthen their defences against frequent criticisms that 
their operations are opaque. 
2.4 An overview of economic sectors in Malaysia 
Bursa Malaysia (Malaysia’s Stock Exchange) offers a choice of two listing boards 
for companies that wish to be listed in Malaysia. These are primary listing, and 
secondary listing (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2008). The primary listing 
(also known as main board listing) offers listing for both local and foreign 
companies. The secondary listing is offered to foreign companies. Listed companies 
in Malaysia are required to comply with the listing requirements stipulated in the 
Bursa Malaysia listing requirements. These requirements include qualitative and 
quantitative criteria. Some examples of quantitative requirements are the paid-up 
capital, uninterrupted profit records of 3 consecutive years, and the minimum length 
of a business’ existence in the market (i.e., at least 5 years).  For example, to be 
listed on the main board, a company must have minimum paid-up capital of RM60 
million (i.e., equivalent to USD15 million). The paid-up capital required for listing 
on the second board is RM40 million (i.e., USD 10 million), and companies are 
subject to compliance with other requirements, as noted earlier. As for the 
qualitative requirements, aspects such as business, competition, and industry 
performance must be fulfilled and demonstrated by companies (see Appendix A) 
As of May 2013, 9306 companies with a total market capitalisation in excess of 
RM1,611.8 billion7 were listed on the main board. These companies are typically 
involved in major sectors such as manufacturing, mining, services, and 
construction. Figure 1 shows the structure of Malaysian production from 1980 to 
2013. Reports by the Malaysian Economic Planning Unit recently indicated that the 
size of market capitalisation in Malaysia was MYR1,611.8 billion (USD402.95 






billion) based on the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of MYR789.9 
billion8 (USD$197.475 billion).  
 
Figure 1. The trend of Malaysia economic sectors. 
From Business Opportunities in the Manufacturing and Services Sector in Malaysia, 2013 by the 
Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA). 
 
2.4.1 Public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia 
The Bursa Malaysia listing rules require at least 25% of outstanding shares of a 
company to be issued to the public (Bursa Malaysia, 2013). It appears that the 
purpose of this provision is to sanction those substantial shareholders deemed as 
“public.” However, in reality these listed companies barely meet this listing 
requirement due to the companies’ major shareholders and controlling rights. 
Samad (2004) found that 69.5% of companies listed on the main board have five 
top shareholders who own more than 50% of the controlling shareholdings. The 
data obtained were based on 512 companies listed on the main board.  
Concentrated ownership is also known as block-holders or substantial shareholders 
(a company which has ultimate owners who owned more than 5-20% voting rights) 
(Hashim, 2011; Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011; Ibrahim & Samad, 2010). Based 
on the total market capitalisation of companies with ownership data, the top five 
shareholder category companies can be:  
1. A state-controlled entity 





2. An institution such as bank  
3. A foreign company 
4. A family or an individual 
5. A widely held corporation  
6. Another corporation, for example, a voting trust or a cooperative.  
 
According to Samad (2004), about half of the publicly listed companies had five 
shareholders owning approximately 60% of total equity in the corporate sectors. 
The largest shareholders held, on average, 30.3% of the shares in a company. Samad 
(2004) also documented that the predominant shareholdings are held by family 
shareholders. This finding suggests that Malaysia’s corporate sector is dominated 
by large shareholders, implying that control of the company is largely in the hand 
of substantial owner(s), which leads to concentrated shareholdings.  
Malaysia has amongst the highest concentration of family-based or family-
controlled companies in the Asian region (see for example Claessens et al., 2000; 
Wolfenzon & Morck, 2005). It ranks third highest in terms of family-based business 
after Indonesia and the Philippines (Ibrahim et al., 2008). Many of the Malaysian 
companies, including small, medium to large companies, are mixed or combined 
with the family controlling ownership structure (i.e., concentrated ownership) or 
they even begin with a family-owned business (Shamsir Jasani, 2002). A number 
of studies such as Barontini and Bozzi (2011); Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-
Nickel, Jacobson, and Moyano-Fuentes (2007); Morck and Yeung (2003); 
Wolfenzon and Morck (2005) reported that this type of company makes a major 
contribution to a country’s economy and national gross domestic product (GDP). 
According to Sciascia and Mazzola (2008), family-controlled companies refers to 
an organisation which the family controls the business through involvement in 
ownership and management positions. Family involvement in ownership and 
family involvement in management is measured as the percentage of equity held by 
family members and the percentage of a company’s managers who are also family 
members. (p. 338) 
In Malaysia, over 43% of the listed companies on the main board of Bursa Malaysia 




of family ownership is evidenced through the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) which reported 76% of the contribution was accounted for by the outputs of 
the 15 top family-controlled pyramid of companies in Malaysia (Wolfenzon & 
Morck, 2005).  
2.5 The quest for voluntary disclosure in corporate reporting 
The promulgation of the Companies Act and accounting standards led the Bursa 
Malaysia to require all listed companies on the Stock Exchange to follow those 
standards in the preparation of their financial statements as stipulated in the listing 
requirements (Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000; Leng et al., 2007). All listed companies 
on Bursa Malaysia are obliged to publish annual reports in accordance with the 
Ninth Schedule of the Companies Act 1965 and must follow accounting standards 
issued by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board.  
In Malaysia, many of the initiatives aimed at improvement (such as a strengthening 
of the accounting system, national economic policy, and listing requirements) have 
been implemented in order to facilitate and strengthen the market participants’ 
confidence, which had been weakened as a result of the adverse markets’ 
phenomenon (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Nathan et al., 2000; Tam & Tan, 2007). 
These initiatives include complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and other 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements – Chapter 9, which set out the continuing 
disclosure requirement that must be complied with by a listed company as outlined 
under 9.02 – Corporate disclosure policy, and 9.03 Immediate disclosure of material 
information. Sarbanes-Oxley requires amongst others (a) corporate responsibility – 
management to take individual responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of 
corporate financial reports by the Chief Executive Officer, and (b) enhanced 
financial disclosures – enhanced reporting requirements for financial transactions. 
It requires internal controls for assuring the accuracy of financial reports and 
disclosure, and the reporting of material changes in financial condition (see, for 
example Nasir & Abdullah, 2004; Wan Nordin, 2009). In line with the Sarbanes-
Oxley requirements, the Bursa Malaysia has also mandated a disclosure of the 
Statement of Corporate Governance in the annual reports of listed companies. This 
requirement is designed to promote greater corporate transparency (Ghazali & 




In line with the regulatory requirements, the Securities Commission and the 
Malaysia Accounting Standards Board are striving for quality financial reporting 
by encouraging companies to comply with ‘best practices’ requirements such as the 
MCCG which was revised in 2000 after the economic downturn (Nathan et al., 
2000; OECD, 2003). The Malaysian regulatory bodies have continued their efforts 
to strengthen disclosure practices as reflected in the corporate disclosure framework 
(i.e., in Chapter 9) under the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement through the 
introduction in 2004 of the Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure document. The 
Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure is a voluntary practice. Its aim is to advocate 
greater disclosure by listed companies in line with the disclosure-based regime 
implemented in 2001 (Ho & Taylor, 2013).  
Following the requirement to comply with ‘best practices’ under the Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance, the National Annual Corporate Report Awards 
(NACRA) were introduced by the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), the 
Bursa Malaysia, and the Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(MICPA) to encourage and enhance the importance of disclosure in companies’ 
annual reports (Gomes, 2010). NACRA’s  main objective is to promote a quality 
corporate reporting environment in Malaysia (Gomes, 2010). These awards are 
deemed important in encouraging all listed companies to provide useful and 
relevant information to the public at large (Gomes, 2010).  
A recommendation by the OECD in its corporate governance report highlighted that 
boards of directors or managers should have a better understanding of the merits of 
greater disclosure (OECD, 2011). According to the OECD, the board of directors’ 
knowledge and awareness about the importance of voluntary disclosure is important 
in addressing issues relating to the information gap between companies and 
stakeholders. In the Malaysian context, Malaysia’s Code of Corporate Governance 
blueprint sets out the guidelines for corporate governance best practices in relation 
to companies’ annual reports, the extent to which they complied with the best 
practices, and an explanation of the circumstances that led to any disclosure 
decisions (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2012b). In line with the OECD, the 
Bursa Malaysia has undertaken several important actions in improving the 




(Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Bursa Malaysia, 2011; Muniandy & Ali, 2012; Rusnah 
et al., 2009). This initiative can be seen through a series of revisions that have 
significantly increased the information that listed companies are mandatorily 
required to disclose in relation to corporate governance, for example, ownership 
structure, professional and education background of directors, and management 
personnel (Ho & Goi, 2012; Muniandy & Ali, 2012). This information typically 
informs the stakeholders about the capabilities of the managers who steer the 
company’s direction, and their accountability in utilising scarce resources for 
business activities.  
2.5.1 Voluntary disclosure in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, as reported by Tan, Kidam, and Cheong (1990), the evolution of 
voluntary disclosure started in the late 1990s. Since then a number of debates among 
researchers, typically about the level, quality, and type of voluntary disclosure in 
companies’ annual reports, have continued (see for example Amran & Devi, 2008; 
Ghazali, 2008; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hashim & 
Mohd Salleh, 2007; Ho, 2008; Hossain, Adams, & Tan, 1994; Tan et al., 1990; 
Thompson, 2002). Some of these studies argue that there was a considerable 
divergence between the level of voluntary disclosure practised by Malaysian listed 
companies, and the level of disclosure perceived by various sets of user groups. 
These differences are typically related to the corporate governance, control, and 
ownership factors (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Additionally, companies in Malaysia are 
also believed to be influenced by external factors such as changes in the capital 
market regulatory framework. Based on a longitudinal Malaysian study spanning 
from1996 to 2006, Ho, Taylor, and Tower (2009) reported that the regulatory 
regime change in the country had significant implications for listed companies in 
terms of their disclosure level. Based on their study’s findings, Ho et al. (2009) 
contended that a country’s regulatory changes can be one factor that influences the 
level of voluntary disclosure of the companies, particularly in the case of the 
introduction of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in early 1999 after 




Another study in Malaysia by Ghazali and Weetman (2006) focused on the 
disclosure process after the economic crisis in 1997 in relation to company’s 
ownership structure. Their findings revealed that government initiatives and 
industry competitiveness influence the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian 
companies’ annual reports. However, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) argue that 
direct ownership and family control on the board of directors can limit the 
managers’ motivation for voluntary disclosure. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
inferred that the government initiative to enhance corporate governance did not 
have substantial effect on family-controlled companies, as the predominant cultural 
ownership outweighs the initiatives taken by the government. However, Ghazali 
and Weetman (2006) study did not differentiate the level of voluntary disclosure 
analysis onto all family control companies in Malaysia.  
Another reason for the rise in demand for voluntary disclosure in Malaysia lies in 
the enforcement of mandatory requirements in preparing a company’s annual 
report. Prior to 2001, there was no regulation that specified or recommended good 
additional information disclosure. Much was left for the company to decide. The 
shift from a merit-based to a disclosure-based regime, however, brought attention 
to the importance of additional information in the company’s annual reports. 
Moreover, in its effort to enhance disclosure quality, Malaysia adopted quarterly 
reporting of financial information for the public listed companies in 1999. This 
change was followed by the harmonisation of Malaysian accounting standards with 
the International Accounting Standards. 
Subsequently, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 9  was 
introduced through the amendments to the  Bursa Malaysia listing requirements in 
2001 (Malak, 2015).  One of the Malaysian Securities Commission’s 
recommendations was a mandatory disclosure on the state of compliance with the 
MCCG, which was issued in the revamped exchange listing requirements. The  
MCCG aims to improve and strengthen corporate governance practice for higher 
corporate performance in the capital market. To achieve this aim, Malaysian listed 
companies are also required to include in their annual report a narrative statement 
of how they apply the governance principles. Corporate reporting transparency is 
                                                 




also applied in the company Memorandum and Article (M&A) which requires a 
higher standard, which is equivalent to international best practice of corporate 
disclosure and behaviour, from the parties involved. In addition, Bursa Malaysia 
has also issued its “Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure” as a means of guiding 
the listed companies on how to perform their disclosure obligations in accordance 
with the listing requirements and securities law (Zulkafli, Abdul Samad, & Ismail, 
2007) 
Since then, studies have documented that, through various best practices and 
recommendations, the listed companies in Malaysia have make a substantial effort 
to disclosed additional information voluntarily in their annual reports (Amran & 
Devi, 2008; Ghazali, 2008; Liew, 2007). Although the new amendment regulations 
did not change the mandatory requirements for accounting disclosure, the 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) does expect all listed 
companies can improve their accountability through greater transparency.  
Given the capital market regulations are changing and moving to better 
transparency and accountability, the professional accounting bodies are also 
playing their part in improving the regulatory system (Amran & Devi, 2008; 
Ghazali, 2008; Liew, 2007). As noted by Liew (2007), timely information reporting 
is made available to stakeholders to enhance disclosure and transparency, and to 
reduce the possible manipulations by management. Therefore, accurate disclosure 
can be used as an argument for management to disclose at a minimum level. 
Accompanying the increased attention to corporate governance and disclosure in 
Malaysia are many considerations that could influence a company’s overall policy 
decision on voluntary disclosure. These factors include: the extent, frequency, and 
method of disclosure (Ghazali, 2007, 2008); the company’s objectives with 
disclosure (Ghazali, 2008); the size, and listing status (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; 
Ghazali, 2007). Haniffa and Cooke (2005) also point to the importance of societal 
background; the complexity of the company such as its size, type, and the 
background of the company’s shareholders; the cost of disclosure; and, the 
favourableness of the news. Some studies articulate that companies simply provide 
information voluntarily to meet the minimum requirements of corporate governance 




Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011; Nasir & Abdullah, 2004; 
Wahab et al., 2007). 
Several recent studies (such as Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ghazali, 2008; Hashim, 
2011; Ho, 2008) juxtapose the adequacy of voluntary disclosure and the demand 
for information. These empirical studies found that current voluntary disclosure 
practices in Malaysia are inadequate to satisfy the information needs of users of 
corporate annual reports. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) reported that the preparers, 
who are usually guided by management, are reluctant to disclose more than that 
which is required by regulations. Users, on the other hand, have a need for more 
information that is useful for effective investment or economic decision-making. 
This situation creates challenges for both preparers and users in terms of what is 
material, what is relevant, and how much data is enough. According to Ball, 
Jayaraman, and Shivakumar (2012), the information available to the users must be 
useful (informative) in order for them to make an effective economic decision.  
In terms of understanding the problems relating to voluntary disclosure in 
companies’ annual reports, it would seem pertinent to consider the perceptions of 
other stakeholders (such as accountants, suppliers or creditors, analysts, nonprofit 
organisations, and government employees) rather than just those of shareholders 
and investors (Ghazali, 2008; Jaffar, Jamaludin, & Mara Riduan, 2007). 
Stakeholders are the people who utilise, assess, and evaluate information within the 
annual reports. As for the information required and needed by stakeholders, the 
conflicting interests between information preparers and information users can lead 
to low quality information in the annual reports. This was a grim signal that low 
quality disclosure can be a continuous problem in corporate reporting if there is no 
appropriate approach to manage voluntary information criteria (Ghazali, 2008; 
Gomes, 2010; Tregidga, Milne, & Lehman, 2012). However, the response to the 
call for quality disclosure in corporate reporting has been encouraging.  
2.5.2 The future direction of voluntary disclosure  
Nowadays, much of academia, professional bodies, and accounting practitioners 
have begun to move towards greater understanding and quality voluntary 
information. Conceding there has been increasing demand for more information in 




traditional reporting towards more holistic corporate reporting, for instance, 
independent sustainability reporting (Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 
Guidelines, G3 in 2006), and, in 2009/10,  integrated reporting through South 
Africa’s King III Code of Governance Principles (de Villiers, Unerman, Rinaldi, 
Stubbs, & Higgins, 2014; Wild & van Staden, 2013). Within the accounting 
literature, the move from traditional reporting is vital in order to address the demand 
of stakeholders who see voluntary disclosure in annual reports as important, and to 
improve the flow of useful information in external reporting for the effective 
functioning of the capital market (Bozzolan, Favotto, & Ricceri, 2003). These types 
of reports are deemed important as they provide concise and material information 
by linking capital used and financial results (Jensen & Berg, 2012; Wild & van 
Staden, 2013). 
As for Malaysia, the integrated reporting topic had been raised and still caught many 
by surprise (Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2011). The move was described as 
very drastic and the framework as a precarious framework. Consequently, 
integrated reporting is still at the infancy stage of acceptance by organisations in 
Malaysia (Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2011). Although many Western 
companies advocate publication of one report that comprises both financial and 
nonfinancial information, several important factors such as a country’s regulatory 
framework, nature of companies, capital market environment, and socio and 
economic environment influence most companies’ decision to adopt this type of 
reporting (de Villiers et al., 2014; Jensen & Berg, 2012). While regulators indicate 
the benefits of integrated reporting for companies and stakeholders in general, the 
system has a number of substantial limitations. These include the fact the reporting 
framework or guidelines will differ from one country to another. The concept of 
integrated reporting is typically practitioner-driven, and evidence on it is based on 
limited case studies of experimental practice (Jensen & Berg, 2012). In addition, 
integrated reporting is also a voluntary practice and the company has to bear the 
cost of production.  
2.6 Summary  
In this chapter, the institutional setting of this study which comprises Malaysia’s 




environment is discussed. The legacy left by the colonial government raises some 
important implications for the sociology and economy of postcolonial societies, as 
shown in the case of Malaysia. One legacy of British rule in Malaysia has been the 
creation of a multiethnic country in which each ethnic group specialised in specific 
employment areas. For instance, those of Malay ethnicity specialised in agriculture 
and plantations (Fraser et al., 2006). As the political and economic landscape 
changed after independence in 1957, the government was drawn into the role of a 
mediator and manager of interethnic tension that resulted from the competition for 
economic resources and rights between ethnicities (Fraser et al., 2006; Siddiqui, 
2012).  
The emerging economy led the Malaysian government to take affirmative action 
and to implement several national policies (such as the New Economic Policy and 
New Development Policy). Furthermore, consistent with the market development, 
the government empowered the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board with the 
authority to regulate accounting practices. In line with the government initiatives 
undertaken, the Securities Commission simultaneously issued the Malaysia Code 
on Corporate Governance in order to encourage best governance practice which is 
based merely on self-regulation. The Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad also took 
an initiative to strengthen the new disclosure regime by incorporating disclosure as 
part of the listing requirements. The development of accounting practices emerged 
continuously until Malaysia became fully convergence with IFRS in 2012.  
The enforcement and regulation of accounting practices and reporting promulgated 
a series of development strategies to enhance disclosure. The debates questioning 
the relevance and usefulness voluntary disclosure demanded from the users (such 
as potential investors, creditors, suppliers and analysts) made further research by 
academics increasingly necessary. The progressive strategies implemented by 
Malaysia’s government, regulators, and accounting bodies may drive board of 
directors’ attitudes towards voluntary disclosure especially for listed companies. 
The preparers (i.e., board of directors) must be able to safeguard the level of 
investors and stakeholders’ confidence in financial reporting and their ability to 




Companies in Malaysia, especially family-owned businesses, have been criticised 
for the corporate governance and voluntary information included in their annual 
reports. Research has shown that corporate governance factors such as owners or 
family members being directly involved in the management of the company make 
any tendency for family-owned companies to disclose information voluntarily 
unlikely. The next chapter presents a review of the literature that forms a basis upon 





REVIEW OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
ON THE LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE 
3.1 Introduction 
As indicated in chapter 1, the aim of this study is to investigate the level and extent 
of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian listed family-owned companies. In order to 
position the thesis this chapter, therefore, provides a discussion of the relevant 
literature. The intention here is to present the empirical work done by various 
scholars in the field and to highlight gaps in the literature in terms of themes. The 
chapter outlines the literature along three themes: voluntary disclosure in emerging 
countries; the impact of organisational structure and social environment on the 
disclosure behaviour of firms; and, prior studies on the voluntary disclosure 
measurement. Furthermore, this chapter clarifies the rationale for the thesis by 
indicating its position in an emerging country and the level of voluntary information 
disclosed in the annual reports in an emerging economy. The chapter concludes by 
providing a synthesis of the existing literature in order to identify the knowledge 
gap and ways in which this study might supplement what has been written about 
the subject.  
3.2 Theme 1: Literature on voluntary disclosure and regulatory changes 
in emerging countries  
Malaysia has undergone a series of important regulatory regime and governance 
changes since 1997 (Liew, 2007; Siddiqui, 2012; Tam & Tan, 2007). This section 
reviews the literature on the implications of regulatory changes in emerging 
countries and the link between the economic environment and companies’ 
disclosure practices. Given these important changes, the subject of information 
disclosure is seen to be a fundamental mechanism in corporate reporting.  
According to Broberg et al. (2010), regulatory regime changes can cause variation 
in the content of information voluntarily disclosed. Regulatory changes in market 




have made information disclosure an important issue in respect of the companies’ 
long-term growth and sustainability in the capital market. However, many of the 
earlier studies evaluated the extent of voluntary disclosure made by companies in 
developed countries rather than examining corporations in emerging countries 
(Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Akhtaruddin & Hasnah, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). 
Prior studies (such as, Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Healy 
& Palepu, 2001; Kang & Gray, 2011; Uyar & Kılıç, 2012; Wang et al., 2013) argued 
that it is important to improve the extent of voluntary disclosure in companies’ 
annual reports. Several factors have been considered in the prior literature. First, 
the subject of voluntary disclosure is limited not only to the reports’ exclusive users 
but also extends to others in the society such as professional institutions, creditors, 
government, and other decision-makers. Second, voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports provides benefits for the stakeholders’ economic decision making, as that 
disclosure complements the existing statutory information in the annual reports.  
The majority of studies found that an absence of a well-organised regulatory regime 
and corporate governance systems shapes low disclosure compliance by listed 
companies in emerging countries such as Jordan (Al-Akra, Eddie, & Ali, 2010; 
Naser, Al-Khatib, & Karbhari, 2002), Qatar (Hossain & Hammami, 2009), Egypt 
(Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni, & Power, 2009), India (Hossain, 2008), Kuwait (Al-
Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010), and Malaysia (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ghazali, 
2008; Hashim & Mohd Salleh, 2007). According to Carnegie, Edwards, and West 
(2003), and Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003), the majority of emerging countries 
inherited their regulatory systems from the colonial powers which once ruled them 
and this inheritance usually has a direct impact on the economic and business 
systems in those countries. Given these countries have high economic growth 
potential as a result of globalisation, their corporations are ultimately exposed to 
competitive advantage. In effect, however, the vast opportunities to extend their 
businesses are impeded because of  a low level of information disclosure (Allegrini 
& Greco, 2013; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Soliman, 2013).  
The economic and social changes in emerging countries show that domestic 
institutions play an important role in determining how corporates behave in 




Balic, & Bwakira, 2002; Wang & Claiborne, 2008).  Within the last century, 
improvements brought about by the industrialisation of nations have inevitably 
resulted in the diminishing of boundaries between countries, a rise in international 
trade and business alliances, an increase in international investment, and changes 
in the competitive environment (Belal et al., 2013; Boesso & Kumar, 2007).  
In response to the rise of international business activities, much of the economic 
policy of a country has gone through several processes of corporate legal 
reformation, which have, in turn, led to the changing of social policies (Campbell, 
2007). First, domestic institutions need to ensure that organisations have a common 
regulatory framework and standards for business activities. Second, the impact 
from globalisation has led to increased demand for capital, which usually refers to 
individuals and organisations as capital providers. Since a market system needs to 
be operated efficiently, the domestic institutions must ensure sufficient and valuable 
information flows in the market in order to enable the providers of capital to make 
efficient economic decisions (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Healy & Palepu, 
2001). Thus, the role of domestic institutions and market pressure can lead to 
increasing voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports. 
However, the effect of globalisation on the relationship between domestic 
institutions and voluntary disclosure is mainly empirically evidenced in Western 
countries or in developed nations (see, for example, Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 1998; 
Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Cormier, Magnan, & Van, 
2005). Many of the developed nations and international financial organisations have 
directed efforts towards improving corporate reporting and issued several 
guidelines, for example, triple bottom line reporting, corporate governance best 
practices, and sustainability reporting (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Boesso & 
Kumar, 2007; Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2001). Indeed, these efforts 
have led many Asian business legal systems to adopt the Western disclosure 
reporting style. Those reports and guidelines provide investors and other 
stakeholders with better access to detailed information than they had before, readily 
enabling them to assess a company’s nonfinancial information relative to its 




The Asian economic crisis created a new international consensus about the need for 
increasing and timely information to sustain developing markets (Ghazali & 
Weetman, 2006; Mitton, 2002). The globalisation process in corporate reporting in 
emerging markets has taken the form of moving towards adopting international 
standards developed by multilateral bodies such as the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, the Cadbury Report, and the OECD (Mitton, 2002). There is also 
evidence that corporate law has been reviewed and reformed since the financial 
crisis (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Madan Lal, 2010; Mitton, 2002; Wang et al., 
2013). The main objective of this regulatory change is to create a sustainable 
economic recovery. For example, in Malaysia, the National Economic Action 
Council (NEAC) was established in January 1998 to formulate plans for ensuring 
the sustainable growth of the nation. The NEAC recommended that restoring 
market confidence could be achieved by improving and enhancing transparency and 
accountability through disclosure and corporate governance (Ghazali & Weetman, 
2006).   
Many of the disclosure practices in the emerging countries (such as Qatar, Jordan, 
Egypt) are imitating those of developed countries and also continuing to follow the 
systems they had inherited from developed countries (Belal & Owen, 2007; 
Muniandy & Ali, 2012; Yunos et al., 2012). The preparation of disclosure in annual 
reports is often based on models laid down in developed countries’ regulations, 
accounting systems, and laws that are compatible with their own local environments 
(Carnegie et al., 2003; Cooke & Wallace, 1990; Muniandy & Ali, 2012; Patel et al., 
2002). A number of factors have led many developing and emerging countries to 
adopt disclosure reporting from developed countries. because, first, there is no local 
specific framework or guidelines for them to adhere to (Muniandy & Ali, 2012), 
and second, these companies are seeking opportunities to raise external funds from 
multiple countries (Bozzolan et al., 2003; Ferreira & Rezende, 2007; Newson & 
Deegan, 2002). Finally, they are responding to the demand for more accountability 
and transparency (Bushman, Piotroski, et al., 2004; Patel et al., 2002). Hence, 
impact from developed countries on disclosure reporting is noticeable. However, 
some companies may not adopt such reporting as they may consider statutory 
disclosure to be sufficient (Lundholm & Winkle, 2006), while others may be 




(Chen, Tan, Cheng, & Gong, 2013; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Huafang & Jianguo, 
2007).  
The shifting trend towards voluntary disclosure in many emerging countries can be 
regarded as a social and institutional practice, rather than a technical aspect (see, 
for example, Belal et al., 2013; Belal & Owen, 2007; Campbell, 2007; Hossain & 
Hammami, 2009; Lundholm & Winkle, 2006). The majority of studies found that 
voluntary disclosure was a way of communicating a company’s image and 
reputation. In some cases, voluntary disclosure provided a way not only to achieve 
social and institutional conformity, but also to report additional information that 
was deemed to be of importance to the external stakeholders. Stakeholders, 
particularly potential investors and society, have been identified as the force factors 
that drive managers to provide disclosure. This phenomenon is evidenced in Islam 
and Deegan’s (2008) study in Bangladesh. Their results show that potential 
investors (i.e., multinational companies) are the major group pressurising 
companies to provide voluntary disclosure. It is claimed that companies provide 
voluntary disclosure in order to attain institutional conformity or gain legitimacy 
when seeking further external investment. Although, the response of companies has 
led to improvement in voluntary disclosure and greater transparency, the corollary 
implies that external stakeholders have an explicit influence on managers’ decision 
to disclose. In China, Liu and Anbumozhi (2009), and Yuen, Liu, Zhang, and Lu 
(2009) found that governmental pressure for corporate disclosure policy exerts a 
coercive pressure on companies to provide voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Qu et 
al. (2012) found regulatory and policy changes in the Chinese stock market have 
contributed to the increase in the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
of listed companies. 
The implementation of policies, standards, and professional regulations can be seen 
as an instrument that allows authoritative bodies and agencies to change and control 
disclosure practices. For example, the execution of such policy regimes via listing 
requirements and market scrutiny enables the securities commissions to control all 
aspects of financial and corporate disclosure. It is important to note that information 
disclosed in annual reports is useful to regulators, preparers, investors, and other 




challenging for companies to obtain investment, regulators can use this information 
to evaluate the current standard of corporate reporting, and determine whether the 
information is sufficient to attract greater number of stakeholders for capital 
mobilisation. 
Companies that are involved in industries that have a high impact on society, 
particularly in terms of pollution, health, and safety, must follow the industry 
regulations and they are expected to disclose levels of information that go beyond 
statutory requirements. According to Milne and Chan (1999), voluntary disclosure 
in areas such as social responsibility impacts on the decision made by the investors 
to a certain degree (see also Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Camfferman & Cooke, 
2002). Disclosure on social responsibility by companies suggests that the existence 
of an organisation relies on the support of society in general. It would appear that a 
society has the right to either support or disapprove of a firm on the basis of its 
social activities, which implies that a number of different stakeholder groups, 
especially those with authoritative influence, may preserve their own self-interest 
within the system through their interrelationship with others (Williams, 1999).  
3.2.1 Voluntary disclosure in emerging countries 
For the purpose of this thesis, the terms ‘emerging countries’ or ‘market business 
system’ refer to a broad range of countries that are rapidly entering the world’s 
global economy. In other words, these countries have high-growth potential (Belal 
et al., 2013; Elsayed & Hoque, 2010; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Huafang & 
Jianguo, 2007). Due to their phenomenal economic growth, this sector of the global 
market has become a key focus for personal and institutional investors. These 
emerging markets include some Eastern European countries, Asian countries, (for 
example, some provinces of China), Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and some of the Latin American countries. While some listed companies in 
emerging countries (such as China, Thailand, and Malaysia) practise voluntary 
disclosure in their annual reports, these disclosures are insufficient and descriptive 
in nature (Ho & Wong, 2001; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Huafang & Jianguo, 
2007).   
Voluntary disclosure practices in emerging countries are often associated with low 




& Gray, 2002; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Jaggi & Low, 2000). Despite listing 
agencies and securities commissions’ requiring listed companies to comply with 
accounting standards and disclosure provisions, it is often alleged that companies’ 
annual reports do not contain sufficient information of a type that exceeds the 
disclosure requirements stipulated by the regulators (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ho & Wong, 2001; Rouf & Harun, 2011). This 
shortcoming has resulted not only in poor voluntary information disclosure, but also 
in poor disclosure compliance on the part of the listed companies (Akhtaruddin, 
2005; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Ho & Wong 2001; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008).  
The business environment and voluntary disclosures are seen by some as a 
mechanism that organisations utilise in order to enhance their benefits, to fulfil the 
stakeholders’ demands, and to discharge their accountability to society as a whole. 
According to Guthrie and Parker (1989), the primary objective of disclosure in 
annual reports is a) to reflect the public perceptions, b) to respond to government 
pressure, and c) to protect corporate prerogatives and projected corporate images. 
It has been suggested that the relationship between those objectives and voluntary 
disclosure represents the ‘interplay of contradictory forces’. That perceived 
relationship has led some to question the intention of managers in providing such 
disclosure (Depoers, 2000; Dilla & Janvrin, 2010; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998; 
Stanton, Stanton, & Pires, 2004). The advantage and/or disadvantage of voluntary 
disclosures for the firm reside in the credibility of the information disclosed 
(Bhojraj et al., 2004). If the voluntary disclosure has a positive influence on the 
firm’s performance and values, then such disclosure can be seen as positive. 
Conversely, a firm has to trade off the positive effects of voluntary disclosure if 
other companies use the information to their strategic advantage (Depoers, 2000). 
International comparative studies of voluntary disclosure are limited. They also 
tend to be largely descriptive in nature and to focus on developed nations, 
particularly the United Kingdom, Australia, and countries in Western Europe. The 
lack of consensus on the factors that influence the decision of managers to engage 
in various voluntary disclosure practices may be one factor inhibiting intensive 
investigation of this phenomenon, particularly in emerging countries (Wang & 




of voluntary disclosure, and to explain significant variations in emerging countries, 
for example, Naser et al. (2002) on Jordan; Hossain and Hammami (2009) on Qatar; 
Khodadadi, Khazami, and Aflatooni (2010) on Iran; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu, and 
Onumah (2007) on Ghana; Hassan et al. (2009), and Elsayed and Hoque (2010) on 
Egypt; and, Wang et al. (2013) on China. Even though regulatory changes and 
different economic issues have plagued some emerging countries over the past 
couple of years, due to their relative stability and good economic prospects these 
developing countries have attracted the interest of researchers.   
Naser et al. (2002) studied the extent of disclosure in 152 Jordanian companies 
listed on the Amman Stock Exchange in 1998. When comparing their study with a 
prior study by Solas (1994), Naser et al. (2002) found that there had been a 
significant improvement in the level of voluntary disclosure. Their study 
conjectures that the revised Companies Act 1997 and Investment Promotion Law 
1998, in accordance with the adoption of IAS/IFRS in 1998 by all listed companies, 
provides a reasonable explanation for the impact of regulatory changes on the level 
of information disclosed. Ultimately, these regulatory changes have improved the 
level of domestic and foreign investments for the benefit of Jordan’s economy.  
Hossain and Hammami (2009) study in Qatar investigated the implications for the 
country’s economy of regulatory changes in the form of financial regulation for 
voluntary disclosure on Qatari financial reporting. They examined the extent of 
disclosure in the annual reports of 42 Qatari companies listed on the Doha Securities 
Market (DSM), and also determined the underlying factors that affect the level of 
disclosures. The results showed that development and growth of a company in an 
emerging capital market like Qatar have a significant association with the level of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression model, the results indicate that age, complexity of business, and assets-
in-place are significant in terms of their relationship to the level of voluntary 
disclosure.  
Wang et al. (2013) analysed the effect of voluntary disclosure on a firm’s value 
during a financial crisis. They documented how accounting regulations and legal 
systems amendments in the Chinese capital market have significantly enhanced 




line with such regulatory changes, China’s Securities Regulatory Commission has 
enforced compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies. 
Wang et al.’s (2013) study used as it sampled the annual reports of 714 companies 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over a period of 5 years from 
2005 to 2009. The study employed a regression model (two-stage OLS). The model 
used the ratio of the computed voluntary disclosure score (unweighted) of a firm to 
the total expected number of voluntary disclosure items disclosed. The two-stage 
OLS was used to identify the voluntary scoring and applied to firm-value 
regression. The results show that changes in the accounting regulations and better 
supervision of corporate management have a significant impact on the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the companies’ annual reports. In addition, the findings 
show that the increase in voluntary disclosure during the research period improved 
the firms’ value. However, Wang et al. (2013) research findings also show that the 
level of voluntary disclosure and firm value have a significant negative relationship 
for firms with more state ownership. 
In the Egyptian context, Hassan et al. (2009) argued that the lack of capital market 
regulations enforcement creates freedom of choice in terms of disclosure practices 
in companies’ annual reports. Hassan et al. (2009) suggest that more severe 
enforcement of penalties should be put in place to encourage managers towards 
greater disclosure. The study’s results also reveal that voluntary disclosure 
complements statutory information and ultimately increases the firms’ value. 
However, in that research, Hassan et al. (2009) did not consider the implication of 
changes to listing rules on the level of voluntary disclosure in the companies’ annual 
reports. Rather, the voluntary disclosure items were based on those of the Center 
for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) and refined by the 
authors through manually surveying the annual reports. This method, however, 
involved outdated items and personal judgement.  
By contrast, Khodadadi et al. (2010) examined the changes in the corporate 
governance regulatory environment in Iran. The study sample used 106 listed 
companies’ annual reports to test the relationship between corporate governance 
factors and the extent of voluntary information. Khodadadi et al. (2010) highlighted 




of the chairperson and chief financial officer; and, the composition of institutional 
investors on the level of voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports. The 
results indicate that strong corporate governance regulations in the capital market 
can enhance the level of voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports. With 
regard to corporate governance, the study also argues that the ownership of 
companies can be an issue that inhibits managers from disclosing more voluntary 
information.   
For Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) the influence of market systems and accounting 
regulations are important in determining the level of voluntary disclosure. They 
examined the annual reports of 68 companies in Saudi Arabia and found that the 
current compliance regarding statutory disclosure by companies in Saudi Arabia 
can influence the level of voluntary disclosure in the companies’ annual reports. 
The study identifies the voluntary disclosure items, as those are closely related to 
the mandatory information. Attention was given to the mandatory items and the 
detail and description of these items in the requirements. The main finding of this 
study reveals that there is no consistent pattern of relationship between compliance 
with mandatory disclosure and the types of voluntary disclosure made by the 
companies.  The findings also reveal that a company’s industry type has a positive 
significant relationship with the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
due to the intervention of the Saudi government (via subsidisation for nonprofit 
making companies). However, the authors suggest that companies that are 
complying with mandatory disclosures are not necessarily disclosing most of the 
information voluntarily.  
In contrast with the aforementioned studies, Ho and Wong (2001) argued that the 
changes in accounting systems and regulatory changes are insufficient to resolve 
the issue of information disclosure in annual reports. According to Ho and Wong 
(2001), improvement in the level of voluntary disclosure has to be augmented by 
companies’ corporate governance systems and structure. Ho and Wong (2001) 
contended that differences in regulatory and cultural environments, either in 
Western or Eastern economies, can affect corporate disclosure practices. Compared 
to the regulatory environments in the US and the UK, Eastern economies have 




mostly listed family- or individual-controlled firms. Consequently, in their Hong 
Kong study, Ho and Wong (2001) concluded that a company’s ownership and 
structure determined the level of voluntary disclosure.  
According to Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), little research attention has been paid to the 
association between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance regulation. 
Hence, their study focuses on specific corporate governance variables (such as the 
composition of the board of directors, proportion of audit committee, independent 
nonexecutive directors, and ownership control) that can stimulate the institutional 
mechanism. The sample in Akhtaruddin et al.’s (2009) study drew on the annual 
reports of 105 listed companies in Malaysia. Their findings revealed that the mere 
adoption of rules and regulations to improve disclosure is not effective. In this 
respect their findings differ from those of previous studies which looked at Western 
countries. Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) conjecture that concerted efforts from the 
boards of directors, those in charge, and those who have direct responsibility play 
a vital role in improving the level of voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual 
reports.  
Furthermore, with regard to the issuance of the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance in 2000, Haniffa and Cooke’s (2002) study in Malaysia found a 
statistically significant association between the structure and composition of the 
board of directors and the degree of information disclosed. They found a negative 
relationship with nonexecutive directors and a positive relationship with family 
board members in terms of the level of voluntary disclosure. Although this study 
found that board composition can influence the level of voluntary disclosure, the 
study did not explore the reasons for the low level of disclosure in the annual 
reports. Thus, a study that investigates the reasons behind the low level of disclosure 
in the Malaysian context can provide further insight into this area.  
Previous discussions in the literature review on voluntary disclosure levels in 
emerging countries point to a degree of consensus among those researching this 
issue in emerging countries. First, with the exception of Ho and Wong (2001), 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), scholars conclude that 




accounting systems and capital market regulations can stimulate the level of 
voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports.  
Secondly, Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), and Akhtaruddin et 
al. (2009) all argue that the level of voluntary disclosure in emerging countries is 
influenced not only by the need for compliance with regulatory changes but also by 
a company’s own internal control systems. Given emerging countries, including 
Malaysia, are often faced with myriad problems (for instance, the need for 
improvements in legal controls (Cheah, Lim, & Yen, 2012; Ishak & Napier, 2006), 
government intervention (Azham, Teck Heang, Yusof, & Ojo, 2007; Selvaraj, 
1999), less investor protection (Ishak & Napier, 2006), and highly concentrated 
ownership (Amran & Ahmad, 2009; Samad, 2004), such features can lead to 
varying levels of voluntary disclosure. According to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
given the different business landscape and regulatory changes in Malaysia, the 
country has been under researched in terms of the level of voluntary disclosure, 
despite the substantial growth in its economy. Since there has been significant 
growth in the Malaysian economy, potential investors, market participants, 
financial institutions, and regulators from other emerging markets would like to 
obtain a better understanding of the corporate reporting environment of Malaysia.  
The previous discussion also highlighted some limitations on the level of voluntary 
disclosure associated with regulatory changes. One of these limitations is that 
earlier studies focus too much on the effect that regulatory factors (such as 
accounting systems, corporate governance systems, and securities commission 
requirements on mandatory compliance) exert on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
No attention is given to analysing and describing the variation in the levels of 
voluntary disclosure in terms of different ownership structures, or uncovering the 
reasons for undertaking voluntary disclosure in the annual reports.  
Even though prior studies are agreed that voluntary disclosure is distinguishable 
from one country to another, their distinctions lack clarity. For instance, Naser et 
al. (2002), Hossain and Hammami (2009), Wang et al. (2013), and Hassan et al. 
(2009) consider regulatory changes such as the introduction of new listing 
requirements and implementation of accounting standards but overlook the 




compliance does not affect the managers’ decision to provide voluntary disclosure. 
In fact, Khodadadi et al. (2010) highlighted the importance of an oversight board 
and company ownership on the level of voluntary disclosure. However, the study 
did not make in-depth distinctions in the levels of voluntary disclosure for different 
types of ownership.  
Furthermore, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) contended that changes in market 
regulations can influence the monitoring role of the internal management in a 
company. For instance, between 1998 and 2000 Singapore experienced a transition 
from a predominantly merit-based philosophy to a predominantly disclosure-based 
regime. The transition resulted in changes to the minimum requirement for board 
independence, whereby at least one-third of the board should be nonexecutive 
directors. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found that a change in the board 
composition had significant effects on the level of voluntary disclosure in the listed 
companies examined. Their results indicated that the level of voluntary disclosure 
in the companies’ annual reports was higher in 2000 than it had been in 1998.   
Research in most emerging countries has found that regulatory frameworks for 
corporate governance are important (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Cheng & Courtenay, 
2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ho & Wong, 2001). However, prior studies focused 
on listing statistical associations between corporate governance variables and 
voluntary disclosure practices.  
Earlier studies on voluntary disclosure in emerging countries have also been unable 
to take into account the crucial role of the managers’ background and the reasons 
for voluntary disclosure. Since voluntary disclosure is a managerial decision, the 
quality and quantity of the levels of the information disclosed in the annual reports 
call for a distinct explanation, particularly in relation to different corporate 
ownership structures. Even though variations exist between companies, the 
managers, to some extent, must be able to exercise their discretion and judgement 
on how to ensure that voluntary disclosure contributes to the company’s long-term 
growth and sustainability.   
It is also noticeable that the earlier studies on the level of voluntary disclosure were 




reasoning would be largely influenced by their understanding of Anglo-Saxon 
business systems, as well as the sociological and political views they subscribed to 
(see, for example, Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Cooke, 
1989; Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008), thus, potentially making their explanations 
inappropriate in the context of emerging countries as voluntary disclosure cannot 
be totally disassociated from its environment. Extant literature (such as Ali et al., 
2007; Chau & Gray, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005) suggests that it is difficult to 
ignore the idea that changes in regulatory systems and stakeholders’ perceptions 
affect the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. However, the phenomenon 
may not work well in many emerging countries, which are characterised by their 
strong collectivist society, due to the high proportion of family businesses in those 
countries.  For this reason,  Denis and McConnell (2003) suggested that examining 
the interrelationships between external and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms can provide a better understanding of organisation-specific internal 
governance mechanisms such as the board of directors. Given that changes in the 
external regulatory regime are likely to have an impact on a company’s internal 
governance, board monitoring may change across different regulatory regimes in 
response to regulatory emphasis.  
3.3 Theme 2: The impact of board and social influences on the disclosure 
behaviour of firms 
An organisation provides a setting where management is in control and responsible 
for any decisions executed in its daily business activities, including reporting. 
Management (i.e., the board of directors) is required to discharge its responsibility 
and actions effectively. However, management can operate effectively only when a 
good corporate governance system is in place. According to the OECD (2003), 
corporate governance is a system that indicates the overall function of an 
organisation. Corporate governance systems emphasise the accountability and 
transparency of the board of directors in executing their roles and responsibilities. 
One way of expressing the accountability and transparency of management is 
through providing additional information about the company’s activities through 




Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, both regulators and members of the 
business community have called for greater corporate transparency. Poor levels of 
disclosure have been identified as one of the factors that contributed to the Asian 
financial crisis and to the challenges of securing economic recovery in the region, 
especially in equity markets (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Mitton, 2002). Regulators 
in the United States, United Kingdom and elsewhere have argued that equity 
markets require better disclosures in order to function effectively. However, prior 
studies document that disclosure decisions are complex and influenced by a number 
of national and corporate factors (Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Bushman, 
Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004; Khanna, Palepu, & Srinivasan, 2004).  
Listed companies in the same national environment will comply with local 
regulations and act according to their domestic institutional environment (Belal et 
al., 2013; Jaggi & Low, 2000; Mir, Chatterjee, & Rahaman, 2009). However, 
voluntary disclosure is an unregulated practice which often relies on the company’s 
management decision. Along with the increase in global businesses, certain areas 
of emerging markets are showing a disproportionate increase in voluntary 
disclosure practice. The majority of studies in emerging markets argue that several 
corporate factors such as ownership structure, and cultural and social belief are 
among the factors that can influence the level of voluntary disclosure (for example, 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Jaggi & Low, 2000). Research 
to date has revealed that the company’s controller can determine the level of 
voluntary disclosure on the basis of the current business environment.  
3.3.1 Effects of board monitoring on the level of voluntary disclosure  
The vast majority of the empirical research into voluntary disclosure has been in 
relation to corporate governance. Disclosure and board of directors form two 
components of corporate governance. Disclosure in corporate governance systems 
is one of the mechanisms used to encourage companies to improve their 
transparency through annual reports (Agca & Önder, 2007). In an accounting 
context, disclosure can provide accounting users with economic information ─ 
whether financial or nonfinancial, quantitative, or otherwise ─ concerning a 




The board of directors is a group of individuals who control and monitor the overall 
operations of a firm. The board of directors is important in a corporate governance 
system because their roles and responsibilities have consequences for the company, 
and also for the growth of a country’s economy. The directors are the main 
determinants of the company’s direction (Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2008). The board of directors is noted as being an 
important factor in the value of a firm (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; La Porta & Shleifer, 
1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), and an important control mechanism (Eng & Mak, 
2003; Ho & Wong, 2001; Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
A considerable body of research has focused on the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and corporate characteristics. Voluntary disclosure has been analysed 
and examined in terms of its relationship with board characteristics, for example, 
board size, proportion of independent executive directors, and Chief Executive 
Officer/Chairman duality. Ownership structure such as institutional and family 
ownership have also been investigated. In the context of ownership structure, Miller 
and Le Breton-Miller (2006) contended that family businesses share two common 
characteristics. First, these companies successfully ensure their survival and 
viability across generations of the family; secondly, each generation of owners 
added value to the business during its tenure. However, these companies have been 
criticised because of their corporate governance system (Amran & Ahmad, 2009; 
Chau & Gray, 2010; Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 2005), and low level of voluntary 
disclosure (i.e., lack of transparency) (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Ali et al., 
2007; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Eng & Mak, 2003).  
Akhtaruddin and Hasnah (2010), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), and Lim, Matolcsy, 
and Chow (2007) documented a positive relationship between board characteristics 
and voluntary disclosure. Akhtaruddin and Hasnah (2010) based their findings on 
a sample of 124 public listed companies in Malaysia. They found a positive 
relationship between independent executive directors and a board’s audit committee 
with regard to the level of voluntary disclosure. They concluded that the presence 
of a high proportion of independent executive directors and an audit committee can 
increase disclosure levels and reduce information asymmetry. Similarly, Chau and 




has a positive relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure in family firms. 
Their results show that an independent chairman can mitigate the influence of 
family ownership and thus increase the level of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the 
importance of board characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure can be seen 
in two areas; first, the board’s composition, and second, the proportion of 
independent executive directors on the board.  
Similarly, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found a positive relationship between 
independent directors and the level of voluntary disclosure in Singapore. They 
found that the presence of external governance mechanisms, that is a regulatory 
framework (i.e., disclosure-based regime), has a direct impact on the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. The study covered two regulatory frameworks 
(merit-based and disclosure-based regime), and the results show a greater 
proportion of independent directors in the disclosure-based regime compared to the 
merit-based regulation. Cheng and Courtenay (2006) concluded that the new 
disclosure-based regime can strengthen the governance mechanisms and lead to an 
increase in the level of voluntary disclosure in the companies’ annual reports.  
Lim et al.’s (2007) study based on 181 Australian companies drew a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and board composition. The result shows 
that the presence of independent boards can lead firms to provide more voluntary 
disclosure on forward-looking and strategic information.  
In contrast, Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) found no association between board 
characteristics and the level of voluntary disclosure in Kuwait. Similarly, Rouf 
(2011) study on Bangladesh found that the extent of voluntary disclosure has no 
relationship with the proportion of independent executive directors. Furthermore, 
Hossain and Reaz (2007) in India, found board composition to have no relationship 
with the level of voluntary disclosure.  
Previous studies show that corporate governance systems in a company situated in 
less emerging country has low effects on the level of voluntary disclosure. This 
analysis also shows that lack of enforcement by national authorities on corporate 





Chau and Gray (2002) suggest that differences, or contradictory results, in the 
extant research could be investigated by looking at the ownership structure of the 
firms. Ownership structure refers the composition of the companies’ board of 
directors. For example, institutional ownership (external) is usually large and 
influential, and, at the same time, gains significant ownership concentration. Chau 
and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), and Barako et al. (2006) find a statistically 
significant relationship between the level of disclosure and external ownership.  
On the other hand, in a family-owned company, the impact on the level of voluntary 
disclosure is more complicated and arguments can be made in either direction (Ho 
& Wong, 2001). In one instance, the degree of voluntary disclosure may be greater 
in order to reduce information asymmetry. On the other hand, family firms also tend 
to disclose less information. According to Eng and Mak (2003), and Chau and Gray 
(2002), family firms tend to disclose less additional information, as the disclosure 
has no additional benefits for the family members. Family members have access to 
the information given because they are more involved in the management of the 
firms they control (Chau & Gray, 2002; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Under these 
circumstances, controlling family members, who are both members of  and 
substantial shareholders in the company, will have direct access to the company’s 
financial and nonfinancial information and, as a result, have less need for voluntary 
disclosure.  
Furthermore, the company can also avoid the additional cost of disclosing extra 
information. For example, Al-Akra and Hutchinson’s (2013) study in Jordan found 
that family firms provide less voluntary disclosure compared to others. The results 
show that family firms are inclined to comply with statutory requirements in order 
to avoid the additional operating costs incurred through voluntary disclosure. This 
result also supports the view that regulatory enforcement strengthens family firms’ 
willingness to comply with statutory requirements rather than provide more 
voluntary disclosure. 
The corporate governance system in family firms can influence the amount of 
information disclosed. Chau and Gray’s (2002) study on the effect of ownership 
structure on voluntary disclosure levels also found that the amount of information 




have a weak corporate governance policy compared to that of nonfamily firms. This 
view is supported by other scholars such as Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Chakroun 
and Matoussi (2012), Eng and Mak (2003), and Ho and Taylor (2013). They argue 
that companies with a weak policy on corporate governance are found to disclose 
less or lower levels of information and this lack of information, in turn, creates a 
high information gap between managers and (external) interested parties. 
A weak corporate governance policy is often associated with companies in 
emerging countries. First, most of the companies there are dominated by family-
owned businesses (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Chau & Gray, 2010; Hashim, 
2011). The second issue is political and economic influence. It is believed that most 
emerging countries demonstrate some elements of duality in that their legal, 
political, and economic systems have evolved around a number of different 
practices (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Madan Lal, 2010). In 
addition to having high numbers of listed family-owned companies and long-
established capital markets, their lack of control on ownership structure directly 
affects the amount of voluntarily disclosed information in those countries 
(Claessens & Fan, 2002; Solomon, Lin, Norton, & Solomon, 2003). However, in 
terms of firm performance, listed family-owned companies demonstrate better 
performance compared to other listed companies (Kowalewski, Talavera, & 
Stetsyuk, 2010; Noor Afza & Ayoib Che, 2010). Wolfenzon and Morck (2005) 
attribute this situation to the fact that the family members are long-term investors 
and that they need to ensure the firm can be passed on to the later generation. The 
inherited relationship-based style of corporate governance is one of the fundamental 
drivers of concentration of ownership.  
In relative terms, family-owned companies are found to be unique in that there is a 
strong family relationship between family members (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chau 
& Gray, 2010; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). Although some family companies are 
listed publicly on the securities board, the combined number of shares held by the 
family is large. The aggregate number of shares held makes them the majority 
shareholders in the company. Most studies (e.g.,Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Patelli & 
Prencipe, 2007) reveal that family-owned companies focus on retaining family 




maintaining the company’s performance and existence in the market. Given the 
current focus on voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports, it is worth 
noting that the priorities and practices of family firms are, by contrast, often linked 
to different preferences for information. This difference appears to be attributed to 
family owners’ strong influence on corporate decisions, and this influence enables 
them to shape corporate disclosure in line with their preferences. However, as 
discussed above, it remains unclear whether or not there are differences in the extent 
of voluntary disclosure between listed family-owned companies and nonfamily-
owned companies. Thus, the question of whether or not differences exist in the 
annual reports of family-owned companies is ultimately an empirical one.10  
3.3.2 Social and business environmental influences  
A number of long-standing studies claim that voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
is a socially and environmentally embedded phenomenon (see, for example Adams 
et al., 1998; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Jaggi & Low, 2000). A variety of social and 
environmental factors affecting voluntary disclosure have been identified in the 
prior literature, some examples being Jaggi and Low (2000), Cooke and Wallace 
(1990), Elsayed and Hoque (2010), and Haniffa and Cooke (2002). These factors 
include the cultural and social attitudes that affect the corporate reporting 
environment. Moreover, traditional and national characteristics are instilled in a 
society, which suggests that differences would exist in their accounting systems, 
and that these culturally-based values may also help to explain the differences 
around voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports (Newson & Deegan, 
2002).   
One explanation for the level of voluntary disclosure in a company’s annual report 
is based on the management’s responsibilities towards the company stakeholders 
(Adams et al., 1998; Muniandy & Ali, 2012; Newson & Deegan, 2002). Additional 
information is demanded by outside stakeholders as a mechanism for conflict 
resolution between various stakeholders for both explicit and implied contracts, for 
example, between the organisation and society. Firms not only have the incentive 
                                                 
10  This research focus on the differences in the level of voluntary disclosure reported in the 
companies’ annual reports between listed family-owned companies and nonfamily-owned 




to provide this additional information to raise capital or reduce the cost of capital, 
but also to reduce risk in the interest of society and other stakeholders (Boesso & 
Kumar, 2007; Elsayed & Hoque, 2010).   
Disclosure of information involves the interaction between individual and other 
environmental factors, for example, regulations and informal activities in which the 
social values are embedded (Boesso & Kumar, 2007). Emerging countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Indonesia, Egypt, Tunisia, and Iran have social systems 
based on Islamic values. Their societies, therefore, differ from those of their 
Western counterparts (see for example Aribi & Gao, 2010; Fatima & Ousama, 
2012; Syafri Harahap, 2003). However, although Malaysia forms part of the Islamic 
bloc of countries, its multiracial society and creation of prominent business 
conglomerates promote greater demands for corporate reporting. Since Malaysia is 
a multiracial society its national culture may not represent the culture of each 
individual ethnic group within the country (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Empirical 
evidence on the voluntary disclosure practices provided by Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005), Hashim (2011), Yunos et al. (2012), and Ho and Taylor (2013) have 
considered the Malaysian social and culture environment in their research. 
However, none of these studies provides evidence on the extent to which a society’s 
attitudes influence the level of voluntary disclosure in isolation from other factors 
such as the economic and political structure of the country. For example, in a 
country where the level of power distance is high, voluntary disclosure may be low 
in practice, and the society may be reluctant to invest in businesses with low 
voluntary disclosure due to the higher levels of uncertainty involved (Gray, Meek, 
& Roberts, 1995; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
Another instance where social and environmental issues may influence the level of 
voluntary disclosure relates to the relationship between corporations and 
stakeholders (either internal or external) (Lepineux, 2005). Despite the increasing 
research on voluntary disclosure, many of the studies often associate social and 
environmental factors with social disclosure. This research often links those factors 
and focuses on the impact they have on corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(see, for example, Belal & Owen, 2007; Htay, Rashid, Adnan, & Meera, 2012; 




exploration of the relationship between social and environmental influences and the 
level of voluntary disclosure can offer future research possibilities, especially in the 
area of listed family-owned companies in emerging countries. 
Social and environmental11 factors may serve as influential factors on the level of 
voluntary disclosure because the information available to the public is believed to 
promote a company’s sustainability (Uyar & Kılıç, 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013) in an economy. It is argued that, as a consequence of the company’s existence 
in the capital market, the need to gain investors and other stakeholders’ confidence 
through the traditional market mechanism (demand and supply of product/services) 
is inadequate. Accordingly, these companies rely to a considerable extent upon their 
organisation’s behaviour and practices in terms of social and environmental 
relationships to provide both resources and opportunities for their long-term growth 
and sustainability. This phenomenon is referred to as social interaction (Campbell 
& Slack, 2008; Cho & Patten, 2007). In particular, this social relationship or 
interaction enables companies to gain access to resources by strengthening their 
image and reputation (Campbell & Slack, 2008). Moreover, Cho and Patten (2007) 
points out that the social and environmental will always entail a sense of 
institutional integration which embraces all kinds of residual forms of sense-making 
practices (voluntary disclosure) (see also Adams, 2002).  
The rationale behind the social and environmental relationship with voluntary 
disclosure lies in the elements of accountability and transparency (Boesso & 
Kumar, 2007; Epstein & Birchard, 2007). This relationship incorporates and 
generates competitive challenges for managers to be explicit about the overall 
business operational activities being reported. The idiosyncratic nature of social and 
environmental variables in business activities can play a vital role in establishing or 
breaking corporate reputation (Bushman, Piotroski, et al., 2004; Hess, 2007). The 
terms social and environmental are said to differentiate the firms’ reporting style. 
The extant literature suggests that the social and environmental variables enhance 
                                                 
11 Here, ‘social’ is referring to a set of societal or community values that stems beneath the stakeholder term ((Newson & 
Deegan, 2002)). On the other hand, the environmental factor is regarded a company’s community involvement, human 




the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Belal et al., 2013; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2005; Mir et al., 2009; Sharma & Davey, 2013).  
Every corporation evolves within a broader social and economic environment, often 
being affected by a wide range of elements in that society. In terms of the long-term 
existence and growth of companies, information disclosed in the annual reports can 
benefit the company through the proliferation of useful information which is not 
regulated (Bushman, Piotroski, et al., 2004). Voluntary disclosure is not regulated 
and, thus, one company’s disclosure reporting differs from another’s. This 
statement is confirmed by many studies (such as, Broberg et al., 2010; Elsayed & 
Hoque, 2010; Ho & Taylor, 2013; Newson & Deegan, 2002). In comparing the 
differences in voluntary disclosure information, these studies found significant 
differences in corporate governance and social and environmental information. For 
example, Ho and Taylor (2013) study’s in Malaysia examined the differences in 
corporate governance information (i.e., corporate and strategic directions, directors 
and senior management, financial and capital markets, forward-looking 
projections) with companies’ specific characteristics (size, leverage, and industry). 
The study found significant increases in the level of such information, and the 
industry within which a firm operates, is a positive significant factor in the 
differences in information.  
Within the industry and capital market context, companies tend to be influenced by 
their peer industry environment. In other words, companies tend to follow or imitate 
the voluntary disclosure practices of some prominent corporations. According to 
Nikolaeva and Bicho (2011), as a result of the increased concern about social and 
environmental policies in a capital market, companies tend to disclose information 
voluntarily by following multinational corporations’ practices. However, in 
response to a lack of proper guidelines or any proper system of voluntary disclosure 
reporting, companies are faced with the question of which set of indicators to 
choose in order to place themselves in the most favourable light. As a result, 
imitating or following other companies’ reporting has become one approach to 
voluntary disclosure. In this scenario, as the voluntary disclosure practices become 
more institutionalised, companies pick up more information from prior adopters 




To summarise, social and environmental factors can influence managers’ views on 
providing additional information in their annual reports. Asian countries are 
collectivistic in nature. Claessens et al. (2000) found in their sample that managers 
of closely held firms consist of relatives of the controlling shareholder’s family, 
specifically with trusted individual. Business alliances and networks are 
fundamental capabilities. They enable the firm to respond effectively to changes in 
the business environment as it tries to generate and maintain competitive advantage 
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Li et al., 2013; Luo, 2008; Wang & Claiborne, 2008). 
Given the social and environmental demands for transparency through market 
information, voluntary disclosure provides a favourable option for managers. 
Voluntary disclosure enables a company to position itself as one of the major 
players in the capital market so as to capture the economic edge.   
Moreover, the debate on the beneficial effects of ownership structure as a corporate 
governance mechanism on the level of voluntary disclosure generates two 
competing arguments, namely that it is efficient or that it is opportunistic. First, 
given that the board of directors has major control in the management of the 
company, board members are able to influence the decision on voluntary disclosure. 
Secondly, managers provide and use voluntary disclosure to downplay the response 
from the business environment towards the organisation. It has been shown that 
differences in the corporate governance structures of companies can significantly 
influence the level of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. In this research, 
one question of interest that needs to be addressed is whether the ownership 
structure and social and business influences can explain the level of voluntary 
disclosure in companies’ annual reports.  
3.4 Theme 3: Measurement of voluntary disclosure and factors 
associated with voluntary disclosure 
Understanding the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports by listed family 
firms is the focus of this thesis and forms the discussion for this section. The 
disclosure criteria approach, which stems from the mandatory disclosure concept 
and interpretation (International Accounting Standard Board, 2007), can be used to 
examine the extent of the voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. That approach 




stakeholders (Beattie, Dhanani, & Jones, 2008; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008; Singhvi & 
Desai, 1971). Rather, the focus is on the high quality of the disclosure, how 
disclosure benefits companies, and its long-term advantages. 
Voluntary disclosure is an information-consuming strategy used by managers to 
integrate their companies’ performance and potential results in a competitive 
advantage. Hence the pursuit of voluntary disclosure practices requires criteria that 
play an essential role in delivering the desired messages (Bhojraj et al., 2004), and 
reflecting the stakeholders’ responses (Holland, 1998; Wang et al., 2013). The 
relevance (Banghoj & Plenborg, 2008; Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Chau & Gray, 
2002; Hooks, Coy, & Davey, 2002; Owusu-Ansah, 1998), and the adequacy (Al-
Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; Wallace & Naser, 1995) of information provide the 
basis for all forms of voluntary disclosure.   
The relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and its criteria in the 
annual reports are both uncertain. Given the current criteria for capturing this 
phenomenon, finding practical ways to measure  the level of disclosure remains a 
challenge for researchers (Beattie et al., 2004; Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010; 
Coy & Dixon, 2004; Hooks, Coy, & Davey, 2001). 
When trying to construct a relevant disclosure index to measure the level of 
voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports, prior studies have adopted a 
classic methodology. Disclosure is commonly measured on the basis of experts’ 
perceptions of what is useful and important to investors. Depending on the research 
objectives and country being examined, the disclosure index comprises different 
voluntary disclosure items. Those indices fall into two groups: weighted (either 
subjectively by the researcher(s) or by the researcher(s) using weights elicited from 
surveys of users’ perceptions), and those that are unweighted and score each item 
equally. For example, the disclosure indices developed by Standard & Poor and the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research-CIFAR are among the 
most commonly used weighted indices (see, for example, Botosan, 1997; Buzby, 
1975; Firth, 1979; Hope, 2003; Omaima et al., 2011). Others such as Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006); Francis et al. (2008); Gul and Leung (2004); Meek, Roberts, and 





Previous studies also show that the use of unweighted and weighted scores for the 
items disclosed in the annual reports can make little or no difference to the findings. 
Firth (1979), for example, pointed out that unweighted and weighted scores show 
similar results. However, recent work on the level of voluntary disclosure shows 
that the weighted scores approach can reduce the subjectivity and increase 
reliability as that approach can achieve the objective of the scoring method for all 
categories of voluntary disclosure on the basis of the relevance and adequacy of 
information for annual report users (Wang & Claiborne, 2008). Unlike the study of 
a specific category of voluntary disclosure such as intellectual capital reporting and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), both approaches can produce either scores 
with similar results or those with no difference. A study which employs a single 
category of voluntary disclosure can effectively focus on the technical information 
that is required for the research and this approach works well  when a research study 
has no intention to measure the quality of such information (for example, Campbell 
& Abdul Rahman, 2010; Ousama & Fatima, 2010).  
Disclosure items can vary from a minimum of 24 (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987) to 
a few hundred items of information (Hassan et al., 2009; Hossain & Hammami, 
2009; Omaima & Marston, 2010). Some of these items are across segments, 
longitudinal, and from similar groups across countries. Disclosure index 
methodology has improved over time, from matched-pair statistical procedures 
(Buzby, 1975; Singhvi & Desai, 1971), to a multiple regression procedure, and to 
sophisticated analysis such as stepwise multiple regression, rank-order correlations 
and regressions (Hassan et al., 2009; Omaima et al., 2011). For example, Hassan et 
al. (2009) uses a stepwise multiple regression (OLS) technique for different dummy 
variable manipulation procedures, while  Li et al. (2013) demonstrates the use of 
two-stage rank (OLS) regression to cater for the monotonic behaviour of disclosure 
indices following a change in independent variables.  
The level of voluntary disclosure and ownership relationship can be influenced by 
corporate governance and internal factors such as cultural and religion belief. 
Previous studies examining this relationship find that certain variables exist as 
moderators and/or controls of this relationship. Common control variables include 




shareholders (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Lim et al., 2007). The 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports lies in the firm-specific 
characteristics (especially of large companies), and corporate governance structure 
(Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Lakhal, 2005). Corporate characteristics and governance structure in large and 
widely-held companies can improve the level of voluntary disclosure and enhance 
decision-making which is crucial in dynamic and competitive environments for 
listed companies (Eng & Mak, 2003; Lakhal, 2005).  
In listed family-owned companies, research on the relationship of the level of 
voluntary disclosure and factors that can influence the managers is scarce or 
remains equivocal. While family-owned companies dominate the economic 
landscape (Kowalewski et al., 2010; Morck & Yeung, 2003) and outperform their 
nonfamily counterparts (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Bartholomeusz & 
Tanewski, 2006; Chau & Gray, 2010), there is still uncertainty as to whether family 
firms present voluntary disclosure differently (in comparison to listed nonfamily-
owned firms), and how a region’s cultural and religion beliefs may influence such 
differences. This equivocality highlights the need for greater research on the level 
of voluntary disclosure and its relationships to other elements in the listed family-
owned companies context, especially in terms of individual decision-making (Chau 
& Gray, 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hutton, 2007; Jaggi & Low, 2000). 
Therefore, the intention of this thesis is to better understand the underlying reasons 
that lead to the differences in the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports.   
In summary, the review of disclosure level studies finds no common understanding 
of the range of disclosure. In terms of its measurement, prior studies have 
recognised the use of disclosure indices to measure disclosure level. The index can 
be either weighted or unweighted. In addition, there is no agreement on the number 
of items in the index. However, the items provide a framework for academics to use 
in future research in measuring the level of voluntary disclosure. Without some 
measurement mechanism, it is mere conjecture that the degree of voluntary 
disclosure is associated with and influenced by certain factors.  
The notion of voluntary disclosure practices is better understood using the 




(corporate governance and cultural belief) factors. Review of previous literature 
(for example, Agca & Önder, 2007; Chakroun & Matoussi, 2012; Chau & Gray, 
2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Wang et al., 2013) on voluntary disclosure has 
identified that several dimensions from both external and internal perspectives can 
be sources of advantage, and explains how combinations of managers’ 
competencies can contribute to the differences in voluntary disclosure. the approach 
places emphasis on the internal attributes that managers are influenced by, how they 
have employed the strength of voluntary disclosure for their company’s benefits, 
and how they will evolve. In the context of listed family business, the approach is 
appropriate because it emphasises the nature of ownership and management 
credibility that have winning characteristics when those companies are compared 
to other companies.  
3.5 Synthesis of the literature and identifying the knowledge gap 
This thesis centres on the challenges for voluntary disclosure within the listed 
companies’ annual reports of an emerging country ─ Malaysia ─ in moving towards 
quality corporate reporting in an economically advancing society. The literature has 
acknowledged that voluntary disclosure has long been associated with globalisation 
(i.e., economic progress), regulatory changes, and corporate governance systems 
(particularly the ownership structure). Different ownership structures in companies 
are an indicator of the level of voluntary disclosure. Ownership structure is directly 
associated with the unique attributes and characteristics to be found in family 
businesses.  Hence, there is a possibility that these attributes and characteristics play 
a more dominant role in those companies’ management decisions than they would 
in nonfamily-owned corporate enterprises (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Ali et al., 
2007; Chau & Gray, 2010; Chen & Jaggi, 2000). The literature also shows that 
voluntary disclosure could be affected by contextual factors such as ethnicity, and 
social and peer influences. 
In general, the prior research agrees that voluntary disclosure varies and is to a great 
extent associated with cost and benefits (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Broberg et al., 
2010; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Uyar & Kılıç, 2012). Large, highly profitable, and 
listed-status companies are seen to be more likely to engage in greater voluntary 




influence disclosure levels. There is, however, limited written material on the 
differences in voluntary disclosure in listed family-owned companies and the 
factors driving these companies to provide information voluntarily in their annual 
reports. It is also important to note that the methods used to measure voluntary 
disclosure have come mainly from Western scholars whose reasoning could be 
largely influenced by their capitalist or laissez faire economies, as well as their 
political and sociological experiences. This background could make their 
measurement unsuitable in the context of an emerging market and society such as 
Malaysia. The literature has acknowledged that the level of voluntary disclosure 
has long been associated with firms’ specific characteristics and globalisation. The 
literature also shows that environmental factors such as ethnicity, and social and 
peer influence can affect the level of voluntary disclosure. 
The absence of research on voluntary disclosure in listed family-owned companies 
has resulted in much of the literature’s tendency to generalise results and findings 
to emerging countries. Those researching in the field of family-owned business 
(Chau & Gray, 2010; Hashim, 2011; Salvato & Moores, 2010; Takashi, Keiichi, 
Hitoshi, & Eri, 2012) continue to ponder the question of whether family managers 
have a greater propensity towards voluntary disclosure than do other forms of 
business ownerships. This question has been addressed mostly by considering 
family members’ involvement, the most popular of the corporate governance 
dimensions researched, within the listed companies. Some researchers have found 
family involvement, as part of the board of directors or management team, to be 
characteristic of family business. Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) find that, 
because of their different corporate governance structures, family firms have a 
greater propensity to lead to performance differential. Furthermore, Takashi et al. 
(2012) find that the monitoring and long-term orientation lead to better quality of 
accounting disclosure compared to that of other companies. In contrast, other 
researchers have found family business corporate governance needs greater 
attention for higher transparency (Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Chau & Gray, 
2010). Chau and Gray (2010) found that having an independent chairman has an 
influential impact on mitigating the influence of family members in the business 




more independent directors in a concentrated ownership business leads to an 
increase in the volume of voluntary disclosure.  
The arguments for weaknesses and strengths in family-owned companies can be 
attributed to the voluntary disclosure advantage and disadvantage factors 
respectively (Salvato & Moores, 2010). For the purpose of this research, the 
uniqueness of listed family-owned firms is set against nonfamily firms in the same 
country to further examine the drivers behind voluntary disclosure in listed family-
owned companies in Malaysia. Given the overview of Malaysia’s overall political 
and social landscape in chapter 2, this research will examine the influence of 
regulatory changes in the capital market, accounting systems, and corporate 
governance to identify the level of voluntary disclosure practices in companies’ 
annual reports. This research will also demonstrate that in-depth studies on listed 
family-owned companies are scarce and difficult to locate. It is the intention of this 
thesis to fill these gaps and to contribute to a better understanding of the problem 
with regard to the level of voluntary disclosure practices in listed family-owned 
companies. The next chapter will outline the methodology adopted for this study in 
order to establish the logical link between the study’s objectives, data generation, 





RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the research methodologies and 
methods available in the literature and to those that could help the researcher in 
developing a suitable research methodology and methods to undertake the current 
study. Chapter 1 of this thesis earlier presented the research philosophies, 
approaches, and design adopted and used to achieve the research objectives. That 
chapter also justifies the methodological choices made for the current study (Byrne, 
2001; Laughlin, 1995). 
Chapter 4 now discusses in detail the research methods chosen and applied in this 
study, including the research preparation phases, the data collection and sample 
selection process, and the research instruments and procedures followed. In 
addition, this chapter outlines the data analysis techniques adopted in the present 
study. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explains in detail the research 
methodologies and methods available in the literature. Section 4.3 discusses the 
background of the researcher in order to reflect the philosophy underlying the 
research. Section 4.4 introduces the paradigm and methods chosen for the research. 
Section 4.5 discusses the research methods, including the research preparation, 
methods for data collection and analysis, as well as data interpretation. Finally, this 
chapter ends with a summary in section 4.6  
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Background to the methodological framework 
The choice of a suitable methodology is made on the basis of the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions about the aspect of reality being investigated and the 
best approach to gain access to its nature (Burrell & Morgan, 1980; Byrne, 2001; 
Laughlin, 1995; Modell, 2010; Zagzebski, 2009). Ontology relates to the nature of 




embraces the idea of reality. On the other hand, epistemology refers to the 
relationship between the researcher and the participants being studied. 
Epistemology is a concept where knowledge is gained and obtained through what 
the observer sees and experiences; thus, knowledge can come from different 
perspective (Hines, 1988; Morgan, 1988; Robson, 1992; Zagzebski, 2009).  
Given this thesis is situated within the accounting discipline, it is important for it to 
gather information from external perspectives. Knowledge gained from different 
perspectives can lead to a better understanding of the epistemology (Modell, 2010; 
Morgan, 1988; Zagzebski, 2009). The epistemological process can also help the 
researcher to recognise, understand, and highlight the hindrances that perspective 
imposes in the generation of knowledge (Hines, 1989; Morgan, 1988; Zagzebski, 
2009). In the accounting context, the idea of viewing accounting practices, and 
managers’ behaviour from external perspectives is still under researched and has 
received rather scant attention, particularly in emerging countries (see, for example, 
Ghazali, 2008; Kuasirikun, 2005; Qu et al., 2012; Sharma & Davey, 2013). 
To arrive at an understanding of the voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia, it 
is important to explore the multiple influences that both external factors (i.e., the 
country’s background, regulatory changes, and social culture), and internal factors 
(i.e., a company’s corporate governance) have within Malaysian companies. 
Studies of managers’ decision-making proliferated in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, and marked an extant change in accounting and organisational studies 
generally (Burrell & Morgan, 1980; Smircich, 1983). Roberts and Scapens (1985) 
in their study stated one can understand the accounting practice through 
investigating it in terms of different situations, persons, its origins, and 
consequences. Roberts and Scapens (1985) suggest that this approach would enable 
the researcher to elaborate upon the accounting system and structure, as well as the 
organisational culture, in a more specific area such as shaping and maintaining 
particular patterns of accountability within organisations.  
Drawing upon Roberts and Scapens (1985) assumptions on the nature of 
accounting’s system and organisational culture, a researcher’s assumptions about 
the worldview that guides his/her methodology are based on interrelated sets of 




a general overview of the relationships between ontology, human nature, 
epistemology, and methodology that have evolved over time. Thus, researchers’ 
views and belief systems can be viewed as worldviews that guide them in the 
research process (Burrell & Morgan, 1980; Guba, 1990; Laughlin, 1995; Modell, 
2010).  
Table 2. Network of basic assumptions characterising the subjective ─ objective 
debate within social science. 
      Objectivist                                                                        Subjectivist 
Ontological 
assumptions 
reality as a 
concrete 
structure 
reality as a 
concrete 
process  








reality as a 
social 
construction 
















an actor, the 
symbol user 











































hermeneutics exploration of 
pure subjectivity 
From “The Case for Qualitative Research,” by G. Morgan and L. Smircich 1980,. 
Academy of Management Review, 5(4), 491-500. 
 
This table also illustrates a broader worldview approach to the investigation of 
social science disciplines rather than simply providing two discrete paradigms i.e., 
the positivist versus the constructivist (Creswell, 2012; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  
As a result of researchers continuously seeking for and debating research 
worldviews, pragmatism has risen to prominence across multiple disciplines 
(Feilzer, 2010; Morgan, 2007). Pragmatism draws from both dominant ways of 
thinking: the objectivist and subjectivist. According to Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2011), the pragmatic researcher is free from both mental and practical constraints. 
The approach avoids the contentious issue of truth and reality, and enables a 
researcher to solve problems in the real world (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
Pragmatism acknowledges that the world is an experiential world with different 




(Creswell, 2014; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The pragmatic view contains a 
blend of the stable and a number of layers of analysis process in its aim for the truth 
(either in objective or multiple, relative realities). Regardless of the type of truth 
obtained, pragmatism attempts to produce knowledge that best corresponds to, or 
represents, reality (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007; Morgan, 2007; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). This view suggests that pragmatists are concerned 
with the practical use of knowledge, and thus would adopt the ways and methods 
most suitable for the researched phenomenon.  
Scholars who support the pragmatic approach believe that both quantitative and 
qualitative methods are compatible and enable researchers to utilise both methods 
optimally (Cibangu, 2010; Creswell, 2012; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2002). Pragmatists believe not only that both quantitative 
and qualitative methods are compatible, they also believe that is best to use the most 
appropriate methods based on the research questions posed (Creswell, 2012; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). However, this stance does not indicate that 
quantitative and qualitative methods are mutually exclusive. A researcher can use 
a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to make use of 
the strengths of each in an appropriate place. Scholars such as Tashakkori and 
Creswell (2008) who subscribe to the pragmatism approach argue that research on 
any given question, at any point of time, falls somewhere on the research cycle. 

















Figure 2. A research cycle: Cycle of scientific method. 
From Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(Vol. 46), by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie, p. 25. 
The mixed methods approach has gained popularity in various areas of social 
science research including accounting and management accounting (Grafton, Lillis, 
& Mahama, 2011; Modell, 2010). The growth of the mixed methods approach in 
accounting research can be seen in the numbers of empirical studies conducted 
(Elijido-Ten, 2007; Elsayed & Hoque, 2010; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; 
Hooks et al., 2002; Lee, 2012). The mixed methods approach enables researchers 
to complement quantitative and qualitative approaches respectively. According to 
Grafton et al. (2011), the mixed methods approach allows researchers to extend 
their findings beyond those evidenced using a single method. The use of mixed 
methods may also identify empirical flaws that might otherwise be overlooked, and 
may establish confidence to quantify findings from different perspectives of the 
research (De Silva, 2011; Modell, 2005).  
Modell (2010) argues that through bridging both the positivist stream and 
constructionist paradigm mixed methods help researchers in analysing findings. 
The mixed methods approach enables the researcher to articulate between 
















Furthermore, Grafton et al. (2011) contend that data obtained through mixed 
methods are richer and deeper and can lead to valuable divergent findings. The 
combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques serves to clarify meaning by 
identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen (see also, De Silva, 2011).  
The emergence of mixed methods has opened new avenues for researchers. For 
years, the choices of research approaches were strictly dichotomous: either 
quantitative or qualitative design (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998). In today’s accounting literature, a number of scholars now accept 
that debates over paradigms are at an end, and a wide range of methodologies are 
accepted as valid by researchers (see, Creswell, 2014; Grafton et al., 2011; Johnson 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(1998) classified contemporary methods into three categories including:  
a. The monomethod (also known as monostrand) or purist era, where a 
researcher can adopt a purely quantitative or qualitative approach 
b. The mixed methods approach where quantitative and qualitative approaches 
are combined into a single study 
c. The mixed methods approach where both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques are combined within the different phases of the research process 
or constitute a distinct continuum through from data collection to analysis. 
 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) further recommended several taxonomies for mixed 
methods designs and mixed model designs (see also, Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011). There are sequential studies (involving two phases), parallel/simultaneous 
studies, equivalent status designs, dominant/less dominant studies, and multilevel 
designs. Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) outlined two basic types of mixed model 
procedures but with different designs. Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) labelled 
these models as follows: 
a. Sequential (explanatory/exploratory/transformative): This procedure is 
used when a researcher seeks to elaborate or expand on the findings of one 
method with another. 
b. Concurrent: Here a researcher combines both quantitative and qualitative 




problem. A researcher who undertakes this design can simply validate and 
substantiate the findings. This concurrent procedure can be applied to 
various triangulation techniques as referred to by other authors (such as, 
Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009; Small, 
2011).  
In addition to those two mixed model procedures, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) 
also added transformative procedures. Transformative procedures are those in 
which a researcher uses a theoretical perspective within a design that encompasses 
both quantitative and qualitative data. The evolution of the pragmatism paradigm 
led Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) to suggest that a further aspect (i.e., causal 
linkages) could be introduced into the four predominant paradigms for 
consideration when researchers are deciding on the methods to employ in their 
research.  The aspects of these four paradigms are detailed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Paradigm comparison in behavioural and social science.  
 
 Positivism Postpositivism Pragmatism Constructivism 












Modified dualistic Both objective 
and subjective 
Subjective 





results that fit 
best 
Value-bound 
Ontology Naïve realism Critical 
Transcendental 
External 
reality – Best 
outcome 
Relativism 
Causal linkages Real causes 
temporally 








change over time 
There may be 
causal 
relationships 





everything else – 
Cannot distinguish 
difference 
between cause and 
effects 
From “Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(Vol. 46),” by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie, p. 23 




4.3 Background of the researcher in the research 
This section introduces the researcher’s background to clarify her position in this 
research. After Malaysia’s independence in 1957, cultural dimensions in terms of 
values and ideas such as education, communications, and language emanating from 
the Western society began to spread into the local societies (including the researcher 
herself) (Lee, 2004; Siddiqui, 2012). Within the context of societal living, this 
phenomenon is one of a globalisation process, which has led societies to become 
more flexible and adaptive. According to Riahi-Belkaoui (1995) amongst others, 
the growth in education, language, laws, politics, and social organisation indicates 
that all societies in general and organisational behaviour are actually responding to 
the changes. For example, the democratic government style adopted by one country 
has changed and responded to some sociopolitical aspects such as human rights and 
governance (see, for example, Ali, Lee, & West, 2008; Siddiqui, 2012; Stafford, 
1997). The changes in socio and political aspects have enabled the nation to respond 
to technological, sociological, and economic developments.  
Being a Malay-Muslim female, the researcher was raised by an Islamic family. 
Born in Malaysia with its multiracial population, both Islamic teaching and 
Westernised culture were inculcated in some ways into the researcher’s upbringing. 
Along with Malaysia’s multicultural heritage of other religions such as Buddhism, 
Christianity, and the philosophies of Hinduism, the Malaysian education system 
enabled the researcher to adapt to and follow the current changes in daily activities.  
As a result of these influences, the researcher believes that everything that exists 
and happens has a definite objective and has been destined. This social world is a 
field of ever-changing form and activity based on the transmission of information. 
Consequently, form and activity in a given time reflect a pattern of differences that 
have become part of the basis of learning and the principles of a human being. It is 
important to note that whether a researcher is a Muslim or otherwise, the religious 
values and culture that have been inculcated into individuals can influence their 
response to certain events. However, this internal landscape differs due to human 




The researcher believes that the nexus between belief and action can be understood 
and interpreted in many ways. The way in which belief is interpreted is influenced 
by different spheres of human existence (see, for example, Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Rashid & Ho, 2003; Storz, 1999). Cultural beliefs, norms, values, and context can 
affect the way people approach ethical decisions relating to politics and business 
(Jaggi & Low, 2000; Mir et al., 2009; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1995). In politics, for 
instance, this nexus would mean taking an ethical approach to power. In the 
economy, it would mean a more ethical approach to profits, and producing and 
marketing goods and services. 
A fusion of Muslim and Westernised values, as well as the implication of living in 
a multiracial society, have influenced the researcher’s cognitive thinking and views 
about how the world operates. The researcher believes that the integration of these 
background factors serves as a valuable tool for elucidating a deeper understanding 
of the potential issues in this thesis and enhancing her competency as a researcher. 
These factors also enable the researcher to fit within the framework of other 
societies’ beliefs, enabling her to balance her view and acceptance of change. 
The researcher holds to the philosophical stance that reality is a fact but that the 
human brain interprets and analyses facts in different ways on the basis of each 
person’s previous experiences and history (Hines, 1988; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998). In describing the existence of reality at a certain point in time, the 
interpretation and view given by an individual can be constructed into another 
reality, an imagination (Hines, 1988). The imagination is only recognised and 
acknowledged when it becomes real, for example, when a research hypothesis for 
unknown or untested material is suggested. This hypothesis can only be accepted 
or rejected at a certain value of significance when based on an examination of the 
findings.  
Reality is structured on the basis of how the brain organises and analyses what an 
individual sees. Thus, the brain will organise and analyse knowledge, experiences, 
and history. While this reality is organised, it is not fixed or limited and it can 
change if new information emerges to modify previous experiences (Hines, 1988; 




systematic mechanism can be used to measure and communicate the overall picture 
of the reality.  
As discussed above, the researcher believes that a researcher should have the 
freedom to select any research methods to achieve the current research objectives. 
In this case, those are to measure the volume of voluntary disclosure, and the factors 
that influence managers in making the disclosure decision (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Laughlin, 1995; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The researcher 
uses both quantitative and qualitative methods in the current study. She believes 
that a combination of both methods is the most appropriate means to produce the 
desired results. Table 4 illustrates the researcher’s view of each philosophical 
stance.  
Table 4. Researcher’s view on philosophical assumptions. 
Philosophical 
assumptions 
Researcher’s view on each philosophical assumption 
Ontology Reality as a contextual field of information 
Epistemology Subject to the researched phenomenon; both objective and subjective 
points of view are accepted – researcher map contexts 
Axiology Issues or problems in this world are created by the human mind 
(consciousness), and no research study can be free from the 
researcher’s value and biases - researcher as an information processor 
Methods Any ways and methods that are most suitable for the researched 
phenomenon are appropriate. These can be either solely quantitative or 
qualitative (monomethods); a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative (either equivalent, dominant/less dominant or, multilevel 
approaches).  
Taken from “Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches (Vol. 46),” by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie, 1998 and modified for 
this research. 
 
Having addressed the philosophical stance held by the researcher for this thesis, the 
next section of the chapter presents the fundamental background to research 




4.4 Pragmatism paradigm and methods used for this research 
This study utilises a pragmatic approach in order to investigate differences on the 
level of voluntary disclosure and the driving factors for additional information that 
exist in Malaysia’s listed family-controlled companies. A number of studies on 
voluntary reporting have employed a pragmatic approach to address the research 
problem, and have used various approaches to understand the problems (such as 
Belal et al., 2013; Campbell, 2004; Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Campbell 
& Slack, 2008; Gray, 2013).  
The rationale for this present research’s use of a pragmatic approach rests largely 
on the premise of the thesis’ research objectives. Because the voluntary disclosure 
practices involve the individual’s perceptions and decisions, the pattern of the 
practices and volume of information disclosed may vary due to social, political, and 
economic factors. In order to investigate the disclosure pattern, a longitudinal 
research approach was used to measure the pattern of change, and to obtain factual 
information (Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010). Therefore, the mixture of both 
quantitative and qualitative data and analysis can be seen as appropriate methods 
for use in this research. An outline of the study’s methodological approach is 



















 “Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
Tashakkori and C. Teddlie, 1998 (Vol. 46),” by A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie, 
1998, p. 127, and “Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research,” by J. W. 
Creswell and V. L. Plano Clark, 2011, p. 63 and modified for this research. 
 
The methodological approach illustrated in Figure 3 was developed on the basis of 
a transformative procedure described by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011). Data 
obtained in phases one and two form an essential part of the research as the analysis 
of these data will be transformed into a reasoned explanation of the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. The procedures in both phases allow the 
disclosure practices among listed family-firms to be analysed from institutional and 
social contract perspectives. The next section of this chapter will present the 
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4.5 Research process 
The research process involves creating a general plan and direction for how the 
research will be carried out and presented in order to achieve its particular purposes 
and objectives. The process involves the formulation, execution, and analytical 
phases. It comprises several steps and it indicates the research methods that will be 
employed. Figure 4 illustrates the research process of this study. Each phase is 
presented in order.  
 
Figure 4.  Research design in this study. 
 
4.5.1 Phase 1: Research preparation 
Research interest definition 
The issue of voluntary disclosure in companies’ annual reports is one of the most 
exigent matters faced by stakeholder (Broberg et al., 2010; Cahan, Rahman, & 
Perera, 2005; Eng & Mak, 2003; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Qu et al., 2012; Qu et 
al., 2013; Uyar & Kılıç, 2012; Wang et al., 2013). The vast majority of these studies, 
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like Malaysia. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and Ibrahim and Abdul Samad (2011) 
pointed out that listed family-owned companies have a strong relationship with 
voluntary disclosures. However, since neither of these studies focused on voluntary 
disclosure and family-owned companies as the subject of the research, this 
circumstance demonstrates that research into family-owned companies is still 
lacking in Malaysia. It is, therefore, important to have a better understanding of the 
current state of voluntary disclosure in listed family-controlled companies in the 
Malaysian context since this type of company constitutes about 43% of all listed 
companies on the main board listing on Bursa Malaysia (Amran, 2011). 
The existing literature on voluntary disclosure practices in emerging 
countries/developing countries spanning the period from 1990 to 2012 was 
reviewed. A number of issues  pertinent to the research interest were identified: 
a. Empirical evidence shows that companies in emerging countries provide 
less voluntary disclosure than their Western counterparts do (see, for 
example, Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Al-Akra & Hutchinson, 2013; Al-
Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; Ghazali, 2008; Hassan et al., 2009; Hossain, 
2008; Hossain & Hammami, 2009). 
b. The sample groups of companies used in previous studies were frequently 
selected randomly from listed companies (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Al-Akra 
& Hutchinson, 2013; Ali et al., 2007; Chau & Gray, 2010; Chen & Jaggi, 
2000; Chen et al., 2008; Hashim, 2011; Ho, 2008; Hutton, 2007). 
c. Factors relating to voluntary disclosure comprise the external and internal 
aspects of an organisation. External factors consist of regulatory 
frameworks, domestic law, culture, social influence and corporate 
governance system enforcements. Internal factors include firm-specific 
characteristics and board characteristics (Adams, 2002; Adhikari & 
Tondkar, 1992; Archambault & Archambault, 2003; Broberg et al., 2010; 
Chakroun & Matoussi, 2012; Chau & Gray, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Meek et al., 1995; Ousama & Fatima, 2010; Qu & Leung, 2006; Qu et al., 
2013; Wang & Claiborne, 2008). 
d. Empirical evidence documented that voluntary disclosure is subject to the 




et al., 2006; Chau & Gray, 2010; Chau & Gray, 2002; Elsayed & Hoque, 
2010; Lundholm & Winkle, 2006).  
e. The self-constructed voluntary disclosure index approach has received little 
attention as evidenced from the studies reviewed (see Elsayed & Hoque, 
2010; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Ho & Taylor, 
2013; Jaffar et al., 2007; Ousama & Fatima, 2010; Qu & Leung, 2006; Qu 
et al., 2013).   
 
Research objectives identification 
The objectives of this research are: 
a. To develop a disclosure index, from stakeholders’ perspectives, for 
assessing the nature and extent of information disclosed in listed Malaysian 
family-controlled companies’ annual reports, and to incorporate a voluntary 
disclosure framework within the disclosure index 
b. To identify the drivers behind voluntary disclosure in listed Malaysian 
family-controlled companies 
c. To review and discuss with users and preparers the findings on voluntary 
disclosure practice in Malaysia. 
 
Determination of research methods. 
The research methods were determined by the research objectives. The details of 
the methods for this research are described in the following section.  
4.5.2 Phase 2: Data collection and analysis   
The research employed a sequential explanatory design of inquiry in that 
quantitative data were collected and analysed to identify the level of the voluntary 
disclosure. Qualitative interviews were then conducted to provide further insights 
into the findings. More specifically, data from the companies’ annual reports and 
databases (quantitative data) were collected and analysed to identify the factors 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. The interviews with top 
management executives (qualitative data) were useful to explain the driving factors, 
and provide insights into the preparers’ attitude towards voluntary disclosure in the 




study as it allows explanation and interpretation of the findings of the study, 
particularly in the case of unexpected results arising from the quantitative analysis 
(Creswell, 2014).  
This research employed three different data collection techniques: Delphi approach, 
content analysis, and interview. These techniques were used in order to complement 
the results obtained by both quantitative and qualitative methods. Figure 5 
illustrates the process and phases employed in this current study. 
 
Figure 5. Summary of data collection and analysis processes in phase 2. 
The quantitative and qualitative methods used in both the data collection and 
analysis phases are discussed in the sections that follow. 
Stage 1: Development of voluntary disclosure index 
As explained in section 4.5.1, phase 1 comprised the processes involved in the 
development of the voluntary disclosure index. The disclosure index was then used 
to examine the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports provided by 
Malaysia’s listed companies. The procedures undertaken in the development of the 
voluntary disclosure index are explained in detail in chapter 5.  
Stage 1
• Development of voluntary disclosure index
• Selection of voluntary disclosure
• Delphi rating for the importance of the voluntary  
disclosure index
• Construction of scoring scheme for coding scheme
• Pilot test for coding scheme
Stage 2
• Annual reports content analysis
• Sample selection: 30 (i.e., 15 family-controlled and 15 
nonfamily-controlled companies) of the largest 150 
companies that are listed in Bursa Malaysia's main market
• Evaluation and scoring of the annual reports (from 2009 -
2013) of sampled companies
Stage 3
• Data analysis - Quantitative and qualitative data
• Quanititative: (a) The comparative results examining the 
level of voluntary disclosure items provided by the sample 
companies from 2009 until 2013,  (b) Companies' attributes 
and the level of voluntary disclosure




The development of the voluntary disclosure index involved three major stages. 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were employed. In an effort to enhance 
and determine the relevance of the current research framework’s voluntary 
disclosure items compared with those of earlier studies, a preconsultative procedure 
with 12 stakeholders was carried out before the actual research work commenced.  
Second, the Delphi technique was employed in order to validate the list of voluntary 
disclosure items obtained from the preconsultative procedure. To validate the 
disclosure items, 40 panel members were approached. All panellists were required 
to give a rating on the importance of each voluntary disclosure item presented in a 
questionnaire. A 5-point Likert rating scale (1–5) was used, in which 1 indicates 
least favourable; 2 indicates less favourable; 3 indicates of intermediate importance; 
4 indicates important; and, 5  indicates the item is highly important. In this research, 
respondents also had the option of choosing 0 which indicated ‘not applicable’ 
(N/A) if they had no opinion about the item. All rating points given for each item 
were summed and divided by 40 (the total number of panel members) to obtain a 
mean scale of importance for each item.  
This Delphi approach took two rounds for confirmation. In the first round, face-to-
face meetings were carried out. During this first meeting, an interview and 
discussion session were also conducted. The procedure allowed the panellists to 
explain their reason/s for giving a particular rating to an item. The researcher was 
also able obtain the panellists’ views and perceptions towards the current practices 
of voluntary disclosure in the companies’ annual reports. The second round 
involved email and telephone conversations to confirm the ratings given for each 
item, so that the voluntary disclosure items could be finalised.  
The next step was to create the scoring criteria for the coding scheme. The scoring 
criteria for the coding scheme were developed in order to assess the reliability and 
validity of the disclosure index. This process involved two pilot tests. The aim of 
the pilot tests was to assess and ensure the reliability of the scoring criteria of the 
voluntary disclosure index. First, the index was tested on six companies listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia main board. Two assessors were involved in this process. Data 
from both assessors were compared using Kripendorff analysis to establish the 




guidelines were made after the first pilot test, but no major changes were required 
for the disclosure index. The second pilot test was carried out to test the coding 
scheme and disclosure index once again. The purpose of the second pilot test was 
to ensure that no further amendments to the coding scheme would be necessary. 
Following Krippendorff (2004), and Guthrie, Petty, Yongvanich, and Ricceri 
(2004), for reliability and validity purposes, a test-retest procedure was conducted 
to ensure that the coding scheme would be ready for use.  
Stage 2: Content analysis of annual reports 
The second phase executed in this current study was a content analysis of 150 
annual reports of 30 listed companies in Malaysia from 2009 to 2013. This phase 
involved two procedures: the selection of family-controlled and nonfamily-
controlled companies in Malaysia, and content analysis of their annual reports.  
Listed family-controlled companies were chosen as the main focus in this study 
because, first, family-controlled companies comprise the largest proportion in the 
share market, particularly in an emerging country like Malaysia. As noted in chapter 
2, a study by Amran and Ahmad (2011) found that about 690 companies listed on 
Malaysia’s main board are run by families. These companies are considered to be 
the top companies and to have higher performance than others. Most of the family-
controlled companies constitute the richest family businesses. Many of them are not 
only the leaders but also the highest performers in their respective industries and 
sectors. Thus, the influence of these companies could be considered as an ideal 
indicator for the evaluation of the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports.  
Second, these companies are often known for their complex ownership type in the 
context of business management, particularly in relation to their governance 
system. As pointed out by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006, p. 83), family 
businesses have “so many disputes about the behaviour and performance.”  
Disputes around matters related to governance could also influence the corporate 
reporting tradition which can be markedly different from that of nonfamily-
controlled companies (see also, Ali et al., 2007). The involvement of family 
members in a business has been identified as one of the factors affecting company 
practices and decision-making. A family business can comprise several generations 




combination of these elements can influence and shape the preferences of a founder 
or owner of the company because of the family’s values and obligations. 
Additionally, a family business owner might give higher priority to family rather 
than to the company’s financial returns in order to maximise his overall benefit.  
Finally, as described in chapter 3, this research recognises the effect of managers’ 
behaviour as regards voluntary disclosure, particularly in family-controlled 
companies. As substantial shareholders12 in a family-controlled company have the 
ability to control the amount of additional information beyond the mandatory 
information required by the public, the decision to disclose or not to disclose is their 
prerogative. However, given these companies are among the best performers, they 
tend to respond to the effects of social beliefs and values embedded in the 
organisational environment as well as the institutional pressure in the business 
context (Fernández & Nieto, 2005; Sharma, 2004). As most of the sample 
companies are their industries’ top performers, it was expected that the level of 
voluntary disclosure in their annual reports would have improved over time.  
Ownership structure 
In order to select the sample of companies, the ownership structure and control of 
a company were identified on the basis of individual/institutional controlling 
interest and rights in a company. For the purpose of this study, the ownership 
structure refers to a situation where the managers (the board of directors) are the 
main shareholders of the company. Company shareholders refers to the controlling 
interest and rights of the individual/institutional in a company. This aspect is often 
defined in accordance with a country’s national act, and the International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS). The definition of control is explained under IFRS 10. 
The standard states that control must comprise three elements: (a) power over an 
investee, (b) exposure, or rights, to variable returns from an investee, and, (c) the 
ability to use power to affect the reporting entity’s returns. The standard further 
indicates that the individual/institution can have power over a company (investee) 
even if the individual/institution holds less than 50% of voting rights in the 
company. However, the power to direct the relevant activities of the company can 
                                                 
12 A person in the company is deemed to have an interest, when he/she is entitled to exercise or control the 
exercise of not less than 15% of votes from the total voting shares in the company ((Malaysian Companies Act, 




be exercised separately (unilaterally) by an individual/institution. Under IFRS 10, 
power arises either individually or in combination, from rights: (a) in the form of 
voting rights or potential voting rights, (b) to appoint, reassign, or remove members 
of key management personnel in any part of the investee (company), and, (c) to 
direct the investee (company) to enter into or make changes to transactions for the 
benefit of the investor13. 
Consistent with IFRS 10, in the Malaysian context, control is defined as the 
authority over the course of action of a company (Amran & Ahmad, 2013; Loh & 
Zin, 2007; Rasiah, 2012). Citing Schleifer and Vishny’s (1997) study, Rasiah 
(2012) says there are two elements that make up ownership structure: first, 
ownership concentration, and second ownership composition. Ownership 
concentration typically explains the distribution of power between the board of 
directors and shareholders, while ownership composition describes the people or 
individual/s who belong in the controlling group (Rasiah, 2012).  
Every company incorporated in Malaysia must have at least two directors who may 
or may not have a controlling interest in the company (Malaysian Companies Act, 
1965). A person is deemed to have an interest in the company when he/she is 
entitled to exercise, or control the exercise of, not less than 15% of the votes of the 
total voting shares in the company (Malaysian Companies Act, 1965 Section 4 C & 
122 A). The Malaysian Companies Act, 1965, section 5, subsections (1) and (2), 
and 6A, subsection (4) define ‘control’ as “… a person who controls more than half 
of the voting power...” and “holds more than half of the issued share capital of the 
corporation.” The term is used to demonstrate the ultimate and significant 
influences and rights of that individual or group of people. 
In Malaysia, many family-controlled companies hold both a large stake of equity 
as well as key management positions in their organisations. In other words, both 
ownership and control are not separated in these companies (see, for example Fan 
& Wong, 2002; Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; Rasiah, 2012). Control 
is often referred to as a shareholder with the ability to exercise “significant control” 








through votes or the shareholding proportion of equity (Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 
2011). The criterion was also used by La Porta and Shleifer (1999), Claessens et al. 
(2000), and Ibrahim and Abdul Samad (2011) on the basis that corporate ownership 
structures in Malaysia are associated with indirect/substantial ownership.  
To identify the shareholding proportion, the fraction of equity ownership can be 
calculated by referring to the direct and indirect/shareholdings of the family 
members. These proportions can be extracted from the annual reports. The details 
of the sum of shares owned, directly or indirectly, by a shareholder can be found 
under the shareholders’ statistics or substantial shareholders section in the annual 
reports required by the Malaysian corporate governance best practices (Ibrahim & 
Abdul Samad, 2011; Punitharaja, Zulkafli, & Masron, 2011; Wan Nordin, 2009). 
Furthermore, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance requires all Malaysian 
publicly listed companies to disclose: (a) the significant or substantial shareholders 
owning more than 5% of issued shares, (b) the top 30 shareholders and respective 
sizes of their shareholdings and, (c) the family relationships between major 
shareholders, directors and/or top executives (Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011; Ishak 
& Napier, 2006; Punitharaja et al., 2011). In other words, the ownership and control 
of the company will be determined by the percentage of shares and equity being 
held in the company.  
A family-controlled company must satisfy three requirements:   
a. the family has (direct and indirect shareholdings) of a minimum of 30% of 
voting rights in the company  in the Malaysia context; 20% of voting rights 
to be sufficient to give effective control of a company (Hashim, 2011; 
Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011; La Porta & Shleifer, 1999),  
b. the family must be a substantial shareholder (Hashim & Devi, 2009), and 
c.  at least two family members on the board must have executive authority 
(Ali et al., 2007; Hashim, 2011; Hashim & Devi, 2009; Ibrahim & Samad, 
2010).  
 
Among the 150 listed companies, only 15 met the criteria and they are the top 
family-controlled companies that contribute to Malaysia’s gross domestic product 




main board are owned by a number of different families. These families also owned 
more than 50% of controlling shareholdings in other companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. Therefore, these 15 companies were used as the research sample.  
Since the aim of this research is to identify the differences in the level of voluntary 
disclosure in listed companies using a longitudinal analysis, an additional 15 
nonfamily-controlled companies were selected and paired with the sample of 
family-controlled companies for comparative purposes. The selection of these 
companies was based on the number of years they had been listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia (i.e., must have been listed for more than 10 years). The other criteria 
were that the companies operated in a similar type of industry, and that each 
company’s market capitalisation was within the range of the selected sample of 
family-controlled companies as at 31 December 2013. The annual reports of these 
30 companies were manually collected.  
Some public companies were excluded from the sample. These were financial firms 
such as banking, insurance, and companies in sectors such as oil and gas, marine 
hull, and leasing companies because they use sector-specific accounting principles. 
Their financial statements are, therefore, not comparable with those of other 
economic sectors (Ibrahim & Abdul Samad, 2011; Ibrahim et al., 2008; Ibrahim & 
Samad, 2010). The activities of the insurance and banking industries are, for 
example, heavily influenced by regulatory requirements.  
The second step carried out under Stage 2 was to evaluate and score the content of 
the annual reports of the sampled companies in order to determine the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The study adopted a qualitative method known as content 
analysis to quantify the data. Content analysis is a method of codifying the text 
(content) of an annual report into several categories according to specified criteria 
(Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010). It is used to make 
valid inferences from the text. Different researchers can thus analyse the same 
phenomenon in different contexts. According to Krippendorff (2014, p. 18), 
“content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.” Content 
analysis was chosen in this thesis because this approach relates integrally to the first 




The “text unit” of analysis used in the current study was at the level of phrase, 
clause, or theme (Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010). Using the sentences and 
paragraphs of the annual reports, the researcher coded sentences as possessing one 
theme with several subcategories of information. The coder was required to assess 
the content in the annual reports based on the meaning of the sentences in relation 
to the index using a coding scheme. Here a 5-point scale (i.e., the 1 to 5 scale 
developed and tested earlier in phase 1) and recorded in an Excel spreadsheet. 
The content of the annual reports was then evaluated. Four sections were used: (1) 
Chairman’s Statement or Statement to Shareholders, (2) Review of Operation or 
Business Review, (3) Management, Discussions, and Analysis, and (4) Others ─ 
Business Management and Operational Summary. For the purpose of evaluation, a 
detailed Excel spreadsheet was created for each of the sampled companies. All the 
voluntary disclosure indexes were inserted, and calculation formulas were 
developed and added into the spreadsheet. All the data examined in each annual 
report were carefully coded in order to ensure their credibility and consistency. The 
completion of the annual report examination led to the final phase, that is, the data 
analysis. 
Stage 3: Data analysis  
All data collected in this research were quantified and analysed in line with the 
research objectives. This stage involved two procedures: 
a. the statistical analysis of the coding data, and  
b. analysis of interviews.  
a. Statistical analysis.  
In order to examine the level of voluntary disclosure practices, and the differences 
in the disclosure categories against ownership type, several statistical tests were 
used. Amongst others, univariate tests, significance test, and a post hoc test were 
used to measure the level of voluntary disclosure practices. Tests were also used to 
examine the association between the voluntary disclosure practices, company 
attributes, and influence in family-controlled companies (i.e., numbers of family 





Univariate tests such as cross-tabulation, one sample t test, and Chi-square analysis 
were used to identify the tabulations included in a frequency distribution (Hair, 
Money, Samouel, & Page, 2007). The one sample t test was used in this study to 
determine the mean (average voluntary disclosure score) of the level of voluntary 
disclosure practices for each item provided in all the companies sampled and to 
identify any differences in the level of voluntary disclosure practices between 
family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled companies. Finally, to describe a set of 
relationships, a cross-tabulation using Chi-square was used. 
Once the preceding two tests had been performed, the comparison of means in each 
category of the voluntary disclosure category were assessed using ANOVA. The 
means for all five categories were tested using the following attributes of each 
company. They were (a) market value, (b) industry, and (c) ownership type. 
According to (Hair et al., 2007), in order to use ANOVA, the variables used must 
be categorical (i.e., nonmetric). ANOVA enables the researcher to reach a 
conclusion on the statistical differences present between group means only. 
However, it does not identify where the differences lie. For this reason, a follow-up 
test known as a post hoc test was performed to assess significant differences 
between group means. Post hoc tests are also widely utilised in many areas of the 
literature (Hair et al., 2007). The analysis comprises: 
 the results of average voluntary disclosure scores between categories 
 the results of average voluntary disclosure scores between company 
attributes. 
A number of previous studies such as Chen et al. (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), 
Ho and Taylor (2013), and Barako et al. (2006) performed correlation tests to assess 
the relationship between the level of voluntary disclosures and companies’ 
attributes. Previous studies have frequently used this technique to assess the effect 
of a company’s attributes on the extent of the different disclosure levels (see 
previous studies by Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Depoers, 2000; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Wallace & Naser, 1995). An alternative approach to Pearson correlation is 
Spearman rho. The Spearman correlation was used to measure the association 
between family-controlled companies’ attributes (i.e., number of family members, 




acquired by family members). Since the data are nonparametric, the Spearman rho 
is the appropriate correlation to calculate (Hair et al., 2007). The larger the 
correlation coefficient, the stronger the level of association between the average 
voluntary disclosure scores in each category and the family-controlled companies’ 
attributes. Results from the Spearman correlation enable the researcher to know 
which category of voluntary disclosure is often emphasised.  
b. Interview and discussion. 
 
Interviews are one of the most commonly used research methods that researchers 
employ for collecting primary data. They can be conducted with individuals or 
groups, using face-to-face, telephone, email, or video (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 
465). As noted earlier, the interview approach enables the researcher to gain insights 
into an individual’s beliefs and his or her attitude towards a specific subject. 
Interviews can be structured, unstructured, or semistructured. A structured 
interview is based on an inflexible set of interview questions. Unstructured 
interviews are also known as in-depth interviews; the interview begins with broad 
questions, the interviewer then debates these with the interviewee in a general, open 
manner. Subsequent interview questions are then very much dependent on the 
answers given by the interviewees (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Hair et al., 2007).  
A semistructured interview is a mixture of the structured and unstructured approach. 
The interview is based on a list of questions on specific topics to be covered in it. 
Interviewees are able to elaborate on certain points and raise specific questions or 
topics (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 467). An additional advantage of conducting 
semistructured interviews is that the views and opinions expressed during the 
interview stem from a single source ─ the interviewee (DiCicco‐Bloom & Crabtree, 
2006). A common feature of the three interview methods is, therefore, that they 
have more flexibility than printed questionnaire surveys do, and they give the 
interviewees the chance to express their personal views and opinions in their own 
words.  
For the purpose of this study, a semistructured, face-to-face interview was carried 
out, as this technique was seen as the most appropriate way to obtain accurate and 




reports. The semistructured interview method not only reveals and answers the 
‘what’ and ‘how’ questions, but also places emphasis on exploring the ‘why’ 
questions (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Hair et al., 2007). Since the present study depends 
on the data extracted mainly from the annual reports, the interview method provides 
valuable supplementary information and explanations that cannot be found in the 
annual reports themselves.  
The interview respondents for this study were identified in three different ways: (a) 
identified by the researcher on the basis of personal relationships and contacts, (b) 
introduced by key respondents, and, (c) through snowballing, that is, one 
respondent leading to another potential respondent. This approach resulted in 41 
top management personnel involved in preparing annual reports agreeing to be 
interviewed. Thirty-one interviews were conducted, along with two focus group 
sessions. These groups comprised 4 and 5 people. To address ethical aspects, 
interviewees were provided with a Participant Information sheet, and a Consent 
Form (see Appendix B). A set of questions to be addressed were attached to these 
ethical documents. Emails were sent to the participants in order to arrange an 
appropriate interview meeting time and place. These were set by the participants. 
At the beginning of each interview, the researcher introduced herself. She then 
provided a brief overview of the research, and purpose of the interview. The 
questions focused on the following topics: the participants’ understanding about 
voluntary disclosure; the importance of disclosure items; and, factors or influences 
in disclosure decision-making. The interviews took approximately 40 minutes each. 
After permission had been granted, all the interviews were digitally recorded 
(Harvey, 2011).  
The Atlas.ti software program was used to transcribe and analyse the data. Content 
analysis was used to analyse the interview transcripts. This process involved the 
following steps:  
Step 1 – Identify the main theme 
Step 2 – Assign codes to the main themes 
Step 3 – Classify responses under the main themes  




4.5.3 Phase 3: Reporting results and interpretation 
The analysis process carried out in phases 1 and 2 yielded a number of findings 
regarding the level of and differences in voluntary disclosure in listed companies, 
particularly family-controlled companies. This section highlights:  
a. the results relating to the level of voluntary information reported by sample 
companies and interpretation of that information, based on the theoretical 
framework established for this research. 
b. the factors that drive these companies’ managers to disclose voluntary 
disclosure. The results were interpreted using the interviewees’ information.  
Therefore, the present research:  
1. acknowledges that regulations and enforcement are important in influencing 
voluntary disclosure. 
2. acknowledges that companies in emerging countries take a longer time, 
compared to those in Western countries, to shift to a new corporate reporting 
practice.  
3. acknowledges that the evolution of common social values and culture can 
influence the companies to disclose more of what is expected by the 
stakeholders. 
4. recognises the complexity of business management in a family-controlled 
company (i.e., the governance system). This type of ownership is concerned 
not only with financial returns but also with other nonfinancial aspects such 
as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the continuance of 
a family legacy.  
4.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed in detail the research methodology and methods 
employed in the study to achieve the research objectives. It began by explaining the 
research philosophy, approach, and strategy. It justified the reasons for the choice 
of research design for the current study. It also outlined the research preparation 




Additionally, it has described the construction of the research instrument and 
processes followed to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of each sampled company. A self-constructed voluntary disclosure rating 
sheet was designed, and a scoring scheme and procedure were developed to obtain 
a company’s disclosure score for each year studied. Finally, the chapter described 
the semistructured interview approach adopted and the statistical analysis 
techniques employed. 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 which follow will report the results of the empirical research. 
Chapter 5 will explain the development of the research instrument  (i.e., the 
voluntary disclosure index items) and research preparation procedures in detail. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the empirical analysis derived from measuring the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 30 listed companies over the 
period 2009-2013. Chapter 7 presents the company attributes that are associated 
with the level of voluntary disclosure practices. Chapter 8 presents the results of the 





DEVELOPING THE INSTRUMENTS: VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE INDEX  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the development of the disclosure index instrument and its 
associated coding scheme. The disclosure index was developed to determine what 
type of voluntary disclosure information is included in the annual reports. The 
development of the instrument involved four major steps as shown below:  
 
Section 5.2 presents the process of establishing the voluntary disclosure items, 
while section 5.3 summarises the development of the voluntary disclosure index. 
The chapter then presents the development of the scoring criteria for the coding 
Step 1: Selection of voluntary disclosure
a. Review of previous studies/work, and scrutiny of a 
number of annual reports in Malaysia (54 items) (as 
discussed in Chapter Five)
b. Consultation process with (12) stakeholders, who are 
also annual report users, resulted to an additional 13 items 
(as detailed in Chapter 5)
c. List of voluntary disclosure items for the index 
construction (67 items)
Step 2: Delphi rating for the importance of the voluntary 
disclosure index 
a. Delphi rating process - first round; computation of the 
importance rating for each item and modifications (refined 
items resulted to 65 items)
b. Delphi rating process - second round; finalisation of the list 
of voluntary disclosure index (61-item index)
Step 3: Construction of scoring criteria for coding scheme




scheme and the results of the testing of the scheme in section 5.4. Section 5.5 
summarises the chapter. 
5.2 Establishing the voluntary disclosure index items 
The purpose of this section is to explain the method used to achieve the first 
objective of this study i.e., to develop a disclosure index, from users and preparers’ 
perspectives, for assessing the nature and extent of information disclosed in listed 
family-controlled companies’ annual reports, and to incorporate a voluntary 
disclosure framework within the disclosure index. Measuring the level of the 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of each sample company for a period of 
5 years involved four steps: (i) selection of the initial voluntary disclosure, (ii) 
scoring the voluntary disclosure index through Delphi technique, (iii) construction 
of the scoring criteria for coding scheme, and (iv) pilot tests for the coding scheme. 
A detailed description of each step is presented next. 
STEP 1: The selection of preliminary voluntary disclosure items 
Two procedures were followed to select voluntary disclosure items. The first 
involved a review of previous national and international disclosure studies. The 
second stage entailed an examination of Malaysian companies’ annual reports to 
identify items that may not have been considered in previous studies. As noted in 
chapter 5, this process yielded a list of 54 items. These items were then used in a 
preconsultative procedure with 12 stakeholders to refine the items included in the 
voluntary disclosure list. This process produced 67 items (see section 5.2.1.2). 
Marston and Shrives (1991) acknowledge that in the process of selecting voluntary 
disclosure items:   
The validity of disclosure indices as a measure of information 
disclosure cannot be accepted without question. However, no 
other method for measuring disclosure has been developed … 
The fact that no one particular index has gained favour with 
researchers illustrates another facet of the validity problem. Most 
researchers adapt and tailor existing indices to meet their own 
perceived needs. This is an attempt to create an index that is valid 





Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the list of items obtained from the processes outlined above. 




1 Financial highlights ─ 3 years
2 Brief history of the firm and nature of the business
3 Discussion of company's major products/services/projects
4 Images of major types of product
5 Information on new product development
6 Discussion of industry trend (past)
7 Information on acquisition and expansion of business activities
8 Statement of ways to improve product and service quality
9 General statement of corporate strategy
10 Organisation structure/group chart
11 Information relating to the general outlook of the economy
12 Discussion of competitive environment
13 Information on disposal and cessation
14 A statement of corporate goal(s)
15 Vision and mission statement
16 Description of marketing and distribution network for products/services
17 Generating value for stakeholders
18 Statement of ways to improve customer service or satisfaction
19 Actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal
20 Reasons for the acquisition and expansion (including planned capital expenditure)
21 Impact of strategy on current results
22 Discussion about major regional economic development
23 Reasons for the disposal and cessation
24 Description of research and development projects
25 Impact of competition on current market
26 Firm's contribution to the national economy
27 Corporate milestones
28
Background of the directors and management team (academic, professional 
qualifications, and positions held)
29 Senior management responsibilities, experiences, and academic background
30 Brief details of senior management team
31 Analysis of distribution of shareholdings by type of shareholders
32 Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown
General corporate and strategic information












33 Review of financial highlights related to financial statement
34
High level operating data and performance measurement that management uses to 
manage the business and in the decision making
35 Share price and volume information (trend)
36 Share price and volume information (year-end)
37 Market capitalisation (year-end)
38 CSR policy, a statement of compliance, and graphic images
39 Discussion of participation in government social campaigns
40 Discussion of community programs carried out (including health/education/charity) 
41 Discussion of environmental protection program(s) implemented
42
Discussion of support rendered for public/private action designed to protect 
environment
43 Corporate policy on employees' benefits and training
44 Discussion of employees' benefits and training
45
Breakdown of workforce by line of business distribution or categories of employees 
by level of qualifications
46 Amount spent on employees' benefits and training
47 Retrenchmentment/redundancy information
48 Information about employees' workplace safety
49 Discussion of health and safety standards
50 Cost ─ average compensation per employee
51
Discussion of opportunities (firm's prospects in general and business strategy on 
future performance in general)
52
Discussion of specific external factors affecting firm's prospects (economy, politics, 
technology)
53
Discussion of future products/services research and development activities with 
planned research and development (R&D) expenditure
54 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure
Financial Information
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) [include environmental, societal, and 
employees]




Eight additional types of voluntary information were suggested by the participants 
during the preconsultative process. These are listed in Table 6.  
Table 6. Additional voluntary information suggested by the participants. 
1 Halal status of the product 
2 Details of Shariah oversight board 
3 Number of Muslim shareholders and their shareholdings 
4 Riba/gharar/maysir activities 
5  Zakat 
6 Sadaqa/donation 
7 Waqf 
8 Qard Hassan 
 
Since the information suggested was general, further modifications based on 
previous studies were made to each information item.  Table 7 shows the refined 
additional voluntary disclosure items in line with the participants’ suggestions.  
Table 7. Additional voluntary disclosure items resulting from the preconsultative 
process and previous works. 
1 Business activities related to Shariah matters (if applicable) 
2 Halal status of the product (if applicable) 
3 Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling (if applicable) 
4 
Analysis of distribution of shareholdings by type of shareholders, and number 
of Muslim shareholders and their shareholdings  
5 Details of Shariah oversight board (if applicable) 
6 
Any form of financing/investment or funding that contradicts Islamic law 
(interest/gambling/uncertainties activities) (if applicable) 
7 Zakat: method used/amount/beneficiaries (if applicable) 
8 Sadaqa/donation (description on the recipients and purpose) (if applicable) 
9 Waqf (description on the policy and amount spent) (if applicable) 
10 
Qard Hassan-borrowing without profit and interest (details on the policy, 
accounting treatment, and recipients) (if applicable)  
11 Nature and cause of risks 
12 
Identification of major differences between actual business performance and 
previously disclosed opportunities, risks, and management plans 





Following Ho and Taylor (2013)14, Amran, Abdul Manaf, and Che Haat (2009)15, 
Qu et al. (2013)16, Jaffar et al. (2007)17, and Ghazali (2007)18, the 67 items (see 
Appendix D) identified for this study were restructured and classified into the 
following five categories of voluntary disclosure: 
(a) General corporate and strategic information,  
(b) Information about management and shareholders,  
(c) Financial information,  
(d) Corporate social responsibility information, and  
(e) Forward-looking and risk-related information.  
STEP 2: Scoring the importance of the voluntary disclosure items 
The first step in measuring the importance of voluntary information in annual 
reports involves scoring the disclosure items. In line with prior scholars (see 
Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Coy & Dixon, 2004; Guthrie et al., 2004; Hooks 
et al., 2002) who used a disclosure index in their research, emphasis was placed on 
the validation of the items by experts who are familiar with and use annual reports 
in their work. To fulfil the criteria, this study used a Delphi19 technique with 40 
panel members (see Appendix C). 
This Delphi panel further validated the voluntary disclosure items drawn from the 
preconsultative process in the initial stage for their disclosure importance in annual 
reports (Coy & Dixon, 2004; Hooks et al., 2001, 2002). As detailed in chapter 5, 
the panellists were selected on the basis of their reporting knowledge, professional 
backgrounds, and engagement with preparing and/or analysing annual reports in 
their work over a period of at least 10 years. An invitation (consisting of a covering 
letter, executive summary, participant information sheet, questionnaire, and consent 
form) was sent to potential candidates in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 6 months before 
the actual fieldwork was to be conducted. The invitation clarified the role and tasks 
                                                 
14 used 85 voluntary disclosure items 
15 used 37 items for risk reporting 
16 used 52 voluntary disclosure items 
17 used 88 voluntary disclosure items, and  
18 used 22 voluntary items for CSR reporting 
19 The Delphi technique was developed in the 1950s. It is a systematic and iterative process by which 
the opinions of a group of experts are obtained, reconsidered, and modified with the purpose of 




for the panellists and asked whether they fitted into one or more of the stakeholder 
categories (Chau & Gray, 2002, p. 247; Ho & Wong, 2001, p. 145). Each panellist 
was asked to utilise his/her accounting knowledge as an annual report user when 
assessing the voluntary items. The purpose of this process was to gain greater 
understanding about the type of information users expected.  
A. Delphi processes and results 
This section explains the scoring used with the Delphi members. The Delphi 
process involved two rounds to ensure consistency in the items rated (Coy & Dixon, 
2004; Hasson, Keeney, & McKenna, 2000; Hooks et al., 2002). A description of 
the Delphi approach adopted now follows. 
I. Delphi scoring process and guidelines 
In the first round, two of the Delphi meetings were conducted as a group session, 
with 4 people in each group. The remaining 32 Delphi members met individually 
with the researcher. In this first round, the members were given a set of 67 voluntary 
disclosure items, in questionnaire form, as noted earlier in chapter 4, section 4.4.2. 
These items were to be rated on the scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is deemed, should not 
be disclosed, 2 is can be disclosed but is of minor importance, 3 is intermediate 
important, 4 is should be disclosed and item is important, and 5 is very important 
and essential to be disclosed. The scoring scale was explained to the Delphi 
members before they started the process. A score of 0 was to be given for items 
which the panellist thought not applicable (Chau & Gray, 2002; Coy & Dixon, 
2004; Ho & Wong, 2001; Marston & Shrives, 1991; Singleton & Globerman, 
2002).  
Within the first round of the Delphi process, this scoring and discussion procedure 
was employed. The average session time was 50 minutes and the meetings were 
conducted in a location of the participant’s choice. All meetings were digitally 
recorded and transcribed. 
II. The scoring computations and results  
Results from the Delphi panels’ scoring process were calculated to identify the 




modifications and refinements to the list during the Delphi process. This stage 
determined a list of 65 voluntary disclosure items. The procedural process is 
explained next. 
a. Delphi:  First round outcomes 
Data from the scoring process were gathered to determine the importance of the 
disclosure items. The scores given for each item by a panellist were entered into an 
Excel database to determine the average weighting (i.e., mean) for each item (Coy 
& Dixon, 2004; Hooks et al., 2002; Liu, 2014).   
The weighted average rating of each item was then classified following the same 
rules applied for the Delphi rating scales as shown in Tables 8 to 12. The five 
categories of voluntary disclosure ─ with the items involved in this current research 
─ are presented with the frequency of each item scored and the item’s average score 












                                                 




(a) General corporate and strategic information 
Table 8. Delphi scores for general corporate and strategic information. 
 
Average score for level of 
importance
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 Financial highlights – 5 years 0 0 2 6 9 23 4 — Important 
2 Brief history of the firm and nature of the business 0 0 1 8 16 15
4 — Important - Withdrawn as 
it is a mandatory requirement 
under the Bursa Malaysia 
3
Discussion of company’s new major 
products/services/projects 0 0 3 8 13 16
4 — Important - Withdrawn as 
it is a mandatory requirement 
under the Bursa Malaysia 
4 Images of major types of product 1 3 8 11 10 7 3 — Average important
5 Information on new product development 1 2 2 9 14 12 4 — Important
6 Discussion of recent industry trends 0 1 4 12 15 8 4 — Important
7 Information on acquisitions and expansion 0 0 1 8 11 20
4 — Important - Withdrawn as 
it is a mandatory requirement 
under the Bursa Malaysia 
8 Statement of ways to improve product and service quality 0 2 4 14 13 7 3 — Average important
9 General statement of corporate strategy 0 1 3 10 14 12 4 — Important
10 Organisation structure/group chart 0 0 1 12 9 18
4 — Important - Withdrawn as 
it is a mandatory requirement 
under the Bursa Malaysia 
11 Information relating to the general outlook of the economy 0 1 10 12 14 3 3 — Average important
12 Discussion of competitive environment 2 0 2 18 9 9 3 — Average important
13  Information on disposal and cessation 1 0 2 11 10 16
4 — Important - Withdrawn as 
it is a mandatory requirement 
under the Bursa Malaysia 
14 A statement of corporate goals 0 0 3 9 12 16
4 — Important and included in 
the Bursa Malaysia disclosure 
guidelines (non mandatory)
15 Vision and mission statement 0 0 4 10 8 18 4 — Important 
16
Description of marketing and distribution network for 
products/services 1 3 6 11 16 3 3 — Average important
17 Information for generating value for stakeholders 1 0 1 13 12 13 4 — Important
18 Statement of ways to improve customer service 2 0 3 15 12 8 3 — Average important
19 Actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal 0 1 3 10 11 15
4 — Important and included in 
the Bursa Malaysia disclosure 
guidelines (non mandatory)
20
Reasons for the acquisitions and expansion (including 
planned capital expenditure) 1 0 1 8 11 19
4 - Withdrawn - overlapped 
with item 23
21 Impact of strategy on current results 0 3 0 11 15 11 4 — Important
22
Discussion about major regional economic development 
pertaining to product and business 1 1 8 16 10 4
3 — Average important and 
included in the Bursa Malaysia 
disclosure guidelines (non 
mandatory)
23 Reasons for the disposal and cessation 0 3 4 8 13 12
4 — Withdrawn - overlapped 
with item 20
24 Description of research and development projects 2 2 7 10 10 9
3 — Withdrawn - overlapped 
with item under forward- 
looking and risk review category
25 Impact of competition on current market 2 1 2 10 14 11 4 — Important
26 Firm’s contribution to the national economy 2 6 14 10 7 3 — Average important
27 Corporate milestones have been achieved 1 0 2 11 11 15 4 — Important 
28 Business activities related to Shariah matters (if applicable) 1 0 3 7 14 15 4 — Important 
29 Halal status of the product (if applicable) 1 0 3 9 11 16 4 — Important 
30
Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling (if 
applicable) if part of business 1 0 2 8 12 17 4 — Important 




Note: The frequency signifies the number of participants (total of 40 panellists) who gave 
each of the items a rating. The average = sum of (the ratings x frequencies)/40. Taking the 
‘financial highlights of 3 years item’ as an example, the following sum demonstrates how 
its result was calculated: [(2*2) + (6*3) + (9*4) + (23*5)]/40 = 4.33 (the average number 
is rounded to the absolute number). 
Table 8 shows that under the general corporate and strategic information category, 
Delphi members rated all of the items as important, and as needing to be disclosed 
in companies’ annual reports. On the basis of the panellists’ opinions, this category 
of disclosure can provide insight into the nature of an organisation overall over the 
period of its financial year. This conclusion is evidenced by 87% (comprised of 
31% scoring 5, 30% scoring 4, and 26% scoring 3) of the panellists scoring general 
corporate and strategic information as important.  
Table 8 indicates that information such as financial highlights (average mean ─ 
4.00), actions the company has taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal 
(average mean ─ 4.00), the impact of strategy on current results (average mean ─ 
4.00), information for generating value for stakeholders (average mean ─ 4.00), and 
information of new product development (average mean ─ 4.00) is perceived as 
important by the panellists because this information provides an indicator of an 
organisation’s continuous direction. The panel members were also of the opinion 
that these items demonstrate how an organisation operates and employs its 
competitive strategy to achieve the maximum possible value for its stakeholders in 
specific economic conditions. Eighty-seven per cent of the Delphi members 
indicated that general corporate and strategic information is important in their 
analysis of company performance in general.  
Based on the Delphi outcomes, items 2, 7, 10, and 13 (highlighted) were withdrawn 
from the disclosure index as this information relates to the Bursa Malaysia 
mandatory requirements21. As overlapping and redundant information, items 20, 
23, and 24 were also withdrawn from the index.  As noted earlier in chapter 4 
regarding the basis used for selecting the items, information included in the Bursa 
                                                 




Malaysia disclosure guide as nonmandatory was included in the index because the 
information is part of voluntary disclosure in the annual report. 
(b) Information about management and shareholders 
Table 9. Delphi scores for information about management and shareholders. 
 
Table 9 indicates the frequency of scores given by panel experts for the 
management and shareholders’ information categories. This table shows that 86% 
of the panel members scored the items within the range 3 and 5, which indicates the 
items are important.  The discussions revealed that they believe that this category 
assists annual report users in making judgements on the direction and monitoring 
aspects of an organisation. They contended that the board of directors’ information 
enables stakeholders to evaluate the influence on the company’s operational system 
and processes of a particular individual on the board. The panellists also expressed 
their belief that this disclosure can provide information on the credibility of the 
board of directors ─ based on their directorship experiences ─ in managing the 
company’s overall performance. In addition, the majority of the panellists who 
responded believed that the disclosure of information often depended on the board 
of directors’ objectives in disclosing it. They argued boards of directors are 
concerned not only with the financial returns to the shareholders, but also the 
nonfinancial aspects of the company such as their ability to maintain the company’s 
continuous long-term growth, and ability to manage the business risks faced by the 
company. 
0 1 2 3 4 5
1
Background of the directors and management team 
(academic, professional qualifications, and positions held) 0 0 3 7 14 16
4 — Important - Withdrawn as 
it is a mandatory requirement 
under the Bursa Malaysia 
2
Senior management responsibilities, experiences, and 
backgrounds 0 2 2 7 12 17 4 — Important
3
A brief details about the company's senior management 
team 0 2 5 10 11 12 4 — Important
4
Analysis of distribution of shareholdings by type of 
shareholders, and number of Muslim shareholders and their 
shareholdings 3 2 4 11 10 10
3 — Average important - 
Withdrawn as it is a mandatory 
requirements under the Bursa 
Malaysia requirements
5 Details of Shariah oversight board (if applicable) 1 0 3 8 16 12 4 — Important
6 Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown 0 0 3 5 16 16 4 — Important
Information about management and shareholders Frequency





Based on the Delphi outcomes, items 1 and 4 (highlighted) were eliminated from 
the list as these items fall under the Malaysia Corporate Governance Code of best 
practices and Bursa Malaysia listing requirements respectively22. 
(c) Financial information  
Table 10. Delphi scores for financial information. 
 
 
As shown in Table 10, 42% of the 40 Delphi panellists rated items under financial 
information as very important (5), and 26% rated them as important (4). The 
panellists’ overall response to the financial information disclosure category 
questions was very positive, with 92% believing that this category presents vital 
data on how an organisation is performing and positioning itself in a given market. 
The majority of the panellists also believed that financial information has an 
influence on the stakeholders’ confidence ─ particularly investors who can use this 
information to assess and anticipate the stability, long-term future growth, and the 
efficacy of the company’s strategic actions.  
Comparison of the above results reveals that only a small number of respondents 
indicated that this category has minor importance, with 7% scoring financial 
information between 1 and 2, and only 1% giving it 0. The 1% was for items 6 and 
7 which received this score because two panellists rated each item as not applicable. 
When asked about the subject, panel members (P4 and P5) commented that the 
information associated with Islamic law parameters would be important for Shariah 
                                                 




compliance organisations and a concern for Muslims. They did not believe that all 
stakeholders would understand or be aware of the relevance of this information 
when making economic decisions. This view was held by non-Muslim preparers 
who are more familiar with conventional financing and tax operations. Although 
familiar with Islamic financing structure and zakat activities, they did not consider 
such information as applicable, even if the items were highly regarded by other 
panel members. 
(d) Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
Table 11. Delphi scores for corporate social responsibility (CSR) [includes 
environmental and societal issues, and employees]. 
 
 
Overall, items under the corporate social responsibility (CSR) category were rated 
as of intermediate importance by the panellists. Thirty-one per cent of the 40 




21% scored it between 0 and 2. Just 17% chose very important for the CSR 
category, with 73%23 of the panellists expressing their belief that the category is 
viewed as a marketing tool and can reflect the company’s image to society. When 
further explanation was required, the panellists indicated that companies are likely 
to disclose CSR items to acknowledge, maintain, or strengthen their relationship 
with stakeholders. In addition, the panel members contended that companies tend 
to provide CSR information beyond the economic information to mirror their 
strengths and contributions towards stakeholders because, since stakeholders are 
not limited to investors alone, information about the organisation’s strengths and 
contributions also need to be shared with other stakeholders.  
A minority of panel members (22%) scored items between 0 and 2. Three panel 
members scored items that fall within the jurisdiction of Islamic law (i.e., Sadaqa24, 
Waqf25, and Qard-Hassan) as not applicable (0). When asked why, they said that 
these items are of importance only for Islamic or Shariah compliance organisations 
and are religion related.  
(e) Forward-looking and risk-review information 
Table 12. Delphi scoring for forward-looking and risk review information. 
 
                                                 
23 The percentage consists of panellists who scored within the range 3 to 5. 
24 Sadaqa is an act of personal devotion and piety (voluntary charity). 




In response to the final category in the voluntary disclosure category, most (84%) 
of the panel members indicated that the category is important. Only 16% gave it a 
score of less than 3. The majority contended that forward-looking and risk review 
information was important because its disclosure provides them with useful data 
with which to interpret corporate strategy plans, actions, and financial performance. 
They thought that these disclosures identified significant anticipated risk that the 
organisation is exposed to and which may have a material effect on the company’s 
overall performance. They also added that disclosures focusing on forward-looking 
and risk review are regarded as complementary information to mandatory risk 
disclosure. Item 7 (highlighted) was withdrawn from the list as this information is 
included in the Bursa Malaysia mandatory requirements.  
During the Delphi scoring process, a number of items were also suggested by the 
panel members. The list of additional items included in the final draft of the 
disclosure index is shown in Table 13. 
Table 13. Items recommended by the panel members. 
Categories of voluntary 
disclosure 
Items recommended Panel ID 
Section A — General 
corporate and strategic 
information 
1. Industry specialised operational statistics 
2. Adoption of and/or used of supporting 




Section C — Financial 
information 
1. Market share in the industry P14 
Section D — CSR 1. Retirement scheme through foundation or 
other means 
P2 
Section E — Risk review 
information 
1. Environmental incidents ─ Implementation 
of procedures for managing materials 
containing environmentally sensitive 
substances ─ converting the production 
processes 
2. High degree of government regulation – 
discussion on the ways to make appropriate 
investment decision 
3. Technical failure – discussion on hiring and 
retaining highly trained and experienced 
staff/developing quality control system and 
equipment maintenance/implementing 
software that allows better design and 
manufacturing process 
4. Natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood) 
— Discussion on engineering, administrative, 




















The table indicates that the form of the risk review information refers to a dimension 
of risk analysis with regard to the external environment around the company. When 
further explanation was requested, the panel members commented that a number of 
incidents related to risk mitigation in Malaysian organisations were in question. 
One panel member (P23) provided an example regarding air pollution caused by 
forest fires in Indonesia. According to the panel member, this geographical risk 
factor caused problems for companies in Malaysia, particularly those in the 
plantation, agricultural, and industrial sectors. This example highlighted the fact 
that, although Malaysia does not experience many natural disasters, the country is 
exposed to risks from incidents in the neighbouring country. The panel member 
believes that these issues are of concern and need to be noted in risk mitigation 
actions or plans provided by Malaysian companies.  
This viewpoint was also shared by P33, who expressed the belief that risk 
information can reflect the company’s health and accountability, which could 
reduce stakeholders’ ambiguities and negative perceptions. In addition, it was 
commented that, although the information is not a promising statement for the 
stakeholders, risk information shows the organisation’s management accountability 
towards the interested parties. When responding, P33 argued that it is impossible to 
avoid risks when trying to ensure the survival of a company over a very long period 
of time. Therefore, assuming that the actual risks are still not acknowledged, 
stakeholders often perceive that risks have to be taken into account in decision-
making.  
b. Delphi: Second round outcomes 
In the Delphi second round process, additional follow-up calls were made to 
confirm and thus ensure answers across panels (Coy & Dixon, 2004; Hooks et al., 
2001). A total of 6526 voluntary disclosure items were provided and sent to each 
panel member. Most of the Delphi members chose email, rather than another 
meeting, due to time constraints. The 65 items were laid out in similar questionnaire 
form, and panellists were asked to apply a similar scoring concept by adding 
comments and suggestions if they had changed their opinions after considering the 
                                                 





modified items. The second round Delphi process produced 40 responses (i.e., all 
of the 40 first round respondents completed the second round). In order to confirm 
the answers received via email, telephone communication was also used. Each 
telephone conversation took about 30 minutes. 
The result from the second round indicated some minor changes such as syntax 
errors, and changes in the categorisation of some items. As a result, four items were 
withdrawn from the list, as shown in Table 14 below. 
Table 14. Voluntary disclosure items suggested for withdrawal during the Delphi 
second round process. 
 
Table 15 summarises the additional information items the panellists offered in the 
second Delphi round. 
Categories Items
Average score for level of 
importance
Images of major 
products/services/projects 2.5
Statement of ways of 
improvement of customer 
service
Overlapping statement with item 
no 8 within the same category
Financial information Market share in the 
industry
Overlapping information with 
item no. 5 within the same 
category
Corporate social responsibility
Qard Hassan - borrowing 
without profit and interest 2.4




Table 15. Responses of panel for additional information in second round. 
 
The second round of the Delphi process thus produced 61 final disclosure items as 
detailed in Table 16. 
Table 16. The final list of 61 voluntary disclosure items used in this research. 
 
Categories Items
Average score for level 
of importance
0 1 2 3 4 5
1. Industry specialised operational statistics 0 3 4 9 16 8 4 — Important
2. Adoption or supporting mechanism to enhance 
ethical practices 0 0 2 9 18 11 4 — Important
Financial 
information 1. Market share in the industry 0 2 7 12 12 7 3 — Average important
Corporate social 
responsibility
1. Retirement scheme through foundation or other 
means 0 3 3 16 18 0 3 — Average important
1. Environmental incidents - Implementation of 
procedures for managing materials containing 
environmentally sensitive substances — convert the 
production processes 0 1 3 7 16 13 4 — Important
2. High degree of government regulation — 
discussion on the ways for appropriate investment 
decision 0 3 5 11 14 7 3 — Average important
3. Technical failure — discussion on hiring and 
retaining highly trained and experienced 
staff/developing control quality system and 
equipment maintenance / implementing software that 
allows better design and manufacturing process 0 2 3 14 14 7 4 — Important
4. Natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood) — 
Discussion on engineering, administrative and 
operating staff to identify and develop control 






1 Financial highlights – at least 5 years
2 Discussion of company’s new major products/services/projects
3 Information on new product development
4 Discussion of recent industry trends
5 Statement and/or information of ways to improve product and service quality
6 General statement of corporate strategy
7 Information relating to the general outlook of the economy
8 Discussion of competitive environment
9 A statement of corporate goals
10 Vision and mission statement
11 Description of marketing and distribution network for products/services
12 Awareness of responsibilties to the stakeholders
13 Discussions on specific actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal




Table 16 continued 
 
14 Impact of strategy on current results
15 Discussion about major regional economic development pertaining to product and business
16 Impact of competition on current market
17 Firm’s contribution to the national economy
18 Corporate achievement
19 Business activities related to Shariah matters (if applicable)
20 Halal status of the product (if applicable)
21 Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling as part of business (if applicable) 
22 Industry specialised operational statistics
23 Adoption/supporting mechanism to enhance ethical and productive practices
24 Senior management responsibilities, experiences, and backgrounds
25 Details of senior management team
26 Details of Shariah oversight board (if applicable)
27 Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown
28 Review of financial highlights related to the financial statements 
29 High level operating data and performance measurements that management uses
30 Share price information (trend)
31 Share price information (year-end)
32 Market share in the industry
33 Market capitalisation in the share market (year-end)
34 Any form of financing/investment or funding related to Shariah law (if applicable)
35 Zakat: method used/amount/beneficiaries (if applicable)
36 CSR policy; a statement of compliance
37 Discussion of involvement in community programmes (health/education/charity)
38 Discussion of environmental protection programme implemented
39 Discussion of involvement in public/private action designed to protect the environment
40 Corporate policy on employees’ benefits
41 Corporate policy on employees’ training
42 Discussion of employees’ benefits 
43 Discussion of employees’ training
44
Breakdown of workforce by line of business distribution or categories of employees by level of 
qualifications






Table 16 continued 
 
During the second Delphi process, panellists were also asked to score the voluntary 
disclosure categories. Figure 6 below shows the percentage scores for each 
voluntary disclosure category in the second round questionnaire. Two findings 
stand out. First, the scoring shows that financial information (30%) gained the 
highest percentage, followed by forward-looking and risk review information 
(28%). There was only a very small difference between general corporate and 
strategic information, and management and shareholders information with 16% and 
15% respectively. On the other hand, information related to corporate social 
responsibility at 11% shows the lowest percentage.  
45 Retrenchment/redundancy information 
46 Information about employee workplace safety
47 Discussion of health and safety standards
48 Sadaqa/donation (description on the recipients and purpose) (if applicable)
49 Waqf (description on the policy and amount spent) (if applicable)
50 Retirement scheme through foundation or other means 
52
Discussion of opportunities (firm’s prospects in general and business strategy on future 
performance in general)
53
Discussion of  specific external factors affecting firm’s prospects (economy, politics, 
technology)
54
Discussion of future products/services research and development activities with planned 
research and development expenditure
55 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure
56 Nature and cause of risks
57
Identification of major differences between actual business performance and previously 
disclosed opportunities, risks, and management plans
58
Environmental incidents - Implementation of procedures for managing materials containing 
environmentally sensitive substances - converting the production processes
59
High degree of government regulation - dicussion on the ways for appropriate investment 
decision
60
Technical failure - Discussion on hiring and retaining highly trained and experienced staff / 
developing control quality system and equipments maintenance/implementing software that 
allows better design and manufacturing process
61
Natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood) - Discussion on engineering, administrative and 
operating staff to identify and develop control programme





Figure 6. Disclosure categories scoring by percentage. 
 
Second, when discussing the categories of this voluntary disclosure, the result is 
also consistent with the scoring decision which indicates that financial information 
and forward-looking and risk review information are interrelated. Voluntary 
information on forward-looking and risk review seems to supplement the financial 
data, and assists stakeholders’ economic and strategic decision-making. This 
finding also resonates with Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) observation that risk 
disclosure can influence stakeholders’ assessment regarding future business 
involvement with the organisation. 
Finally, the panellists were asked to rank items on a scale of 1 to 5 in order to 





Figure 7. Forms of voluntary disclosure presentation: Panel member scoring. 
Results from the data demonstrate that quantitative information in monetary, unit, 
or percentage form has the highest scores (27%), with narrative disclosure coming 
second highest at 26%. Seventy per cent of those who were questioned indicated 
that disclosure of information cannot be purely in narratives without quantifying 
the information described. They contended that nonnarrative information captures 
their attention. As for table forms, 24% of panel members argued that only a few 
types of information can be disclosed using tables, for example, 5-year financial 
highlights and market price trends. Furthermore, they added that this information 
can also be disclosed using both qualitative and quantitative forms.  
Lastly, presentation in the form of figures, graphs, and photographs received the 
lowest score (23%). According to the panellists, this category of presentation 
requires an additional effort by the companies to display a summation of 
information about their significant activities. For example, panellist P39 stated that, 
since the competitive advantage increasingly involves value-creation processes, 
many large companies tend to provide pictures, graphs, and charts in their annual 




essential for annual report users, particularly for those who have less technical 
ability to analyse and interpret the data.  Scholars such as Beattie et al. (2004) also 
share his view; they note that images are helpful for understanding and analysing 
annual reports information. 
5.3 Summary 
This section detailed the construction and selection of voluntary disclosure items. 
An initial list was first developed after the review of previous studies, examination 
of Malaysian listed companies’ annual reports, and a preconsultative process with 
12 annual report users. These voluntary items were then modified, and used with 
40 panellists in two rounds of the Delphi consultation process. This processes 
validated and ensured that information of the following nature was considered: 
highly demanded information, and information which is important to Malaysian 
society. Several changes were made as a result of the suggestions given by the 
panellists, and a total of 61 voluntary items was finally identified as relevant to 
Malaysian annual reports and applicable to all sampled companies. The following 
section details the process of the second step in the development of the voluntary 
disclosure index.  
STEP 3: Development of scoring criteria for coding scheme 
A. Coding of annual reports 
Research into disclosure has employed content analysis as a research method in 
different ways (see, for example, Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010; Guthrie et al., 
2004; Hooks et al., 2001, 2002; Milne & Adler, 1999; Samkin, Schneider, & 
Tappin, 2014). Scholars such as Coy and Dixon (2004); Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers 
(1995); Hooks et al. (2002) who adopted a mixed approach distinguished between 
narrative and numerical data as part of the coding process. In addition, research that 
employed this criterion often used the disclosure index for measuring and capturing 
data when using content analysis27.  
                                                 
27 Content analysis is a study of recorded human communications, for example, books, annual 




In this study, content analysis was used to examine the extent and the major types 
of voluntary information disclosed in listed family-controlled companies in 
Malaysia.  The data were taken from the companies’ annual reports from 2009 to 
2013. The content analysis method in this research aimed to identify the importance 
of a disclosure item by referring to the frequency count or scores of such items. In 
order to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in each of the sample companies’ 
annual reports, content analysis was used to capture disclosure meaning by 
disaggregating narrative into several components and then describing the content 
of each component (for example, Beck, Campbell, & Shrives, 2010; Milne, 
Tregidga, & Walton, 2003; Raar, 2002). This process involved capturing and 
recording the content of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports and its 
presentation style and/or character (Beck et al., 2010; Samkin et al., 2014). 
Therefore, a coding scheme was established for the purpose of the content analysis. 
The aim here was to interrogate voluntary disclosure content diversity and depth, 
rather than to use a dichotomous system. 
B. Development of the coding scheme  
Prior to the coding process, a scoring sheet which included a 61 voluntary disclosure 
item index (refer to Table 12) was designed to score each of the sample companies’ 
annual reports on their voluntary disclosure levels. A scoring approach was 
adopted. The current study adopted this approach primarily because one major 
research objective concerns the developments in the voluntary disclosure levels 
over the period 2009 to 2013.  
I. Disclosure coding scheme and scoring points. 
Each paragraph in the focus sections was studied initially in order to understand the 
content of the message being conveyed. The purpose of this disaggregation into 
content categories increased the resolution of the coding scheme to capture all 
relevant meaning. The resolution of the coding is at the level of the phrase (see 




allocated to several types of categories28 and, where practicable, examined on the 
basis of unit of analysis (themes) for manual coding.  
For the purpose of this current research, the disclosure scoring scale is a 5-point 
scale 1 to 5. The scale was applied as follows: 
1.  the information disclosed is trivial or immaterial.  
2. the information is descriptive in nature ─ information is fairly provided and 
little meaningful discussion has been made.  
3. the information has intermediate detail ─ information is generally 
elaborated and may include narrative descriptions, and monetary and/or 
nonmonetary detail such as percentage, proportion, and statistic 
descriptions, and/or nondetailed diagram, table, chart and picture. 
4. the information provides detailed description ─ information is sufficiently 
elaborated, including the impact of the issues being discussed, and may 
include narrative descriptions, and monetary and/or nonmonetary details 
such as percentage, proportion, and statistic descriptions, and/or diagram, 
table, chart and picture with title. 
5. the information offers highly detailed disclosure ─ information is 
sufficiently elaborated, with the discussion about the item or issue being 
more than three paragraphs (includes discussion on impact, monetary 
and/or nonmonetary information such as percentage, proportion, and 
statistic description, and/or detailed diagram, table, or chart are provided).  
Following the voluntary disclosure items’ categorisation, the content was evaluated 
for its meaning and presentation, i.e., the level of information provided combined 
with the detail of the disclosure (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004).  
The implementation of the disclosure coding scheme focused on three sections 
namely, (1) Chairman’s Statement or Statement to Shareholders, (2) Review of 
Operation or Business Review, and (3) Management, Discussions and Analysis29. 
                                                 
28 Milne and Adler (1999) identify the coding unit sentence as the preferred option in terms of 
reliability. Sentences for disclosure context provide meaningful measurement.  
29 The Malaysia Companies Act 1967, and Bursa Malaysia listing does not mandate that listed 




These sections, beginning with the 2013 reporting period, were read30  in their 
entirety to identify voluntary disclosure. All information that related to either 
strategic planning, financial information, directors’ information, risk management, 
or performance evaluation was captured. 
STEP 4: Pilot testing: Reliability measure for coding data 
The pilot test undertook two rounds of analysis for reliability purposes. The pilot 
testing was conducted by two coders who independently analysed six annual reports 
consisting of three annual reports from listed family-controlled companies 
randomly selected from the actual sample (see Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007), with 
the remaining annual reports coming from other listed nonfamily firms, in order to 
have a distinctive range of the sample group. Data of the sample companies were 
hand-collected from the annual reports, which were downloaded from the website 
of Bursa Malaysia (http://www.klse.com.my). Prior to the pilot test, a small number 
of units were chosen to assess reliability informally during the coder training to 
ensure that the instrument and coding instructions were adequate to obtain a level 
of agreement (Beck et al., 2010; Lombard, Snyder‐Duch, & Bracken, 2002, p. 589). 
A. Developing a content analysis procedure: Initial approach 
The initial procedure was developed prior to the pilot analysis. In this stage the 
choices were guided by the ‘unit of meaning’, as utilised by Guthrie et al. (2004), 
Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005), and Samkin et al. (2014). To ensure the criteria 
accuracy in this study, this pilot test was guided by several decision rules, also 
known as coding schemes. Each paragraph was carefully read and understood in 
order to identify a suitable category for it. Narrations, within the context of the 
structuring in each sentence, may represent different ideas and meanings. Thus, the 
coders have to determine the purpose of sentences within their paragraphs. In other 
words, a coder should decide whether or not the paragraphs in a given section 
contains voluntary disclosure that fits within the five categories. Next, they decide 
whether or not the sentences in each paragraph fall under or contain items relating 
                                                 
Discussions and Analysis, but most companies provide these sections due to the statutory 
information stipulated in the said act and listing requirements. 
30 Chairman’s Statement, Review of Operation, and Management, Discussions and Analysis were 




to a particular category. Finally, the sentence(s) or voluntary items were coded in 
the form of their presentation in accordance with the disclosure coding scheme.  
These steps were performed for every paragraph in the document. As noted earlier, 
to ensure the coders were properly guided, all categories and items were clearly 
defined. 
A set of rules for the coding scheme was established to provide more guidance and 
clearer justification. The rules were as follows: 
1. Read and understand each category and its items (index). 
2. Read the annual report thoroughly. Sections may be located in different files 
for each company. There are three main sections for content analysis: (a) 
Chairman’s Statement or Statement to Shareholders; (b) Review of 
Operation or Business Review; and/or, (c) Management, Discussions, and 
Analysis.  
3. When determining whether a part of a compound sentence can be regarded 
as meaningful:  
a. An introductory statement of two or three words is not regarded as a 
separate sentence, and is added to the next sentence that it introduces. 
b. If the majority of sentences in a summation can be regarded as 
‘meaningful’ sentences in themselves, each statement is treated as a 
separate item.  
c. If the majority of sentences in a summation cannot be regarded as 
‘meaningful’ sentences in themselves, all statements are treated as one 
item/category.  
During the pilot test, the coding scheme was explained and coders were trained in 
coding. Each sentence within each paragraph contained in the annual reports was 
highlighted and marked with notes for coding purposes, which ensured the cross-
referencing system was in place from the start and thus made further calibration 
unnecessary. The process took 7 days to complete. These notes were later 
transferred and recorded on separate initial coding sheets under coder A and B. The 
initial coding sheets were combined and compared to measure the degree of 




using Krippendorff’s alpha (in SPSS 31 ). Krippendorff’s alpha is used in this 
research for several reasons, including that (a) it allows for any number of coders; 
(b) it is designed to be used for variables at different levels of measurement from 
nominal to ratio; and, (c) it also accounts for chance agreements between coders 
(Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Lombard et al., 2002).  
Figure 8 below illustrates the process carried out for coding the sentences in each 
paragraph under the relevant sections. The highlighted sentences were coded as 




Figure 8. An example to demonstrate the technique used for coding in this study. 
All of the scores noted in the annual reports were transferred into a worksheet to 
calculate both the quantitative and qualitative frequency with which an item appears 
in the sample.  
                                                 
31 SPSS – Statistical Package for Social Science, a software package used for statistical analysis 
This is a note 
made to quote the 
section, the 
category, and item 
into which the 
sentence falls, and 














picture). Thus, the 




indicate they are 
meaningful and 
provide additional 
information in a 
paragraph.  







is a continuous 
paragraph. A 











Thus, score the 




The reproducibility of the content analysis is assessed by calculating the 
Krippendorff’s alpha for the coders’ entire coding. In determining the standards for 
an acceptable level for interreliability, some care is needed to specify the situation 
in which the standards are to apply. Lombard et al. (2002, p. 600) emphasise that 
“an appropriate minimum acceptable level of reliability for the index or indices to 
be used” (p. 599) must be determined carefully (see also Beattie & Thomson, 2007; 
Beck et al., 2010; Guthrie et al., 2004; Milne & Adler, 1999).  
The results for the two researchers’ first round of reliability testing are presented in 
Table 17. The table indicates the level of agreement on each of the 61 indices and 
an overall Krippendorff’s alpha for all codes calculated. 
Table 17. First round of pilot test using Krippendorff’s alpha. 
 
In addition to the choice of the appropriate index for intercoder reliability, the 
acceptable level of reliability in Krippendorff’s alpha is set at 0.800 or αmin = 0.800. 
Following prior work carried out by scholars in accounting, including Beck et al. 
(2010), Boesso and Kumar (2007), and Milne and Adler (1999), the current research 
also applied the same decision rule.  
As indicated in Table 17, while the agreement rates show that 7 (58%) out of 12 
sections scored a high agreement rate, they also indicate that 5 (42%) of the sections 
analysed fall below the threshold value of 0.800 (i.e., four Management, 




KPJ Management Discussions and Analysis 0.6003
SOP Management Discussions and Analysis 0.7225
Hartalega Chairman's Statement 0.9476
Management Discussions and Analysis 0.9507
IJM Chairman's Statement 0.8028
Review of Operation 0.8165
Management Discussions and Analysis 0.7023
Tan Chong Management Discussions and Analysis 0.9107
Chairman's Statement 0.931
UMW Chairman's Statement 0.888
Review of Operation 0.7499




accounting and related literature, many authors acknowledge the issue of different 
interpretations in content analysis (see, for example, Deegan & Rankin, 1997; 
Guthrie et al., 2004; Milne & Chan, 1999; Unerman, 2000). During the pilot test 
process, both coders signalled several coding challenges. Among those challenges 
were that: 
(a) voluntary disclosure items are scattered outside focus sections, thus making it 
difficult for the coders to decide whether such information should be incorporated 
into the coding sheet; 
 (b) voluntary disclosure on board of directors’ information and senior 
management team are not within the focus sections, but the information falls within 
one of the categories;  
(c) difficulties for classification of sections arose when analysing voluntary 
information in the form of pictures, bar charts, diagrams, and graphs that are 
outside the focus sections; and,  
(d) coders were unable to describe bar charts, graphs, diagrams, and pictures for 
qualitative character.  
Having obtained the results in the first pilot test, both coders discussed the results 
further, and highlighted the issues. Both coders exchanged ideas and solutions for 
differences that had occurred in the coding process. One of the unconscious 
weaknesses in the coding process was lack of cross-checking of voluntary items’ 
categories and indices’ suitability to the types of information disclosed in the annual 
reports. It was also found that some of the disclosure items involved overlapping 
meanings or subjective judgements. Therefore, limitations of the coding process 
used during the first round were addressed, as indicated below, to further refine the 
guidelines for the second pilot test.  
1. Determining voluntary information that is not included in the focus sections:  
a. When skimming the voluntary disclosure in the annual report, the 
coder should begin from the first page excluding the cover page, 
table of contents, notice of annual general meeting or any corporate 




because some of the voluntary disclosure information, such as a 
company’s vision and mission and objectives or goals may be 
remote from their focus sections. Any voluntary information that is 
not within the focus sections shall be considered as part of the data 
for coding purposes. For instance, a half-page of the introduction 
section containing the company’s principle for standard and 
professionalism (nonmandatory) would be counted as voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
Figure 9. An exemplar of a company’s vision, mission, and corporate 
values in one page that is outside the focus sections. 
 
b. Information regarding the board of directors’ profile falls within 
Management, Discussions, and Analysis.  
c. Information that falls under a particular page such as health, safety 
and environment, human resource management, or training and 
development (any information that can combine as one section for 
CSR) is considered as voluntary disclosure, while corporate 
governance statements, being part of the mandatory sections, are 
excluded. 
d. Statistical highlights, for example, financial, production, and other 
quantitative data are considered as voluntary information. This type 
Highlighted ─ as the 
statement is a 
voluntary disclosure. 
A note was made to 
quote this vision and 
mission statement, 
consider them as two 
paragraphs. They 
were located outside 
the focus sections. 
Thus, was coded as 
“Others – Business 
Management and 
Operational 
Summary - vision 
and mission 
statement (item 
no.10), one paragraph 
and information is 
fairly provided – 




of information will fall under a separate section called ‘Others – 
Business Management and Operational Summary’. 
2. Information or data in the form of tables, diagrams, or charts which can 
convey a meaningful message is treated as a paragraph based on its 
subheadings or subtitles. For example, Figure 10 below indicates the two 
tables as two separate paragraphs, and subheadings are circled. The revenue 
subheading is important as it indicates one of the items under financial 
highlights for at least 5 years. 
 
 
Figure 10. An example of subheadings or subtitles as a paragraph. 
3. Any identification of overlapping meaning or ambiguity of word meanings 
for each sentence is allocated to a different coding sheet, with details for 
discussion. 
For the second pilot test, an additional section named ‘Others ─ Business 
Management and Operational summary’ was inserted into the new coding sheet 
guidelines.  This new section, together with all of the five sections with low alpha, 
was tested in the second pilot test independently. The results for the second round 
pilot test are presented in Table 18.  
Two subheadings 





within one category 




Table 18. Second round of pilot test using Krippendorff’s alpha. 
 
 
In Table 18 the Krippendorff’s alpha is reported for each company and independent 
section of the disclosure index. The results show that all sections tested are above 
0.800 or αmin = 0.800. Both coders discussed some minor issues, such as words used 
for an item in the coding sheet which may not accurately reflect the definition of 
the item (refer to Appendix E for each item’s explanation) along with the absence 
of the word ‘picture’ in the coding scale. In light of this discussion, the revised 




KPJ Management Discussion and Analysis 1.0000
Others ─ Business Management and 
Operational Summary 1.0000
SOP Management Discussion and Analysis 0.8983
Others ─ Business Management and 
Operational Summary 1.0000
IJM Management Discussion and Analysis 1.0000
Others ─ Business Management and 
Operational Summary 0.9994
UMW Review of Operation 1.0000
Management Discussion and Analysis 1.0000





Table 19. Revised disclosure scoring scheme used in this research. 
 
B. Test-retest  
To ensure the stability of the coding scheme, a pilot test for test-retest was carried 
out a week after completion of the second round of the pilot test. A Chairman’s 
Statement section in the 2009 annual report of IOI Corporation Berhad, Malaysia 
was selected for the retesting process. The test result shows a Krippendorff’s alpha 
of 0.8967 ─ higher than the threshold of 0.800. 
Table 20. Retest result for disclosure coding scheme using Krippendorff. 
 
As can be seen from the analysis of the percentages of agreement presented in 
Tables 17, 18 and 20, the results and procedures demonstrated a practical way to 
harmonise the output of two coders in quantitative content analysis. Applying a 
procedure for intercoder reliability assessment works to minimise the risk of 
intersubjectivity during the coding process, and thus enhances the credibility of 
research results. Based on the process executed for this content analysis, the 
1 Information trivial or the information about the item is immaterial.
2
Information descriptive in nature — the company fairly provides the 
information but little meaningful discussions were made.
3
Intermediate detailed — information is generally elaborated and may 
include narrative descriptions, monetary and/or nonmonetary (i.e., 
percentage, proportion and statistic description), and/or non-detailed 
diagram, table, chart and picture.
4
Detailed description —  information is sufficiently elaborated and 
including the impact of the issues being discussed.  May include 
narrative descriptions, monetary and/or nonmonetary (i.e., percentage, 
proportion and statistic description), and/or diagram, table, chart and 
picture with title.
5
Highly detailed disclosure ─ information is sufficiently elaborated and 
including the impact of the issues being discussed.  The item or issue 
appears to be more than three paragraphs (includes discussion on impact, 
monetary and/or nonmonetary information (i.e., percentage, proportion, 
and statistic description), and/or detailed diagram, table, chart and picture 
are provided.








disclosure coding scheme and guidelines proved viable instruments for quantitative 
content analysis and were thus ready to be used in the actual content analysis. 
5.4 Summary  
This chapter traced the development of a voluntary disclosure index. The index was 
first developed from prior literature, reviewing various sources of regulatory 
guidelines, and current annual reports. It was then pretested with 12 stakeholders 
for comments. The voluntary disclosure items from this process were then revised 
and checked. The consultative process produced a total of 67 items which were 
incorporated into the questionnaire for the Delphi process. Through a Delphi 
approach with 40 panel members from various organisations and professional 
backgrounds (who fulfilled the panel members’ criteria), a two-round consultative 
process was conducted to validate the items. During the process’ first phase, an 
index questionnaire was completed by, and interviews conducted with, these panel 
members. The purpose of the Delphi questionnaire was to obtain weightings for 
each disclosure index (using a 5-point Likert scale). Likert-type scales are often 
used to measure concepts in business research such as importance or intentions 
(Hair et al., 2007, p. 229). The data obtained from this process were summed and 
the calculated number was divided by 40 (the number of panel members) to obtain 
an average that represented the weighting of the item. At this point, the calculation 
of the average weight was also rechecked and confirmed using mean, median, and 
standard deviation in an Excel database and SPSS. The interview data with the 
panellists were transcribed to provide supplementary information on the 
quantitative data, and to aid in understanding what other potential voluntary 
information might be expected to appear in the annual reports. 
Next, the data from the weighting were sent for confirmation. A draft of a final set 
of 65 items was sent via email in the second phase of the Delphi process, under the 
same rules as in the first process. In addition, the panellists were required to score 
the disclosure categories (using percentages) in order to investigate their 
preferences on each of the categories. Minor changes were made based on the 
second phase outcomes. From the second process, a final list of 61 voluntary 
disclosure indices was established. These voluntary disclosure indices would be 




Finally, in conjunction with the voluntary disclosure index, a voluntary disclosure 
coding scale was developed for content analysis purposes. At this stage a set of 
coding schemes was developed. The coding went through two stages of pilot tests, 
and one test-retest method. The purpose of the pilot tests was to ensure that the 
disclosure coding scale provided adequate stability, reliability, and reproducibility 
in practice. After their establishment, the disclosure indices and disclosure index 
coding scale were used to measure the level and extent of voluntary disclosure in 
two groups of listed companies (family-controlled companies and nonfamily-







RESULTS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE BEST 
PRACTICE INDEX TO THE SAMPLE OF 
COMPANIES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the primary results for the content analysis of 150 public listed 
companies’ annual reports between 2009 and 2013. The aim of this chapter is to 
present the results gathered from applying the index to assess and score the level of 
voluntary disclosure provided in Malaysian listed companies’ annual reports. The 
chapter begins in section 6.2 with a brief description of the sample companies used 
in this thesis. Section 6.3 then presents the descriptive statistics that summarise the 
data. Within this section, a list of comparative analysis discussions are presented 
including: (a) the results of the overall level of voluntary disclosure items and 
categories provided by sample companies from 2009 until 2013; (b) a discussion 
on voluntary disclosure in relation to Islamic values; (c) the results of the level of 
voluntary disclosure between family-controlled companies and nonfamily-
controlled companies; (d) presentation of images (such as graphs, pictures, charts, 
and diagram); and, (e) the presentation of other voluntary information by 
companies. Finally, section 6.4 summarises and concludes the chapter.  
6.2 Background information 
As discussed in chapter 4, all of the sample companies were selected from the 
Malaysian top 150 companies for the financial year 2013. Data on the ownership of 
the sample companies were downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia website 
(http://www.klse.com.my). Each of the companies’ annual reports was checked 
thoroughly to collect the relevant information, and care was taken to identify the 
indirect holding of the largest shareholder (see Table H for selection technique for 





Table 21. List of nonfamily-controlled companies covered by the current study. 
 
 







Name of listed companies Industry Market value
1 Sime Darby Diversified 57,210.06
2 Telekom Consumer product 19,854.58
3 UMW Automotive 14,089.63
4 Gamuda Property 11,002.95
5 SP Setia Property 7,400.72
6 Sunway Holdings Diversified 4,687.89
7 Magnum Gaming 4,543.29
8 Kulim (M) Berhad Plantation 4,451.54
9 KPJ Consumer product 3,979.14
10 Dutch Lady Consumer product 3,016.96
11 IJM Plantation 2,847.79
12 WCT Holdings Property 2,239.55
13 Tasek Cement 1,839.48
14 Ta Ann Holdings Plantation 1,545.97
15 MBM Resources Automotive 1,254.18
Name of listed companies Industry Market value
1 IOI Corporation Diversified 30,352.59
2 Kuala Lumpur Kepong Plantation 26,580.86
3 Berjaya Sports Toto Gaming 5,471.67
4 Oriental Holdings Automotive 5,267.14
5 Tan Chong Motor Automotive 4,159.68
6 Top Glove Consumer product 3,493.59
7 QL Resources Consumer product 3,386.32
8 Mah Sing Property 3,137.70
9 Sarawak Oil Palms Plantation 2,853.39
10 Kossan Rubber Consumer product 2,762.50
11 TSH Resources Plantation 2,720.52
12 Keck Seng (M) Diversified 2,486.96
13 Cahya Mata Sarawak Cement 2,333.76
14 JayaTiasa Holdings Plantation 1,986.38




6.3 The comparative results examining the level of voluntary disclosure 
items provided by the sample companies from 2009 to 2013. 
This section focuses on the level of disclosure for each item in the disclosure index 
used in this study. As the title suggests, the aim of this section is to answer the 
second objective of this thesis, i.e., to identify the level of voluntary disclosure 
practices in Malaysian listed family-controlled companies from 2009 to 2013. This 
section reports on the frequency of the voluntary disclosure items provided within 
the following categories: general corporate and strategic information; information 
about management and shareholders; financial information; corporate social 
responsibility (CSR); and, forward-looking and risk review information. A 
comparison between family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled companies is also 
used to identify the differences in the voluntary disclosure items between family-
controlled and nonfamily-controlled companies. In addition, based on results of the 
comparative analysis between companies, the current level of Malaysian voluntary 
disclosure practices is reviewed. 
6.3.1 Overall comparative results of the level of voluntary disclosure categories 
from 2009 to 2013  
Using the same approach employed by Hooks et al. (2001), and Liu (2014), Table 
23 shows an overview of the average voluntary disclosure scores (AVDS)32 for five 
categories from 2009 to 2013. Overall, the table shows an increasing trend in the 
level of voluntary disclosure practice, particularly after 2011. However, the 
forward-looking and risk review information had a slight drop in the level of AVDS 
in 2012.  
                                                 
32
 The average voluntary disclosure scores (AVDS) are calculated using a normal average method: 
i.e., (numerical frequency of a voluntary disclosure item X’s content analysis score) / (∑number of 




Table 23. An overview of average voluntary disclosure score trends for five 
categories from 2009 to 2013. 
 
 
Although the result shows an overall low average voluntary disclosure score for 
each category, there are substantial changes in the level of voluntary disclosures 
(i.e., items provided by the sample companies in this study). Items such as (a) 
Impact of competition on current market; (b) Vision and mission statement; (c) 
Discussion of company’s new major product/services/projects; (d) High level 
operating data and performance measurements that management uses; and, (e) 
Discussion of future products/services research and development activities with 
planned research and development expenditure, are among the voluntary disclosure 
items that evidence large changes between 2009 and 2013. On average, the change 
in the level of voluntary disclosure for the five categories used in this thesis is at 
4.4%33 between 2009 and 2013. On the other hand, there are also a number of items 
within these voluntary disclosure categories that indicate a negative change (i.e., 
lower disclosure). These are: (a) Discussion of recent industry trends; (b) 
Discussion on specific actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal; 
(c) Market capitalisation in the share market (year-end); and, (d) Environmental 
incidents.– implementation of procedures for managing materials containing 
environmentally sensitive substances – converting the production processes. These 
results are also consistent with the panel members’ expectation, as they believed 
that the majority of companies in Malaysia are demonstrating slow improvement in 
their disclosure reporting, and that is why the level remains low. An assumption 
                                                 
33 The changes in % for each category between 2009 and 2013: general corporate and strategic 
information (5.40%) + information about management and shareholders (2.89%) + financial 




commonly pointed out by these panel members is the method that preparers use for 
disclosing information. For example, if the managers regard the information as less 
important, they may not disclose it. The panel members argued that this situation 
usually happened because these companies are afraid of litigation costs that might 
occur or competitors’ misusing information against the preparers. As an alternative, 
the preparers may choose to strengthen and improve the level of mandatory 
disclosure in their annual reports. As confirmed by Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004), 
in their Saudi Arabian study, companies tend to show good reporting on mandatory 
disclosure, accompanied with relatively large amounts of additional information 
that is closely related to mandatory disclosure. This finding suggests that preparers 
strategically use voluntary disclosure as a mechanism to moderate any negative 
news stated in their annual reports (Broberg et al., 2010; Qu et al., 2013; Uyar & 
Kılıç, 2012; Wang et al., 2013).  
6.3.2 Actual voluntary disclosure by companies from 2009 to 2013 
The levels for these items are presented in three quartiles. The percentile and 
quartiles rank were used as indicators of the frequency level in this study. Jo and 
Kim (2008, p. 866), for example, use the quartiles approach to classify companies’ 
ethical values through the level of voluntary disclosure34. Similarly, Loughran and 
McDonald (2014, p. 1655) use the quartiles approach to report the most frequent 
words of voluntary disclosure found in the sample companies’ documents (see, also 
Francis et al., 2005, p. 1139). Therefore, in this study, to present the numbers for 
frequently disclosed voluntary items, three quartiles were identified. First, the most 
frequent items that appear were classified as the highest group. These account for 
more than 15% of the items found in the companies’ annual reports. Second came 
items that are found to have an average frequency of less than 15% but more than 
10% in the observation. The third group indicated the least frequently disclosed 
items found in the observation. They appeared less than 10% in the observation. 
Figure 11 illustrates these three quartiles. 
  
                                                 
34  The percentile approach uses the average percentile rank of the number of press releases, and 






25th Percentile      50th Percentile  75th Percentile               
 
          1st Quartile             3rd Quartile 
   
       0%                 9.80%                        14.60%     33.20% 
  Low            Median         High                 Maximum 
       
Figure 11. An illustration for grouping the items based on quartiles. 
 
In particular, if the frequency percentage is equal to or greater than the third quartile 
value, then the item is assigned to Group 1. If the frequency percentage is lower 
than the third quartile but equal to or greater than the median, then the item is 
classified as belonging to Group 2 (usually or commonly found in the companies’ 
annual reports). If the frequency level is equal to or lower than the median, the item 
is assigned to Group 3 (less disclosed by the companies).  
Data from cross-tabulation, which are displayed on a percentage frequency by each 
company (see Appendices, Table C), were used to calculate the interquartile group. 
The minimum value is 0, which is also equivalent to 0%. The interquartile group is 
classified as follows. The first quartile (Q1) is the 25th percentile – Group 1, which 
is at 5.1 %. For the 50th percentile, the median is at 9.8% – Group 2. The 75th 




Table 24. Group 1 – Items occurring in companies' annual reports at 75th percentile. 
 
Based on the data calculated, only seventeen items have a disclosure frequency of 
more than 14.6% in the sample companies’ annual reports (Table 24, Group 1). As 
presented in chapter 5, the majority of panel members ranked these items as 
important on the basis that these items provide certain indicators about the 
company’s performance and business activities in a given industry. For example, 
Financial highlights – at least 5 years, and Discussion of recent industry trends are 
important for explaining the level of return on investments (ROI) of the financial 
period based on the assets invested. These disclosures also provide information 
about the implication of external factors on the industry’s raw material supply and 
demand, as well as the industry growth in the capital market respectively. As 
suggested by Ho and Taylor (2013), financial and capital market data information 
are basically used to review the company’s performance and wealth creation, and 







1 Financial highlights – at least 5 years 12.7 12.4 25.1 1.77 8.29
2 Discussion of recent industry trends 9.5 6.9 16.4 1.23 -8.23
3 Information relating to the general outlook of the economy 6.2 8.7 14.9 1.21 2.07
4 A statement of corporate goals 9.8 5.1 14.9 1.21 -0.71
5 Vision and mission statement 13.2 7.1 20.3 1.26 16.67
6 Discussions on specific actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal 10.4 8.2 18.6 1.32 -3.64
7 Impact of strategy on current results 7.1 7.5 14.6 1.21 6.29
8 Adoption/supporting mechanism to enhance ethical and productive practices 13.9 8.1 22 1.37 7.88
9 Senior management responsibilities, experiences, and backgrounds 12.4 12.3 24.7 1.74 6
10 Review of financial highlights related to the financial statements 16.5 13.2 29.7 1.74 7.32
11 High level operating data and performance measurements that management uses 13.6 13.4 27 1.74 14.95
12 CSR policy; a statement of compliance 16.8 16.4 33.2 1.49 12.35
13 Discussion of involvement in community programs (health/education/charity) 16 12 28 1.66 13.4
14 Discussion of involvement in public/private action designed to protect the environment 7.8 7.5 15.3 1.27 8.9
15 Corporate policy on employees’ training 10.2 5.8 16 1.23 1.31
16 Discussion of opportunities (firm’s prospects in general and business strategy on future performance in general) 7.8 7.7 15.5 1.26 6.94
Group 1


















Broberg et al. (2010) contended that a company can choose the type of voluntary 
information it wants to disclose based on the benefits and positive results it will 
gain from the stakeholders’ reaction. Amongst others, findings from the content 
analysis show that voluntary disclosure within the general corporate and strategic 
information category consists of items that are frequently disclosed by companies. 
This type of information often relates to the company’s background, market and 
competition, industry competitiveness, and prevailing economic and political 
conditions that can affect the company’s operational performance. In addition, these 
items also relate to investors’ interests. They are more geared to suppressing the 
propensity of investment risks, and attracting the investors to invest in the company. 
In other words, this finding suggests that companies commonly disclose voluntary 
information that is expected to protect the company’s performance, reputation, and 
existing external stakeholders.  
Noteworthy is the rising trend in the majority of the items between 2009 and 2013. 
However, one item was found to have an irregular trend of changes between the 
observation periods, namely Discussion of recent industry trends. During the 
period, this category showed a fluctuating trend in the level of disclosure. As stated 
in previous studies (see chapter 2 of the thesis), this result suggests that a company’s 
managers’ decision for such disclosure can be influenced by the external economic 
environment, for example, the increase or decrease in the price of oil, and a 
decreasing or increasing demand for raw material used in the company’s production 
process.  
 
(Source: IOI Group, 2013). 





Looking at the overall type within Group 1 in Table 24, it can be argued that the 
information that was frequently disclosed in the companies’ annual reports is 
related to the companies’ performance with regard to their objectives, financial 
performance, companies’ value, and relationship with the social environment. As 
confirmed in previous studies such as Ho and Taylor (2013), Broberg et al. (2010), 
and Ho and Wong (2001), this type of additional information is often disclosed 
because the preparers perceive it as important. These studies suggest that the 
preparers are also trying to create a better impression of companies’ share values. 
Simultaneously, the companies can develop a positive image in the eyes of the 
stakeholders for utilising resources, and consideration for the social and 
environmental relationships that might have been affected by the organisations’ 
activities (see also Wang et al., 2013).  
Table 25. Group 2 – Items occurring in companies' annual reports at 50th percentile 
 
As Table 25 shows, only 14 of the voluntary disclosure items in Group 2 (i.e., 
greater than median but less than 3rd quartile) were found in the companies’ annual 






1 Information on new product development 8.7 4.1 12.8 1.23 5.52
2 Statement and/or information of ways to improve product and service quality 9.2 4 13.2 1.23 11.51
3 General statement of corporate strategy 5.1 6.8 11.9 1.15 12.21
4 Description of marketing and distribution network for products/services 8.5 5.8 14.3 1.29 4.46
5 Awareness of responsibilties to the stakeholders 5.7 6.2 11.9 1.16 8.03
6 Discussion about major regional economic development pertaining to product and business 6.1 7.5 13.6 1.2 1.42
7 Impact of competition on current market 6.2 5.2 11.4 1.18 17.42
8 Corporate achievement 8.5 5.2 13.7 1.2 12.5
9 Industry specialised operational statistics 5.5 5.3 10.8 1.28 2.68
10 Share price information (year-end) 6.7 3.8 10.5 1.23 1.4
11 Discussion of environmental protection program implemented 7.1 5.6 12.7 1.22 8.45
12 Corporate policy on employees’ benefits 7 6.4 13.4 1.19 9.85
13 Information about employee workplace safety 8.5 3.9 12.4 1.23 6.99
14 Discussion of  specific external factors affecting firm’s prospects (economy, politics, technology) 2.7 8.1 10.8 1.16 8.09
Group 2 Voluntary disclosure items















information category, only 1 item came from the financial information category, 
and 1 from the forward-looking and risk review information category. These 
findings suggest that companies tend to disclose information that can represent their 
strength, achievement, and their position in the current economic environment. 
Bhojraj et al. (2004) stated that companies tend to offset the influence of voluntary 
disclosure that has a positive influence on the company’s performance and values. 
They do so to gain a strategic advantage from the information disclosed.  
Once again the frequency level of voluntary disclosure items in this group is 
dominated by the general corporate and strategic information category (9 out of 14 
items). One possible explanation for this finding is a company’s industry 
characteristic, in particular, where a company is concerned about assets acquisition 
investment for a business project. Ferreira and Rezende (2007) contended that 
information about strategy-specific investment disclosures was often provided by 
companies that required or were concerned about investment, especially in an 
unpredictable environment. One example is companies where special machines and 
equipment are required for a new venture. As stated in Cahaya Mata Sarawak’s 
annual report, 2012, p. 18: “Management is reviewing options to increase the 
plant’s production capacity and efficiency and studies are underway to acquire a 
more modern, second hand machine. We are also exploring the viability of a second 
wires plant in Bintulu.”  
Basically, the information is used to influence interested parties such as investment 
partners or bankers to undertake investments that are specific to certain corporate 
strategic plans and projects. Narrowing the content of the items, almost all of the 
disclosure concentrated on companies’ commitment and action plans in promoting 
their product quality and/or services. Information appearing in, for example, 
Information about new product development, Statement and/or information of ways 
to improve product and service quality, General statement of corporate strategy, 
Corporate achievement, and Industry specialised operational statistics can 
demonstrate the quality of the company’s performance in the capital market. In 
addition, as confirmed by the panel members, these items are also typically 
provided by companies when preparing the annual reports. The panel members 




ways. The majority of the panel members ranked these items either as averagely 
important or important. Consistent with the panel members’ expectation, therefore, 
these items are commonly disclosed in the annual reports, but not comprehensively 
so.  
As for Share price information (year-end), and Discussion of opportunities (firm’s 
prospect in general and business strategy on future performance in general), the 
panel members argued that the share price information is typically important for the 
analysts and investors to assess the company’s past financial results in order to 
project the company’s future performance. Together with the Discussion of 
opportunities (firm’s prospect in general and business strategy on future 
performance in general) disclosure, the analysts and investors, who are the 
interested parties, would be able to integrate both bits of information in their 
prediction when making an investment decision. Lim et al. (2007), Wang and 
Hussainey (2013), and Ho and Taylor (2013) noted that the disclosure of stock 
market information, as well as the forward-looking statements, are informative 
about future earnings and the companies’ current performance.  
As shown in Table 5 above, all of the voluntary disclosure items within Group 2 
saw positive changes between 2009 and 2013. Surprisingly, the Impact of 
competition on current market disclosure item shows the largest changes between 
the years. One factor that might explain this change is the Malaysian capital market 
environment during the annual report period. For example, as stated in IOI Berhad‘s 
2013 annual report, p.7:  
Similarly, the contribution from our associate, Bumitama Agri Ltd. 
(“BAL”), to the Group’s plantation profit was also impacted by the lower 
CPO prices during the financial year under review. However, the aforesaid 
impact was significantly mitigated by higher FFB production as more 
mature areas came on-stream’. According to Broberg et al. (2010) and Qu 
et al. (2013), a country’s capital market condition can influence and 
motivate the managers’ behaviour towards or selection of voluntary 
disclosure.  
Unlike in Group 1 and Group 2, about 31 voluntary disclosure items fall within 
Group 3 (see Table 26). This finding was unexpected and suggests that the level of 
voluntary disclosure in Malaysia remains low. There are two noteworthy 




in the Corporate social and responsibility (CSR) category, and 8 out of 10 (80%) 
voluntary disclosure items related to the Forward-looking and risk review 
information category fall under this group. This result also implies that forward-
looking and risk review voluntary disclosure items are the main category that are 
under disclosed by the sample companies.  
The unexpected results for Group 3 could be explained in two ways. First, voluntary 
disclosure on CSR may be perceived as less important by the preparers. As noted 
in previous studies (see chapter 2), providing additional information in companies’ 
annual reports involves cost. Therefore, companies must be very careful to use 
resources (i.e., human and financial) to provide only important information that 
benefits the companies. Second, the predictive voluntary disclosure in the 
companies’ annual reports can lead to stakeholders’ reactions. As confirmed by 
Amran et al. (2009), companies in Malaysia tend to disclose less about the status of 
risk. The authors suggest that the predictive or forecasted information can result in 
stakeholders’ reactions, and also litigation costs. These authors also contended that 
the preparers seem to follow the mandatory requirement relating to forward-looking 
and risk review information. These reasons could explain the level of forward-
looking and risk review disclosure provided voluntarily by the sample companies.  
Despite the low percentage of frequency in Group 3, this observation also provides 
further evidence that almost all voluntary disclosures within Group 3 saw positive 
changes between 2009 and 2013. However, only seven of the voluntary disclosure 
items have unexpected trends of change. These items are:  
 Halal status of the product  
 Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling as part of 
business  
 Market capitalisation in the share market (year-end)  
 Zakat: method used/amount/beneficiaries  
 Amount spent on employees’ benefits and training  
 Sadaqa/donation (description on the recipients and purpose)  
 Environmental incidents – implementation of procedures for managing 









Table 26. Group 3 – Items occurring in companies' annual reports at 25th percentile. 
 
Note: This table summarises the sample of 150 annual reports by 30 companies over the period 2009-2013. The 61 voluntary disclosure items are measured on 
the numerical frequency found in the total annual reports. The sample contains 150 observations during 2009-2013. Number of annual reports observed: 150 (n), 






1 Discussion of company’s new major products/services/projects 4.70 3.00 7.70 1.16 12.59
2 Discussion of competitive environment 3.70 4.00 7.70 1.11 2.24
3 Firm’s contribution to the national economy 4.10 1.00 5.10 1.07 6.45
4 Business activities related to Shariah matters (if applicable) 1.30 0.40 1.70 1.03 3.31
5 Halal status of the product (if applicable) 1.70 0.20 1.90 1.05 -3.85
6 Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling as part of business (if applicable) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.83
7 Details of senior management team 6.80 1.30 8.10 1.20 1.41
8 Details of Shariah oversight board (if applicable) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
9 Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown 0.80 0.20 1.00 1.02 4.17
10 Share price information (trend) 5.90 2.20 8.10 1.15 7.46
11 Market share in the industry 0.90 0.90 1.80 1.03 4.13
12 Market capitalisation in the share market (year-end) 4.60 2.20 6.80 1.13 -3.62
13 Any form of financing/investment or funding related to Shariah law (if applicable) 0.30 0.50 0.80 1.01 0.00
14 Zakat: method used/amount/beneficiaries (if applicable) 0.90 0.00 0.90 1.02 -1.61
15 Discussion of employees’ benefits 1.70 2.90 4.60 1.07 0.80
16 Discussion of employees’ training 5.90 1.70 7.60 1.15 5.93
17 Breakdown of workforce by line of business distribution or categories of employees by level of qualifications 4.70 1.20 5.90 1.15 3.76
18 Amount spent on employees’ benefits and training 6.20 0.50 6.70 1.13 -0.74
19 Retrenchment/redundancy information 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
20 Discussion of health and safety standards 6.50 3.20 9.70 1.17 5.04
21 Sadaqa/donation (description on the recipients and purpose) (if applicable) 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.01 -0.83
22 Waqf (description on the policy and amount spent) (if applicable) 1.00 0.20 1.20 1.02 0.83
23 Retirement scheme through foundation or other means 0.20 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.00
24
Discussion of future products/services research and development activities with planned research and development 
expenditure 5.30 4.00 9.30 1.15 12.12
25 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure 0.50 0.70 1.20 1.02 4.13
26 Nature and cause of risks 3.20 3.80 7.00 1.10 6.20
27
Identification of major differences between actual business performance and previously disclosed opportunities, 
risks, and management plans 5.60 3.90 9.50 1.15 1.46
28
Environmental incidents - Implementation of procedures for managing materials containing environmentally sensitive 
substances - convert the production processes 7.00 2.80 9.80 1.19 -2.74
29 High degree of government regulation - dicussion on the ways for appropriate investment decision 3.70 1.90 5.60 1.09 7.26
30
Technical failure - discussion on hiring and retaining highly trained and experienced staff / developing control quality 
system and equipment maintenance/implementing software that allows better design and manufacturing process 5.70 1.30 7.00 1.10 3.91
31
Natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood) - Discussion on engineering, administrative and operating staff to identify 
and develop control program 0.60 0.50 1.10 1.02 5.00
Group 3 Voluntary disclosure items















The second observation is that all voluntary disclosure items related to Shariah 
principles have the lowest percentage of frequency found in the companies’ annual 
reports. As expected for voluntary disclosure items related to Shariah principles, 
this finding seems to be confirmed by the small number of panel experts (see 
chapter 5) who argued that not all listed companies will disclose Shariah-related 
voluntary disclosure items. However, the arguments were put forward by panel 
members who are mainly non-Muslim and reflect their understanding about Shariah 
principles.  
Two voluntary disclosure items were found to have no disclosure in the observation. 
These are: (a) Details of Shariah oversight board, and (b) Retrenchment/redundancy 
information. These two voluntary disclosure items are new and have not been used 
in any previous voluntary disclosure study in Malaysia. However, given companies 
are producing goods and services for society at large, these items are considered 
important and may reflect the external stakeholders’ confidence in the company’s 
accountability. In particular, Details of Shariah oversight board was ranked as 
important by panel members. A possible reason to explain nondisclosure for this 
item is perhaps because the companies have no involvement in Shariah-compliant 
products and services. This view was also shared by some of the panel members, 
who argued that information relating to the Shariah background of a board of 
directors is expected to be provided by a company that is Shariah-based or Shariah-
compliant in response to better governance. On the other hand, 
Retrenchment/redundancy information was ranked as averagely important by the 
panel members. Based on this finding, this information is not perceived by the 
preparers to be important or of benefit to them.  
Based on the preceding findings, the average voluntary disclosure score (AVDS) 
for each category shows that the score for each item is low, i.e., in the range of 1.00 
to 1.77 (i.e., maximum score is 5)35. However, it is important to note here that this 
average scoring resulted from the coding instrument36  used. The data gathered 
showed there are some companies in the sample that attained a maximum score for 
                                                 
35 The range of scores for content analysis is from one to five. One is the minimum score for an 
item, and indicates the information is trivial. Five is the maximum score for an item, and indicates 
information disclosed is highly detailed.  





some of the voluntary disclosure items in their annual reports. This finding, 
therefore, suggests that the instrument used in the content analysis is robust. 
 
Figure 13. An example of the highest voluntary disclosure score of 5. 







Figure 14. An example for voluntary disclosure score of 2 
(Source: Gamuda, 2013, annual report, p.10). 
 
6.3.3 Voluntary disclosure in relation to Islamic values 
It is apparent that very few companies provide voluntary disclosure in relation to 
Islamic values. Based on the level of AVDS calculated for each item, this type of 
information received an average disclosure score between 1.00 and 1.05, for 
example, Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling as part of 
business (AVDS – 1.00); Halal status of the product (AVDS - 1.05); Zakat: method 
used/amount/beneficiaries (AVDS – 1.02); and, Waqf (description on the policy 
and amount spent) (AVDS – 1.02). This finding provides some support for the 
conceptual premise found in previous studies such as Barako et al. (2006), and 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002) that the nature of the business or a company’s 
industry is one of the factors that can influence the type of voluntary disclosure 
provided in the annual reports. This result was also expected. As documented in 
chapter 4, a small number of stakeholders argued that voluntary disclosure in 
relation to Islamic principles/values is important only to Shariah-compliant 
corporations or those related to religion. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) suggest that the 




values voluntary disclosure. Thus, a particular industry and ethnicity could explain 
the level of Islamic values disclosure. 
On the other hand, it is somewhat surprising that Halal37 status of the product 
information provided by some of the companies has a maximum score of 5. As 
noted earlier in chapter 5, a number of panel members expressed their thoughts that 
items falling under Islamic values might be least important because of the nature of 
the companies’ business and involvement in Shariah-based activities. Three 
companies (SimeDarby, Dutch Lady, and Kulim) have provided information on the 
halal status of the product. This finding suggests that these companies would be 
more likely to engage in or focus on their external stakeholders at large, particularly 
Muslims. Two companies (Magnum and Berjaya Sports Toto) provide information 
on Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling as part of business. 
These two companies were expected to provide information for this category item 
as they are involved in gaming and gambling activities. However, the voluntary 
disclosure for such an item was not consistently observed perhaps because the 
preparers perceived that stakeholders or society at large in Malaysia already 
recognise them as companies that are involved in gaming and gambling (see 
Ibrahim & Samad, 2010). Five companies ─ SimeDarby, WCT Holdings, 
TopGlove, KLK Kepong, and TSH ─ disclosed any form of financing/investment 
or funding related to Shariah law information voluntarily. This finding suggests that 
a number of Malaysian listed companies are aware of the importance of disclosing 
Islamic values for the purpose of their companies’ market reputation and value.  
In addition, this finding suggests that the halal status, particularly for consumer 
products, is an important concern for managers. This finding further supports the 
findings of Aribi and Gao (2010) who suggested a company tends to provide certain 
additional information voluntarily related to Islamic values because of the societal 
sentiment towards religion (although it as a company is not subject to it). 
Companies engage in this practice to ensure that sufficient assurance is given to 
Muslim clients and shareholders. This finding, therefore, suggests that the same 
underlying principles apply in Malaysia. Halal certification is a voluntary practice 
                                                 
37  Halal is a term used in Islam that indicates the product or services consume conform to religious 




for all manufacturing companies that produce consumer products, particularly in 
relation to the ingredients of a product38. This halal certification is issued by an 
independent agency called the Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia 
(JAKIM). Halal certification will be granted only if the product conforms to Islamic 
principles. An example of voluntary disclosure information related to Islamic 




(Source: Kulim, 2010, annual report, p. 118) 
Figure 15 shows that the certification of the halal status of a company’s product is 
a commitment to inform the stakeholders about the source of substances and/or 
derivatives used in its products. The sampled companies also provided a photo of 
their halal certificate in their annual reports. This finding also seems to corroborate 
the finding of Ireland and Abdollah Rajabzadeh (2011) who found that Malaysia’s 
population was concerned about halal certification of food and other consumer 
products such as toiletries including cosmetics, sun block, toothpaste, and 
mouthwash.  
                                                 
38  Certain things or actions are forbidden by Shariah law. They include: (a) meat and by-products 
from swine, (b) dogs, (c) carrion or dead animals, (d) slaughtered animals other than those 
pronounced in the Quran, (e) insects, with the exception of grasshoppers, (f) blood, with the 
exception of spleen and liver from halal sources, and (g) wine, ethanol, and aqua vitae. 




In addition to Islamic values disclosures, this current study found that two 
companies ─ KPJHealthcare and Telekom ─ provided disclosure on Zakat: method 
used/amount/beneficiaries in their annual reports. In Malaysia, there is no 
requirement for companies to pay zakat, because it is a form of Islamic business 
tax. A Muslim has to make two compulsory payments from the same source of 
income every year. Companies in Malaysia that pay both business tax and zakat can 
apply for rebates under Section 31 6A (3) of the Income Tax Act, 1967. If the zakat 
paid is less than the tax payable, the balance must be paid to the Inland Revenue 
Board (IRB). However, if the zakat paid is more than the tax payable, then the 
difference cannot be claimed from Inland Revenue Board (IRB) – Sec 6A(4)39. An 
example of voluntary disclosure on Zakat: method used/amount/beneficiaries 
disclosure (which received a score of 1) is shown in Figure 16. 
 
“... The Group’s profit before zakat and tax, registered a 19% 






One possible reason to explain this zakat disclosure might be due to the number of 
Muslim stakeholders that have direct involvement with the companies’ businesses 
operations (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004; Ireland & Abdollah Rajabzadeh, 2011; 
Naser & Nuseibeh, 2003). Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004), for example, suggest 
                                                 
39 http://sadaqa.in/2016/01/21/business-zakat-accounting-taxation-in-malaysia/ 




that companies subject to Islamic principles, and related to Muslim investors and 
customers, are likely to provide zakat information.  
6.3.4 An overall comparative analysis of voluntary disclosure practices by 
information categories and ownership 
Further tests were executed to investigate the level of voluntary disclosure in 
companies’ annual reports between family-controlled companies and nonfamily-
controlled companies based on ownership. To assess the differences in the level of 
voluntary disclosure between categories, a cross-tabulation Chi-square analysis was 
used (see Appendix J). A Chi-square analysis was carried out to determine the 
degree of the voluntary disclosure categories disclosed by family-controlled and 
nonfamily-controlled companies. The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 
17.  
Figure 17 shows the differences in the amount of information disclosed by family-
controlled companies and by nonfamily-controlled companies within the 
observation period. Overall, the figure shows that nonfamily-controlled companies 
provide more voluntary disclosure compared to that provided by family-controlled 
companies. This result is consistent with previous studies such as Chau and Gray 
(2002), Chen et al. (2013), and Chen and Jaggi (2000) who found that companies 
where the family controlled greater amounts of the company’s equity, and which 
also have managerial ownership on the company’s board, tend to provide less 






Figure 17. Comparative analysis of voluntary disclosure based on categories and 
ownership. 
Figure 17 shows that the level of disclosure by nonfamily-controlled companies are 
higher compare to family-controlled companies by 21% for the following 
categories: (a) General corporate and strategic information, and (b) Information 
about management and shareholders. In the financial information, and CSR 
categories, disclosure by nonfamily-controlled companies exceeds that of the 
family-controlled companies by 25%.  
It is important to note that there is a similar trend difference (12.5%) in the level of 
forward-looking and risk review information provided by nonfamily-controlled 
companies and family-controlled companies. This finding suggests that both 
family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled companies have relatively similar 
behaviour when it comes to providing such information. This finding further 
suggests that voluntary disclosure for forward-looking and risk review is still 
lacking (see for example Amran et al., 2009; Keasey, Cai, Othman, & Ameer, 
2009).  
Figure 17 also shows that the general corporate and strategic information reported 
had the highest percentage (13%), followed by financial information and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), at 12%. This finding seems to support the ideas about 
the level of voluntary disclosure in developing or emerging markets of Uyar and 




example, Uyar and Kılıç (2012) found that the general information and corporate 
strategy index, as well as the social responsibility index, are among the items most 
frequently disclosed by Turkish firms. As for Hong Kong, Ferguson et al. (2002) 
reported that strategic information disclosure was the most frequent information 
disclosed voluntarily by companies in their annual reports. Furthermore, similarities 
between the trend shown in the general corporate and strategic information, and 
financial information can be found in Ho and Taylor’s (2013) study in Malaysia. 
Ho and Taylor (2013) found that corporate and strategic information, and financial 
and capital markets information were among the most supplied additional 
information types provided by the Malaysian companies in their sample.  
It is worth highlighting that, according to the preceding data, 25% of the total 
sample companies in this study that disclosed their general corporate and strategic 
information also disclosed more financial and CSR information. Ho and Taylor 
(2013) suggest that companies prefer to disclose different types of information 
voluntarily as a means to strategise their approach to the stakeholders in assessing 
their business performance. As stated in chapter 2 of the thesis, these findings 
suggest that the Bursa Malaysia’s efforts to provide a CSR framework for all listed 
companies since 200640 have influenced the companies to become involved in and 
provide disclosure on CSR activities. However, as noted earlier, the majority of the 
sample companies focused on specific areas such as community investment projects 
or charity rather than on a holistic involvement that encompasses all areas of CSR.  
6.3.5 A comparative analysis of total average voluntary disclosure scores 
between family-controlled companies and nonfamily-controlled companies 
As noted earlier, the nonfamily-controlled companies provide a higher level of 
voluntary disclosure items than do family-controlled companies. However, several 
items within the voluntary disclosure categories showed a consistently high level 
of disclosure for family-controlled companies (refer Table 27).  
  





These items include:  
a. General corporate and strategic information  
 Discussion of company’s new major product/services/projects  
 Discussion of recent industry trends  
 General statement for corporate strategy 
 Information relating to the general outlook of the economy  
 Discussion of competititive environment  
 Awareness of responsibilities to the stakeholders  
 Impact of strategy on current results  
 Discussion about major regional economic development pertaining to 
product and business  
 Adoption/use of supporting mechanism to enhance ethical and productive 
practices. 
b. Information about management and shareholders 
 Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown 
c. Financial information 
 Review of financial highlights related to the financial statements  
 Market share in the industry  
 Any form of financing/investment or funding related to Shariah law 
d. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) information  
 Discussion of involvement in public/private action designed to protect the 
environment 
 Discussion of employees’ benefits  
 Sadaqa/donation  
 Retirement scheme through foundation or other means 
e. Forward-looking and risk review information 
 Discussion of opportunities (firm’s prospects in general and business 
strategy on future performance in general)  
 Discussion on specific external factors affecting firm’s prospects  
 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure  
 Nature and cause of risk, and natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood) 
 Discussion on engineering, administrative and operating staff to identify 





General corporate and strategic information. It seems that the sampled companies 
are inclined to disclose information most relevant to companies’ performance in a 
competitive market that is directed more towards the company’s major products 
and services, their current and past plans and their implications, as well as business 
results. Nevertheless, this category is considered important by the panel members, 
since the information within the category provides information relating to a 
company’s profile and portfolio that is essential for stakeholders to understand. 
Furthering Chau and Gray’s (2002) argument on the confidentiality and restriction 
of disclosure of information by family-controlled companies, this current finding 
suggests that family-controlled companies preferred to disclose information that is 
all-purpose for all types of stakeholders.  
Information about management and shareholders. Here the results show that only 
one family-controlled company tended to disclose information relating to the board 
of directors’ domestic and foreign shareholding breakdown. The observation is not 
surprising, as Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and Chen and 
Jaggi (2000) found that family-controlled companies tend to disclose less 
information about their key management and shareholders.  
Financial information. Information within this category seems to include items 
that are likely to construct the key performance review in the form of financial 
performance and the company’s position in the capital market. This finding 
suggests that this information could serve as a yardstick for the company’s position 
in the competitive market. As suggested by Naser and Nuseibeh (2003), disclosure 
under the financial information category can show a comparability of performance 
between companies operating within the same industry.  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) information. The results show that the 
family-controlled companies tend to provide more content – mostly in the form of 
narrative and graphs – when presenting information about charity and employees’ 
benefits than do nonfamily-controlled companies. The family-controlled companies 
provided information regarding the amount of contribution made to education 
foundations, orphanages, and old-folks homes. Each of these CSR items has at least 
one page of reporting dedicated to it. It is noteworthy to highlight that those 




belong to the family-controlled companies. Ghazali (2007) suggests the level of 
CSR in Malaysia remains at a low level. However, in response to the society at large 
and business environment, these companies may disclose CSR information in other 
forms of public document such as websites and newspapers (Ghazali, 2007). Other 
areas of CSR disclosure being mentioned relatively often may only be expressions 
of intent, including policy on the environment and details on the employees’ 
structure and training. For example, a quote from one of the family-controlled 
companies’ annual reports shows how it manifests its readiness on behalf of the 
company to shoulder full responsibility for environmental protection:  
Going forward, the Group is committed to pursuing and 
undertaking more initiatives in accordance with the CSR 
framework, leading to the achievement of the sustainable 
values for the community, the environment, stakeholders, and 
to society at large. (Keck Seng, 2013, p. 33) 
Forward-looking and risk review.  The information regarding the Forward-looking 
and risk review category was difficult to locate. The majority of the related 
information was found within the Chairman’s Statement, or Review of Operations 
section. Some differences are evident in the level of AVDS for Discussion of 
specific external factors affecting firm’s prospects (economy, politics, and 
technology), and Nature and cause of risks between family-controlled and 
nonfamily-controlled companies. The companies seem to be adopting a caveat 
approach to their future performance. One example appears at the end of the 
Chairman’s Statement section:  
Although contributions from the new plant will only be seen in 
FY2014, we are optimistic that with the right strategies, the 
performance of the oleochemical sub-segment in FY2013 would 
remain satisfactory amidst a slowing global economy. (IOI 








Table 27. Level of AVDS between different ownership for each item from 2009 to 2013 
 
































General corporate and strategic information
Financial highlights – at least 5 years 1.71 1.87 1.55 0.32 1.66 1.82 1.50 0.32 1.82 2.02 1.62 0.40 1.82 2.00 1.63 0.37 1.85 2.00 1.70 0.30
Discussion of company’s new major products/services/projects 1.13 1.18 1.07 0.12 1.16 1.25 1.07 0.18 1.12 1.15 1.08 0.07 1.14 1.13 1.15 0.02 1.27 1.28 1.25 0.03
Information on new product development 1.21 1.25 1.17 0.08 1.28 1.38 1.17 0.22 1.21 1.23 1.18 0.05 1.18 1.20 1.17 0.03 1.28 1.33 1.22 0.12
Discussion of recent industry trends 1.32 1.38 1.25 0.13 1.19 1.20 1.18 0.02 1.23 1.22 1.23 0.02 1.23 1.30 1.15 0.15 1.21 1.22 1.20 0.02
Statement and/or information of ways to improve product and service quality 1.16 1.28 1.03 0.25 1.23 1.28 1.17 0.12 1.23 1.30 1.15 0.15 1.24 1.32 1.17 0.15 1.29 1.40 1.18 0.22
General statement of corporate strategy 1.09 1.07 1.12 0.05 1.15 1.15 1.15 0.00 1.13 1.10 1.15 0.05 1.18 1.18 1.17 0.02 1.23 1.25 1.20 0.05
Information relating to the general outlook of the economy 1.21 1.25 1.17 0.08 1.15 1.10 1.20 0.10 1.28 1.22 1.33 0.12 1.18 1.18 1.18 0.00 1.23 1.17 1.30 0.13
Discussion of competitive environment 1.12 1.13 1.10 0.03 1.11 1.13 1.08 0.05 1.10 1.12 1.08 0.03 1.08 1.02 1.13 0.12 1.14 1.20 1.08 0.12
A statement of corporate goals 1.18 1.23 1.12 0.12 1.24 1.38 1.10 0.28 1.24 1.37 1.12 0.25 1.23 1.28 1.17 0.12 1.17 1.23 1.10 0.13
Vision and mission statement 1.15 1.18 1.12 0.07 1.20 1.28 1.12 0.17 1.27 1.32 1.22 0.10 1.36 1.52 1.20 0.32 1.34 1.50 1.18 0.32
Description of marketing and distribution network for products/services 1.31 1.42 1.20 0.22 1.26 1.35 1.17 0.18 1.25 1.25 1.25 0.00 1.24 1.22 1.27 0.05 1.37 1.37 1.37 0.00
Awareness of responsibilties to the stakeholders 1.14 1.17 1.12 0.05 1.16 1.15 1.17 0.02 1.13 1.12 1.13 0.02 1.15 1.13 1.17 0.03 1.23 1.15 1.32 0.17
Discussions on specific actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal 1.38 1.50 1.25 0.25 1.35 1.38 1.32 0.07 1.28 1.37 1.20 0.17 1.25 1.28 1.22 0.07 1.33 1.32 1.33 0.02
Impact of strategy on current results 1.19 1.22 1.17 0.05 1.20 1.18 1.22 0.03 1.15 1.15 1.15 0.00 1.25 1.25 1.25 0.00 1.27 1.18 1.35 0.17
Discussion about major regional economic development pertaining to product and business 1.18 1.10 1.25 0.15 1.14 1.15 1.13 0.02 1.31 1.37 1.25 0.12 1.18 1.12 1.25 0.13 1.19 1.15 1.23 0.08
Impact of competition on current market 1.10 1.10 1.10 0.00 1.11 1.15 1.07 0.08 1.15 1.15 1.15 0.00 1.25 1.32 1.18 0.13 1.29 1.35 1.23 0.12
Firm’s contribution to the national economy 1.03 1.03 1.03 0.00 1.06 1.07 1.05 0.02 1.04 1.07 1.02 0.05 1.11 1.18 1.03 0.15 1.10 1.18 1.02 0.17
Corporate achievement 1.13 1.17 1.10 0.07 1.18 1.22 1.15 0.07 1.20 1.27 1.13 0.13 1.18 1.22 1.15 0.07 1.28 1.42 1.13 0.28
Business activities related to Shariah matters (if applicable) 1.01 1.02 1.00 0.02 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03 1.03 1.05 1.00 0.05 1.05 1.07 1.03 0.03 1.04 1.07 1.02 0.05
Halal status of the product (if applicable) 1.08 1.17 1.00 0.17 1.08 1.15 1.00 0.15 1.04 1.08 1.00 0.08 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.04 1.05 1.03 0.02
Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling as part of business (if applicable) 1.01 1.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Industry specialised operational statistics 1.24 1.25 1.23 0.02 1.32 1.38 1.25 0.13 1.31 1.37 1.25 0.12 1.27 1.27 1.27 0.00 1.28 1.25 1.30 0.05
Adoption/ use of supporting mechanism to enhance ethical and productive practices 1.38 1.53 1.22 0.32 1.32 1.52 1.12 0.40 1.31 1.40 1.22 0.18 1.38 1.37 1.40 0.03 1.48 1.62 1.35 0.27
28.52 26.35 28.72 26.37 28.67 26.92 28.55 27.33 29.68 28.10
Information about management and shareholders
Board of directors' responsibilit ies, experiences, and backgrounds 1.67 1.83 1.50 0.33 1.74 1.90 1.58 0.32 1.77 1.90 1.63 0.27 1.77 1.90 1.63 0.27 1.77 1.90 1.63 0.27
Details of senior management team 1.18 1.37 1.00 0.37 1.20 1.37 1.03 0.33 1.21 1.38 1.03 0.35 1.20 1.37 1.03 0.33 1.20 1.37 1.03 0.33
Details of Shariah oversight board (if applicable) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03 1.03 1.07 1.00 0.07 1.04 1.03 1.05 0.02
5.20 4.50 5.30 4.62 5.32 4.67 5.33 4.67 5.30 4.72
Financial information
Review of financial highlights related to the financial statements 1.71 1.65 1.77 0.12 1.67 1.70 1.63 0.07 1.72 1.82 1.62 0.20 1.77 1.95 1.58 0.37 1.83 1.88 1.78 0.10
High level operating data and performance measurements that management uses 1.62 1.67 1.57 0.10 1.65 1.68 1.62 0.07 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.00 1.86 1.82 1.90 -0.08 1.86 1.90 1.82 0.08
Share price information (trend) 1.12 1.17 1.07 0.10 1.11 1.17 1.05 0.12 1.15 1.23 1.07 0.17 1.15 1.27 1.03 0.23 1.20 1.32 1.08 0.23
Share price information (year-end) 1.19 1.30 1.08 0.22 1.24 1.40 1.08 0.32 1.23 1.32 1.13 0.18 1.26 1.38 1.13 0.25 1.21 1.28 1.13 0.15
Market share in the industry 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.02 1.04 1.07 1.02 0.05 1.03 1.03 1.02 0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.00
Market capitalisation in the share market (year-end) 1.15 1.20 1.10 0.10 1.13 1.20 1.07 0.13 1.10 1.15 1.05 0.10 1.15 1.25 1.05 0.20 1.11 1.17 1.05 0.12
Any form of financing/investment or funding related to Shariah law (if applicable) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.03 1.00 1.05 0.05 1.03 1.07 1.00 0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Zakat: method used/amount/beneficiaries (if applicable) 1.03 1.07 1.00 0.07 1.01 1.02 1.00 0.02 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03
10.05 9.60 10.23 9.52 10.35 9.58 10.7 9.7 10.63 9.92










Notes:  The highlighted columns represent the level of differences in average voluntary disclosure score by family-controlled companies 
No 































Corporate social responsibility (CSR)
36 CSR policy; a statement of compliance 1.42 1.53 1.30 0.23 1.47 1.57 1.37 0.20 1.46 1.58 1.33 0.25 1.51 1.63 1.38 0.25 1.59 1.70 1.48 0.22
37 Discussion of involvement in community programs (health/education/charity) 1.62 1.75 1.48 0.27 1.53 1.63 1.43 0.20 1.68 1.72 1.63 0.08 1.62 1.63 1.60 0.03 1.83 1.88 1.78 0.10
38 Discussion of environmental protection program implemented 1.18 1.22 1.15 0.07 1.20 1.27 1.13 0.13 1.21 1.25 1.17 0.08 1.23 1.23 1.22 0.02 1.28 1.40 1.17 0.23
39 Discussion of involvement in public/private action designed to protect the environment 1.22 1.30 1.13 0.17 1.24 1.33 1.15 0.18 1.29 1.32 1.27 0.05 1.26 1.23 1.28 0.05 1.33 1.33 1.32 0.02
40 Corporate policy on employees’ benefits 1.10 1.13 1.07 0.07 1.14 1.17 1.12 0.05 1.22 1.25 1.18 0.07 1.26 1.30 1.22 0.08 1.21 1.23 1.18 0.05
41 Corporate policy on employees’ training 1.28 1.45 1.10 0.35 1.15 1.22 1.08 0.13 1.22 1.35 1.08 0.27 1.21 1.27 1.15 0.12 1.29 1.37 1.22 0.15
42 Discussion of employees’ benefits 1.04 1.07 1.02 0.05 1.06 1.05 1.07 0.02 1.12 1.08 1.15 0.07 1.08 1.08 1.07 0.02 1.05 1.03 1.07 0.03
43 Discussion of employees’ training 1.13 1.25 1.00 0.25 1.14 1.22 1.07 0.15 1.14 1.22 1.07 0.15 1.14 1.22 1.07 0.15 1.19 1.30 1.08 0.22
44
Breakdown of workforce by line of business distribution or categories of employees by level of 
qualifications 1.11 1.22 1.00 0.22 1.19 1.30 1.08 0.22 1.17 1.25 1.08 0.17 1.13 1.18 1.07 0.12 1.15 1.27 1.03 0.23
45 Amount spent on employees’ benefits and training 1.13 1.25 1.00 0.25 1.13 1.23 1.03 0.20 1.18 1.30 1.07 0.23 1.08 1.17 1.00 0.17 1.12 1.23 1.00 0.23
46 Retrenchment/redundancy information 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
47 Information about employee workplace safety 1.19 1.32 1.07 0.25 1.22 1.35 1.08 0.27 1.23 1.40 1.07 0.33 1.25 1.37 1.13 0.23 1.28 1.38 1.17 0.22
48 Discussion of health and safety standards 1.16 1.22 1.10 0.12 1.11 1.18 1.03 0.15 1.15 1.22 1.08 0.13 1.21 1.32 1.10 0.22 1.22 1.30 1.13 0.17
49 Sadaqa/donation (description on the recipients and purpose) (if applicable) 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.02 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.02 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
50 Waqf (description on the policy and amount spent) (if applicable) 1.01 1.02 1.00 0.02 1.03 1.02 1.05 0.03 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03 1.01 1.02 1.00 0.02 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03
51 Retirement scheme through foundation or other means 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
19.72 17.43 19.57 17.72 19.97 18.20 19.65 18.28 20.47 18.63
Forward-looking and risk review information 
52
Discussion of opportunities (firm’s prospects in general and business strategy on future performance in 
general) 1.20 1.23 1.17 0.07 1.27 1.28 1.25 0.03 1.23 1.33 1.12 0.22 1.33 1.27 1.38 0.12 1.28 1.30 1.27 0.03
53 Discussion of  specific external factors affecting firm’s prospects (economy, politics, technology) 1.13 1.05 1.22 0.17 1.18 1.07 1.28 0.22 1.17 1.08 1.25 0.17 1.08 1.03 1.12 0.08 1.23 1.13 1.32 0.18
54
Discussion of future products/services research and development activities with planned research and 
development expenditure 1.10 1.15 1.05 0.10 1.14 1.15 1.13 0.02 1.18 1.20 1.15 0.05 1.09 1.12 1.07 0.05 1.23 1.25 1.22 0.03
55 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.05 1.03 1.07 0.03
56 Nature and cause of risks 1.08 1.07 1.08 0.02 1.13 1.13 1.13 0.00 1.08 1.05 1.10 0.05 1.06 1.10 1.02 0.08 1.14 1.10 1.18 0.08
57
Identification of major differences between actual business performance and previously disclosed 
opportunities, risks, and management plans 1.14 1.15 1.13 0.02 1.13 1.20 1.05 0.15 1.16 1.25 1.07 0.18 1.18 1.20 1.15 0.05 1.16 1.20 1.12 0.08
58
Environmental incidents - Implementation of procedures for managing materials containing 
environmentally sensitive substances - convert the production processes 1.22 1.33 1.10 0.23 1.13 1.20 1.07 0.13 1.25 1.38 1.12 0.27 1.16 1.25 1.07 0.18 1.18 1.27 1.10 0.17
59 High degree of government regulation - dicussion on the ways for appropriate investment decision 1.03 1.03 1.03 0.00 1.03 1.05 1.02 0.03 1.09 1.15 1.03 0.12 1.16 1.18 1.13 0.05 1.11 1.18 1.03 0.15
60
Technical failure - discussion on hiring and retaining highly trained and experienced staff / developing 
control quality system and equipment maintenance/implementing software that allows better design 
and manufacturing process 1.07 1.10 1.03 0.07 1.13 1.23 1.02 0.22 1.13 1.23 1.02 0.22 1.08 1.15 1.02 0.13 1.11 1.17 1.05 0.12
61
Natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood) - Discussion on engineering, administrative and operating 
staff to identify and develop control program 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.00 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.02 1.05 1.08 1.02 0.07
11.12 10.83 11.33 10.97 11.70 10.87 11.30 10.97 11.72 11.37




6.3.6 Presentation of images (graphs, pictures, charts and diagrams) and other 
voluntary information by companies 
The majority of the companies include images such as graphs, pictures, charts, and 
diagrams in their annual reports. As noted in section 6.3.1, Financial highlights – at 
least 5 years has a high frequency and the highest level of average voluntary 
disclosure score (AVDS) under the general corporate and strategy information 
category. The majority of the companies include graphs, diagrams, and charts to 
show their key financial indicator trends for the period. The main key 
indicators/measurements used for presentation are revenue, profit before taxation, 
return on equity (ROE), earning per share, and total assets or net asset per share. It 
was found that family-controlled companies tend to provide less summary 
information in the form of images compared to the nonfamily-controlled 
companies. Furthermore, family-controlled companies such as Supermax provided 
only 2 comparative years instead of 5 years, and Keck Seng did not provide any 
visual images or pictures in their annual reports. As noted earlier, the Financial 
highlights – at least 5 years item was ranked as important by the panel members on 
the basis that this information provides a summary of the company’s performance, 
and can add value for those users (i.e., stakeholders) who have less knowledge in 
company analysis. The panel members also agreed that 2 years’ analysis is 
insufficient to demonstrate the company’s potential performance, as the 
information identifies no significant trend to compare with the performance. Figure 
18 presents a screenshot showing that Keck Seng provides financial highlights 






Figure 18. An example for no provision of bar charts or graphs. 
 
Within the information about management and shareholders category, the analysis 
revealed that the majority of the companies provide a picture of their board of 
directors and shareholders (Board of Directors’ responsibilities, experiences, and 
backgrounds). Furthermore, two-thirds of the family-controlled companies in this 
study included pictures of their senior management team in their annual reports, 
while others do not show any pictures of their management team (Details of senior 
management team). Family-controlled companies such as Tan Chong, Sarawak Oil 
Palms, Keck Seng, and Kossan provide only a written profile of the company’s 
board of directors or the senior management team (see Figure 19). Only two of the 
nonfamily-controlled companies ─ Dutch Lady and TASEK ─ had a low score for 
the management and shareholders information category. For example, TASEK also 
provides written profile for Board of Directors’ responsibilities, experiences and 
backgrounds. Once again, this finding is inconsistent with the panel members’ 
view. The panel members ranked all items within the information about 
management and shareholders category as important. Almost all of the panel 
members were in agreement that both narratives and images of the board of 
directors, and other top management levels, provide important knowledge for 
stakeholders, although it has minor economic implications. The panel members 
further argued that because Malaysia is an emerging market, knowing the 






Figure 19. An example for no pictures of board of directors under the information 
about management and shareholders category. 
In the financial information category, the majority of companies use images to 
present their main products and services. Although in some cases companies such 
as Supermax, and TSH provided images, they were merely used to supplement 
underlying messages the company wanted its annual reports readers to understand 
(see Figure 20).  
 
 
Figure 20. Images with underlying messages. 
The most frequent images found occur in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
category within the companies’ annual reports. The images provided often related 
to the company’s CSR commitment. The majority of the annual reports showed 
numerous pictures of events and activities conducted during the reported period. 
The outcome from the content analysis in this study shows that most of the images 
provided under the CSR category reflected the Discussion of involvement in 




with the level of AVDS in Discussion of involvement in community programmes 
(health/education/charity) presented in Part 1 of this chapter. This finding was also 
expected as almost all of the panel members contended that companies would 
provide pictures or visual images to assist in the understanding of exactly what the 
company does as part of its CSR activities. A number of examples of the 
companies’ activities in the last financial year were presented, and these included 
such things as a description of staff volunteer programmes or graphics of 
advertisements from their campaign for particular community programmes (i.e., 
education, health, and charity). 
On the other hand, the number of images provided for the environmental and 
employees’ aspect is minimal. Most of the images provided merely show the 
company’s involvement in environmental campaigns. The outcomes of this analysis 
also found that only two of the family-controlled and four nonfamily-controlled 
companies provided schedules and/or charts relating to Breakdown of workforce 
by line of business distribution or categories of employees qualifications. Figure 21 
provides an example of a schedule, and pie charts provided by Cahaya Mata 
Sarawak, and Mah Sing. 
 
 




The lowest number of images provided among the categories was in the forward-
looking and risk review information category. Most of the information provided 
was in narrative form which manifested the companies’ commitments to future 
plans and undertakings. It is interesting to note that a company that disclosed 
voluntary information for Environmental incidents – Implementation of procedures 
for managing materials containing environmentally sensitive substances in the 
production processes tended to present images of operational machines and/or 
equipment to describe the method and technology employed (see Figure 22). These 
findings suggest companies involved in diversified industry, and/or the property 
industry are trying to illustrate their strategic thinking in areas such as project 
sustainability and risk reduction.  
 




The aim of this chapter was to describe the level of voluntary disclosure provided 
by sampled companies in this study. The application of the best practice voluntary 
disclosure index used in this process took account of the possible information that 
can be covered under integrated reporting, as noted in chapter 2. Since integrated 
reporting is still at the infancy stage in Malaysia, the topic and framework on 




through this observation, it was found that some of the voluntary information 
provided by these companies, which also scored a maximum 5, is likely to be within 
the integrated reporting framework, for example, companies’ attempts to tell the 
annual report users about their company’s journey towards reaching its vision, 
reporting about its historical and intended performance. These intended statements 
and assumptions about the company are focused on the strategies that underlie its 
value and are carried out to reach its vision during the reporting period. 
Nevertheless, the content and context covered in the voluntary information is 
sparse.  
Overall, the application of the best practice voluntary index to the sample of 
companies shows that the level of voluntary disclosure by these companies is low, 
with an average overall score of 1.20 out of a maximum possible score of 5.00. 
Comparative analysis between five categories used in this study shows that the 
general corporate and strategic category was the most frequently provided 
information in the companies’ annual reports. On the other hand, forward-looking 
and risk review information is the least disclosed information. In addition, the 
analysis reveals that the level of voluntary disclosure items related to Islamic values 
is very low and is hardly found in the companies’ annual reports.  
With regard to the companies’ ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure 
provided, it was found that the family-controlled companies provide less voluntary 
disclosure compared to nonfamily-controlled companies. However, there were a 
number of information categories that showed higher scores for family-controlled 
companies. These are: Discussion of recent industry trends; General statement for 
corporate strategy; Review of financial highlights related to the financial 
statements; Discussion of employees’ benefits; Retirement scheme through 
foundation or other means; and, Discussion of opportunities (firm’s prospects in 
general and business strategy on future performance in general). The results 
indicate that these family-controlled companies are likely to highlight information 
that can emphasise the company’s strength in a particular industry and its potential 
to remain in the capital market. 
Although the analysis was not limited to narrative voluntary disclosure, it was found 
that the information disclosed tended to be expressed discursively. This form of 




and often fails to employ numerical symbols or expression that can reflect the 
monetary and economic measurement. This outcome is considered to be a downside 
aspect of the voluntary disclosure practice, as it failed to meet the panel members’ 
expectations. The voluntary disclosures were expected to disclose comprehensive 
information which is complete, and also easy for users to assess and quantify. 
Applying the same notion, voluntary disclosure presentation in the form of images 
was also limited to certain categories, namely corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
and general corporate strategic category.  
This chapter presented differences on the level of voluntary disclosure practice 
between companies. In line with the objective of this thesis, the company attributes 
were analysed to identify their association with the level of voluntary disclosure 
practice between family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled companies. The 
results and findings of this analysis are presented in the next chapter, and will 
provide some evidence of a significant difference in the level of voluntary 





COMPANY ATTRIBUTES’ AND THE LEVEL OF 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relationship between company attributes and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The aim of this chapter is to examine company attributes that 
can potentially explain the differences in the level of voluntary disclosure practices 
by family-controlled companies. The results and findings in this chapter are 
expected to contribute important insights about family-controlled companies’ 
features that represent these companies’ corporate governance structure. Thus, a 
number of family-controlled companies’ features, which also represent the 
companies’ corporate governance factors, are used to measure their relationships 
with the level of voluntary disclosure.  
Barako et al. (2006), Eng and Mak (2003), and Ho and Wong (2001) explain that 
companies’ attributes such as their corporate governance structure, listing status, 
ownership structure, firm size, and/or value are associated with the level of 
voluntary disclosure. According to Barako et al. (2006), the board of directors is 
one factor that can influence the level of voluntary disclosure because the board of 
directors has the resources and power to decide and shape the type of information 
to be disclosed voluntarily. Theoretically, the board of directors will evaluate the 
information that they perceive as important to the companies and which give 
meaning to the stakeholders in terms of making economic decisions. To interpret 
the association of companies’ attributes with the level of voluntary disclosure, 
proxies such as ownership structure, industry, market value, and specific family-
controlled companies’ attributes, namely number of family members, generation of 
family members, and experiential and professionalism factors are tested. The key 
findings in this chapter are organised as follows:  
7.2 addresses the significant differences in the level of voluntary disclosure practice 




7.3 provides a comparative analysis of average voluntary disclosure scores for 
Malaysian listed family-controlled companies, and 7.4 presents a synthesis of the 
findings. 
7.2 The significant difference in the level of voluntary disclosure practice 
by company market value, industry, and ownership 
The companies in this thesis show that they have different market value, are in 
different industries, and have different ownership. It, therefore, is important to 
compare these characteristics with the total average voluntary disclosure score 
(AVDS). The aim of this comparison is to identify whether there is a significant 
mean difference between elements. For this reason, factors such as market value41, 
industry, and ownership type, and AVDS were examined in order to identify the 
significant differences in the level of voluntary disclosure. In order to analyse the 
level of voluntary disclosure, a significance test was conducted.  
Significance test 
A significance test was performed to evaluate any significant difference in the level 
of voluntary disclosure scores within the companies’ attributes, namely market 
value, industry, and ownership type. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests are 
performed to test for differences between the means of each category of voluntary 
disclosure between companies’ attributes 42 . Table 28 shows the result of the 
ANOVA test used in this study.  
                                                 
41 Market value is indicated in Malaysia Ringgit  
42 Results from statistical tests of 150 annual reports (i.e., normality, homogeneity, and robust test) 




Table 28. Results on the significance test between companies’ attributes and the 
voluntary disclosure categories. 
 
***The mean difference is highly significant at the 0.01 level.  
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.  
*The mean difference is moderately significant at the 0.1 level. 
Note: F value shows the differences across companies’ attributes, and Sig value shows the significant level of the ANOVA. 
The higher the F value found, the more significant is the difference between companies in the population. For example, if the 
company’s market value shows 0.000 which < 0.01, this result shows that voluntary disclosure for general corporate and 
strategic information provided by companies is different across the companies’ market value range. 
 
This finding shows that the initiative of disclosing information voluntarily in the 
annual reports by family-controlled companies differs across the companies’ 
respective industries. Two voluntary disclosure categories show significant 
differences across industry. Table 28 shows there is evidence to conclude at the 5% 
level of significance that the mean level of AVDS in voluntary disclosure is 
different for the five categories of voluntary disclosure (p-value<0.05). However, 
the information about management and shareholders, CSR, and forward-looking 
and risk review categories show no significant differences across industries. This 
finding suggests that almost all companies provided similar patterns and levels of 
voluntary disclosure in relation to these categories. One possible reason for this 
situation could be plausibly explained by the fact that Malaysia is an emerging 
market, and companies are driven more by financial reporting indicators and 
measurements for performance rather than nonfinancial reporting for transparency. 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) suggest that Malaysian companies are more 
concerned with financial reporting as a consequence of the financial crisis in 1997. 
They emphasise financial reporting to show and inform the public that they are 
transparent about the company’s financial position and activities.  This result is also 
consistent with findings in chapter 5, where the panel members also agreed that the 
Companies attributes
F value Sig F value Sig F value Sig F value Sig F value Sig
Market value 18.434 0.000*** 3.193 0.042** 28.279 0.000*** 6.031 0.003** 2.133 0.119
Industry 2.603 0.0024** 1.894 0.094 4.94 0.000*** 1.429 0.212 2.149 0.0058

















financial information category is the most important information when evaluating 
a business’ current and future cash flow. However, this finding could vary from one 
emerging country to another due to differences in each country’s background. 
Wang and Hussainey (2013) argued that a country’s background context can 
influence the level of voluntary disclosure provided by listed companies. They 
suggest that a country’s government regulations and capital market regulatory 
bodies can shape the level of voluntary disclosure by companies. For example, 
Wang and Hussainey (2013) found that voluntary disclosure practices in relation to 
forward-looking and corporate governance information can be different across 
countries because of the difficulty in measuring disclosure for such information 
categories. 
This finding also seems to agree with those of Wallace (1994), Owusu-Ansah 
(1998), Naser et al. (2002), Barako et al. (2006), and Alsaeed (2006) who suggested 
that the level of voluntary disclosure between industries can differ. For example, 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) contended that firms that operate in highly regulated 
industries might be subject to rigorous controls that can have an impact on their 
voluntary disclosure practices. Consistent with Owusu-Ansah (1998), two of the 
voluntary disclosure categories (i.e., general corporate and strategic information, 
and financial information) are at a 5% level of significance, though the level of 
AVDS is different in the two categories. This finding suggests that different 
companies are subject to their industry’s regulation and thus, industry cannot 
explain the level of voluntary disclosure. Companies that are regulated by certain 
acts or laws may have provided higher disclosure. For example, those within the 
plantation industry might disclose more additional information on their concepts 
and strategies to preserve land that has been explored. One such company was 
Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad (KLK). It was found to have a higher disclosure 
score on its corporate social responsibility towards the environment. The industry 
to which a company belongs, therefore, seems to lead to a different level of 
voluntary disclosure. This factor resulted in mixed results for the relationship 
between industry characteristic and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports.  
This study’s findings suggest that Malaysian companies apparently preferred to 
disclose more general corporate and strategic information, and more financial 




environment, which may have impacted on the nature of their business (Alsaeed, 
2006). Some of the companies may provide less information in the general 
corporate and strategic information, and financial information categories because 
the companies’ managers may perceive the information they provided during the 
observation period was sufficient. They may also have expected less capital market 
reaction in their business industry (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
It is worth pointing out that a company’s market value and its ownership type have 
an important bearing on the level of voluntary disclosure. According to Eng and 
Mak (2003), large companies with high market value 43  ─ which was also 
considered as a control factor for the sample selection ─ are likely to disclose more 
additional information voluntarily. Consistent with Eng and Mak (2003), 6 of the 
30 highly ranked companies (Sime Darby, IOI Corporation, Kuala Lumpur Kepong, 
Telekom, UMW, and Gamuda) are among the companies that have more than 
MYR10 billion market value. This study’s findings suggest that high market value 
companies tend to provide more voluntary disclosure than other companies do. 
Additionally, when further tests (i.e., post hoc analysis 44 , see Table 29) are 
performed on the range of market values of these companies, the findings suggest 
that the variation of mean differences within the sample observations are significant 
for four categories, the exceptions being the Forward-looking and risk review 
information. This finding suggests that almost all Malaysian listed companies 
exhibit a low and similar pattern as regards the level of voluntary disclosure for 
forward-looking and risk review information.  
                                                 
43 Market value of firm – sum of market value of ordinary shares, preferences shares, book value of 
long-term and short-term debt, divided by book value of total assets. 
44 Post hoc tests in the analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used to provide specific information on 




Table 29. The mean difference results between companies’ market value range and 
the level of voluntary disclosure – result from post hoc analysis. 
 
***The mean difference is highly significant at the 0.01 level. 
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*The mean difference is moderately significant at the 0.1 level. 
Note: Mean difference shows the differences across companies’ market value range, and Sig. value shows the significant 
level of the mean difference. The higher the mean difference value found, the more significant is the difference between 
companies in the population. For example, the mean difference between a company whose market value is above 30 billion 
and those with less than 10 billion shows 0.000 which < 0.01. This result shows that voluntary disclosure for general corporate 
and strategic information provided by companies with above 30 billion market value is different from companies’ with less 
than 10 billion market value. 
 
This current study found supportive evidence on the relationship between the 
family-controlled companies’ ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure (see 
Table 30). This result is consistent with previous studies, particularly in China, for 
instance Chau and Gray (2010), Eng and Mak (2003), and Huafang and Jianguo 
(2007) who suggest that a company’s ownership plays an important role in the level 
of voluntary disclosure. In this study’s sample, about 60% of the top 150 listed 
companies on the main board of Bursa Malaysia are family-controlled companies45. 
These companies also have a number of family members in the company’s top 
management. This finding also corroborates previous studies by Chau and Gray 
(2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and Chen and Jaggi (2000) in the governance 
structure area who found a low level of voluntary disclosure in family-controlled 
companies.  
                                                 
45 In Amran’s (2011) study, it was stated 43% of listed companies on the main board listing in Bursa 












Above 30 billion v.s <10 billion 0.18 0.000*** 0.16 0.12 0.37 0.000*** 0.03 0.84 0.34 0.49
<30 billion and >10b v.s. < 10 billion 0.10 0.000*** 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.004** 0.14 0.002** 0.04 0.16
Above 30 billion v.s <30 billion and >10 billion -0.1 0.000*** -0.11 0.17 -0.12 0.004** -0.14 0.002** -0.05 0.16














Table 30. The mean difference results between companies’ ownership and the level 
of voluntary disclosure – result from post hoc analysis. 
 
***The mean difference is highly significant at the 0.01 level. 
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*The mean difference is moderately significant at the 0.1 level. 
Note: Mean is the level of average disclosure score for each category. Mean difference shows the differences across 
companies’ ownership type, and Sig. value shows the significant level of the mean difference. The higher the mean difference 
value found, the more significant the difference that exists between companies in the population. For example, the mean 
difference between nonfamily-controlled and family-controlled companies shows 0.000 which < 0.01. This result shows that 
voluntary disclosure for general corporate and strategic information provided by nonfamily-controlled is different from that 
provided by family-controlled companies. 
 
However, it is worth highlighting, as stated earlier in chapter 6, family-controlled 
companies provide certain voluntary disclosure items more than nonfamily-
controlled companies do. This study is also consistent with Al-Akra and 
Hutchinson’s study (2013) in Jordan. They found that family-controlled companies 
exhibit higher levels of voluntary disclosure on certain information compared to 
nonfamily companies. Al-Akra and Hutchinson (2013) suggest that regulatory 
reforms resulting from the globalisation of the capital market have implications on 
the level of voluntary disclosure by family-controlled companies.  
7.3 A comparative analysis of average voluntary disclosure score among 
Malaysian listed family-controlled companies 
This part of the thesis offers a comparative analysis of the family-controlled 
companies over the 5-year period. The analysis is presented in Table 31. Based on 
the table, the IOI Group shows the highest level of AVDS, at 1.35, followed by 
Cahaya Mata Sarawak at 1.26, and Mah Seng at 1.23. Keck Seng and Supermax 
have the lowest AVDS, at 1.08. The financial information category has the highest 
level of AVDS, followed by the general corporate and strategic information 













Nonfamily-controlled 1.25 1.320 1.300 1.240 1.140
Family-controlled 1.17 1.160 1.210 1.130 1.100
19.966 0.000*** 16.969 0.000*** 11.669 0.000*** 18.715 0.000*** 6.221 0.013**
Information about management 
and shareholders
General corporate and strategic 
information Financial information
Corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)





Table 31. Comparative analysis of average voluntary disclosure score between 
sampled family-controlled companies. 
 
Note: Berjaya Group (BERJAYA), Cahaya Mata Sarawak (CMS), IOI Group (IOI), Jaya Tiasa Holdings (Jaya Tiasa), Kuala 
Lumpur Kepong (KLK), Kossan Rubber (KOSSAN), Oriental Holdings (ORIENTAL), QL resources (QL RES), Sarawak 
Oil Palms (SOP), Tan Chong Motor (TAN CHONG), TSH Resources (TSH). 
 
Findings on the family-controlled companies might be explained further on the 
basis of their family governance structure. It is possible that the composition or 
generation to which family members who sit on the board belong could explain the 
variation in the level of voluntary disclosure of these companies (Chen et al., 2008; 
Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009). As pointed out by Chen et al. (2008), the unique 
characteristics of family owners is that they have different preferences for voluntary 
disclosure than do other owners. Since the focus of this current study is on family-
controlled companies, further correlation tests were performed. Four variables were 
used to check the relationships with the level of voluntary disclosure. These 
variables consisted of:  
1. Number of family members on the board: Ho and Wong (2001)’s study in 
China found that the number of family members on the board plays an 
important role in terms of the level of voluntary disclosure in family-
controlled companies. Ho and Wong (2001) suggested a high number of 
family members on a company’s board can lower the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the companies’ annual reports. 
2. Generation of family members on the board: Sansone, Mussolino, Cascino, 
and Pugliese (2010) that family business have a different ownership 
structure from other types of ownership. This leads to dominant family 
Company BERJAYA CMS IOI JAYATIASAKECKSENG KLK KOSSAN MAH SING ORIENTAL QL RES SOP SUPERMAX TAN CHONG TOP GLOVE TSH
Industry
Gaming and 









General corporate and strategic 
information
1.18 1.29 1.41 1.17 1.05 1.25 1.15 1.32 1.07 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.15 1.25 1.06
1.17
Information about management 
and shareholders
1.13 1.21 1.25 1.16 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.18 1.13 1.19 1.10 1.13 1.13 1.29 1.13
1.16
Financial information 1.26 1.37 1.71 1.18 1.10 1.16 1.12 1.26 1.13 1.09 1.15 1.13 1.24 1.19 1.06 1.21
Corporate social responsibility 1.13 1.23 1.17 1.12 1.05 1.23 1.03 1.28 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.04 1.09 1.14 1.12 1.13
Forward-looking and risk review 1.15 1.20 1.21 1.13 1.07 1.10 1.08 1.12 1.06 1.10 1.03 1.03 1.09 1.10 1.07 1.10






control. Most of the sample companies in their study are family-founded and 
consist of multiple generations and they control top management positions 
(see also, Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Noor Afza & Ayoib Che, 2010).   
3. Number of Muslim directors on the board: In the context of Malaysian 
companies, the proportions of Muslim directors on a company’s board is not 
stipulated in any statutory requirement. (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), however, 
suggested the proportion of Muslim46 directors on the board can influence the 
level of voluntary disclosure in a family business.  
4. Family members’ acquisition of knowledge related to: (a) a company’s 
industry, (b) business and management of a company, and, (c) a combination 
of both (a) and (b): Knowledge acquired by family members who sit on the 
board can be an important determinant in the voluntary disclosure practice. If 
the majority of the family members on the board were educated abroad and 
have been involved with numerous business industries, the influence of that 
knowledge could play an important role in explaining their disclosure 
behaviour (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). A further statistical test was performed 
to investigate the relationship between these factors and the level of voluntary 
disclosure and presented next.  
  
                                                 
46 The identification of Muslim directors in the annual reports is based on their name, which must 




Table 32. Correlation between family-controlled attributes and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*The mean difference is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
Note: Correlation coefficient shows the association between proxy used and the average voluntary disclosure scores by each 
family-controlled company, and Sig. value shows the significant level of the association. For example, the number of family 
members involved in the managerial level is negatively associated with the average voluntary disclosure scores in financial 
information 0.020 which < 0.05.  
 
Table 32 presents the results obtained from the correlations between the selected 
variables and the level of voluntary disclosure (subcategory). The result is revealing 
in several ways. First, the number of family members was found to have significant 
correlation with financial information and corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Second, the knowledge acquired in the business and management field by family 
members was found to have significant correlation with the corporate social 
responsibility category, and moderately significant correlation with general 
corporate and strategic information. Third, the generations of family members 
involved in the business was found to have moderately significant correlation with 
general corporate and strategic information.  
The combination of knowledge acquired was found to have moderate correlation 
with the general corporate and strategic information and financial information 
categories. These findings suggest that family members’ involvement in a company 
is an indicator towards the level of voluntary disclosure provided. With regard to 

















Number of family members -0.401 0.138 -0.890 0.753 -0.619* 0.014 -0.591* 0.020 -0.197 0.481
Generation of family members 0.473 0.075 0.167 0.552 0.270 0.331 0.282 0.308 0.240 0.389
Number of Muslim directors 0.181 0.519 -0.120 0.671 0.208 0.458 -0.150 0.594 -0.233 0.404
Knowhow-industry -0.034 0.906 0.344 0.210 0.152 0.589 0.029 0.918 0.000 1.000
Knowledge acquired-bussiness and management -0.494 0.061 -0.312 0.258 -0.409 0.130 -0.528* 0.043 0.002 0.955
Knowledge acquired-combination 0.444 0.098 0.269 0.333 0.496 0.060 0.298 0.281 0.000 1.000












to a higher level of information reported due to their experiential and 
professionalism backgrounds. First, the knowledge acquired by these family 
members represents the directors’ competencies in handling the overall business 
management, including disclosure reporting (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Ingley & Van 
Der Walt, 2008; Wang et al., 2013). For example, Ingley and Van Der Walt (2008) 
suggest that board members’ acquired knowledge and other skills are important in 
influencing the company’s business outcomes. Second, given family members’ 
knowledge and other skills are important, education (i.e., study abroad or at home, 
and areas of qualification) is another important element that can contribute to the 
board’s decision outcomes. As a consequence, the roles and responsibilities of 
company directors are becoming more challenging, and directors need to make 
company decisions that involve a greater degree of uncertainty and risk.  
It is apparent from Table 32 that there was no significant correlation between the 
number of Muslim directors and knowledge acquired in the industry field by the 
family members and the level of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. In the 
context of the number of Muslim directors on the board, the result of this current 
study does not support Haniffa and Cooke (2002). Haniffa and Cooke’s (2002) 
study in Malaysia suggested that Muslim directors may have an influential role in 
the level of voluntary disclosure. One of the possible reasons to explain this finding 
is the underlying principle of a company’s ownership and control. This finding 
suggests that the status of Muslim directors on the board does not warrant their 
influence on the decision for voluntary disclosure. In Malaysia, not all Bumiputera 
are Muslim. As noted in chapter 2, Bumiputera means “son of the soil,” which refers 
to Malays and other indigenous peoples as distinct from Chinese, Indians, and other 
nonindigenous residents. Therefore, the composition of Bumiputera requirement in 
the company’s board has no relationship with Muslim directors.  
It is somewhat surprising that none of these variables was statistically correlated 
with the information about management and shareholders category. This finding, 
however, seems to be in line with previous results obtained in this study, as stated 
in chapter 6. This finding suggests that regardless of the ownership type, listed 
companies in Malaysia tend to follow similar patterns or styles when providing on 
information about management and shareholders. One possible reason to explain 
this condition may lie in the companies’ obligations to meet the Bursa Malaysia 




Governance (MCCG) in 2012.These, amongst others, require companies to (a) 
establish clear board roles and responsibilities, (b) strengthen board composition, 
(c) reinforce board independence, and, (d) foster board commitment. In addition, 
according to an OECD (2011) report on Corporate Governance in Asia 2011: 
Progress and Challenges, Malaysia is amongst the jurisdictions reported to have 
developed provisions in the country’s corporate governance codes and listing rules 
about the board profile. However, the changes in the level of AVDS during the 
observation period are not encouraging. This study’s findings imply that the reasons 
for this phenomenon may be a lack of awareness on the part of boards regarding the 
importance of providing corporate governance information to the stakeholders. 
For a meaningful analysis, a correlation test was further performed between the 
mean of each voluntary disclosure category and the various family-controlled 
company characteristics mentioned above. Significant correlated factors identified 
in Table 32 were further analysed in order to identify detailed family-controlled 
company characteristics that have significant correlation coefficients. Number of 
family members on the board, generation of family members, and number of family 
members with acquired industry, business, and management knowledge were 
tested. Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010) suggest that manager-specific 
characteristics can influence corporate decisions. These characteristics may also 
contribute to voluntary disclosure decision practices.  
Thus, the key proxies are as follows: 
(a) Number of family members on the board – at least two family members on the 
board, three to four family members on the board, and more than four family 
members on the board 
(b) Generation of family members on the board – family members aged below 49 
years, family members aged between 50 to 70 years, and a combination of both 
young and old (below 49 years old, and 50 to 70 years old) 
(c) Number of family members with knowledge acquired: 
i Industry knowledge acquired – only 1 family member has industry 
knowledge, only 2 family members have industry knowledge, and more 




ii Business and management knowledge acquired – only 1 family member has 
business and management knowledge, only 2 family members have 
business and management knowledge, and more than 3 family members 
have business and management knowledge 
iii Combination of industry, business, and management knowledge acquired –
only 1 family member has industry and business and management 
knowledge, only 2 family members have industry and business and 
management knowledge 
Table 33 presents the Spearman (nonparametric) correlation-coefficient measures 
(see Appendix Q). From the correlation analysis, corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), financial information, and forward-looking and risk review categories have 
significant relationships (p-value ≤ 0.05) with number of family members on the 
board, generation of family members, and family members’ knowledge acquired. 
At least two family members on the board is positively significant (p-value ≤ 0.05), 
indicating that family companies with lower numbers of family members on the 
board tend to have a higher level of CSR disclosure. The coefficient for more than 
four family members on the company’s board, with its negative (-) significant 
correlation is unexpected. Family-controlled companies with higher numbers of 
family members on the board tend to disclose less financial information voluntarily, 
which means they tend to provide the disclosure only in accordance with the 
mandatory requirement (see, for example, Oriental, Kossan Rubber, & QL 
Resources’ details in Appendix H). This finding is supported by Ho and Wong 
(2001) in Hong Kong who found that companies with a higher number of family 
members on the board are more likely to have a lower extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Ho and Wong (2001) suggest that the situation is due to the number of 
family members who dominate the board and control the companies. The finding 
from this current study also seems to imply that Malaysia might have similar 
voluntary disclosure practices to those of Hong Kong family-controlled companies. 
Companies which have family members below 49 years old who sit on the board 
are positively significant (p-value ≤ 0.05) with the level of forward-looking risk 
review information. This result indicates that the company tends to disclose more 
future and risk information voluntarily as a result of having younger family 
members involved in the management. This result supported a previous study by 




generation, while the business is still run by the founders, can strengthen the 
companies’ strategies through sharing their knowledge. This notion also seems to 
support the links between managers’ preferences and strategies that might apply to 
the voluntary disclosure practices.  
Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) contended that family members’ involvement 
can also bring broader knowledge and deeper monitoring capabilities in the 
companies’ management through transfer of their tacit knowledge. Supported by 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) ideas, this current study found that companies 
with at least two or three family members that have business and management 
knowledge is positively significant with the level of forward-looking and risk 
review information. The chance of sharing knowledge and experiences by family 
members, either young or old, may contribute expertise and objectivity, which 
could provide an alternative and/or main perspective on the type of information that 
needs to be disclosed. Therefore, this finding shows that the number of family 
members with the appropriately acquired knowledge can encourage the level of 





Table 33. Family characteristics significant correlation coefficients with mean 
voluntary disclosure categories. 
 
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*The mean difference is moderately significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
Note: Correlation coefficient shows the association between proxy used and the average voluntary disclosure scores by each 
family-controlled company, and Sig. value shows the significant level of the association.  
 
The correlation coefficients for more than four family members on the board, more 
than three family members that have business and management knowledge, and 
only one family member who has the combination of knowledge of industry and of 
business and management are unexpected, but significant. These findings reveal a 
plausible explanation that the more family members involved in the management 
and who sit on the board, the lower the level of voluntary disclosure. While the 
number of family members involved tends to cause a lower level of voluntary 
disclosure, the knowledge and background of these family members are also 
Family-controlled 











Two family members on the board 0.354 0.195 0.040 0.888 0.460 0.085 0.63* 0.012 0.292 0.291
Three to four family members on the board -0.083 0.770 0.053 0.851 0.033 0.908 -0.321 0.243 -0.259 0.352
More than four family members on the board -0.289 0.297 -0.110 0.696 -0.549* 0.034 -0.295 0.285 0.000 1.000
Family members age below 49 years old 0.298 0.281 0.247 0.374 0.391 0.190 0.338 0.217 0.518* 0.048
Family members age around 50 to 70 years old 0.219 0.433 -0.072 0.799 -0.500 0.860 -0.034 0.905 -0.264 0.343
Combination of both young and old (below 49 years old and 50 to 70 years old) 0.146 0.605 0.182 0.517 0.120 0.671 0.223 0.423 0.380 0.163
At least one family member has industry knowledge 0.000 1.000 -0.389 0.152 -0.228 0.413 -0.068 0.811 0.000 1.000
Two or three family members have industry knowledge 0.131 0.643 0.279 0.314 0.368 0.177 0.134 0.635 0.000 1.000
More than three family members have industry knowledge -0.265 0.341 0.247 0.374 -0.293 0.288 -0.034 0.903 0.000 1.000
Only one family member has business and mamagement  knowledge 0.224 0.423 0.040 0.888 0.276 0.320 0.420 0.119 -0.292 0.291
Two to three family members have business and management knowledge 0.331 0.229 0.389 0.152 0.163 0.562 0.068 0.811 0.518* 0.048
More than three family members have business and management knowledge -0.495 0.061 -0.397 0.143 -0.549* 0.034 -0.527* 0.043 -0.323 0.241
Only one family member has combination  knowledge -0.495 0.061 -0.397 0.430 -0.549* 0.034 -0.295 0.285 0.000 1.000
Two to three family members have combination knowledge 0.066 0.815 0.247 0.374 0.065 0.817 -0.340 0.905 0.000 1.000
Number of family members




















expected to result in less voluntary disclosure due to managers’ different 
preferences in relation to the type of information (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). 
These relationships suggest family-controlled companies are heterogeneous, and 
managers’ specific characteristics tend to influence the differences in the level of 
voluntary disclosure because of managers’ personal values and cognitive (i.e., 
knowledge) styles.  
7.4 Synthesis of the findings 
Results and findings of the previous sections reveal the level of voluntary disclosure 
practice by Malaysian listed companies. The level of voluntary disclosure provided 
by these companies was examined from several perspectives: (a) comparison 
between companies’ attributes, (b) comparison between family-controlled 
companies and others, and, (c) comparison between family-controlled attributes.  
In terms of the relationships between companies’ attributes and the level of 
voluntary disclosure, the findings show that a company’s capital market and 
ownership have significant association with the types of voluntary disclosure 
categories. This result may be explained by the fact that a large company may have 
sufficient resources to accommodate the cost of providing additional information in 
its annual reports. On the other hand, a company’s industry results show mixed 
findings, and this study’s findings suggest that certain companies tend to provide 
additional information when the managers perceive that the benefits of certain types 
of information have a positive impact on the nature of their business.  
With regard to differences in the level of voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia, 
this finding shows the family-controlled companies provide less voluntary 
information when compared to nonfamily-controlled companies. Two companies 
─ Keck Seng and Supermax  ─ obtained the lowest average disclosure score, at 
1.08 each. It was an unsurprising result, since both companies are controlled by the 
founders: Keck Seng is controlled by siblings (i.e., two brothers) and Supermax by 
a husband and wife only. This finding suggests that family-controlled companies 
with only two family members, and no combination of young and mature family 
members on the board, can limit the amount of voluntary disclosure because of their 
highly concentrated ownership and control. In addition, the lack of a combination 




preferences about the importance of voluntary disclosure. According to Zahra, 
Hayton, and Salvato (2004), a family-controlled company with a strong individual 
business orientation could be an important driving factor to stay in the market, since 
such companies have autonomy of action in their management system, and this 
factor could affect their reporting preferences too. With regard to family-controlled 
culture, which has more of a focus on the relationships within the companies, it was 
found that family-controlled companies have a higher voluntary disclosure on their 
employees. Two possible reasons may be suggested here: first, the niche industry 
they are operating in, and second, the family engagement with the employees for 
long-term sustainable.  This finding seems consistent with Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006) who suggest that within family-controlled companies, industry 
competitiveness is not a significant influence on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Findings from this current study, therefore, imply that director ownership and 
family domination on the board are strong determinants of voluntary disclosure.  
In regards to the content of voluntary disclosure practices of the family-controlled 
companies, the current analysis revealed that this type of company tends to report 
items related to external factors and global conditions. The managers seem to 
perceive that external factors can have a major impact on the businesses’ operations 
and profitability and the risks that these companies might face. In addition, the 
family-controlled companies are inclined to disclose more on General statement of 
corporate strategy (2009 to 2012); Discussion about major regional economic 
development pertaining to product and business; and, Information relating to the 
general outlook of the economy (2010 to 2013). It is believed that the purpose of 
disclosing these items is to inform the reader about the risks from business 
competition, and challenges that the company may face due to scarce resources. 
This current result also seems to corroborate Hutton (2007) who found that family-
controlled companies provide more on quality earnings’ reports, focusing on 
financial warnings. Hutton (2007) suggests that less information was disclosed in 
relation to the plan, monitoring action, and strategy to be executed to mitigate a) 
the probability of the corporate risks that might cause stakeholder reactions, and b) 
competition factors. 
Turning to what has been disclosed, the findings show that information relating to 
companies’ business strategy plan, companies’ operational technology, companies’ 




as other disclosures relating to the company’s long-term plan are provided at a 
minimum level. The analysis reveals that the majority of disclosure provided in the 
annual reports was often descriptive in nature and based on the management’s 
interpretation of the company in general. Managers seem to be very prudent in 
selecting the type of information to be disclosed voluntarily. Information and 
discussion content tends towards the discursive, or, in other words, the information 
is merely general and repetitive in nature.  
Furthermore, detailed discussion (such as on the impact of the issues, objectives, 
results, and current status of certain activities carried out) on the voluntarily 
disclosed items is quite low. At times, there is almost no disclosure by most of the 
companies. One example is the information about management and shareholders 
category, where details on the board of directors merely document their 
professional experience and current position in a particular company. It is also 
found that one third of the family-controlled companies in the study do not provide 
pictures of the board of directors or the senior management team, or details of the 
board of directors such as directorships held in other companies, academic and 
professional achievement, and former occupations.  
In terms of the CSR voluntary disclosure category, the family-controlled companies 
were found to disclose more information about charity and education- related areas. 
The analysis reveals, however, that most of the charity homes and education funds 
declared belonged to the same organisations disclosing them. In addition, disclosure 
in relation to employees’ benefits and employees’ involvement in social activities 
are among the common information disclosed. Almost no family-controlled 
companies disclosed a training and development breakdown for the different level 
of employees categories.  
This finding implies that the majority of the family-controlled companies listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia main board are owned by the Chinese. Only one family-
controlled company within the top 150 listed companies in Malaysia is owned by 
Bumiputera. However, given that Malaysia is part of the Islamic bloc, and the 
majority of its population comprises Muslims, two items were found to be 
frequently disclosed by half of the nonfamily-controlled companies over the 5-year 
period. These were Halal certification of the product, and the Shariah-based 




Rajabzadeh (2011) study in the United Arab Emirates. They suggest that Muslim 
consumers are concerned about the halal status of their products. This practice of 
disclosing halal information represents a great opportunity for trustworthy firms, 
brands, and institutions. A country with a large Muslim population might influence 
the managers to consider more disclosure of their product and services’ status in 
this area/category. Doing so could be highly significant in promoting the company’s 
brand.  
Moreover, this chapter developed a further perspective in terms of family 
characteristics in order to produce knowledge about the level of voluntary 
disclosure practices by using an investigation of correlation analysis between 14 
variables as proxy to the family characteristics. These tests showed that high family 
member involvement in the management can lead to a low level of voluntary 
disclosure. On the positive side, the involvement of multiple generations (i.e., 
young and mature/old managers) appears to result in a higher level of voluntary 
disclosure, particularly in the forward-looking and risk review category.  
To complement the discussion on the level of voluntary disclosure practices by 
family-controlled companies, a further discussion introduced other perspectives, 
i.e., the annual reports users’ views. The reasons underlying the current level of 
voluntary disclosure by listed companies in Malaysia will be identified further by 
reporting the qualitative data results in the next chapter. The following chapter will 





VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PRACTICES: 
INTERVIEWEES’ THOUGHTS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the interview sessions with annual report users. 
The findings of the quantitative analysis presented in chapters 6 and 7 revealed 
differences in the level of voluntary disclosure between listed family-controlled and 
nonfamily-controlled companies in Malaysia. These findings offered a basis upon 
which to engage with users of annual reports to learn about their experiences of 
using voluntary disclosure information within annual reports.  
The research seeks not only to draw attention to the current level of voluntary 
disclosure practices but also to investigate factors that can shape the differences in 
the levels of voluntary disclosure between nonfamily-controlled and family-
controlled companies. To deepen understanding of the research issues, the 
following areas were chosen for further consideration: 
A. The nature of the voluntary disclosure 
B. The current level of voluntary disclosure practices by Malaysian companies 
C. Factors and challenges for voluntary disclosure practices 
D. The differences between family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled 
companies’ voluntary disclosure practices. 
The findings presented in this chapter also emphasise how differences in the 
disclosure practices are rooted. For example, the work of Ghazali (2008), and 
Kuasirikun (2005) on identification of voluntary disclosure is particularly valuable 
in helping researchers to understand how voluntary disclosure practices interwoven 
into the societal context serve to establish a better voluntary disclosure reporting 
culture. Using a similar approach to that used by Kuasirikun (2005), and Ghazali 
(2008), this chapter advances an understanding of how stakeholders perceive 
voluntary disclosure, and the individual factors that can influence the decision to 




8.2 provides a description of the interviewees and identifies the interview analysis 
questions.  
8.3 presents the interview data analysis in line with the research issues categories. 
8.4 reflects on the findings. 
8.5 summarises the chapter. 
8.2 Interview information  
Interviews were conducted to investigate the views and perceptions of annual 
reports stakeholders (including preparers and users) on voluntary disclosure 
practice in Malaysia. The 41 corporate managers who were interviewed included 
business owners, senior executives, analysts, regulators, and financiers. For the 
purpose of this analysis, the interviewees were coded as P1 to P41, and classified 
according to their occupation (see Appendix R). The interviews were first recorded 
and then transcribed; this process allowed the researcher to investigate and reflect 
on the information about the voluntary disclosure practice in Malaysia. The 
recorded interviews were carried out in English. However, it is important to note 
that English is not the native tounge47 of any of the participants, a fact which is 
reflected in many of the interview transcripts. The meaning of information given 
by all participants was translated based on their explanation and examples given 
during the interview sessions.  
8.3 Analysis of interview results 
This section reports the interviewees’ responses to questions about the voluntary 
disclosure practices of Malaysian listed companies. It presents the participants’ 
thoughts in terms of their ability to identify or interpret what, according to their 
knowledge and experience, signifies voluntary disclosure. As already noted in 
chapter 4, the interviewees are individuals in top management positions who use 
and/or prepare annual reports. The aim in choosing these individuals was to gather 
greater insight into the ways in which they perceived voluntary disclosure as 
material information that can affect stakeholders’ economic decision-making, and 
the implications of such disclosure in practice. All participants were asked to 
                                                 




elaborate on their experiences in relation to voluntary disclosure practices, their 
perceptions of them, and how those practices impact their work. The key questions 
and findings are presented below. 
A. The nature of voluntary disclosure reporting 
Question 1: What do you understand by the term voluntary disclosure? 
Complement to mandatory disclosure.  
Voluntary disclosure is a practice associated with the disclosing of additional 
information that goes beyond the statutory requirements or laws such as, in the case 
of Malaysia, the Malaysia Companies Act 1965, Malaysia Financial Reporting 
Standards, and Bursa Malaysia listing requirements (Muniandy & Ali, 2012). The 
interview findings identified that additional information disclosed voluntarily is 
essential to complement the traditional reporting included in companies’ annual 
reports.  
The following comments from the participants provide examples of their thinking: 
Disclosure is usually subject to financial reporting standards, the 
Companies Act, and code of corporate governance. So, to me, 
anything that is disclosed other than that, it falls under voluntary 
disclosure. (P29, analyst) 
Voluntary disclosure is essentially information disclosed by a 
company above that which is required by the regulatory 
framework, meaning the minimum information required by the 
stock exchange as well as the Security Commission. (P8, 
corporate finance advisor) 
In my understanding, voluntary disclosure is information that is 
not required by regulators and had been provided by companies. 
It is anything additional to tell everything that may [provide] 
windows into certain activities in the organisation. (P19, 
researcher) 
Irrespective of the participants’ professional backgrounds, the voluntary disclosure 
descriptions they gave all indicate that they are aware of the voluntary disclosure 
that companies provide in its various forms. It is worth noting here that the 
participants basically see voluntary disclosure as important because it complements 
the mandatory information. Thus, voluntary disclosure not only gives the 
companies economic benefits, but also helps the users of annual reports to evaluate 




Interestingly, various interviewees positioned voluntary disclosure as information 
that goes beyond the mandatory requirements; their definitions, therefore, seemed 
to echo those offered in previous studies (for example Sharma & Davey, 2013). Qu 
et al. (2013) contend that both preparers and users of annual reports are basically 
gaining economic benefits from the additional information provided in the annual 
reports. The belief that there is a benefit is based on the ability of voluntary 
disclosure features to support a country’s capital market’s sustainability through the 
provision of useful information (Qu et al., 2013).  
This finding clearly indicates how stakeholders react to voluntary disclosure and 
how they may use the available information to secure future economic benefits. In 
arguing for the use of this additional information by stakeholders, the participants 
implicitly position themselves as seeing that information as important when it 
comes to making economic decisions.  
Question 2: Do you agree that voluntary disclosure is important to other 
stakeholders rather than just investors? 
The importance of voluntary disclosure. 
The interview findings suggest that voluntary disclosure typically attracts a variety 
of stakeholders, especially investors, suppliers/creditors, employees and customers, 
when the stakeholders have an interest in engaging with certain business matters. 
This finding demonstrates that different stakeholders process the available 
voluntary disclosure in different ways according to their own self-interests. Here, 
the participants also expressed their views, from the economic perspective. For 
example, the following comments illustrate the types of stakeholders that might 
have an interest in the voluntary disclosure provided in a company’s annual reports.  
Yes, it is important to other stakeholders. I think, of course, the 
first one is investors, other than that will be bankers, employees, 
your suppliers, and customers … they would like to know the 
profit trend of at least 5 years, so as to evaluate the strength of the 
company. (P24, professional body) 
Yes, voluntary disclosure is important for both shareholders and 
other stakeholders. The public, and other related agencies, and 
NGOs may need this information to complement mandatory 
information for them to assess and make wise economic decisions. 




Consistent with previous studies in the area of voluntary disclosure (such as Ghazali 
& Weetman, 2006; Healy & Palepu, 2001), the interviewees viewed investors as 
the main stakeholders concerned about the companies’ financial performance when 
it came to making current and/or future investment decisions. A similar view was 
also reported by Ghazali and Weetman (2006) who found that companies assumed 
that voluntary disclosure was important in gaining stakeholder confidence. Ghazali 
and Weetman (2006) also suggest that companies tend to use voluntary disclosure 
as a way to reduce any negative economic implications their companies may 
experience in response to stakeholders’ reactions, particularly those of investors 
and analysts.  
This finding indicates that, in the interviewees’ opinion, voluntary disclosure is 
important to various external stakeholders. This finding is, therefore, consistent 
with the findings of Qu et al. (2013) in China, and Hossain and Hammami (2009) 
in Qatar, as well as those of Uyar and Kılıç (2012) in Turkey. Qu et al. (2013) 
suggest, for example, that the interest of stakeholders in listed companies can shape 
those companies’ voluntary disclosure practices. Companies that are heavily 
regulated by regulatory bodies tend to improve the level of voluntary disclosure 
because of the demands from stakeholders such as creditors, financial analysts, and 
public investors. This finding also shows that information provided in the annual 
reports provides a primary mechanism for companies to document their companies’ 
information, and inform the external stakeholders.  
Economic implications.  
The interviewees contended that voluntary disclosure can signify a company’s 
market value and ability to undertake future business activities. Voluntary 
disclosure such as assessment of risks and community value of projects can create 
an economic impact measurement in the economic value chain. For example, 
analytical followers of companies that are highly attractive might be interested in 
their future undertakings. The participants thought that it is important for companies 
to provide more additional information voluntarily, as the information can be used 
to support the stakeholders’ knowledge about the company’s performance. 
Voluntary disclosure can indicate the companies’ future operating performance for 




For example, whether the company is eligible to raise either bond 
or sukuk48 in some size … Obviously, we will look at the reports 
from the balance sheet and income statement but that is not 
enough. We also need to look at the voluntary disclosure 
information, and which project they are looking at in the future. 
(P40, fund manager) 
… someone who is assessing the risk of the company, they 
[annual reports users] would want to see more disclosure being 
given particularly on risk areas, to see how the company 
overcomes the risk or anticipates the risk so that the economic 
benefits can be predicted. (P29, analyst) 
Drawing on their experiences, P40 and P29 suggested that voluntary disclosure 
information provides essential data that allows users to make economic decisions. 
These views also show that users of annual reports such as fund managers and 
analysts are among the primary external stakeholders and that they often assess the 
credibility of the information provided in the annual reports. In addition, this 
information is often used to assess potential performance which relates to the 
companies’ future economic investment. This finding seems consistent with 
Bushman, Piotroski, et al. (2004), and Healy and Palepu (2001) who suggest that 
voluntary disclosure has economic implications in terms of companies’ economic 
investment. Broberg et al. (2010), for example, argue that additional information 
such as credit rating in the companies’ annual reports can represent additional 
information related to the level of debt ratio of the companies; it is, therefore, 
important for the stakeholders to have this information when they wish to assess the 
companies’ position in the capital market. 
On the one hand, analysis of the interviewees’ comments indicated that the analysts 
and fund managers use voluntary disclosure information to interpret how an 
organisation matches its own capabilities with the opportunities in the marketplace, 
and also the risks involved in implementing its strategies and accomplishing its 
plans and objectives. On the other hand, it was also argued that the companies are 
aware that information provided within the annual reports can be used as an 
advantage for them to strategise their economic benefits such as increase in share 
price, increase in goodwill, and financing opportunities, whilst fulfilling the 
stakeholders’ demands for voluntary disclosure for the purpose of economic 
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investment decision-making. Therefore, voluntary disclosure exerts economic 
influence over the decision to provide voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
(Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004; Stanton et al., 2004; Yuthas et al., 2002). 
To create a certain public image.  
The majority of the interviewees agreed that all companies want to differentiate 
themselves in many ways, and clearly show their existence in the capital market, be 
it domestic or international. It is, therefore, the interviewees argued, a manager’s 
prerogative to provide voluntary disclosure that can shape the amount of 
information disclosed and thus differentiate one company from another. This 
finding signifies that one of the purposes of voluntary disclosure is to create good 
impressions of a company. In other words, voluntary disclosure can distinguish the 
companies within the marketplace. The participants argued that a certain group of 
companies in Malaysia provide voluntary disclosure for the purpose of image 
building and reputation enhancement. In so doing, their objective is to benchmark 
themselves as leaders in the market and to be recognised by current and prospective 
stakeholders. Three of the participants made this point: 
They report for images and reputation to be able [to] compare 
[themselves] with others. (P15, P16, P17, services provider) 
… good image and reputation that should translate in the capital 
market into appreciation for the companies. (P8, corporate 
finance advisor) 
… we need to gather the information [both mandatory and 
voluntary] and reflectively compare [with other companies] 
where we ourselves stand in that particular industry. If it [this 
information] were not disclosed, we would not know where we 
are, and where we stand. (P41, CEO, services provider) 
This finding seems to support Armitage and Marston’s (2008; 2000) idea that 
companies can voluntarily disclose to promote confidence amongst stakeholders, 
particularly the investors, and to create an image and reputation for openness in 
sharing information. Similarly, Belal and Owen’s (2007) study in Bangladesh 
suggests that voluntary disclosure such as information relating to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is influenced by corporate image and that companies use this 





Here, the interviewees implicitly expressed their agreement that the voluntary 
disclosure is a strategy that can impact the public perceptions of: a) the reputation 
that companies have built; b) how companies benchmark themselves against other 
corporations; and, c) how they go about projecting their corporate image. However, 
the view expressed by P41 shows that a company’s reputation and image are created 
in combination with the overall context of the information provided in their annual 
reports. Furthermore, P41’s opinion suggests that the core of the companies’ 
reputation and image, when it comes to positioning themselves in the capital 
market, is dependent on the overall content of the voluntary disclosure rather than 
one focus area. 
B. The current level of voluntary disclosure practices by Malaysian listed 
companies 
Question 3. What do you think about the current level of voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysian listed companies’ annual reports?  
All the participants in the study believed that the current level of voluntary 
disclosure overall is improving, but that it remains at a low level. The majority of 
the participants expressed their frustration with the voluntary disclosure provided. 
One factor shaping this frustration is that the intention behind the information 
supplied by preparers impacts on the quality, nature, and usefulness of information 
for the reader. Furthermore, the types of voluntary disclosure items can be wide-
ranging, which can lead to wide interpretation. As a result, the quality of 
information is impaired. One respondent indicated, “Companies are free to provide 
other relevant additional information that is useful, and provide clearer explanation 
to the users” (P38, regulator).  
Although the majority of the interviewees agreed that voluntary disclosure 
reporting can enhance the companies’ value in terms of the commercial aspects of 
the companies, some participants argued that the information disclosed may 
sometimes be inappropriate for stakeholders or be difficult for them to understand. 
The following comments provide examples: 
… the importance is the clarity, what kind of information is 





… only relevant information should be disclosed in the annual 
reports, otherwise the unnecessary information can lead to 
misrepresentation, and wrong understanding that causes 
confusion to the stakeholders. (P39, media) 
… some of them make voluntary disclosure which is not relevant 
and has no impact on the companies’ value overall. (P16, services 
provider) 
For the participants, the aim of providing voluntary disclosure is to enhance the 
quality and the meaning of mandatory information provided within the annual 
reports. However, most of the participants in this study expressed their 
disappointment that the companies’ strategy and reporting style limit the benefits 
of voluntary disclosure in terms of providing clear and useful information. 
In terms of what constitutes useful disclosure content for stakeholders, the 
information should have a clear explanation on the item and useful data for 
interpretation, because users (i.e., the public) seek reliable and accountable 
organisations when making investment decisions, and when deciding whether to 
purchase goods or services. An example of an accountable organisation is one that 
has halal certification of the goods or products it provides to Muslims: 
… for example, the halal certification. The consumption of that 
particular product can significantly affect a company’s position 
in the market and also the financial performance. (P16, services 
provider) 
According to the interviewees, this qualitative characteristic (i.e., clear explanation) 
is important as it acts as a signal to the readers and informs them of the current and 
potential risks and benefits in economic decisions, and thus provides reassurance 
for stakeholders. For example, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) study in Malaysia 
found that a number of companies tended to focus on voluntary disclosure in order 
to gain stakeholders’ confidence after the economic crisis in 1997. Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) suggest that the disclosure of additional information can raise 
public trust and confidence in companies, especially when they are in a very 
competitive capital market. 
In addition, this finding is also consistent with Adams (2002), and Stanton et al. 
(2004). It can be argued that the content and message conveyed within the voluntary 
disclosure must be objective and useful. Stanton et al. (2004) argue that the use of 




the readers’ interpretation of particular information. In other words, the form in 
which a message is presented in the voluntary disclosure is often used to guide the 
stakeholders’ interpretation of particular outcomes.  
The interviewees also argued that, within the current voluntary disclosure practice, 
the nature of the information disclosed should represent the accountability and 
transparency of the manager providing the information voluntarily. As P40, and 
P22 commented:  
… companies are accountable to give to the public the true picture 
of the companies. (P40, fund manager) 
… depends on how accountable you are when making the 
decision on what kind of information to be included or disclosed 
in the annual reports. (P22, analyst) 
These interviewees’ thinking seems to agree with that of Adams (2002) who 
contends that the principle of  the managers’ accountability should underpin 
disclosure practices. Adams (2002) also argues that several features of voluntary 
disclosure, for example, the extensiveness of the reporting, its quality and quantity, 
its completeness, and critical analysis of the discussion, are crucial in establishing 
the preparers’ accountability.  
Here, the participants also highlighted the virtues of accountability and 
transparency when they put forward the idea that voluntary disclosure comes from 
the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors, something which is stated 
clearly in the Malaysia Companies Act and financial reporting standards. Indeed, 
the voluntary disclosure is expected to be objective and useful to users wanting to 
assess, and anticipate, the outcomes of the economic decisions they make based on 
the information provided.  
Question 4: Does the information disclosed give a sufficient picture of the 
companies’ nature and activities? 
The majority of the interviewees expressed their feelings that the voluntary 
disclosure remains insufficient and that it falls below their expectation in certain 
areas. Two of the participants stated: 




As for the current level of voluntary disclosure, there is room for 
improvement, not for perfection, but improvement, enhancement 
towards expectation level. (P2, equity investor) 
Those participants argued that it is important to improve every aspect of voluntary 
disclosure practices in order to increase the value and purpose of the voluntary 
disclosure practices of Malaysian companies. The comments made by P21 and P2 
above reflect the extent of current voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. 
For example, the finding that there is a need to improve the unsatisfactory level of 
voluntary disclosure seems to corroborate the content analysis result presented in 
chapter 6 (6.3.1), in that that finding shows a small change in the forward-looking 
and risk review information category. Irrespective of the ownership of a company 
in Malaysia, i.e., whether the listed company is family-controlled or nonfamily-
controlled, these interviewees pointed out that the low level of voluntary disclosure 
can be categorised in two ways. The first category consists of voluntary disclosure 
that is confined to limited categories, while the second consists of voluntary 
disclosure that is confined to information that will provide shareholders with a 
positive view of a company’s position. 
(a) Confined to limited categories. The companies that provided voluntary 
disclosure in their annual reports seem voluntarily to add information that is closely 
related to the mandatory disclosure requirements (Al-Razeen & Karbhari, 2004). 
As P23 commented, “The level of voluntary disclosure is at a satisfactory level but 
the disclosure is limited to financial statement [that is already mandated]” (P23, 
CEO, trading company). This comment signifies that the additional information 
disclosed voluntarily by the companies usually falls within the statutory 
requirements. An additional comment by P33 supports this point: “like Axiata, 
they disclosed more than what they should. But generally [it was] still subject to 
what Bursa Malaysia and Securities Commission want.”  
Companies tend to provide information about their achievement and their current 
operational activities. This information is often presented in the form of narrative, 
economic signs (i.e., percentage and rank), images, and qualitative statements about 
the companies’ current project progress and investment, as well as operational and 
credit risks (which is also part of the Bursa Malaysia requirements) on future 




As mentioned, the report must be supported by the historical 
figures or data, but the qualitative explanation or understanding 
of those must point to the direction of the future, not on the 
comprehensiveness of the existing business alone. People don’t 
expect to have a report about how the company feels good about 
itself, nor a glamorous picture; instead they want to have a 
snapshot of your [sic] performance as well as your [sic] strategic 
future plan, product diversification, market entry into a different 
zone, future plans for collaboration and alliances. (P35, analyst) 
Besides that, the interview participants also agreed that it would be safe for 
companies to disclose additional information related to statutory requirements. As 
P35 added:  
They know about voluntary disclosure but the question remains, 
subject to how much they want to use the information to 
strategise. Thus, it would be easier to report as required by the 
country or regulators. Not so much information is involved. (P35, 
analyst) 
These participants believed that information that falls within the mandatory 
requirement is considered as neutral and safe for the companies to disclose. This 
finding suggests that companies are willing to provide information that is not 
market-sensitive, and has either moderate or no negative economic implications for 
the companies’ performance in the capital market. In other words, companies are 
willing to provide voluntary disclosure when it seems safe to disclose the 
information. Two of the interviewees expressed their beliefs about disclosure in this 
area: 
… disclosure in respect to market, what they do to communities, 
such as charity support, scholarship for students, education, 
foundation … because it is safer than other types of information. 
(P27, researcher) 
… they would like to give the information as adequately as 
possible but not on sensitive areas. (P41, CEO, services provider) 
In addition to confining disclosure to certain areas, in terms of the voluntary 
disclosure features, most of the information provided in the annual reports does not 
contain a full and clear description of the disclosed item. The information consists 
of general and superficial statements, and so is merely a statement of intent and a 
signalling that there is an intention to implement certain activities. Some companies 
tend to cover as much as they can in voluntary disclosure segments, but the level of 




“They just provide surface information for the sake of box ticking because 
competitors are doing so” (P14, services provider).  Echoing this view, another 
participant commented: 
Basically what they are satisfying first, primarily, is the 
regulatory framework what needs disclosing, and above that also 
reporting to investors, the general investing public at large. (P8, 
analyst) 
Saleh, Zulkifli, and Muhamad (2010), for example, found that voluntary disclosure 
provided by companies in Malaysia such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
information which is also a voluntary disclosure, is still limited to general 
information and qualitative statements. The findings from the interviews in this 
study, therefore, confirm prior studies such as Saleh et al. (2010), since they argue 
that disclosed information takes more narrative forms which do not contain 
economic signs and which are, in general, merely statements.  
This finding also reflects the idea that companies provide voluntary disclosure 
because of the mandatory requirements to do so (such as listing purposes, bidding 
for government tender/contract, and borrowings) and also in response to peer 
pressure (i.e., external factors). According to Uyar and Kılıç (2012), companies 
tend to provide the mandatory information in order to fulfil the regulatory 
requirements so that they are able to satisfy their investors. The findings from this 
current study show that Malaysian companies also tend to react in the same way as 
companies in other emerging countries such as Turkey, since this finding reveals 
they need capital to finance high growth and respond to the intense competition for 
international capital in order to attract foreign investors.   
While the interviewees commented that the voluntary disclosure level in Malaysia 
is limited to certain categories, all the participants seemed to view the additional 
information disclosed as being limited to good news only. The preparers expressed 
this view when speaking about the CSR information in the annual reports. 
Essentially, the relationship between external factors and voluntary disclosure 
which relates to only limited voluntary disclosure categories may lend empirical 
support to the aforementioned assumptions reported in previous studies such as 




(b) Confined to information that presents a good outlook. The interview 
responses emphasised that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the most 
commonly disclosed category. This is the case because CSR information is 
considered as information that can be used to create a positive impression of a 
company, for example, by portraying a convincing picture about the company’s  
responsible use of resources, and underlining the contributions that the company 
has made to the community (Saleh et al., 2010). According to the majority of the 
participants, the aim of CSR voluntary disclosure is to raise stakeholders’ 
recognition of the company. Their comments showed that much of the voluntary 
disclosure, particularly in the CSR category, is more likely to promote social 
engagement designed to build or maintain a company’s reputation in a capital 
market than nondisclosure would. Consistent with this category type, almost all 
the participants agreed that the CSR category presents a good view of companies 
and informs the stakeholders about the contributions that have been made by the 
organisations. The following comments indicate some of the ways in which the 
participants viewed CSR disclosure: 
… for example CSR, this type of category of disclosure is likely, 
for a company, to create branding for recognition. (P38, 
Regulator) 
I think normally people will do it [disclose voluntarily] because 
of branding; for example, CSR. Why do you want to show that 
you are doing a lot on CSR? Because you want to be associated 
with something good, and create societal recognition. (P24, 
professional body) 
… other charitable works and money to be spent and shared with 
the public. … by sharing this information with shareholders, it 
should satisfy what they have done with the stakeholders’ money. 
Stakeholders’ money was spent for good deeds. For example, 
creating Yayasan (The Yayasan or Foundation), helping 
misfortunate people. So I think that would give satisfaction to the 
shareholders. (P41, CEO, services provider) 
Previous studies such as Saleh et al. (2010), and Campbell (2007) document that 
disclosing CSR information is important as its reporting can show how companies 
act in socially responsible ways. These authors also suggest that there is still a lack 
of CSR disclosure in companies’ annual reports and argue that this disclosure could 
help companies to attract new investment opportunities. These findings, therefore, 




build reputation and image. Rather, this information should also be concerned with 
and focused on the credibility of CSR disclosure that represents the ethical 
behaviour of the companies.  
In the participants’ experience as users of annual reports, the voluntary disclosure 
practices can be poorly presented as a result of decisions made by managers. 
Managers tend to provide voluntary disclosure because it accords with their own 
interests rather than to provide objective and useful information, and they see such 
disclosure as a complement to the mandatory disclosure reporting in the annual 
reports. Thus, it can be concluded that the level of voluntary disclosure practices in 
the companies’ annual reports is influenced by both internal and external factors. 
The first is that voluntary disclosure is optional for companies. When managers 
choose to disclose information voluntarily, the disclosure aims to complement the 
mandatory information and to attract more stakeholders’ interest in their companies. 
The second is that, since it is done on a voluntary basis, both the reporting styles 
and information contained in the reports are dependent on the company managers’ 
interests and their perceptions of the information provided. For these reasons, 
voluntary disclosure practices by Malaysian listed companies may be questionable, 
and may be influenced by certain corporate governance characteristics.  
Question 5: Do you think voluntary disclosure in Malaysia is a new kind of 
reporting trend? 
When the participants were asked about the current reporting trend in Malaysia, 
some agreed that the voluntary disclosure practices are no longer in their infancy. 
That said, they believed the transition from one phase to another has been quite 
slow. This notion seems consistent with the findings presented in chapter 6, where 
longitudinal study of companies in Malaysia showed small, positive, responsive 
changes in the voluntary disclosure practices. Conceding Malaysia is an emerging 
country, the participants believed that Malaysian social culture overall can 
influence the disclosure practice trends. One participant went further and suggested 
the country needs to encourage this change in society, and argued, “The society or 
stakeholders believe that the government and policy makers are responsible for 
initiating or developing disclosure responsibility through laws and regulation, and 




One reason that might explain this situation is that the culture of a country shapes 
voluntary disclosure practices. For example, in the case of Tabung Haji, one of the 
interviewees stated, “It reflects on the interests of a society. For example, the news 
about Tabung Haji’s49 plans for property investment in Detroit, in the U.S. The 
news has triggered regrets and concerns by all Muslims who had kept their money 
in the pilgrim fund.” This situation demonstrated that the significance of a society’s 
culture (i.e., cultural sentiment) can be seen to contribute to the shaping of the 
voluntary disclosure practices. As Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue, given that 
Malaysia is a developing country with an emerging market, factors such as 
ethnicity, religion, and language can contribute to the way the nation perceives 
accounting reporting and the voluntary disclosure practices.  
In the context of cultural factors, this finding reflects similar views about cultural 
underpinnings of accounting practices in India and New Zealand (Mir et al., 2009). 
Mir et al. (2009) argue that disclosure practice cannot be free from either cultural 
influence or societal values resulting from globalisation. The cultural diversity of a 
country can contribute to the policies underlying financial reporting as well as the 
level of corporate information to be shared with the stakeholders. Mir et al. (2009), 
for example, found that the increase in formal education in Indian society along 
with the system for managing companies have resulted in growing levels in 
disclosure reporting. This finding, therefore, supports the idea that the more 
developed a society’s culture, the better the level of voluntary disclosure practices 
will be, because the government is concerned about the relationship between these 
stakeholders’ interests and the country’s economic growth.  
C. Factors and challenges for voluntary disclosure practices 
Question 6: Looking at Malaysia’s current economy and social phenomenon, what 
drives the companies to disclose information voluntarily?  
The interview findings indicate that the regulatory bodies which enforce mandatory 
requirements are the main drivers for companies to disclose information 
voluntarily. Within this context, the majority of the participants believe that listed 
companies in Malaysia are more concerned about the authorities’ requirements 
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rather than those of the society at large. The finding shows that government 
regulations, listing requirements, and industries’ regulations can drive the 
companies to disclose additional information voluntarily. Pressure from society at 
large seems to have a subtle influence, particularly when companies have close 
relationships and dealings with the regulators or other authorities in the capital 
market. Over and above that, companies also consider the benefits that the company 
will get from the voluntary disclosure. For example, will the companies which 
disclose voluntarily gain greater long-term stability in the capital market than those 
which do not?  As P8 commented: 
As a manager, the factors that drive me to disclose more are 
interrelated. What drives me to disclose information is due to 
expectations to meet the minimum requirement as far as the 
regulators are concerned, and as the industry practices are 
concerned, and a corporate responsible concern. (P8, corporate 
finance advisor) 
Furthermore, P18 said:  
If the business feels that the society doesn’t need the information 
and they are fine with the statutory disclosure that is already made 
compulsory by law, then they don’t have the push factor to 
disclose. But I would say that the society also plays the role of 
actually showing the business owner that they need more than 
what is required to be disclosed, because the statutory 
requirement may not be enough for the society to make decisions 
and [it may] need a better picture. For example, how CSR-
friendly are you; how employee-friendly are you; how 
environmentally friendly are you? Thus, these are probably some 
of the soft factors that an investor and society want to know (P18, 
regulator) 
As already noted in chapter 3, the regulatory system of a country plays a vital role 
in shaping the voluntary disclosure practices. The absence of a well-organised 
regulatory system constitutes one of the challenges for voluntary disclosure 
practices. Since the business environment is growing and becoming globalised, the 
Malaysian government has to ensure a common regulatory corporate reporting 
framework for business activities. Bushman, Piotroski, et al. (2004), and Broberg 
et al. (2010) show that a country’s regulatory system and framework can lead to 
increasing voluntary disclosure practices on the part of companies.  
The findings from the interviewees’ responses to question 6 suggest that Malaysia’s 




level of the voluntary disclosure practices by companies. For example, government 
could plan long-term benefits for companies that provide voluntary disclosure, and 
the securities commission of Malaysia could consider establishing voluntary 
disclosure criteria that are beneficial in measuring the quality of the information 
and so help the annual reports users to assess the information. 
Question 7: Why is the level of voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia low? 
The majority of the interviewees pointed out that several challenges may account 
for the low level of voluntary disclosure practice in Malaysia. These challenges 
include: (a) the preparers’ fear of disclosing information that can be used against 
their companies; (b) a third party (vendor) being the preparer of annual reports; and, 
(c) the companies’ ownership. 
Managers’ attitude. 
One participant commented as follows: 
The biggest paranoia is that they [the family-controlled 
companies] don’t want it [to disclose voluntarily] because of the 
competitors out there using the information against them and they 
can lose out against the competitors.  Although this paranoia 
applies to all listed companies, it is about the level of paranoia. 
(P8, corporate finance advisor) 
P8, a corporate finance advisor, agreed that revealing too much information will 
result in negative implications for the company itself. P8 commented that his 
advice would be:   
… do not disclose too much information because you 
[management] know that competitors can take it up and use it as 
a means against you [your company]. (P8, corporate finance 
advisor) 
P8 highlights the damage that companies might suffer if certain unnecessary 
disclosures were to be made in their annual reports. This statement also reflects the 
need for managers to make wise decisions when providing additional information, 
as competitive behaviour exists among companies in Malaysia. Here, ironically, 
concern (i.e., fear) is positioned as a reason for providing less disclosure.  
When managers tend to limit the information disclosed for fear of both their 




disclosure. P19, who also stated his disappointment about the level of voluntary 
disclosure, said that low levels of voluntary disclosure are also a result of the 
organisation being concerned about the reaction of stakeholders and, especially, the 
reaction of investors, since they dislike negative or bad news. P19 commented:  
… that they [companies] prefer not to disclose or disclosed less 
is probably because they anticipate that information would reflect 
the society interest at large …. Although it [voluntary disclosure] 
creates an opportunity for them [the company], the information 
may create emotional resentment on the part of the public at large. 
(P19, researcher) 
The interviewees believe that by providing other types of voluntary disclosure may 
show irregularities. Hence, providing that information might create a risk for them, 
and could trigger external parties to seek additional information on the company, 
information that then presents the company in a less positive light (see, Chau & 
Gray, 2010). Thus, in addition to crafting their companies’ image and reputation 
through positive information, some managers might favour withholding private 
news in order to avoid or reduce any financial cost, political cost, or litigation costs 
that could result from providing too much additional information in their 
companies’ annual reports.  
The participants’ insights that managers may fear damaging their companies 
through irregularities or disclosing too much information support  the findings of 
Healy and Palepu (2001) who suggest that companies tend to disclose less or focus 
on disclosure related to other areas to protect their companies’ performance. The 
findings of this study revealed that companies in Malaysia are concerned about their 
reputation and, thus, limit the disclosure of additional information because they 
believe that the authorities could penalise them for any irregularities in their 
business activities reporting.  
Third party (vendor) as the preparer of annual reports.  
The second challenge that may lead to low voluntary disclosure is the fact that 
companies usually appoint a third party vendor to provide the company’s annual 
reports. This finding suggests that the facilities provided by third party vendors can 
result in the provision of insufficient information and in a lack of useful information 
that is specifically informative about the companies’ overall performance. For 




generic in that it uses similar wording and format for a number of companies’ 
annual reports. P23 expressed his belief that annual reports seem to be template-
driven:  
Usually, from the party (vendor) that the company hired to 
prepare the annual reports, choices of presentation and format are 
usually presented to the company and most boards decide to use 
the same format they had used the previous year, as it is easy to 
produce. Save time and take the information. (P23, Trading 
company CEO) 
Although the Malaysian Company’s Act, 1965 does not specify the presentation 
format of annual reports, the information contained in the annual reports should be 
independent. It should vary from one company to another, and should also reflect 
the nature of the company and its activities. Hossain and Hammami (2009), who 
conducted their study in Qatar, also document that company law in Qatar also does 
not specify the format for a company’s annual reports.  The law does, however, 
specify that the information provided shall reflect a “true and fair view” of the state 
of the company.  
The findings from the interviews show that the third party vendor engaged for 
annual reports preparation can lead to information discrepancies and/or annual 
reports’ being template-driven. While third party vendor services do help 
companies in the preparation of their annual reports, these vendors should be aware 
of the importance of the information reported within the annual reports. In 
particular, the disadvantage of employing third party vendors lies in the fact that 
this practice can lead to other obstacles to companies’ improving voluntary 
disclosure within their annual reports. 
Company ownership. 
Another challenge for companies to disclose voluntarily in annual reports suggested 
by the majority of the interviewees is a company’s ownership type. P7, a services 
provider with a major listed company, said the following: 
Ownership of the company: probably that will be two things. First, 
I think family firms are not interested in disclosing so they are 
going to be as private as possible and do the minimum required. 
Unless that particular firm happens to be a very large firm or 
conglomerate, and that interest could be on the larger scale; their 




willingness to provide more information is higher compared to 
that of smaller ones. (P7, services provider) 
A regulator explained: 
If the company is family-based, and controlled by family 
members, we seldom see disclosure in this company. Even 
though they are a large public company, they still maintain their 
secrecy and they don’t like people to know a lot about the 
company. They only announce what is required by the law. They 
would like to keep it in their circle of controlling shareholders. 
(P34, regulator) 
Although the family-controlled companies are publicly listed, the comments by P7 
and P34 show that, for some reason, a company’s ownership type is one of the 
inevitable challenges to voluntary disclosure practices within the annual reports. 
Participants highlighted a number of elements relating to family characteristics in 
the context of corporate governance, managers’ culture, customs, and beliefs. In 
light of these challenges, factors contributing to the differences in the voluntary 
disclosure practices of family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled businesses were 
discussed with the participants. The findings in these areas are presented in the next 
section. 
D. The differences in the voluntary disclosure practices of family-
controlled and nonfamily-controlled companies 
Question 8: Do you think there will be differences in the voluntary disclosure 
practices of family-controlled companies and those of other companies? 
During the interviews, a number of participants agreed that family-controlled 
companies have a different approach and style in their voluntary disclosure 
practices. The majority of the participants agreed that the level of voluntary 
disclosure practices in family-controlled companies is different from that in other 
types of companies. P40, an analyst, gave one example of when he had to request 
more information from companies for issuance of bonds or sukuk50. According to 
P40:  
When it is a family business, they refuse to disclose more because 
it is not mandatory. But some investors want to examine the share 
structure in line with the standard. So when they were told that 
                                                 




such information is a requirement for share structure, then they 
will provide it. But then we always find a couple of things that 
normally are hidden by the family-controlled companies. (P40, 
fund manager) 
In particular, sharing information with nonfamily members is perceived to have a 
detrimental impact on a company’s survival and a family’s control rights. An 
analyst, P1, expressed his view as follows: 
But, for a family-controlled company, which is also sharing the 
company with other investors, they [family owners] have this 
fiduciary obligation to ensure that the company can really be a 
going concern. So they need to be very careful in choosing what 
they plan to disclose. (P1, analyst) 
P1’s statement reveals that the combination of ownership and control in family 
businesses, and being selective about the choice of voluntary disclosure in their 
annual reports, can be advantageous for this type of company. As noted in P1’s 
statement, the protection of the company’s wealth and information can be 
safeguarded, since the family members determine and control the important 
business decisions. P1’s observation is, therefore, consistent to Villalonga and Amit 
(2006, p. 410) who suggest that, in relation to voluntary disclosure, a company’s 
value is dependent on the company’s corporate governance system. Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) suggest that the combination of family ownership, control, and 
management in a company can shape the board of directors’ decision on voluntary 
disclosure, and that this information can have an impact in line with a company’s 
value. In this case, Villalonga and Amit (2006) contended that family-controlled 
companies are more likely to be selective about disclosure to counter any reverse 
causality interpretation on the part of stakeholders. 
While some participants placed the unwillingness of family businesses to share 
information within the context of ownership and control, others contended that 
some family-controlled companies have made an effort to provide voluntary 
disclosure, and are progressing towards internationalisation (i.e., globalisation) 
processes and markets.  
Family-controlled, sometimes they don’t really happen as what 
we expected (i.e., less disclosure, or less transparency); for 
example QL is a family business and [it] disclosed information at 




to disclose more in their annual report, but some of the good ones 
do disclose information voluntarily. (P13, government agency) 
They [family businesses] are at the global standards. They 
[family businesses] are aware of what needs to be disclosed and 
how disclosing this information has [an] impact … The trend of 
voluntary disclosure – it’s developing and in fashion. (P8, 
corporate finance advisor) 
In defining the differences in the voluntary disclosure practices of family-controlled 
and nonfamily-controlled companies, the findings for Question 8 show mixed 
opinions with these being based on the participants’ experience in using companies’ 
annual reports. It was found that not all family-controlled firms adhere solely to 
their traditional business principles and concepts based on family values51. As these 
companies’ business operations and reporting are governed by financial institutions 
and regulators such as the Malaysia Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia, 
abiding by this notion seems to motivate some family-controlled companies to 
move forward for better disclosure reporting. Thus, interview data suggested that 
some family-controlled companies seem to have shifted away from their traditional 
focus, which was mainly on profit, to now providing more voluntary disclosure. At 
the same time, the interviewees indicated that these family businesses are also 
constructing their business management identity, since they have the privilege of 
being able to control the type of information to be disclosed.  
Some comments made by P13 and P8 show that they shared a common experience. 
It can be inferred from their statements that, regardless of the fact that the 
companies they referred to were family-controlled, these interviewees agreed that, 
in principle, diverse other factors which are likely to impact on any competitive 
nonfamily-controlled company, for instance, the manager’s background and 
characteristics in relation to norms and beliefs, family upbringing, education, and 
professionalism, will influence the voluntary disclosure practices. Nevertheless, 
when questioned further these interviewees both agreed that the differences in 
voluntary disclosure are actually rooted in the individuals who sit on the companies’ 
board of directors, because, when making a decision to disclose additional 
information, the board members will decide what best meets their interests, first as 
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the owners and controllers of the company, or second, as stewards who manage the 
company in the best interest of others too. Given that the aim of this thesis is to seek 
out the differences that lead to low voluntary disclosure practice by family-
controlled companies, several factors which the interviewees highlighted are 
presented below. 
The family-controlled companies and voluntary disclosure practice. 
Throughout the interviews, the participants commented on common elements that 
represent family-controlled companies52. Consistent with the ownership factor, the 
culture within the family, and the family’s business tradition formed the primary 
foundation for their voluntary disclosure practice within their business operation. 
The family-controlled company is seen as an entity which is different from other 
types of companies, because the direction of family-controlled companies relies on 
the founder/owner or the successor’s business and entrepreneurial style. This self-
direction element often relates to the level of openness of the individual, either for 
sharing or for change. As one participants put it:  
For me to ensure that my company [family business] would live 
healthily for the next 25 years, there are things that I will not share 
with others. (P1, analyst). 
Here, positioning himself as a business owner, P1 emphasises that in directing his 
business, namely its objectives and vision, he would follow his own business 
philosophy, and that the same principle should apply in sharing information with 
external parties. The main concern with regard to disclosure, and to this business 
philosophy of self-direction, is often related to the owner’s motivation, which is the 
long-term survival of the company. The strength of business motivation can be used 
as a continuous factor for the family business’ continuous direction, as noted by one 
of the participants:  
… if you look at [an] entrepreneur-driven company, say [a] 
family-oriented business, the only mantra is about survival. (P8, 
corporate finance advisor) 
When P8 mentioned that the objective of his family business is survival, he also 
added that this family business has to ensure that it is also making profit so that it 
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described as founding-family-controlled, ownership and management by founder and extended 




can grow. Once more, the objective of remaining as a family business is the main 
focus. This situation also demonstrates that the owner of the family business gives 
a higher priority for his own interest over those of external parties. However, while 
this does not mean his duty as a director is breached, it does mean greater focus on 
the primary objective that the director needs to fulfil, and on ensuring the existence 
of the business so that the company can meet the other stakeholders’ demands, 
particularly on investment return.  
One way to ensure that family businesses will continue in the longer term is through 
showing their financial strength in the capital market. This view also supports an 
argument made by Hutton (2007) who contends that family-controlled companies 
tend to provide more financial or earnings disclosures in order to signal the 
company’s future positive cash flow. This notion is also consistent with the 
statistical findings in chapter 6 of this thesis, where it was found that the financial 
information category is frequently disclosed in the family-controlled companies 
investigated in this study.  
Along with the voluntary disclosure practices of family businesses, it is important 
to highlight that these companies can be willing to share information. That sharing, 
however, can be subject to the extent of the family’s business relationship with 
stakeholders. An equity investor commented: 
Those [family-controlled companies] who have a strong link with 
the shareholders, then they are more inclined to disclose more, to 
maintain market share, competency, trust, and support to expand 
their market share but not for those who are a little bit away from 
the shareholder touch, so they don’t feel that they are under 
pressure to meet the needs of stakeholders. (P2, equity investor) 
Another participant stated: 
But if you own 75% of family-owned shares in the company and 
you are not looking to extend the company beyond the borders, if 
your particular business is not economically impactful, and has 
no interest to grow beyond what you have right now and you’re 
just hanging on to your shareholders [family members] as they 
are, nobody making the fuss, nobody asking more, then you are 
not going to do disclosure because, especially if it has been fine 





This notion, and comments from participants, demonstrate the link between the 
willingness of family-controlled companies to share information and the interplay 
between with the stakeholders’ demands and the amount of information these 
companies disclose so that both parties can gain mutual benefits. As noted in 
chapter 3 of the thesis, their interactions with stakeholders can be seen as a reason 
for family businesses to provide voluntary disclosure. As Chen et al. (2008) suggest, 
family-controlled companies often act in their own best interests. That said, 
voluntary disclosure does not necessarily show that the level of information 
asymmetry is low in family-controlled companies, because companies may see the 
importance of reducing risks in the interest of society and other stakeholders in 
order to reduce the levels of uncertainty over their companies’ performance. This 
finding seems to support Chen et al. (2008) finding that family-controlled 
companies are also similar to other types of ownership which tend to use disclosure 
as a mechanism to control the amount of information shared with external 
stakeholders. This result suggests that family-controlled companies would not 
respond to calls for more additional information if there were no pressure for them 
to disclose.   
The relationship between the board of directors’ role and the level of voluntary 
disclosure seems to include the individuals’ interactions and informal norms in 
shaping the actual practice of doing things that are reflected in regulations (Gibbins, 
Richardson, & Waterhouse, 1990; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). With regard to the 
management aspect, some participants associated the board of directors’ attitude 
towards voluntary disclosure decisions with cultural factors such as family business 
customs, ethnicity, religion, and the beliefs of an individual. P8 voiced his belief 
that family businesses, compared to other types of ownership, involve a different 
entrepreneurial concept.  
I suppose, an entrepreneur-driven, family company, the culture 
[the way they manage business] is vastly different … the only 
mantra is about survival. They are making sure that they are 
making profits, to grow. (P8, analyst) 
P8 reflected on his experience in dealing with family-controlled companies. P8 had 
found that the process of dealing with family-controlled companies and their 
sharing of information with external parties is different in terms of their concern 




family business concept and success are important, because these elements are seen 
by the family to reduce the probability of business failure. Md Zabid and Ibrahim 
(2002) contend that a family business is more likely to maintain its social tradition 
in every aspect of life. Drawing on P8’s experience and previous studies, one 
possible factor in retaining the family business concept is the trust factor between 
family members and the fact that their objective is to ensure and maintain the 
company’s existence in the capital market for as long as possible. As noted by P8, 
the only ‘mantra’ or principle that the company has is its ability to survive and exist 
in the capital market through continuously making profit. Therefore, family trust 
and the family relationship are the core elements that sustain the company’s long-
term existence in the capital market so that the company can continue to make 
profit. 
The influence of family tradition. 
The way in which tradition affects the concept of the family business is often related 
to a manager’s upbringing. This upbringing often relates to the traditions that have 
been upheld by a family. P7 commented:  
Family firms have [their] own successful line. Your [family 
firm’s] next generation comes up … they [family firms] have a 
different vision for the company to grow. (P7, services provider) 
P7’s statement shows that, in carrying out their businesses’ operational activities, 
family-controlled companies have different forms of management ideas and 
objectives. The family-controlled companies can be seen as an ownership type that 
has a positive entrepreneurial culture which basically must maintain the stability of 
the family business in the capital market or industry. Interestingly, in Malaysia, Md 
Zabid and Ibrahim (2002) contend that family control and upbringing can influence 
the managers’ attitude towards corporate disclosure reporting. Applying this notion 
to the family business, the family’s control and upbringing can be influential factors 
in determining the individuals’ (i.e., managers’) attitudes towards the management 
style that has been followed in a family-controlled company (Zahra et al., 2004). 
Along the same lines, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that social tradition refers 
to customs that have been practised by a nation. Since the traditions have become 




The above statements are also supported by Wang (2006) who argues that family-
controlled companies are more focused on the importance of passing the company 
on to subsequent generations and concerns over the reputation of the family and the 
company. Consistent with previous studies on cultural elements, the interviewees 
seemed to agree that, to ensure future stability, a family business also has greater 
commitment and devotion to the business’ goal(s) and objective(s) (see also Chen 
et al., 2008). Chen et al. (2008) found that family-controlled companies have a 
greater commitment to the company because of the family’s longer investment 
timeline – the family tends to hold shares for generations. Chen et al. (2008) also 
contend that the active involvement of the family members in the management can 
influence the level of voluntary disclosure practices.  
Another contributing factor in maintaining control is through the family members’ 
competencies to execute the business operation and so continue their family’s 
business concept and tradition. The findings revealed that one of the ways the 
managers’ competencies can influence the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
companies’ annual reports comes through the generations the family members 
belong to. Each generation can impose different interests, management styles, and 
objectives on the family firms (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). With regard to cultural 
characteristics, education, and competencies, these can also refer to one’s learned 
traditions and lifestyles, which include shaping the way of thinking, feeling, and 
acting. As P38 states: 
Knowledge and professionalism play a part in voluntary 
disclosure. The young generation’s level of education is supposed 
to be better with voluntary disclosure. But in terms of attitudes, 
they are different. This is because, their attitude notwithstanding, 
they should see no problem to disclose more information. Unless 
they have something to hide. Education is the essence of 
professionalism. (P38, regulator) 
Danes, Lee, Stafford, and Heck (2008) suggest that a family manager is an 
individual often influenced by family culture through the interaction of the family’s 
members and their communities. This environment emanates from the family 
values and beliefs that pattern these interactions. This notion also supports the 
findings in chapter 6 of this study that show the characteristics of the generations 
(i.e., hierarchical and multigenerational) of the family members who sit on the 




shows that the interactions between family members from different generations 
have an effect on their approach to managing the business. Within family-controlled 
companies’ governance, the family members’ characteristics can differ in terms of 
the age of the members, whether the company is run by the founder or by a later 
generation, the education background of the members, and the different positions 
and authority the family members hold in the company (Miller & Breton‐Miller, 
2011). These elements, therefore, can include intergenerational interaction patterns, 
personalities, and experiences. An example that highlighted the differences between 
young and older family members is found in the following statement. P11, a 
business owner, remarked:  
Basically old companies may have the older generation running 
the companies. If you look at today’s young market leaders, they 
are more open-minded and into Western culture instead of the 
Eastern culture, which has resulted to various management 
styles …. Now what are they [the family owner/founder] 
concerned about is who can serve the company best and who is 
the best to serve [lead and control] the company. (P11, provider 
of goods and services) 
P11’s statement confirms that the education and lifestyles of the family members 
play a major role in making decisions about voluntary disclosure reporting. P11’s 
comment implies that traditional family values and the education received by the 
different generations have a great influence in the family business. Here, when the 
founder or older generation is considering passing on the business legacy, the 
preparedness of the new generation to run the company is important. The leaders of 
the family business will usually assess the competency of the family members in 
terms of their personality and emotional relationship (Miller & Breton‐Miller, 
2011). These factors can determine the family-controlled companies’ strategies and 
governance, and eventually affect the voluntary disclosure reporting practices. At 
the same time, the younger generation is viewed as open-minded and more likely 
to follow current reporting environment trends and demands because most of these 
younger people have studied abroad and are familiar with voluntary disclosure 
reporting trends.  
While the younger generation is acknowledged to be broad-minded and familiar 
with Western reporting styles, some participants argued that the differences in the 
generations within a family business can lead to tension between them. The younger 




companies in the market. By contrast, the older generation remain concerned about 
their conservative views, which centre on profit growth and continuously operating 
in the market.  
In terms of family generation, the younger generation will follow 
the demand in order to be a success in the market. The younger 
generation have fresh ideas, more exposure because they have 
new knowledge, yet the old generation or family member are still 
important. This is because the older generation is more concerned 
about financial and relationship elements as a success factor. 
However, the drawback about this legacy is the family members 
tend to have closed minds. They don’t see things broadly and rely 
on traditional ways instead of the modern ways. Although 
technology is good, they still prefer to use the old way and don’t 
want to change to the new system for continuous legacy and 
profit. But the younger generation often wants to change. 
Therefore, we can see that there is a conflict between family 
members. (P39, media) 
Tradition is an inherent part of longevity and the younger generation must know 
how to combine and balance the businesses’ traditions, and how to progress through 
competitive advantage (Amran & Ahmad, 2009; Danes et al., 2008). Analysis here 
shows that the family businesses, regardless of which generation is in charge, are 
more conservative in their corporate strategies and do not adapt to changes as other 
companies do, particularly when it comes to spending their resources (financial and 
employee resources) on additional disclosure. The family companies are often 
leveraging longevity with modernity and flexibility. According to P18, the younger 
generation’s decision on voluntary disclosure may differ from that of the older 
generation because, in order to correspond to both the family and the external 
stakeholders’ interest, the younger generation’s personality and emotional factors 
encompass a wider perspective. As a result, the voluntary disclosure provided by 
this younger generation is believed to be different on certain matters. For that 
reason, P18 stated: 
Last time, during the founder’s time, CSR is just simply 
additional information that is not pertinent, and then it comes to 
the next generation CSR has become important to measure the 
sustainability of the business. And then, under this new 
generation, voluntary disclosure is used not only for business 
sustainability, but also used for the business venture purposes. I 
suppose it is a different mind-set from the founder because the 
founder came about and started out the company; it’s more on 
focusing on one type of business. Whereas when it comes to the 




are more venturing into other business, how to diversify their 
income and how to do other things for better branding like CSR, 
how they are supposed to support the environmental exercise … 
not just pumping out on profits but also the image, branding, and 
how they want to go international. (P18, regulator) 
The statement above implies that as part of the multigenerational family life-cycle 
the hierarchical element in the family business continues to determine thinking and 
behaviour. This notion also supports Danes et al. (2008) assumption that the older 
generation remains involved in the family’s key decision-making team because of 
the culture of respect for the elderly that continues to exist in certain ethnic groups. 
One reason that can explain this factor is that Eastern culture remains central to the 
country’s society (see Danes et al., 2008).  
Question 9: Does culture play a role in business? If so, how? 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002, 2005) suggest that culture is constructed through socially 
learned and acquired traditions and lifestyles of the members of a society. These 
shape their way of thinking, feeling, and acting. In general, companies’ managers 
perform the same functions when shaping a company’s culture, but the way they do 
it could be different because they may be affected by their own tradition, history, 
values, and beliefs. These elements are usually a result of the managers’ ethnicity, 
religion and education. In other words, ethnicity, religion and education construct 
a society’s culture. In the same vein, Muniandy and Ali (2012) add that culture 
influences the quality of financial reporting practices in Malaysia.  
These insights of Haniffa and Cooke (2002, 2005), and Muniandy and Ali (2012) 
underpin the current study of voluntary disclosure practices. Findings from the 
interviews revealed that cultural elements such as ethnicity, religion, education, and 
professional background are interrelated. In particular, ethnicity and religion were 
often regarded as a discrete factor. The external stakeholders believe the current 
business environment is moving towards a broader and more global outlook, and 
believe this phenomenon can limit the board of directors’ decision on the control of 
information with regard to any material released to the public. The majority of the 
interviewees explained how these cultural factors are interrelated, and remain in the 
family-controlled companies, and ultimately affect their decision on making 




The influence of ethnicity. 
Ethnicity, which is also a cultural factor, is among the key influences that can shape 
the family-controlled companies’ voluntary disclosure practices. Here, it is also 
important to acknowledge that the majority of the family-controlled companies 
listed on the top Malaysia Stock Exchange are Chinese. In Malaysia, studies by 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002, 2005), Muniandy and Ali (2012), and  Hashim (2012) 
found that ethnicity can differentiate the way companies’ managers think about 
their business operation and management, and this factor might include voluntary 
disclosure. When asked about ethnicity, the interviewees most frequently gave 
examples of Chinese ethnicity as a cultural factor. One participant gave his view as 
follows:  
For Chinese family companies, they see business as a battle. And 
because of that, they are less inclined to disclose information, 
unless it is useful to them. So it has to be something that is useful, 
then they will disclose. (P27, researcher) 
P27 expressed his concern about the way the managers of family-controlled 
companies perceived external stakeholders when sharing information, and dealing 
with them. Almost all of the participants acknowledged that Chinese family 
businesses are likely to create relationships and trust within their own ethnic circle. 
In addition, the majority of the participants agreed that this relationship and trust 
have limited the degree of willingness of these family-controlled companies to 
share their company information through voluntary disclosure reporting 
A comment by P21, an analyst, also showed that the close relationships that exist 
within the family business can result in limited voluntary disclosure, since the 
decisions on any business matter are discussed among family members only: 
Because the business is family-owned, every discussion and 
decision made is sufficient by having a family meeting [will do]. 
So they don’t really need to disclose more. (P21, analyst) 
P21 feels family ties, or the relationship in terms of the business matters and 
management, represent a dominant influential factor in their decision-making. 
Although official meetings are conducted in the office, certain business matters that 
need detailed attention would definitely be discussed among family members. In 




For a family business – decisions can be made anytime and 
anywhere, and they concern my [the owner’s] family … 
Although my wife is not directly involved in the business, it still 
matters what she says, and it does matter what my son thinks, 
whether to take this project or not. This attitude reflects how 
much information is disclosed and how a decision is being made 
outside the boardroom. (P36, researcher) 
Ramasamy, Ting, and Ling (2007) contend that the Chinese businesses in Malaysia 
are known as large, prudent, and long-term orientated companies. Regardless of 
which family generations sit on their board, these companies are often regarded as 
successful but cautious in sharing information with others (Ramasamy et al., 2007). 
In addition, as cited by Rashid and Ho (2003), the Chinese appear to be diligent, 
pragmatic, family-oriented, prosperous, harmonious, and willing to take risks in 
business. As noted earlier, the Chinese regard trust highly in the establishment and 
maintenance of good relationships (Ramasamy et al., 2007; Rashid & Ho, 2003, p. 
77).  
This finding seems to show that the Chinese family-controlled companies in 
Malaysia are seen as an entity with a collectivist characteristic that often avoids 
sharing company information with unrelated parties. This conclusion is drawn 
because they often work closely with family members, employees, and other 
business partners of their own ethnicity. In addition, by making a close relationship 
with family members and ethnicity a priority, these factors are consequently seen 
to shape the managers’ decision on voluntary disclosure practice.  
The influence of religious belief, knowledge and professionalism.  
The inclusion of a question about the religious 53  beliefs of family-controlled 
companies and their influence on accountability led a number of participants to 
share their opinions and experiences. P36 offered her view on the interface between 
individuals, family characteristics, and being accountable and transparent in family 
business activities. The family’s religious belief was found to be one of the vital 
factors that shape the accountability and transparency of the family business. As 
P36 put it:  
The religious teaching is the most important factor. Belief in God 
is important. This situation can be seen in the family itself, for 
example, among the siblings, among employees, and how they 
                                                 





[family and employees] are arguing unethical action by the 
family members in using the company’s money. And also family 
in the US, the family are Jewish, very stern Jewish, are doing very 
well in their business. The values and the culture that are 
embedded in the organisation are carried from the family itself, 
carved by that religion. (P36, researcher) 
According to P24 and P12:  
An individual’s belief and principles have to do with it, not 
ethnicity per se. (P24, professional body) 
I think managers’ culture, norms, and beliefs do contribute to the 
willingness to provide additional disclosure. Of course, the other 
part is the market place. If the market expects more, then I think 
people naturally respond to that, but if the market doesn’t care, 
then, of course, nobody bothers to disclose. Culture plays a 
significant role in making decisions because right and wrong is 
determined more by culture than anything else ─ ethical virtue. 
(P12, regulator) 
In contrast, one participant expressed her view on religious influence as follows: 
I think when it comes to CSR information any religion or 
ethnicity will have similar beliefs and direction, including 
disclosing information. Sometimes, maybe Muslim companies, 
tend to reveal information like zakat54 and waqf 55(or what relates 
to CSR) more compared to other ethnicities, but I can’t deny that 
other religions or ethnicity also have the awareness on CSR, 
except that in Islam it is more. As for other forms of information 
such as risk, financial, or general information, that would be the 
same regardless of their religion and ethnicity. (P10, financial 
provider) 
The findings from these interviews revealed that, to a certain extent, the influence 
of religion is associated with the level of voluntary disclosure practice by family-
controlled companies. The interviewees implied that managers’ beliefs, which also 
represent their ethical values, can influence the amount of information disclosed on 
certain voluntary disclosure categories. However, these comments ultimately show 
that the influence of religious belief is usually complemented by the individual’s 
education and professional background too.   
In the case of P36 and P24’s comments, their statements imply that they think that 
individual professionalism and religious beliefs can shape the voluntary disclosure 
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reporting style, as  (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005) assert. The Malaysian managers cited 
in Haniffa and Cooke (2005) study are influenced by norms and beliefs, education, 
and the type of organisation they work for, thus reflecting the influence family-
controlled companies’ managers’ beliefs, thoughts, and the execution of their 
responsibility for the organisation they work for.  Haniffa and Cooke (2005) 
contend culture, in terms of ethnicity (i.e., including the religious element), and 
education are among the influential factors for voluntary disclosure style. This 
notion was also implied when P21 stated, “Some cultures [ethnicities] that value 
truthfulness and transparency may favour more voluntary disclosure.” Thus, 
ethnicity, religious belief, education, and professionalism factors seem to support 
the way the family members manage their business activities.  
8.4 Reflection on the findings  
The findings reveal that there is wide variation in the participants’ interpretation of 
and opinion on voluntary disclosure practice due to its not being regulated. A 
number of the participants tended to use different expressions for voluntary 
disclosure. These were influenced by their own way of thinking which was based 
on both the characteristics of their professional background and how they utilise 
and interpret the information in the annual reports. Ultimately, regardless of the 
different groups of stakeholders, the participants in this study interpret voluntary 
disclosure as information disclosed voluntarily and not regulated by any statutory 
laws.  
Furthermore, the findings reveal that all of the participants have similar views on 
the growth of the level of voluntary disclosure in the companies’ annual reports. 
They were all in agreement that voluntary disclosure in Malaysia is growing, but 
that it remains at a low level, and they emphasised the need for further 
improvement. They agreed that the content of the information disclosed voluntarily 
is deemed insufficient because reporting such disclosure is likely to be superficial, 
with limited or no substantial explanation on the matters disclosed. As a result, such 
disclosure requires stakeholders to use alternative or additional information to 
assess the company.  
Ownership type and reputation are the main concerns contributing to the low level 




advisors, business owners, and those in government agencies argued that, regardless 
of the companies’ ownership type, only large and reputable companies can afford 
to provide more voluntary disclosure. In this context, operational cost seems to be 
an issue for all types of companies when making decisions regarding voluntary 
disclosure. Interestingly, all the participants were of the opinion that proprietary 
cost that can affect the company’s reputation, rather than the monetary cost, may 
have a greater impact on the companies’ performance. However, from the financial 
reporting perspective, all of the participants agreed that the level of voluntary 
disclosure is mainly determined by the major controller of the company, and so 
refers to the ownership of the company.  
The interviewees agreed that family-controlled companies tend to have less 
voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. However, from the regulators and 
business owners’ perspectives, the family-controlled companies have made a great 
effort to provide additional information, beyond what is mandatory, voluntarily. 
They believe that whatever is disclosed beyond the mandatory requirement reflects 
a positive attitude on the part of annual report preparers. Ultimately, all the 
participants gave several reasons to account for differences in the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the family-controlled companies. These related to ownership factors 
and the nature of family control. Elements inherent in the way the companies are 
controlled, and related management factors, are also seen to be among the factors 
that contribute to the differences in disclosure practices. Given almost all the 
family-controlled companies in this study that are listed on the main board with 
high market value are Chinese-owned, it is contended that ethnicity still impacts 
modestly, in terms of cultural characteristics and values, on providing additional 
information voluntarily. As noted earlier, irrespective of the ethnicity of the family 
businesses’ ownership, the voluntary disclosure practices by listed family-
controlled companies are evolving. One reason for this change in reporting is that 
these companies are also considering embracing internationalisation in order to 
expand their businesses, particularly those operating within a diversified industry.  
The findings also reveal that the attitudes of the preparers and interview participants 
are restricted to matters that conform to profit and performance. The nonfamily-
controlled companies tend to provide more profit and performance voluntary 
disclosure compared to family-controlled companies for several reason, namely 




by an individual. They have more institutional shareholders, and government 
connections (also known as political relationships) (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; 
Hutchinson et al., 2009). The political relationships are evidenced by the presence 
of the independent executive directors who are Bumiputera and have considerable 
influence in certain government ministries. Hutchinson et al. (2009) contend that 
racial diversification and the Malaysian government’s policy on Bumiputera 
participation in the country’s economy could be one reason for the existence of 
politically connected companies. Most participants in this study believed that these 
companies are expected to have more positive attitudes in providing more voluntary 
disclosure compared to family-controlled companies. They also believe that 
initiatives for better information flows in the capital market lie in the hands of 
government and regulators. The government and regulators are deemed to be the 
bodies responsible for improving the supply of voluntary disclosure through laws 
and regulation for all types of companies. 
Overall, the findings show that voluntary disclosure practices are market-driven. 
Globalisation and local structures such as historical and individual cultural 
influences are among the elements that can have an impact on the behaviours of 
preparers and stakeholders in Malaysia. They, subsequently, shape the level of 
voluntary disclosure in this context. For example, pressure from regulators in the 
form of regulations and best practices, and the stakeholders’ demand for 
accountability through certification such as halal status certification can induce the 
preparers to disclose more voluntary information. As noted earlier, a number of 
participants argued that when a company disclosed less information, stakeholders 
were likely to seek answers, and that this situation resulted in the company incurring 
additional cost to produce such information. Therefore, the content of voluntary 
disclosure should be appropriately guided so that it is acceptable to both 
stakeholders and preparers. 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter represents the final stage of the current study which focused on 
investigating the voluntary disclosure practices by Malaysian listed family-
controlled companies. The chapter presented an overall view of the voluntary 
disclosure context through the corporate managers’ (i.e., stakeholders’) lenses. The 




disclosure practices in Malaysia, particularly in family-controlled companies. A 
number of the study’s participants pointed out that the level of voluntary disclosure 
by family-controlled companies is largely influenced by the individual and/or 
family ownership and inheritance factors. As mentioned in chapter 4, Atlas.ti 
software was utilised to transcribe the interview data and create themes in relation 
to the voluntary disclosure practice characteristics in Malaysia. These were then 
justified in the form of arguments and supported by relevant evidence. Reflection 
on the findings indicated the motives behind the current voluntary disclosure 
practices by Malaysian listed companies, and also what is needed to enhance the 
level of voluntary disclosure practices.  
Further discussions and the implications of this current study will be presented in 
chapter 9. That chapter will discuss the relationship between the findings in chapters 
6, 7, and 8, in order to develop a voluntary disclosure best practice framework for 














DISCUSSION OF OVERALL FINDINGS 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter reflects on the main findings of the research in terms of a) their 
contributions to the development of a best practices voluntary disclosure 
framework, b) the level of voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia, and, c) the 
factors contributing to differences in the level of voluntary disclosure practice. The 
chapter first presents the results of the quantitative and qualitative data, and then 
considers how they have contributed to meeting the research objectives. In addition, 
this chapter presents the emergent voluntary disclosure model for Malaysian 
companies; the attributes of family-controlled companies; and, the driving forces 
behind the decision-making on voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of such 
companies. 
Section 9.2 returns to the discussion of the development of a best practices 
voluntary disclosure framework which was first presented in chapter 5. Section 9.3 
sets out the current level of voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia, before 
discussing the association between company attributes and the level of voluntary 
disclosure practices. Thereafter, section 9.3 moves to a discussion of the findings 
from the study’s sample of annual report users and preparers, in order to consider 
in detail factors that cause the differences between family-controlled and 
nonfamily-controlled companies’ voluntary disclosure practices. Some personal 
views on how certain enhancement can be made to promote voluntary disclosure 
among companies in Malaysia are then offered. Section 9.4 looks at the 
implications for practice in terms of mechanisms that can drive voluntary disclosure 
practices in Malaysia, while section 9.5 summarises the chapter.  
9.2 Discussion of the development of a best practices voluntary 
disclosure framework  
This section reflects on the outcomes of the Delphi process and the contribution to 
knowledge this research makes in terms of its methodology. As stated previously 
in chapter 5, it was important to develop a voluntary disclosure index in this study. 




data collection and analysis; and, results interpretation. It is also worth noting here 
that this study’s findings on a voluntary disclosure index instrument support 
previous studies such as Coy and Dixon (2004), Beattie et al. (2004), and Campbell 
and Abdul Rahman (2010). For example, Campbell and Abdul Rahman (2010) 
suggest that a disclosure index with a proper content analysis scoring system is 
capable of capturing the information’s meaning. To summarise, the research 
findings in that section concluded that: 
a. Expectation of voluntary disclosure items can vary in many ways, depending on 
how the annual report preparers think their stakeholders and/or users perceive the 
meaning and usefulness of the information in terms of their economic decision-
making. 
b. Financial information is the main voluntary disclosure category, followed by the 
forward-looking and risk review management category. 
c. The presentation of nonnarrative information in monetary, unit, or percentage 
form is likely to be an important form of voluntary disclosure. 
d. In terms of methods, the content analysis scoring process is understood to be a 
research approach that can incorporate ways to measure the importance of the 
voluntary disclosure items in the annual reports.  
The first of these findings signifies that voluntary disclosure items can be varied 
depending on the types of stakeholder identified as relevant and the ways in which 
these items can assist them with their economic-related decision-making. In relation 
to disclosure quality, useful voluntary disclosure should contain rich and 
meaningful additional information. This information must be presented as facts that 
can be expressed and/or indicated in a meaningful manner, for example, financial 
value, and not as mere perception or impression (Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 
2010). In particular, the importance of voluntary disclosure reporting across entities 
can differ as a result of a country’s financial reporting regulations, and its company 
law regime. For instance, companies  situated in emerging countries tend to 
emphasise their governance and operational transparency disclosure rather than 
those located in developed countries like in the United Kingdom would do (see, 
Shi, Magnan, & Kim, 2012; Uyar & Kılıç, 2012 for examples). To capture the 




stakeholders’ opinions gathered through the Delphi exercise not only form the basis 
of the voluntary disclosure index, but also demonstrate the validity of the list of 
voluntary disclosure items used and finalised as an index. Coy and Dixon (2004), 
and Hooks et al. (2001) tend to see the principles of the Delphi process as an 
approach that serves to validate the voluntary disclosure items according to the 
current reporting practice and their benefits to interested parties. Therefore, the 
panel members were willing to fulfil the stakeholder’s role. In terms of the 
voluntary disclosure items’ features, the panel members scored each item and 
identified both how important and how relevant each item is with regard to the 
respective disclosure categories and purposes.  
The second point indicates that stakeholders have a high expectation that voluntary 
disclosure within the financial information and forward-looking and risk review 
management categories will be provided in the companies’ annual reports. It is 
noteworthy that regardless of the panel members’ background and interest in 
voluntary disclosure, they all expected very similar types of voluntary disclosure 
information. Both the panel members and the stakeholders, who in this study 
consisted of a company’s top management team, reveal that the financial 
information category remains important. Thus, they see financial information that 
signifies financial or key economic indicators as essential for them in assessing a 
company’s performance. At the same time, the stakeholders also expected that not 
only the historical information but also the current information provided must 
denote the company’s present and future business performance by providing a 
platform or basis for future performance. For example, financial information often 
refers to disclosure reporting that relates to a company’s tangible outcomes such as 
profits and return on investment. This information is often use in the strategic 
management decision to evaluate the company’s performance in the future.  
It is significant that the findings in chapter 5 of this study are consistent with those 
of Ghazali and Weetman (2006). Their study found that financial information has 
the largest impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. However, Ghazali and 
Weetman’s (2006) study was carried out to assess the level of voluntary disclosure 
practices in reaction to the Asian financial crisis. In this research, however, the 
panel members’ concerns with the financial information seem to indicate a growing 
awareness about the importance of such information. These concerns show that 




transparency in corporate reporting. In relation to disclosure, it was found that 
voluntary disclosure practices can maintain or enhance the accountability and 
transparency of companies. Indeed, Uyar and Kılıç (2012) found that this practice 
reflects positively on the image and reputation of companies in the capital market.  
In addition, the findings in this study show that, in order to strengthen the corporate 
governance system practices and the companies’ value, voluntary disclosure such 
as financial information should accommodate the company’s forward-looking and 
risk review information category. The notion underlying this opinion is first that the 
reporting of forward-looking and risk review management information appears to 
be linked with the value creation process, which is ultimately related to a company’s 
corporate strategy. Secondly, financial performance refers to the efficiency in 
allocating the resources to generate the company’s return (see also Ho & Taylor, 
2013).  
The third finding reveals that the presentation of nonnarrative voluntary disclosure 
information in the annual reports is important for overall annual report users. Such 
nonnarrative information is indicated in the form of a dollar sign ($) or as a unit or 
percentage (%), as detailed in chapter 5. In addition, chapter 5 also documented that 
the development of this study’s voluntary disclosure index has recognised that it is 
imperative to include economic symbols to broaden the voluntary disclosure 
dimensions that are expected, in order to enhance and complement the mandatory 
disclosure. This study’s findings about nonnarrative presentation corroborate 
previous studies such as Beattie and Thomson (2007), Beattie et al. (2004), and 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004). Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), for example, found that 
annual reports offer multiple usage, are easily available, and contain information 
and presentation of disclosure that explains and validates the quantitative measures 
in the financial statements. Therefore, findings from the current study confirm 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) in that nonnarrative information is important to annual 
report users. It is important to note that this current study reveals that the Malaysian 
stakeholders’ view on voluntary disclosure is not limited to narrative presentation, 
but also encompasses nonnarrative information such as images, charts, and graphs 
which can disclose brief information clearly and support the overall disclosure. 
The fourth point signifies that, based on the researcher’s interpretation, the scoring 
process helped to identify the importance of each item in the voluntary disclosure 




the scoring system can vary in every content analysis research approach. For 
example, a company may provide little information about discussion of 
opportunities, i.e., the firm’s prospects in general, and its business strategy on future 
performance in general. As Campbell and Abdul Rahman (2010) note, information 
disclosed might be merely in the form of a general statement which does not 
represent any key material economic effect that can mark it as useful voluntary 
disclosure. In that case, the item would receive a score of only 1, which 
acknowledges the presence of the item but indicates that it ignores the economic 
effects. As suggested by Beck et al. (2010), a potential limitation with the content 
analysis approach is the aggregate final score because it can conceal and obfuscate 
any differences with other studies. However, as explained by Beck et al. (2010), 
“An interrogation of information quality, or its fitness for purpose, is capable of 
analysis only when the views of users can be included in the analysis” (Beck et al., 
2010, p. 210). Therefore, this current study carried out two pilot processes using 
two different coders in order to ensure the coding approach was viable. Within this 
process, the coders had to determine the depth and useful meaning of sentences 
within their paragraphs on the basis of the coding guidelines established in this 
study. With regard to the reliability and validity of the coding instruments, the 
content scale identifiers drew on the methods of Beck et al. (2010), Samkin et al. 
(2014), and Campbell and Abdul Rahman (2010). The final version of the coding 
system consisted of five content categories. These were tested for intracoder 
reliability prior to the system’s final application to ensure the consistency of coding 
decisions. They yielded a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.9, a result that exceeds the 
threshold of 0.800. Consequently, the coding system for the content analysis 
process was deemed acceptable. Beattie and Thomson (2007, p. 140) suggest that a 
proper voluntary disclosure scoring system is crucial because it is the fundamental 
premise of content analysis.  
9.3 The current level of voluntary disclosure practices by Malaysian 
listed companies and its association with companies’ attributes 
In this section, the findings of chapters 6, 7, and 8 are discussed and evaluated. The 
section outlines the contribution of this research to knowledge in three areas:  a) the 
current level of voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysian companies, particularly 




practices between the sample companies; and, c) the influence of family-controlled 
characteristics that contribute to the differences in the level of voluntary disclosure 
practices. The key discussion is presented in line with the three areas mentioned 
above. 
9.3.1 The current level of voluntary disclosure practices by Malaysian listed 
companies 
Drawing upon the comparative analysis, the findings show that the overall actual 
score of each item within the categories used in this current study is quite low 
compared to that expected by the panel members. The highest average voluntary 
disclosure score (AVDS) is 1.77, and the lowest is 1.00 out of a maximum score of 
5.00. The results indicate that companies merely disclosed general statements, and 
statements of fulfilment relating to the voluntary disclosure item provided. This 
finding also confirms prior studies in Malaysia relating to disclosure such as Saleh 
et al. (2010), and Sumiani, Haslinda, and Lehman (2007) who found that the level 
of voluntary disclosure provided by Malaysian listed companies is low, and the 
content is a common statement, where the mean score is less than 1.00 out of 5.00. 
In addition, findings from chapter 7 also reveal that the majority of the stakeholders’ 
emphasis on the need to improve the content and presentation of the voluntary 
disclosure should be considered. One implication here is the possibility that 
voluntary disclosure is important not just to analysts, bankers, or fund managers, 
but is also valued by other stakeholders such as potential employees, suppliers, 
researchers, consumers, and nongovernment agencies.  
In section 6.3 the comparative results examining the level of voluntary disclosure 
items provided by the sample companies from 2009 to 2013 show that the financial 
information category is the most frequently voluntarily disclosed information in the 
annual reports. Findings from the panel members’ expectation in the Delphi process 
corroborate the actual financial information disclosure in this study. Unlike the 
financial information, the comparative result shows that the provision of 
information about management and shareholders is the second category where the 
panel members’ expectation differs from the practice of those who provide this 
information. As noted in chapter 5, the panel members ranked the forward-looking 




finding has important implications for any guidelines used in developing a 
voluntary disclosure index for listed family-controlled companies’ practices.  
The forward-looking and risk review information category is important, because it 
not only enables stakeholders to evaluate the financial information when making 
economic decisions but also facilitates future projection of overall business 
performance and management credibility. Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) suggest that 
the advantage of forward-looking and risk review information is that it is useful for 
reducing the degree of uncertainty, and information asymmetry, between preparers 
and stakeholders. Thus, it helps the investors to make forecasts on the basis of 
comprehensive information. It is important that findings from chapter 8 of this 
current study align with Aljifri and Hussainey (2007). With regard to the type of 
voluntary disclosure category, the majority of the interview participants agreed that 
both the financial information, and the forward-looking and risk review information 
categories are interrelated and support the information within companies’ annual 
reports. This finding provides some support for the idea that the study’s participants 
expressed difficulty in assessing the information in the annual reports, particularly 
the projection of cash flow for the following year, since the risk review information 
is usually lacking in the report.  
It is worth highlighting here that the level of voluntary disclosure items relating to 
Islamic values was found to be disappointing. It was found that both the panel 
members and the actual companies ─ judging by the practices of sample companies 
─ were relatively unconcerned about Islamic values disclosures. Findings from the 
analysis revealed that the perceived importance of additional information relating 
to Islamic values remains low in Malaysia. These findings show that companies that 
do provide such information are likely to be involved in Shariah-based sectors or to 
focus on Muslim stakeholders. This combination of findings provides some support 
for previous studies in relation to Islamic values, for instance, (Aribi & Gao, 2010). 
Aribi and Gao (2010) argued that voluntary disclosure relating to Islamic values is 
unlikely to be found in the companies’ annual reports, particularly those in 
conventional businesses. Aribi and Gao (2010) suggested one reason that could 
explain this circumstance is that these disclosures are related to religious practices. 
Therefore, the idea that some of the issues emerging from this finding relate 




Delphi panel members. They believed that these disclosures apply to businesses 
that have Muslim owners, or are Shariah-based, or Shariah-compliant.  
That said, the content analysis results are important in at least two major respects. 
The results of this investigation show that halal56 certification of the product, and 
the Shariah-based financing structure were among the Islamic values-related items 
found in the companies’ annual reports. These findings support the conceptual 
premise of Ireland and Abdollah Rajabzadeh (2011) study in the United Arab 
Emirates. They suggest that, in a country with a majority of Muslim consumers, 
concern about the halal status of their products tends to influence companies to 
provide halal certification on their products and services. Scholars also suggest that 
halal certification represents a great market and economic opportunity for 
trustworthy firms, brands, and institutions. Therefore, the results of this present 
study explain that a country with a large Muslim population would likely encourage 
company managers to consider more disclosure about their products for the benefit 
of their company. This finding suggests that some companies are now trying to 
seize the opportunity and benefits offered by the disclosure of Islamic values to 
capture stakeholders’ investment interest and confidence in their company business 
activities, rather than seeing the Islamic values disclosure as an additional operating 
cost.  
9.3.2 The differences in the voluntary disclosure provided by Malaysian listed 
companies 
As previous studies have documented, various factors can contribute to the level of 
voluntary disclosure and can influence the managers’ decision to disclose additional 
information voluntarily. For example, Broberg et al. (2010) noted that these factors 
could come from either internal or external forces (see also, Adams, 2002; Ho & 
Wong 2001). External factors such as a country’s financial accounting reporting 
standards, securities commission listing requirements, company law, and corporate 
governance systems can shape the amount of information reported in a company’s 
annual reports. As for internal forces, company attributes such as ownership type, 
corporate governance practices, company industry, and company culture can 
determine the amount of information provided by companies. However, the 
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findings show that the main constraint for voluntary disclosure practices is relate to 
internal forces, specifically to the ownership structure of companies. 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) found that among Malaysian listed companies, those 
with family business ownership (i.e., family-controlled companies) provide less 
voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) found an 
overall variation of differences in the level of voluntary disclosure categories by all 
companies in the areas of corporate social responsibility, strategic information, and 
financial information. With regard to ownership type, this current study extends 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) in that it examines separately the level of voluntary 
disclosure categories provided by both family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled 
companies. Findings from the analysis in section 6.3.5 reported that family-
controlled companies are more likely to provide, amongst others:  
(a) General corporate and strategic information: i.e., disclosure relating to external 
causes or factors that may affect the company’s production and performance 
(b) Financial information: i.e., disclosure relating to financial statements 
(c) Forward-looking and risk-review information: i.e., disclosure relating to the 
current risk exposure factors related to economic and equity issues that may affect 
the company’s performance in the capital market.  
These results signify that family-controlled companies are concerned about 
litigation and reputation issues, issues which were often claimed by stakeholders to 
be one of the reasons to strategise and be selective about information disclosed 
voluntarily. Because companies try to avoid negative consequences for their 
reputation and market value, this approach resulted in a low level of voluntary 
disclosure. One implication of this result is the possibility that companies, 
particularly family-controlled companies, are concerned about their long-term 
family investment horizon (Chen et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2008). Chen et al. (2013) 
suggest that the family owners’ long-term investment perspective is one of the 
factors that causes them to be selective about certain information such as low 
voluntary disclosure about techniques, plant, and equipment used in their 
production process. One of the issues emerging from these findings is that a firm’s 
value is often related to the reputation of a family company and business continuity. 




intervention of other shareholders, enables family-controlled companies to 
maintain and/or enhance their companies’ flagships in the capital market. The 
emphasis on reputation and business continuity can have a great impact on the 
amount of information disclosed voluntarily. For example, it was observed that 
many family-controlled companies provide general information and data that limits 
the voluntary disclosure items included in the annual reports.  This style of reporting 
is created when the family companies feel that too much information can threaten 
the companies’ long-term orientation.  
As Meek et al. (1995) state, strategic and financial information can provide a 
feasible measurement for companies to benchmark themselves, especially in terms 
of listing status in the capital market. As the current study shows, nonfamily-
controlled companies tended to report information relating to past and current 
market conditions that had affected their companies’ current performance when 
compared to that of others. These companies also highlighted their mission and 
vision relating to the companies’ contribution to the national economy. The 
companies’ performance and position are also stated through the companies’ 
achievements, market share in the industry, market capitalisation in the share 
market, as well as the share price information trends, and price at year-end.  
Information about the management and shareholders category is discussed and 
presented comprehensively in the annual reports through the inclusion of all related 
data and images regarding the key management profile. This type of voluntary 
information can be considered as common voluntary disclosure for stakeholders, as 
it contributes to marking the direction and performance of the company in the 
capital market. In addition, some of these companies also provide an information 
breakdown on the shareholdings held by the board of directors. Findings from this 
study support previous research by Ho and Taylor (2013) who suggest that 
Malaysian listed companies tend to provide additional information to inform the 
stakeholders about their direction in enhancing corporate governance systems in the 
capital market. On the other hand, as noted in chapter 7, some of the participants 
argued that the additional information disclosed is essential for them to evaluate the 
company’s performance, strength, and stability in the capital market, particularly 
when making plans and projections on the company’s future cash flow and 
sustainability in the industry. The combination of these findings suggests that 




top management can establish trust and confidence in the companies’ current 
performance and future directions on the part of the stakeholders.  
The differences in the level of voluntary disclosure can also be seen from the 
Islamic perspective. It is important to note that this current study documented that 
the nonfamily-controlled, compared to family-controlled, companies are more 
likely to provide Islamic values disclosure than others. This result refutes Thani and 
Othman’s (2010) study which suggests that listed companies in Malaysia provide 
only minimal social justice through Islamic social reporting voluntary disclosure 
and so are not offering the level of  transparency and accountability required by 
Muslim society. Thani and Othman’s (2010) study was, however, limited to zakat57 
and waqf58 information. The current study’s finding, on the other hand, is rather 
encouraging because halal certification, zakat, and waqf information is frequently 
found in most of the annual reports, particularly within those of nonfamily-
controlled companies. One possible reason for this result could be the dispersed 
ownership in nonfamily controlled companies, as they have no substantial control 
and ownership by an individual or a group of individuals. Dispersed ownership 
within a company can result in lower opportunities for a particular owner to use his 
or her right of control for private benefit and, therefore, there is less incentive not 
to disclose additional information.  
Aribi and Gao (2010) indicate that Islamic values disclosure is likely to be a 
common practice among emerging markets in Islamic bloc countries. Aribi and Gao 
(2010) suggest that the differences in the Islamic values disclosure between the 
listed companies are usually a result of globalisation and broader accounting 
reporting needs. However, in this current study, apart from the financial reporting 
growth due to cross-border international markets, findings from chapters 6 and 8 
signify that the practice of disclosing Islamic values by the sampled companies is 
done to meet the expectations of religious needs in the context of Islamic 
environments. In other words, although Malaysia is classified as a multiethnic 
society with various races and religions, Islam is the official religion and, hence, a 
number of the sampled companies are willing to disclose their halal certification 
within their annual reports. This practice seems to support the notion that a 
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country’s religion can be one of the contributing factors for listed companies’ 
disclosing information voluntarily in respect to the social environment (Ireland & 
Abdollah Rajabzadeh, 2011). In addition, Hasegawa and Noronha (2009, p. 333) 
stated that some Islamic values have increasingly been incorporated into the 
legislative and administrative systems in Malaysia. For example, cafeteria or 
canteen arrangements need to be considered because Muslims do not eat pork and 
eat only halal food. The incorporation of Islamic values within a management’s 
work policy can be seen as another contributing factor that allows the companies to 
accommodate the need for voluntary disclosure, particularly in relation to Islamic 
values.  
With regard to the corporate social responsibility category, nonfamily-controlled 
companies focus more on employee issues. The majority of these companies 
frequently disclosed information regarding employee workplace safety, the amount 
spent on employees’ benefits and training, and a general discussion on employees’ 
training. Some of the nonfamily-controlled companies clearly stated the breakdown 
of workforce by categories of employees and by level of qualifications. According 
to Beattie and Smith (2010), and Campbell and Abdul Rahman (2010), information 
regarding employee or human capital is considered one of the elements that can 
contribute to a company’s value creation. Adding to the conclusions arrived at in 
these previous studies, findings from this current study signify that, regardless of 
the companies’ attributes, voluntary disclosure on employees’ issues can give a 
useful focus for the stakeholders when it comes to predicting each company’s value 
creation in areas such as goodwill and intellectual property.  
9.3.3 The influence of family-controlled characteristics that contribute to the 
differences in the level of voluntary disclosure practices 
The choice for voluntary disclosure can be influenced by ownership type, 
particularly in the case of family-controlled companies where it was found to be the 
main contributing factor for low disclosure practices in Malaysia. The findings of 
this longitudinal59 data analysis show that the actual level of voluntary disclosure 
practices is lower than the stakeholders’ expectation. In addition, over the 5-year 
period analysed, voluntary disclosure did not improve significantly in accordance 
with stakeholders’ expectations. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
                                                 




such as (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Chau and Gray 
(2010), and Ali et al. (2007) who all found that in developing countries family-
controlled companies tend to provide less voluntary disclosure. As suggested by 
Salvato and Moores (2010), “not all shareholders are alike. Investors with 
concentrated ownership, for instance, and owner families in particular may 
reasonably have different preferences for disclosure” (p. 197). 
As explained by Chen et al. (2013), not all family-controlled companies are the 
same (see also Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Salvato & Moores, 2010). In terms 
of internal forces, family-controlled companies are often acknowledged as having 
a unique and different approach to business management and decision- making 
because of the family members’ involvement in the companies’ management. A 
previous study by Chau and Gray (2010), for example, suggests that the influence 
of the family member(s) who sit(s) on the board affects the level of voluntary 
disclosure. This influence manifests itself in the controlling of the type of 
information provided in their annual reports. In addition, Bamber et al. (2010), and 
Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) suggest that the characteristics of the family 
members who are on the board seem to reflect the way they perceive voluntary 
disclosure. Two elements within cultural factors, namely customs and knowledge, 
were argued to be components shaping the level of voluntary disclosure practices.  
In addition, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) suggest that the combination of 
younger and older generation family members can result in the process of 
transferring and sharing of tacit knowledge within a family company’s 
management. Findings in this current study reveal that the main internal forces that 
differentiate between family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled companies in 
Malaysia are, amongst others, the governance structure and the backgrounds of 
family members involved in the companies. The number of family members sitting 
on the board, the generations to which members of the family belong, and the 
education level of family members are positively significant in terms of the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the family-controlled companies’ annual reports. For 
instance, a company with at least two family members sitting on the board tends to 
show a higher level of total mean score in the financial statement and in the 
corporate social responsibility information categories. This finding has important 
implications for developing a conceptual premise that the degree and content of 




given that, family members are usually the substantial controllers of the company’s 
overall business activities. The result may be explained by the influence that family 
customs, intergenerational family members, and the family members’ background 
business knowledge can have on the managers in making decisions around 
voluntary disclosure practices.  
This current study shows that the family managers’ characteristics can influence the 
level of voluntary disclosure provided by family-controlled companies. The 
combination of a manager’s family background and demographic is of importance 
to family businesses. These elements are also found to mark an association between 
the family-controlled companies’ managers and the amount or level of information 
disclosed. As suggested by Bamber et al. (2010), “Managers’ unique disclosure 
styles are associated with observable demographic characteristics of their personal 
backgrounds” (p. 1131). 
Al-Akra and Hutchinson (2013) suggest that the background of family members 
and their demographic can have a positive impact that affects the business’s 
approach and strategy, including its corporate reporting. On the one hand, findings 
in this study reveal that different families have different approaches. These are 
based on their customs, the number of family members involved in the business, 
and the knowledge gained and/or education received either abroad or in their home 
country. These factors can all also influence the companies’ individual style in 
deciding the amount of additional information to be disclosed voluntarily. Findings 
in chapter 7 show that having a high number of family members involved on the 
company’s board can lead to less voluntary disclosure in the company’s annual 
reports. One explanation for this finding could be a conflict of characteristics when 
making business decisions. This result also indicates that the background of the 
family members has a significant relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure 
provided. For example, if too many (i.e., five or more) family members sit on the 
board and are involved in the company’s management, the level of voluntary 
disclosure tends to be lower than that for family-controlled companies with four or 
fewer family members on the board. This finding supports previous studies such as 
Ibrahim and Samad (2010), and Bamber et al. (2010). This phenomenon could be 
explained by family background in areas such as level of acquired business 
knowledge. The finding shows that experiential and professional elements can 




As the content analysis revealed, the annual reports demonstrate not only the family 
values but also the philosophies and beliefs of family-controlled companies. A few 
of the family-controlled companies in this current study set out their family and 
business philosophies in their annual reports to indicate their focus and direction in 
managing the company. According to Melin et al. (2013), family business customs 
or philosophies are often shown in a number of subtle and covert ways. These 
include not only the language used in the annual reports but also symbols, 
characters, and images that represent their beliefs (see also Gray, 1988). Take, for 
example, Top Glove Corporation Berhad. The owner provides a list of business 
rules in the company’s annual report. These are: “(i) Do not lose our shareholders’ 
money, (ii) Do not lose our health, (iii) Do not lose our temper; and (iv) Do not lose 
our customers (Top Glove Corporation Berhad, 2012, p. 8). Berjaya Sports Toto 
Berhad uses red as its official colour in the annual reports, and Mandarin as a third 
language in the company’s annual reports. Keck Seng (Malaysia) Berhad also uses 
Mandarin as a third language in the company’s annual reports, although its use is 
limited to the Chairman’s Statement section. Another example is QL Resources 
Berhad, which also lists the company’s values and ‘personality’ in its annual reports 
as follows: (a) “values–integrity, win-win, team work, and innovation, and (b) 
personality–progressive, trustworthy, initiative, and humility.” These findings have 
important implications as they show that family-controlled companies frame the 
way they run their businesses in terms of their personal and family values, their 
companies’ reputation, and the trust factor.   
The majority of the sample family-controlled companies are second generation 
family business. Here, ironically, the family business remains in the hands of the 
founder, but the network relationship is extended to siblings, children, and through 
marriage. Within family business, Steier and Miller (2010) explored the family 
business governance implications on the organisation’s operational and economic 
decision. They argue that family-controlled companies appear to be typically 
structured and cognisant of maintaining the traditional ways of doing things. Steier 
and Miller (2010) contend that the companies’ management structures normally 
remain unchanged, even when the business is in the hands of a successor. Using the 
lens of Steier and Miller (2010), and the observation made within this current study, 
it is argued that the younger generation will introduce changes into the organisation, 




(see also, Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). The result for Cahaya Mata Sarawak 
presented in chapter 7 illustrates this point. The company’s deputy group chairman, 
who is also a nonindependent, nonexecutive director, is a son of the founder who is 
also a major shareholder. His brothers-in-law also sit on the company’s board. It 
was observed that Cahaya Mata Sarawak shows a higher level of voluntary 
disclosure practices in its annual reports compared to the disclosure practices of 
other family-controlled companies.  
The total correlation result for all categories shows that the familial generation 
factor is significant (p = 0.1) to only one category of voluntary disclosure, namely 
general corporate and strategic information. As noted in the preceding sections, the 
generation to which family members belong, along with their personal background, 
education, and knowledge acquired by these managers can influence the level of 
voluntary disclosure provided in the annual reports. It seems, therefore, that the 
relationship between family generation and the level of voluntary disclosure is 
supported by how much business knowledge the family members who sit on the 
board have acquired. Although the generation factor seems to show a moderately 
significant correlation with the level of voluntary practices, family members who 
have high levels of professional education and experience play an important role in 
demarcating the decisions for making voluntary disclosure (Baydoun & Willett, 
1995). Family-controlled companies that show a high level of voluntary disclosure 
are found to have family members who have taken their tertiary education and 
graduated overseas, and some who have gained professional qualifications in their 
respective areas either locally or abroad. For example, in IOI Berhad the family 
members within the company have a combination of overseas and local academic 
and professional qualifications, and the company also provides a high level of 
voluntary disclosure compared to that of others. This finding provides some support 
for the conceptual premise that the type of education and experiences acquired can 
influence the level of voluntary disclosure. As Bamber et al. (2010) contend, a 
manager’s preference in voluntary disclosure practice can be influenced by the level 
of education and experiences gained. These elements can result in managers’ 
preferences on certain additional information, and impact on the way they 
manipulate the disclosure for the benefit of the company. For example, managers 
from finance or accounting areas may develop more precise communication styles 




The number of family members sitting on the board of these companies and the 
generation the members come from seem to signify the importance of the 
knowledge and education elements. These elements could contribute to the 
effectiveness of the voluntary disclosure practices by these companies. This finding 
has important implications in that it signifies that the family managers tend to 
provide voluntary disclosure in line with their own functional expertise, and that 
the amount of information disclosed voluntarily is subject to their discretion. 
Regardless of whether a decision is made collectively or individually within family-
controlled companies, the process is typically influenced by the social and cultural 
values of the person/s involved (Bamber et al., 2010; Hasegawa & Noronha, 2009). 
As noted in chapter 8, the interview findings agreed that voluntary disclosure 
practices in Malaysia are likely to involve market-driven reporting. The 
combination of findings provides some support for the conceptual premise that the 
voluntary disclosure practices by family-controlled companies signify a pattern of 
managers’ attitudes and perception on voluntary disclosure practices in their annual 
reports. Family business managers are typically influenced by their societal norms, 
professional background, and perhaps some government regulations. It can, 
therefore, be assumed that such elements can collectively represent a “subculture”, 
within a wider society. Subcultures are not, however, limited to only those within a 
business community (Gray, 1988; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hashim, 2012; Jaggi & 
Low, 2000). The business subculture is made up of stakeholder groups ranging from 
nonprofessional users such as graduates to professional managers who use 
information in the companies’ annual reports. Although family-controlled 
companies are often regarded as conservative, and to have overriding interest issues 
between shareholders (Ali et al., 2007; Sharma, Chua, & Chrisman, 1997; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006), findings from this current study show that family-
controlled companies are tending to participate in providing voluntary disclosure 
and are becoming more receptive to the stakeholders’ expectations. These efforts 
are shown in section 6.3.5, where some of the voluntary disclosure provided by 
these companies in their annual reports is frequently found to be greater compared 
to that of other nonfamily-controlled companies. Once again, it is noteworthy to 
highlight that it is a common behaviour for family-controlled companies to decide 
to provide voluntary disclosure up to a certain level only. It should be noted that 




interests, as managers are not keen to sacrifice the family’s legacy to accommodate 
stakeholders’ expectations (Chen et al., 2008; Takashi et al., 2012). One implication 
of this point is the possibility that most of the family-controlled companies in this 
study provide more voluntary disclosure that is closely related to the mandatory 
disclosure. In summary, the findings reveal that the family-controlled companies 
have a distinct character in their business management approach, and this 
distinctiveness includes voluntary disclosure.  
9.4 Mechanisms to enhance the voluntary disclosure practices by listed 
family-controlled in Malaysia 
The evaluation of the annual reports and interview data highlighted three key areas 
of concern: 1) disclosure of current and future performance measures; 2) family-
controlled companies’ business and entrepreneurial practices; and, 3) external 
forces as contributing factors for voluntary disclosure practices by listed family-
controlled companies. These concerns were discussed with the interview 
participants. In their opinion, it is important to improve on the voluntary disclosure 
practices in the companies’ annual reports. They pointed out that forward-looking 
and risk review information is important and has to be improved in order to 
accommodate the evaluation of financial information to measure the current and 
future performance of the companies in the capital market.  
The comprehensiveness and depth of the voluntary disclosure content was 
highlighted, and three of the participants who were regulators and auditors 
mentioned integrated reporting styles. As stated in chapter 2, integrated voluntary 
disclosure is considered as a future direction for voluntary disclosure reporting. It 
is, however, still in its infancy in terms of its implementation in Malaysia. A number 
of limitations (such as cost and framework) for the implementation of integrated 
reporting were highlighted, because the capital market regulations and business 
practices, as well as environment, in Malaysia differ from those of other countries 
(Jensen & Berg, 2012). With regard to integrated reporting practices in Malaysia, a 
number of participants argued that, although the introduction of integrated reporting 
has been announced and recently introduced by professional bodies, such practices, 
in their opinion, are likely to be utilised by nonfamily-listed companies rather than 
by family-controlled companies. In addition, the participants were in agreement that 




be improved first, rather than leaping into a new reporting practice. As noted, cost 
and proper framework or guidelines have always been part of the challenges for 
those companies wanting to move on to a new reporting style. This issue was 
explored in chapter 7 of the thesis. In addition, PWC Malaysia recently carried out 
an assessment of answers given to 110 questions used to identify the level of 
Malaysian listed companies’ readiness to embrace integrated reporting60. PWC 
found that listed companies tend to report basic reporting information and to lack 
interrelated content or linkage of information within the elements outlined in the 
recommended Integrated Reporting Framework. Based on the participants’ 
opinions and the PWC Malaysia survey assessment (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2015, p. 9), it is clear that the companies are not ready to embrace a new era of 
corporate reporting. Enhancing some current technical structures for better 
corporate reporting in the annual reports is, therefore, suggested.  
Following the discussions and opinions expressed by all the participants, a model 
of voluntary disclosure practices for voluntary disclosures by listed family-
controlled companies in Malaysia emerged. This model is recommended to listed 
family-controlled companies. The average level of importance for each category in 
the model was arrived at through the Delphi process results from panel members 
and through discussions with interview participants. This process has important 
implications for developing a voluntary disclosure model for family-controlled 
companies in Malaysia. The level of importance for each category that emerges 
from this Delphi process is that the financial information category contains the most 
important data, followed by forward-looking and risk review information. At the 
same time, corporate general and strategic information and the management and 
shareholders’ information categories were also ranked as important, because 
information within these contains: the key elements of a company’s overview and 
external environment implications; the company’s strategies, resource allocation, 
monitoring, and coordinating processes; and, the company’s business model, 
governance, and direction and performance in the capital market. The results are 
summarised in Table 34. 
 





Table 34. The emergent model of voluntary disclosure for family-controlled 
companies in Malaysia. 
Category Motive Level of 
importance 
(1 to 5) 
Financial information  To link the forward-looking and 
risk review information with past 
financial performance so as to 
assess the company’s plans and 
the provision provided, and to be 
able to mitigate possible 
unexpected risks to the company 
5 
Forward-looking and risk 
review information 
To evaluate past and current risk 
mitigation plans so as to forecast 
the possible outcomes resulting 
from the plan implementation – 
sustainability implications 
4 
Corporate general and 
strategic information 
To assess the company’s overall 
market and industry growth, and 
to compare it with the prevailing 




To indicate the professionalism 
and knowledge acquired by the 
company’s key person to direct 




To indicate the ethical values that 
underpin the organisation’s 
activities, and its appreciation of 
stakeholders at large  
3 
Author source for this study. 
Note: 5 - is very important; 4 - should be disclosed and important; 3 – the information is of 
intermediate importance; 2 - the information is of minor importance; and, 1 – the information 
is not important.  
 
The family-controlled companies’ business and entrepreneurial practices are often 
recognised as being different from those of other companies in various respects 
such as governance (namely ownership), control and management, and the family’s 
customs and beliefs. The researcher’s concerns about these family-controlled 
companies were also discussed with the interview participants.  
The participants stated that the biggest challenge for a family-controlled company 




noted in chapter 8, they agreed that family-controlled companies hesitate to disclose 
more information voluntarily because of the family business legacy. This concern 
was also expressed in previous studies such as Sharma (2004) and Villalonga and 
Amit (2006). It is interesting to note that most of the business decisions made are 
often associated with the family’s wealth and continuous business operation. These 
aim to retain family business matters in a protected environment and to protect the 
business from unnecessary interference by external parties or authorities. However, 
at the same time, findings in chapter 6, 7 and 8 signify that some large family-
controlled companies show that they tend to provide additional information 
voluntarily in order to meet the stakeholders’ (institutional investors and 
government) expectations and the current corporate reporting environment in 
Malaysia. As a result of the combination of both internal and external factors, these 
companies tend to provide additional information voluntarily to the degree that the 
managers perceive it to be safe, important, and of benefit to the annual reports users 
to do so.  
With regard to cultural elements, the majority of the interview participants agreed 
that cultural elements such as customs associated with ethnicity, religion, education, 
and family values are considered important, because they believe that these 
elements resulted in what the family’s manager considered true and, thus, likely to 
influence their attitude and behaviour towards providing information voluntarily. 
Amongst other factors, a family-controlled company’s business philosophy, 
corporate colours, and the language used in the annual reports are some of the 
cultural means that are employed to represent a specific meaning common to the 
same culture, as well as for the identification of the company’s stand in relation to 
its business condition (Hashim, 2012; Rashid & Ho, 2003). Indeed, when ethical 
concerns were raised and discussed in chapter 7, culture, among other things, was 
seen as an important transmitter and generator of ethical values within companies’ 
voluntary disclosure practices. Interestingly, comments from the participants seem 
to support Rashid and Ho’s (2003) study which suggests that the influence of ethnic 
groups on business ethics may be dependent on the situational context (see also, 
Mir et al., 2009). Consequently, this study argued that the more complex the 
business situation (i.e., the greater the interaction with external stakeholders and 
companies), the more likely the influence of culture. Some examples of cultural 




feelings among the Malays (the majority of whom are Muslims) about investment 
issues that contradict Islamic principles. 
The participants also believe that the family-controlled companies in Malaysia are 
progressing towards better voluntary disclosure. These companies are seen as trying 
to adapt to the transition to a capital market regime, and to simultaneously develop 
a style that family businesses are comfortable with. As noted in chapter 8, any 
additional information beyond the mandatory requirement provided by the 
companies is considered as a good effort, because the participants agreed that, 
whether companies, managers, or individuals respectively are typically influenced 
by their surroundings and the background of the individual involved in making 
additional information, disclosure is, after all, provided on a voluntary basis. 
Following the review and discussion of the voluntary disclosure practices by 
family-controlled companies, the participants were agreed that the driving factors 
for these companies to disclose information voluntarily are often subject to: (a) 
company reputation; (b) trust level; and, (c) market forces (i.e., regulations and peer 






Figure 23. The emergent model of family-controlled company in relation to 
voluntary disclosure decision making. 
 
In Figure 23, family values form the core element for the family-controlled 
company in making decisions for voluntary disclosure. This family values element 
is influenced by the number of family members involved in the management which, 
in turn, associates with the selection and preferences regarding voluntary disclosure 
in their annual reports. This selection of and preference for positive and 
encouraging information is often intended to assure stakeholders Thus, it represents 
the company’s reputation and embodies trust among the family and the people (i.e., 
stakeholders) around them. At the foundation level, the decision on the amount of 
information disclosed voluntarily often governs by the family manager’s 
demographic background. Elements such as norms, education and professionalism 
often take the form of family business spirit in various ways. The way of business 
carried out by these family-controlled companies is interconnected with family 
business spirit, which includes the composition of family members’ involvement in 
the management of the companies, at the operational level. As a result, the decision 
on the level of voluntary disclosure in the company’s annual report are often shaped 
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by the managers’ preferences and views in various economic contexts. However, 
according to accounting literature, family-controlled companies have reached a 
stage of development, where it is necessary for them to give emphasis to the 
company reputation, trust, and market forces factors. In light of this research-based 
emergent model, it seems very likely that outcomes from this research will clarify 
the relationship between family-controlled companies and their decision-making 
for voluntary disclosure in the future. This finding also shows that voluntary 
disclosure decisions vary among companies, and are more complex within family-
controlled companies since the control elements (i.e., equity rights) are majority-
shared between family members. Therefore, in explaining the rationale for the 
family-controlled companies to provide additional information voluntarily, the 
family-specific values and governance often determine the level of voluntary 
disclosure in their annual reports. Since these companies are listed on the Malaysian 
market, they have to ensure their businesses’ continuity in the capital market. They, 
therefore, have to maintain company reputation, build trust among stakeholders, 
and follow market forces that have economic value for the organisation and society. 
In addition, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, it is possible to place family-
controlled companies in the context of isomorphic voluntary disclosure practices, 
in which the family-controlled companies business environment influenced them to 
evolve for better disclosure and governance.  
9.5 Summary of the chapter  
This chapter presented a discussion of three findings reported in this thesis. First, it 
discussed the development of the best practices voluntary disclosure framework. 
The aim of this section was to describe the importance of the voluntary disclosure 
index in this research in order to demonstrate how it helps to achieve the objectives 
of this study. The list of voluntary disclosure index items developed stems from the 
panel members’ knowledge about voluntary disclosure information and regulatory 
changes or updates to the mandatory disclosure requirements that relate to voluntary 
disclosure. This section also explored the feasibility of the voluntary disclosure 
scoring instrument developed for the purpose of this study. Within this section, 
financial information was found to be the most important category of voluntary 




of voluntary disclosure in the companies’ annual reports enhanced the information 
presented.  
Second, this chapter presented a discussion on the current level of voluntary 
disclosure practices by Malaysian listed companies. This section revealed that the 
current level of voluntary disclosure practices by Malaysian listed companies 
remains at a low level. This research investigation indicates that the financial 
information category is the category most frequently provided by these companies. 
By contrast, voluntary disclosure relating to Islamic values is minimal. Only two 
voluntary disclosure items related to Islamic values were frequently found among 
the sampled companies’ annual reports.  
Several factors that cause a low level of voluntary disclosure practice were 
identified, namely market value, industry, and ownership. However, the analysis 
showed that family-controlled companies’ ownership is the major factor that 
contributes to the current level of voluntary disclosure. Analysis showed that both 
family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled companies tend to disclose different 
areas of voluntary disclosure. The family-controlled companies tend to disclose 
information concerning the implications of economic conditions that have affected 
their operational costs. They also disclose information that relates to market 
opportunities which may have had a moderating effect on their economic 
achievement in the market. By contrast, the nonfamily-controlled companies are 
more market-oriented. Hence, most of their voluntary disclosure items relate to 
those past and current market conditions that have affected their companies’ current 
performance. 
Third, this chapter presented a discussion on the challenges for voluntary disclosure 
practices by listed family-controlled companies. It presented the challenges in terms 
of ownership, control, and management of family-controlled companies, as well as 
the external environment’s influence in relation to making decisions about 
voluntary disclosure. The aim of this section was to map the importance of 
information as segments or categories of voluntary disclosure practices, and to 
recommend a voluntary disclosure framework to the listed family-controlled 






SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis by providing the study’s background and 
explaining how the research objectives have been achieved. The chapter also 
addresses the scope and limitations of the research in respect of its research design. 
It also suggests directions for future research. The chapter draws to its conclusion 
with the presentation of final reflexive remarks on the research process. 
10.2 Background of the study and its research objectives 
Muniandy and Ali (2012) point out that voluntary disclosures in companies’ annual 
reports have been used as a means of communication that complements the current 
statutory disclosure and enhances the flow of information provided in Malaysia’s 
capital market. Studies such as, Healy and Palepu (2001), Wang et al. (2013), and 
Wang and Hussainey (2013) all show that voluntary disclosure is regarded as 
valuable information by stakeholders who wish to make economic decisions. The 
voluntary disclosure practices by companies often result from the managers’ 
decision to show their accountability and transparency towards their stakeholders. 
These concepts are of importance not only to the stakeholders, but also to 
companies as they help to achieve the businesses’ objectives and sustain the 
businesses’ long-term prospects in a competitive and globalised market. In other 
words, voluntary disclosure is regarded as a communication tool than can reduce 
the information asymmetry in a capital market (Ho & Taylor, 2013; Uyar & Kılıç, 
2012; Wang et al., 2013).  
Previous studies in Malaysia argued that the level of voluntary disclosure provided 
is considered low when compared with stakeholders’ levels of expectation 
(Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ghazali, 2008). Ghazali (2008) suggests that one reason 
for low disclosure in the companies’ annual reports is due to factors such as 
governance structures and directors’ accountability, market forces, shareholders’ 




Another important reason why companies fail to meet the stakeholders’ 
expectations is that the depth and detail of the information disclosed are not at a 
constructive level (Ho & Taylor, 2013; Saleh et al., 2010). As Campbell and Abdul 
Rahman (2010, p. 56) state, “A key challenge in voluntary corporate reporting 
concerns the relevance and usefulness of the information being conveyed.” In 
addition, responses to improving the level of voluntary disclosure practices were 
not seen as encouraging, due to the low level of willingness on the part of 
companies’ key managers, and particularly the board of directors, who make the 
disclosure decisions (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). The low level of willingness to 
disclose has also, therefore, resulted in differences in the selection of additional 
information for disclosure in companies’ annual reports (Broberg et al., 2010; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Ho & Taylor, 2013; Naser et al., 2002). Ultimately, these 
studies argue that ownership type is one of the main factors that contributes to the 
differences in the level of voluntary disclosure. The extent and nature of current 
voluntary disclosure practices were a motivating factor for this research, and hence 
its key objective is to evaluate the possible factors that cause the differences in the 
level of voluntary disclosure between family-controlled companies and nonfamily-
controlled companies.  
Family-controlled companies are among the major contributors to Malaysia’s 
economy and gross domestic product (GDP). Their importance is evidenced by the 
number of family-controlled companies listed on the first board of Bursa Malaysia, 
and the fact that many are flagship companies in their respective industries in 
Malaysia (Hashim, 2011; Ibrahim & Samad, 2010). In spite of best practices 
guidelines for disclosure provided by the Bursa Malaysia, Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009), for example, suggest that the level of voluntary disclosure practices in 
family-controlled companies in Malaysia needs to be improved. In terms of the low 
level of voluntary disclosure practices, it was also argued that these companies tend 
to provide other additional information which the managers perceived important to 
the company (Depoers, 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hashim, 2011). Research 
into voluntary disclosure reporting such as Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), and Hashim 
(2011) contends that particular attributes of family-controlled companies may 
explain their corporate reporting practice. In Malaysia, research on voluntary 
disclosure by family-controlled companies is scarce. Hashim (2011), for example, 




is limited, and suggests further research into family-controlled companies in the 
disclosure area is important in order to measure corporate governance transparency.  
Extant studies argue that one factor that causes differences in the voluntary 
disclosure practices is the company’s corporate governance system. Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) suggest that family members are the major controllers of family-owned 
companies, and so they also, substantially, have the right to decide what should be 
disclosed within their annual reports. Villalonga and Amit (2006) contend that the 
level of voluntary disclosure is not caused by a company’s corporate governance 
alone but also by both external and internal elements. According to Villalonga and 
Amit (2006), the weaknesses arising within both elements were seen to result in 
considerable differences in the level of voluntary disclosure practice, and thus in 
the provision of insufficient useful information in the disclosure reporting. In 
addition, Villalonga and Amit’s (2006) study shows that external elements such as 
regulatory requirements, stock exchange listing requirements, and reporting 
standards were influential, and could drive the companies to disclose more 
additional information. This current research, therefore, suggests that voluntary 
reporting developed from the annual report users’ perspective can enhance the value 
of voluntary disclosure provided by companies. Since companies’ annual reports 
are their most accessible and comprehensive communication material, they have 
the potential to make information available in one document (Campbell & Abdul 
Rahman, 2010).  
In order to improve the level of voluntary disclosure practices by family-controlled 
companies, attention to the type of information provided in terms of its depth and 
relevance is important (Ali et al., 2007). Study on the voluntary disclosure practices, 
particularly by family-controlled companies, is important because of the ownership 
and control factors that are inherent in the family businesses’ decision-making. 
Here, it is crucial to investigate the actual voluntary disclosure practices provided 
by these companies to discharge their accountability and responsibility towards 
other stakeholders. The aim of this current research is to develop a voluntary 
disclosure index for family-controlled companies. This research also set out to 
identify both substantial differences across relevant industries and the factors that 
contribute to such phenomena. This aim is important because companies’ annual 




prospects of a company and because they act as a mechanism for communicating 
this information to users (Hooks et al., 2002, p. 502).  
The methodology and method of this current research embodies both quantitative 
and naturalistic elements. This combination allows the research to better understand 
the expectations and gain deeper insight into issues. The benefits of this approach 
can be seen through the interaction with panel members and users and preparers of 
annual reports, in terms of its ability to facilitate interpretation, illustration, and 
validation in the research data and findings. In other words, the mixed methods 
approach enables flexibility in the process of discovering “what is” and “what ought 
to be” disclosed in the family-controlled companies’ annual reports. It also helps in 
establishing the potential factors that contribute to the differences in the voluntary 
disclosure practices by family-controlled companies. In addition, this approach 
contextualises the family-controlled companies within the social, political, and 
economic environment, and distinguishes the users’ and the preparers’ interest in 
voluntary disclosure reporting (Ghazali, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ho & 
Wong, 2001; Salvato & Moores, 2010).  
The aim of this study was to develop a best practice framework of voluntary 
disclosure for family-controlled companies. To achieve this end, the study has 
addressed the following primary research objectives: 
(a) To develop a disclosure index, from the users’ and the preparers’ 
perspectives, for assessing the nature and extent of information disclosed in 
Malaysian listed family-controlled companies’ annual reports, and to 
incorporate a voluntary disclosure framework within the disclosure index 
(b) To identify the level of voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysian listed 
family-controlled companies from 2009 to 2013  
(c) To review and discuss the voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysia from 
stakeholders’ perspectives.  
10.3 Research approach and process 
Voluntary disclosure indices have been used as a research tool in accounting studies 
to measure the extent and amount of voluntary disclosure provided by companies 
in their annual reports (see for example, Coy & Dixon, 2004; Hooks et al., 2002; 




importance of these voluntary disclosure items as a means of scoring the level of 
voluntary disclosure information. This current study involved three major phases 
as follows. 
In the first phase, research issues and objectives were identified, and an initial 54 
items were identified from the literature. Subsequently, in the second phase, the 
Delphi process was employed to develop a voluntary disclosure framework. 
Using the Delphi model, 40 panel experts were approached. Weightings were 
assigned to each item and category through the use of a questionnaire survey. Items 
considered of greater importance by the panel of experts were awarded higher 
weights than those they considered to be of less importance. The Delphi process 
involved two rounds with the 40 panel experts. This process ultimately yielded 61 
items and these were classified into five categories. These voluntary disclosure 
items were seen to be applicable to the Malaysian business and corporate reporting 
environment. Thereafter, the weighting for each voluntary disclosure item within 
the five categories was determined. The weighting was based upon the opinions of 
the panellists on the level of importance of each item as expressed in a questionnaire 
survey. Lastly, criteria for assessing the content and level of voluntary disclosure 
were established on the basis of the prior literature. 
Within the second phase in this research, semistructured interviews were 
conducted. Those who had responded to the main survey, along with additional new 
participants, were invited to participate in the interviews. The interview data were 
seen as providing an in-depth understanding of the participants’ experience as 
stakeholders. Thus they enabled the researcher to undertake a comprehensive 
review of the extent and nature of voluntary disclosure practices. This approach 
also helped the researcher gain deeper understanding from the viewpoint of the 
actual participants. Thematic analysis of this qualitative data enabled the researcher 
to identify the phenomena that resulted in a model for voluntary disclosure practices 
of family-controlled companies along with factors that influence these companies’ 
decision for voluntary disclosure.  
Once the index had been constructed, it was used to code the annual reports of the 
sample companies in order to identify the level of voluntary disclosure by 




to be used on the companies’ annual reports was developed. Most previous studies 
(for example, Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Hashim, 2011; Ho & Taylor, 2013) 
involving disclosure indices in the voluntary disclosure area have focused on the 
extent of disclosure by assessing the absence and presence of an item. The present 
study, however, makes several noteworthy contributions to the development of 
voluntary disclosure in terms not only of the number of items being disclosed but 
also the quality of each disclosure. In order to assess the level of voluntary 
disclosure practice by Malaysian listed companies, each paragraph within the 
selected sections, that is, (1) Chairman’s Statement or Statement to Shareholders, 
(2) Review of Operation or Business Review, (3) Management, Discussions, and 
Analysis, and (4) Others: Business Management and Operational Summary, was 
studied, and a unit of analysis was identified. The approach used in this process 
built upon previous work carried out by Guthrie et al. (2004), Abeysekera and 
Guthrie (2005), and Samkin et al. (2014). In order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the coding scheme, two rounds of pilot tests were conducted. The pilot tests 
involved two assessors: the author, and a second assessor. The two assessors 
evaluated the results of the first pilot test; thereafter, some minor amendments were 
made to the scoring guidelines. These amendments involved the inclusion of one 
additional section – Others: Business Management and Operational Summary – and 
some additional guidelines for coding. The results from the second round pilot test 
showed that the amendments made during the first pilot test had improved the 
content analysis guidelines in terms of the overall consistency of the results. This 
process showed that the index was both valid and reliable in practice. It achieved a 
Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.9. As this score was higher than the threshold of 0.800, 
the index was deemed ready for use. 
All the data gathered through content analysis of the annual reports were then 
recorded in a spreadsheet, quantified, and analysed from several perspectives. 
These included: the frequency of voluntary disclosure items found in the 
companies’ annual reports; the comparative analysis of average voluntary 
disclosure scores provided by the sample companies; the association between 
companies’ market value, industry, and ownership; and, the relationship between 
the average voluntary disclosure scores and the attributes of family-controlled 
companies. These findings were then used to determine the differences between the 




In the final phase, the results obtained from the content analysis were integrated 
with the interview data. The final results formed a basis for discussion of the 
following: the overall level of voluntary disclosure practice in Malaysia; the level 
of voluntary disclosure provided by family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled 
companies in the sample; and, the contributing factors that influenced the managers 
to provide voluntary disclosure. Within this phase, a model of Malaysian listed 
family-controlled companies’ voluntary disclosure emerged. The benefits of this 
model are manifold: (a) it provides a conceptual framework of voluntary disclosure 
practices in terms of family values; (b) it can be applied in other disciplines; and, 
(c) it provides a theoretical underpinning for analysis of how a board of directors’ 
demographic background, and a country’s capital market environment have 
actually contributed to listed companies’ voluntary disclosure practices.    
10.4 Research findings and contributions of this thesis  
Chapter 3’s review of the extant literature and research into the level of voluntary 
disclosure identified the limitations in current knowledge. These limitations relate 
to the following: the subjective nature of voluntary disclosure and its measurement; 
the family-controlled ownership; the external influence of regulatory bodies and 
society; and, the environment. This research has offered a contribution to the body 
of knowledge in these areas. Consequently, by discussing the contributing factors 
that influence the level of voluntary disclosure in Malaysia in a wider context, this 
study aims to provide an overview of the current voluntary disclosure practices of 
both those who prepare annual reports and of stakeholders.  
10.4.1 Development of voluntary disclosure index: Methodological 
contributions 
On the basis of the index, it was found that the stakeholders, who were also the 
panel experts, ranked financial information as a primary disclosure category that 
must appear in the annual reports. This item was then followed by forward-looking 
and risk management information, corporate general and strategic information, and 
management and shareholders’ information. Information relating to corporate 
social and responsibility (CSR) was deemed to be the least important category. The 
panel of experts were in agreement that the first three categories are interrelated, 
complement each other, and provide a complete picture of a company’s 




information, and CSR, this type of disclosure was seen to be useful in terms of both 
ethical considerations with regard to the major controller of the company, and the 
accountability of the management towards external stakeholders, because the 
companies’ operational activities are often related to social and environmental 
matters in general. Therefore, stakeholders tend to expect that information relating 
to social and environmental activities will be disclosed voluntarily in the 
companies’ annual reports. 
10.4.2 The level of voluntary disclosure practices by listed companies in 
Malaysia: Practical contributions 
The second objective of this study is to identify the level of voluntary disclosure 
practices in Malaysian listed family-controlled companies from 2009 to 2013. The 
level of voluntary disclosure provided by the sampled companies is measured by 
the average voluntary disclosure score (AVDS) in their annual reports. Based on 
the findings presented in chapter 6 of the thesis, the study found that the current 
level of voluntary disclosure practices by Malaysian listed companies remains at a 
low level and does not yet match with the stakeholders’ expectations. The following 
are the essential features of the current voluntary disclosure practices: 
 The general corporate and strategic information category is the most 
frequently provided category of the sampled companies, followed by 
financial information, and the corporate social responsibility information 
category. The forward-looking and risk review management category was 
found to be the least frequently provided type of information.  
 Results from the panel members showed that they rated financial 
information as very important. Information relating to the forward-looking 
and risk review management category ranked next and was seen as should 
be disclosed and important, while the corporate general and strategic 
information, and the management and shareholders’ information categories 
were rated as should be disclosed and important respectively. The corporate 
social responsibility information was rated as intermediate important.  
 This longitudinal data analysis (2009 to 2013) shows that the quality of the 
information disclosed is merely general and expressed in discursive rather 
than numerical symbols that can reflect monetary and economic 




statement and its commitments to its product and services, general strategy 
plan, achievements, and operational activities carried out during the period. 
The information disclosed was not quantified, which meant that it also 
avoided any inaccurate meaning in terms of the information users were 
assessing. 
 Two Islamic values voluntary disclosure items were frequently disclosed by 
all the companies over the 5-year period. These were Halal certification of 
the product and the Shariah-based financing structure of companies. 
The results reported in chapter 7 show that companies’ market value and ownership 
type have a positive influence on their level of voluntary disclosure practices. That 
said, findings relating to companies by industry yielded mixed results. In addition, 
the results indicate that family-controlled companies, although having an overall 
lower level of voluntary disclosure than others, had better disclosure than most 
other companies in areas such as: 
 Discussion of the company’s new major product/services/projects  
 Discussion of recent industry trends  
 General statement for corporate strategy 
 Information relating to the general outlook of the economy  
 Discussion of competitive environment  
 Discussion of employees’ benefits  
 Sadaqa/donation  
 Retirement schemes through foundations or other means 
 Discussion on specific external factors affecting the firm’s prospects  
 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure  
 Nature and cause of risk, and natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood). 
By examining the extent of voluntary disclosure practice in these companies, this 
study reveals that voluntary disclosure practices vary significantly within company 
ownership. While this study’s results have some similarities with previous studies 
such as Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Ho and Taylor (2013), and Hashim (2011), the 
current study found that differences in the family-controlled company attributes are 
quite pronounced. For example, the number of family members involved in the 




business and management knowledge they have acquired have a positive 
relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure provided. In particular, the 
number of family members on the board should not make up more than half of the 
board of directors. The combination of these family members’ coming from various 
educational and experiential backgrounds and generations did, in some cases, result 
in a higher level of voluntary disclosure. 
10.4.3 Review and discussion of findings with the users and preparers of 
annual reports: Theoretical contributions  
This study reinforces Hossain and Hammami’s (2009) findings that the level of 
voluntary disclosure practices is complex and multifaceted. One aspect of the 
differences in the level of the voluntary disclosure practices phenomenon is the 
product of both external factors (such as accounting regulations, capital market 
environment, and listing requirements), and internal factors (such as ownership, 
management, and governance system). As presented in chapter 2 of the thesis, 
Malaysia has experienced extensive accounting regulatory reformation and 
corporate reporting environment changes through disclosure-based regimes. This 
situation has resulted in a significant change in the voluntary disclosure practices 
by the preparers of company annual reports (Hashim, 2012; Muniandy & Ali, 
2012). Similarly, the majority of the participants believed that companies often 
tended to provide voluntary disclosure, because pressure from their external 
surroundings forced them to satisfy the demand for additional information. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that some companies in this study have changed their 
disclosure practices to build or maintain their reputation and relationship with the 
stakeholders. Over and above that idea, the interviewees agreed that voluntary 
disclosure is lower than stakeholders expected. The key views being highlighted 
are that: 
 the decision to disclose information voluntarily is subject to company 
resources and activities which belong to the family; 
 the influence of family ownership and control can result in differences in 
the levels of voluntary disclosure between family-controlled and nonfamily-
controlled companies in terms of their voluntary disclosure. Consequently, 
family ownership and control provide a plausible explanation for the low 




 the participants agreed that attributes such as the number of family members 
involved in the family business, the generations the family members in the 
company come from, and the business knowledge they have acquired are of 
importance in relation to the level of voluntary disclosure practice. 
In light of the findings reported in previous chapters of the thesis, it can be said that 
the level of voluntary disclosure provided by the family-controlled companies in 
this study is moving towards better disclosure reporting than was reported in 
previous studies such as Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Ho (2008) and Ghazali (2007). 
As is the case with other publicly listed companies, the Malaysian publicly listed 
family-controlled companies investigated for this study have also undergone 
substantial development over the past decades as a result of all the regulatory 
changes in the country. These external factors have resulted in many family-
controlled companies changing the voluntary disclosure practices in their annual 
reports to adapt to the business environment in an attempt to increase and/or 
maintain the companies’ long-term business sustainability. However, at any stage 
of making the decision for voluntary disclosure, influences around family values 
and reputation that entail negotiation of the amount, usefulness, and relevance of 
additional information disclosed voluntarily can arise.  
10.4.4 Perceptions of family-controlled voluntary disclosure practices by 
stakeholders 
This section presents the stakeholders’ overall perception of family-controlled 
companies’ voluntary disclosure practices within the constructed conceptual 
framework in this thesis and the model that emerged in chapter 9.  
Generally, the findings showed that family-controlled companies are evolving 
towards better disclosure reporting, even though the stakeholders agreed that some 
family-controlled companies have not departed from their traditional business 
mode. The findings in this research indicate that two dimensions influence the 
voluntary disclosure practices of family-controlled companies: first, at the 
foundation level, and second at the operational level. Developments along the two 
dimensions were found.  
At the foundation level, the demographic background of family managers, 




shaped the way that these managers make decision for their organisation. Family 
business continuity and interests are among the main concern for these managers to 
safeguard in a business environment. The managers often maintain the family 
values as to strengthen their family business reputation and in managing the 
organisation direction based on their own business mode.  
As for operational level, the influence of family values leads to the complexity of 
the families’ managers decision-making in their business. The family relationships 
factor often reside in the family managers’ characteristics and lead to conservative 
action for voluntary disclosure practice. Furthermore, the influence of family values 
actively multiplies when family members are involved in the management of the 
companies. 
As a result of the family members’ involvement in the organisation, the nature of 
the businesses’ rules and governance usually differ from those of other nonfamily-
controlled companies. The number of family members who sit on the board of 
directors or who are involved in the management plays a vital role in determining 
the level of voluntary disclosure. Having a balanced composition, or low number, 
of family members involved in the business management can result in better 
voluntary disclosure practice. In addition, within the nature or rules and compliance 
mechanisms, these family-controlled companies are driven to diverge from a more 
traditional business concept, and to follow their peer industry environment. This 
process implies that family-controlled companies are trying to follow their peers, 
but with reputation, trust, and gain economic value from the market forces.   
In order to further improve voluntary disclosure practices by family-controlled 
companies, a conceptual framework that can highlight good voluntary disclosure 
reporting is, therefore, needed. Findings from this study suggest that information 
relating to financial information, forward-looking and risk review, corporate 
general and strategic information, followed by management and shareholders 
information, and corporate social responsibility information should be clearly 
stated. The specific purpose, and the principal and possible results from both the 
companies’ current and future performance needs to be identified. The findings also 
suggest that the presentations of the voluntary disclosure should integrate both 




10.5 Research limitations and directions for future research 
The study was subject to the following limitations which must be considered when 
evaluating its results.  
First, a total of 30 companies listed on the main board in the Bursa Malaysia 
(Malaysia’ Stock Exchange) provided the setting for this study’s investigation. 
While this sample can be seen as a relatively small one compared to the total 
number of companies listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia, the study does 
offer insights into and contribute to our understanding of family-controlled 
companies in an emerging market. Second, given that the aim of this thesis was to 
explore differences between family-controlled and nonfamily controlled companies 
in the multiethnic context of Malaysia, the study’s findings need to be viewed 
within this particular context, and not in terms of their wider generalisability. 
Furthermore, the rigid characterisation of the term family-controlled used in this 
particular research context meant that the family-controlled companies sampled 
were found to be predominantly ethnically Chinese (14). Only one company was 
Bumiputera-run. In addition, the ethnic imbalance in the current sample limited the 
study’s ability to fully explore ethnicity in relation to the level of voluntary 
disclosure in companies’ annual reports and to compare the behaviours of 
companies with a more diverse range of ownership in terms of their ethnicity. It is 
hoped, therefore, that future studies may be able to redress this limitation, as the 
business environment in Malaysia develops greater diversity of ownership and 
control. 
Second, this current research is restricted to the context of voluntary disclosure 
practices provided in the companies’ annual reports in Malaysia. Therefore, the 
generalisability of its findings is limited by the characteristics of the specific 
context. The findings are based on the researcher’s experience of the specific data 
obtained, and there is a risk that it may not, therefore, be possible to raise the level 
of the generality of the findings. In addition, this research examined the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the sampled companies’ annual reports. Any other forms of 
media that the companies may have used for disclosure purposes are excluded 




Third, to a certain extent, the interviewee sample was likely to limit the ability to 
generalise in terms of voluntary disclosure practices by family-controlled 
companies. Only half of the interviewees sampled are business owners and 
advisors, and had previous exposure to and experience of preparing voluntary 
disclosure within family-controlled companies’ annual reports.  
10.5.1 Directions for future research 
The limitations mentioned in the preceding section suggest valuable directions for 
future research which could extend the research findings. Thus, this section 
proposes several interesting research ideas to be investigated or explored on the 
basis of the knowledge gained from the research undertaken.  
First, future research could perhaps look into the role played by female family board 
members in terms of their involvement with and influence on the level of voluntary 
disclosure provided in the annual reports of family-controlled companies. Research 
could be undertaken to see if the involvement of female members in family-owned 
businesses has an influence on particular categories of the voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, future research could extend the study by exploring further the role of 
family business succession planning to establish whether or not it might influence 
the decision-making process within the context of voluntary disclosure. 
Second, future research could extend the study to specific categories of market-
value range, and even to public listed family-controlled companies on the second 
board of Bursa Malaysia. Doing so would also enable future research to develop a 
coding scheme to measure, test, and validate the voluntary disclosure index 
framework developed in this study. Further, a longitudinal or temporal study could 
be embarked upon to determine the robustness of the current findings.  
Third, it would also be interesting to see how religion plays a part in shaping family 
and organisational values. Perhaps future research could also be carried out using a 
similar methodology in predominantly Islamic countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, the 
research could also be extended to compare Malaysian companies with companies 
in other neighbouring countries within the Asia Pacific region, thus supporting the 
idea that a country’s social culture in general, whether in terms of ethnicity and/or 




factors, and/or whether religion is a factor that binds the family and organisational 
shared values within the voluntary disclosure context.  
Fourth, this research employed a mixed methods approach. However, other 
approaches could also be employed in the future. Future research could investigate 
the perceptions or attitudes of business owners towards voluntary disclosure 
practice. Various stakeholder groups could be surveyed and interviewed to obtain 
in-depth information regarding their preference for providing voluntary disclosure, 
and explore the importance of voluntary disclosure items for them. 
10.6 Final reflexive remarks 
As already reported in chapter 4, throughout the research process the author has 
positioned herself as a stakeholder, considering that she has ‘“first-hand’ experience 
of using companies’ annual reports. During the course of the research, the author 
has articulated both a quantitative and a qualitative approach as a researcher. This 
mixed methods approach accepts the answers and/or opinions of stakeholders 
including, in this case, those of users and preparers of annual reports. Creswell 
(2007) suggests “the individual using this worldview will use multiple methods of 
data collection to best answer the research question, will employ both quantitative 
and qualitative sources of data collection, and will emphasize the importance of 
conducting research that best addresses the research problem” (p. 23).  
The search for understanding of the voluntary disclosure practices, the significance, 
and the relevance of differences in reporting practices, as well as the driving factors 
that can explain the position of family-controlled companies have provided better 
explanation for the different company attributes that influence the level of voluntary 
disclosure practices. Reflecting on the research process and findings, the following 
key knowledge could shape a researcher’s understanding and thinking in the future: 
(a) Voluntary disclosure practices do not represent the accountability and 
transparency of the companies’ business-related action only. Rather than 
showing companies’ transparency, the practice reveals much about the 
company’s top management, because it reveals the board of directors’ 
personal interest, given the fact that it is ultimately these individuals who 




controlled companies are often faced with complex and unique family-
business relationships.  
(b) Family-controlled companies are moving towards better voluntary 
disclosure practices. Despite the frustrations of stakeholders, and 
insufficient additional information within the annual reports, the level of 
voluntary disclosure provided by companies in Malaysia is moving towards 
positive change in certain disclosure categories. In addition, it is believed 
that companies that are disclosing voluntarily are making an enormous 
effort to do so. 
(c) More training and guidance about voluntary disclosure can also improve the 
level of voluntary disclosure practices. Professional institutions and/or 
agencies could provide training to preparers on the significant features to 
disclose. Over and above the pressure from regulatory requirements, 
stakeholders’ awareness can influence the Malaysian listed companies, 
particularly the family-controlled ones, to improve their voluntary 
disclosure practices.  
(d) With regard to research aspects, conducting field interviews in Malaysia is 
quite a challenging experience. Cultural values within the society such as 
power distance, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance may impede the 
probability that a researcher can successfully approach managers. 
Nevertheless, reputation and professional connections are among the 
features that are useful in investigating and approaching top management 
stakeholders. Such connections can help the researcher to gain meaningful 
data. 
10.7 Summary of the chapter 
This study had the objective of developing a voluntary disclosure index, exploring 
the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports provided by family-controlled 
companies, and elucidating factors that influence the companies’ managers’ 
decisions for voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. These objectives were achieved by 
investigating the importance of voluntary disclosure in detail with reference to the 
relevant literature, supporting documents, and stakeholders’ opinions. It also 
identified a number of important themes that could contribute to existing 




This study revealed that the current levels of voluntary disclosure provided by listed 
family-controlled companies are low. Consequently, these companies may require 
suitable guidance when providing voluntary disclosure in their annual reports, 
particularly in terms of the content and type of information to be provided 
voluntarily. It appears that the degree of improvement in the level of voluntary 
disclosure is quite slow and small. Additionally, lack of demand for voluntary 
disclosure in companies’ annual reports in Malaysia offers an opportunity to some 
companies, particularly the family-controlled companies, to continue providing low 
voluntary disclosure.  
To an extent, voluntary disclosure is currently biased towards certain types and 
categories of information that contain less important and useful data for 
stakeholders making economic decisions. As a result, stakeholders, in practice, 
often have to utilise the limited information obtained from the statutory disclosure. 
Doing so leads to uncertainty. The current situation creates ambiguity in the 
corporate reporting, because no appropriate concept or guidelines for voluntary 
disclosure exist. Moreover, the findings revealed that the consequences of the 
diverse forms of voluntary disclosure content in the annual reports cause some 
stakeholders simply to ignore the information, as they cannot compare and measure 
the details for the purpose of economic evaluation. This situation often occurs when 
stakeholders face a lack of useful information such as information in relation to a 
company’s strategic plan – when dealing with various types of risk that may impact 
on the company’s performance.  
Given that a company’s board of directors have the prerogative to decide the type 
of information to be disclosed voluntarily, further revision of current statutory 
disclosure is imperative to deal with the aforementioned problems of providing 
useful voluntary disclosure. The overall interview findings revealed that most of 
the stakeholders agreed that suggested guidelines for voluntary disclosure would be 
a great help to them. While nearly all of them recognised the importance of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports, they were uncertain whether the level of 
voluntary disclosure provided by these companies would improve effectively if 
society’s perception of voluntary disclosure in general were changed. One 
important finding was that most considered that the governance of family-
controlled companies is different from that of other publicly listed companies. The 




create challenges in providing information voluntarily and in the sharing of it with 
others.  
However, better incentives coupled with appropriate guideline suggestions would 
minimise issues related to the level of voluntary disclosure provided by family-
controlled companies. As shown in the quantitative data, the involvement of 
multigenerational family members with diverse knowledge and professional 
experience may offer an opportunity for these companies to improve their 
disclosure practice. This study found that three internal factors (i.e., number of 
family members involved in the company, the different family generations, and 
their knowledge and experience gained) influenced the decision for voluntary 
disclosure. These findings run counter to the existing perceptions that family-
controlled companies are influenced by the inherent tension between institutional 
arrangements, and the families’ businesses and values.  
These findings suggest that a revision of the provision of voluntary disclosure 
guidelines and the incorporation of better tax incentives are needed in order to 
improve the level of voluntary disclosure provided by Malaysian public listed 
companies, particularly Malaysian family-controlled publicly listed companies. It 
is hoped that the knowledge gained through this study will provide a greater 
understanding of how voluntary disclosure could result in better corporate reporting 
for stakeholders and promote greater transparency and accountability in the capital 
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A. Primary listing of local and foreign companies 
 
 








Mode of Listing 
Profit Test  
 Uninterrupted profit after tax ("PAT") of three to five full 
financial years ("FY"), with aggregate of at least RM20 million; 
and  
 PAT of at least RM6 million for the most recent full FY  
Market Capitalisation Test  
 A total market capitalisation of at least RM500 million upon 
listing; and  
 Incorporated and generated operating revenue for at least one 
full FY prior to submission  
Infrastructure Project Corporation Test  
 Must have the right to build and operate an infrastructure 
project in or outside Malaysia, with project costs of not less than 
RM500 million; and  
 The concession or licence for the infrastructure project has been 
awarded by a government or a state agency, in or outside 
Malaysia, with remaining concession or licence period of at 
least 15 years 
Public Spread 
 At least 25% of the Company’s share capital; and 
 Minimum of 1,000 public shareholders holding not less than 
100 shares each 
Bumiputera Equity Requirement 
 Allocation of 50% of the public spread requirement to 
Bumiputera investors on best effort basis ** 
** the portion made available for subscription via balloting, 50% of which are to be made 
available to retail Bumiputera investors (source: Securities Commission Malaysia (2012a) 
 
Additional Criteria for foreign Companies must comply with the 
following: 
Place of incorporation, Approval of regulatory Authorities of Foreign 
Jurisdiction, Registration, Accounting Standards, Translation of 




 An identifiable core business which it has majority 
ownership and management control 
 Core business should not be holding of investment in other 
listed companies 
Infrastructure Project Corporation Test 
 Continuity of substantially the same management for at 
least three full financial years prior to submission 
 For market capitalisation test, since the commencement of 
operations (if less than three full financial years) 
Financial Position and Liquidity 
 Sufficient level of working capital for at least 12 months; 
 Positive cash flow from the operating activities for listing 
via profit test and market capitalisation test; and  
 No accumulated losses based on its latest audited balance 
sheet as at the date of submission 
Moratorium on Shares 
 Promoters’ entire shareholdings for six months from the 
date of admission 
 Subsequent sell down with conditions for companies listed 
under Infrastructure Project Corporation test 
Transaction with Related Parties 
 Must be based on terms and conditions which are not 
unfavourable to the company 
 All trade debts exceeding the normal credit period and all 
non-trade debts, owning by the interested persons to the 
company or its subsidiary companies must be fully settled 
prior listing  
Additional Criteria for Foreign Companies 
Place of incorporation 
Approval of regulatory Authorities of Foreign Jurisdiction 
 Prior approval of all relevant regulatory authorities of the 
jurisdictions(s) in which it is incorporated or carries out its 
core business operations before issuing its listing prospectus  
Registration, Accounting Standards 
 Must have been registered with the Registrar of Companies 
under the Companies Act 1965 
Translation of Documents 
 All documents to be submitted to the authorities (including 
financial statements), which are in a language other than 
English, must be accompanied by a certified English 
translation 
Valuation of Assets 
 Standards applied in Malaysia or International Valuation 
Standards 
Currency Denomination 
 Applicants is required to consult Bursa Malaysia and obtain 
approval of the Controller of Foreign Exchange for quotation 
of securities in a foreign currency 
Resident directors 
  Companies predominantly Malaysian-based operations - 
majority of directors whose principal or only place of 
residence is in Malaysia; companies predominantly foreign-
based must have at least one director 

































i. Participant Information Sheet 
                                                            
 







I am Syeliya Md Zaini, a PhD candidate at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. Currently, I 
am conducting the above research as my PhD requirement under the supervision of Professor 
Howard Davey, Associate Professor Grant Samkin and Dr. Umesh Prasad Sharma. The objectives 
of this research are to examine, and identify the extent of voluntary disclosure practices in Malaysian 
listed family firms by assessing the differences in voluntary disclosure items in firms’ annual reports.   
 
I am writing to ask if you would be willing to assist me with some research over the next two months. 
This would require you to answer a set of questionnaires between October and November, and would 
take about 40 to 50 minutes (approximately) of the session. As part of my thesis research procedures, 
I am conducting a Delphi opinion seeking exercise of annual reports user groups. As a representative 
of ..........................................…... the invitation is for you to participate as one of anonymous 
members of the external stakeholders’ group. Your opinion would be sought about what information 
listed companies should disclose in their annual reports. The research will provide valuable insights 
for stakeholders, regulators and standard setting bodies to develop better strategies and frameworks 
in providing voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. It will also identify the current challenges 
faced by firms in providing voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. 
 
Information obtained in this research is strictly confidential. There will be no identification of your 
firm or participation in my PhD thesis, or any publication related to the research. You may refuse to 
answer any particular questions and to withdraw from the interview.  
 
The outcomes of this research cannot be produced without your participation. Your opinions and 
experiences are important in this research.  
 
Should you have questions or concerns about this study, please contact me at 017-5707705 or email 
me at sbm11@waikato.ac.nz.   
 












ii. Consent Form for Participants 
  
                                                          
The Extent and Differences of Voluntary Disclosure Practices in Listed 
Family Firms in Malaysia 
 
Syeliya Md Zaini, PhD Candidate, Waikato Management School 
Email: sbm11@waikato.ac.nz  
 
Consent Form for Participants 
 
I have read the Information Sheet for Participants for this study and have had the 
details of the study explained to me. My questions about the study have been 
answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at 
any time.  
 
I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time (within 
TWO (2) weeks after the interview), or to decline to answer any particular 
questions in the study. I agree to provide information to the researchers under the 
conditions of confidentiality set out on the Information Sheet.  
 






Name:  _____________________________________________ 
 
 
Date:  _____________________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s name and contact information: 
 
Syeliya Md Zaini 
Department of Accounting 
Email: sbm11@waikato.ac.nz 
Phone (Mobile): 0221893779 
 
Supervisor’s Name and contact information: 
Professor Howard Davey 
Department of Accounting 
Email: hdavey@waikato.ac.nz 




C. List of panel members and category as annual report 
user 
ID Position Classification 
1 Chief Executive Officer Analyst 
2 Deputy Director of Research Analyst 
3 Manager - Risk and Governance Provider of services 
4 Audit Manager Provider of services 
5 Business Consultant Provider of services 
6 Head of Research Centre Researcher 
7 Manager - Company Secretary Provider of services 
8 Managing Director Corporate Finance Advisor 
9 Director Equity investor 
10 Relationship Manager Financial provider 
11 General Manager Provider of services 
12 Executive Director Securities Malaysia Regulator 
13 Deputy Director - Institute of Integrity Malaysia Government agencies 
14 Senior Analyst Analyst 
15 Assistant Manager Provider of services 
16 Audit Director Provider of services 
17 Audit Associate Provider of services 
18 Manager - Securities Malaysia Regulator 
19 Dean of Institute Researcher 
20 Managing Director Provider of goods and services 
21 Senior Research Analyst Analyst 
22 Senior Executive Analyst 
23 Chief Executive Officer Trading company 
24 Senior Manager Regulator 
25 Manager Auditor 
26 Head of Risk and Shariah Compliance Financial provider 
27 Head of Institute Researcher 
28 
Director of Corporate Management and 
Communication Government agencies 
29 Assistant Vice President Analyst 
30 Finance Manager Financial provider 
31 Project Manager Provider of goods & services 
32 Finance Manager Government agencies 
33 Head Group Risk Provider of services 
34 Manager - Market Surveillance Regulator 
35 Director of Private Sector Analyst 
36 Associate Professor Researcher 
37 Business Consultant Provider of services 
38 Director Regulator 
39 Assistant Editor Journalist 




















summary for 5 
years 
2. Brief history of 
the firm and 
nature of the 
business 




4. Images of 
major types of 
product 
5. Information on 
new product 
development 
6. Discussion of 
recent industry 
trends 









1. Background of 











3. Picture of board 
of directors and 
senior management 
team ) 





number of Muslim 
shareholders and 
their shareholdings 
5. Details of Shariah 
oversight board (if 
applicable)  











operating data and 
performance 
measurements that 
management uses  
to manage the 
business and in the 
decision making 
3. Share price 
information 
(trend) 






6. Any form of 
financing/investm







1. CSR policy, a 
statement of 
compliance 
















5. Discussion of 
involvement in 
public/private 
action designed to 
protect 
environment 
6. Corporate policy 
on employee 
benefits 
7. Corporate policy 
on employees’ 
training 
1. Discussion of 
opportunities 
























5. Nature and cause 
of risks 












relating to the 
general outlook 
of the economy 




on disposal and 
cessation 
14. A statement 
of corporate goals 
15. Vision and 
mission statement 








18. Statement of 
ways to improve 
customer service 
19. Actions taken 
during the year to 
achieve the 
corporate goal 









8. Discussion of 
employees’ 
benefits 
9. Discussion of 
employees’ 
training 
10. Breakdown of 




employees by level 
of qualifications 










14. Discussion of 









(description of the 








7. Effects of 
opportunities and 
















23. Reasons for 
the disposal and 
cessation 
24. Description of 
R&D projects 















29. Halal status of 
the product (if 
applicable) 
30. Declaration of 
activities that 
involve alcohol 
and gambling (if 
applicable) 
17. Qard Hassan ─ 
borrowing without 
profit and interest 









E. List of voluntary disclosure categories, items, and 











28 Review of financial highlights related to the financial statements. 
Disclosure and description of the company’s financial 
performance (such as profit before tax, revenue/sales, or 
return on investment).
29 High level operating data and performance measurements that management uses.
Information on business division, product or plan 
contribution on the company’s financial performance.
30 Share price information (trend).
Disclosure on the share-price movement from last year and 
current year.
31 Share price information (year-end). Disclosure on the current share price performance.
32 Market share in the industry
Additional information about the company's market size 
within its industry/sector.
33 Market capitalisation in the share market (year-end).
Disclosure on the company’s market capitalisation in the 
stock exchange.
34 Any form of financing/investment or funding related to Shariah law (if applicable).
Information or disclosure of financing structure or 
investment in accordance to Islamic law.
35 Zakat: method used/amount/beneficiaries (if applicable).
Disclosure on the policy for Islamic form of tax payable 
including amount and zakat paid breakdown. 
36 CSR policy; a statement of compliance.
Brief information about the company’s CSR policy or 
statement of compliance for CSR.
37 Discussion of involvement in community programmes (health/education/charity)
Disclosure regarding the company participation and 
involvement in the community programmes carried out. 
Information can include the objectives, amount spent, and 
benefits (who and what) of the programme.
38 Discussion of environmental protection programme implemented.
Disclosure regarding the company participation, and 
involvement reports on the environmental protection 
programmes, carried out. Information can include the 
objectives, amount spent, and benefits (who and what) of 
the programme.
39
Discussion of involvement in public/private action designed to protect the 
environment.
Disclosure regarding adopting or employed policy or 
machine or plant to protect the environment around the 
organisation project or plant operating.
40 Corporate policy on employees’ benefits.
Brief information about the company’s corporate policy or 
statement of compliance for employees’ benefits.
41 Corporate policy on employees’ training.
Brief information about the company’s corporate policy or 
statement of compliance for employees’ training or career 
advancement.
42 Discussion of employees’ benefits.
Disclosure of information relating to types of benefits solely 
for employees, and/or may include the amount and 
breakdown of benefits provided since their commencement.
43 Discussion of employees’ training.
Disclosure of information relating to types of training 
(external/in-house) solely for employees, and/or may 
include the amount and breakdown of training provided 
since its commencement, and successful employees from 
the programme.
44
Breakdown of workforce by line of business distribution or categories of 
employees by level of qualifications.
Disclosure of information relating to the proportion or 
statistical figure of workforce employed (by level of 
qualifications) based on business distribution.
45 Amount spent on employees’ benefits and training.
Information relating to the breakdown or details of the 
benefits and training expenditure.
46 Retrenchment/redundancy information.
Information relating to the past or possible number of 
employees compensated due to restructuring process 
47 Information about employee workplace safety.
Disclosure on the importance of the company’s 
responsibilities towards employees’ workplace safety and 
health. 
48 Discussion of health and safety standards.
Information may include healthy activities or programme/s 
carried out and their purpose and outcomes. 
49 Sadaqa/donation (description on the recipients and purpose) (if applicable).
Disclosure of information relating to charity made in 
accordance with Islamic principles Information may 
describe the beneficiaries, amount donated, aims, and 
objectives for such donations. 
Financial information Explanation of item









50 Waqf (description on the policy and amount spent) (if applicable).
Information relating to charity made in accordance with 
Islamic law, such as building of mosques, schools, or 
premises for the use of society, employees, or specific 
community groups. 
51 Retirement scheme through foundation or other means. 
Disclosure of information relating to employees’ retirement 
benefits (either in cash or material).
52
Discussion of opportunities (firm’s prospects in general and business strategy on 
future performance in general).
Disclosure of information relating to the company’s plan for 
future investment strategy to improve the company’s 
performance due to certain government policies or 
competitive environment.
53
Discussion of  specific external factors affecting firm’s prospects (economy, 
politics, technology).
Disclosure of information relating to last year’s and/or 
current governmental policy or economic global status that 
can or may affect the company’s position.
54
Discussion of future products/services research and development activities with 
planned research and development expenditure.
Disclosure of information relating to implementation of 
system, machine, technique, or any form of device 
employed for production enhancement  and firm’s 
competitive advantage.
55 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure.
Disclosure of information regarding the budgeted or 
forecast expenditure cost for the company’s product and 
branding marketing.
56 Nature and cause of risks.
Information relating to the type, cause, and effect on the 
company’s financial and performance status.
57
Identification of major differences between actual business performance and 
previously disclosed opportunities, risks, and management plans.
Information relating to past year’s performance and 
expected production and profit and current year’s 
performance that may have either positive or negative 
implication for the strategy carried out.
58
Environmental incidents - Implementation of procedures for managing materials 
containing environmentally sensitive substances - convert the production processes.
Disclosure relating to company’s contingency plan, 
procedures, and strategies to mitigate any possible 
environmental uncertainty or risk related to the use of 
materials for production.
59
High degree of government regulation - dicussion on the ways for appropriate 
investment decision.
Information relating to government policy or regulation that 
has led the company to make suitable economic investment. 
60
Technical failure - discussion on hiring and retaining highly trained and experienced 
staff / developing control quality system and equipments maintenance/implementing 
software that allows better design and manufacturing process.
Disclosure relating to company plans and strategies that 
involve special equipment, software, programme for 
productivity enhancement. 
61
Natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood) - Discussion on engineering, 
administrative and operating staff to identify and develop control program.
Disclosure relating to the company’s contingency plans and 
strategies to mitigate any possible natural disasters.




F. The List of Top 150 Companies in Malaysia as at 
31.12.13 
 
No NAME MARKET VALUE No NAME MARKET VALUE
1 MALAYAN BANKING 88089.0 76 QL RESOURCES 3386.32
2 PUBLIC BANK 68519.25 77 DAYANG ENTER.HDG. 3184.50
3 TENAGA NASIONAL 64224.25 78 MAH SING GROUP 3137.70
4 AXIATA GROUP 58930.42 79 DUTCH LADY MILK 3016.96
5 CIMB GROUP HOLDINGS 58897.57 80 PARKSON HOLDINGS 3008.23
6 SIME DARBY 57210.06 81 SHANGRI-LA HOTELS (MAL.) 2974.40
7 PETRONAS CHEMICALS GP. 55359.98 82 POS MALAYSIA 2942.90
8 MAXIS 54549.71 83 MEDIA PRIMA 2883.21
9 PETRONAS GAS 48043.62 84 SARAWAK OIL PALMS 2853.39
10 DIGI.COM 39246.19 85 IJM PLANTATIONS 2847.79
11 GENTING 38161.89 86 KOSSAN RUBBER 2762.50
12 IHH HEALTHCARE 31400.99 87 TSH RESOURCES 2720.52
13 PETRONAS DAGANGAN 31234.18 88 UOA DEVELOPMENT 2599.18
14 IOI 30352.59 89 BERJAYA 2536.74
15 SAPURA-KENCANA PETROLEUM 29361.55 90 KECK SENG (MALAYSIA) 2486.96
16 HONG LEONG BANK 27070.68 91 CAPITAMALLS MAL.TRUST 2481.95
17 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG 26580.86 92 HONG LEONG CAPITAL 2419.59
18 GENTING MALAYSIA 26008.62 93 AIRASIA X 2358.52
19 MISC BHD. 25443.61 94 CAHYA MATA SARAWAK 2333.76
20 AMMB HOLDINGS 21822.70 95 ZHULIAN 2295.40
21 RHB CAP. 20120.58 96 LINGKARAN TRANS KOTA HDG. 2251.15
22 TELEKOM MALAYSIA 19854.58 97 WCT HOLDINGS 2239.55
23 PPB GROUP 19133.98 98 ALLIANZ MALAYSIA IRR.CV. PF.SHS. 2235.56
24 BRIT.AMER.TOB.(MALAYSIA) 18308.17 99 EASTERN & ORIENTAL 2146.33
25 YTL 17397.06 100 HAP SENG PLTNS.HDG. 2144.00
26 FELDA GLOBAL VENT.HDG. 16380.18 101 MALAYSIAN RES. 2130.19
27 HONG LEONG FINL.GP. 16296.86 102 AEON CREDIT SERVICE 2119.68
28 NESTLE (MALAYSIA) 15946.00 103 TIME DOTCOM 2034.48
29 UMW HOLDINGS 14089.63 104 JAYA TIASA HOLDINGS 1986.38
30 YTL POWER INTERNATIONAL 13562.77 105 AMWAY (MAL.) HDG. 1972.63
31 BUMI ARMADA 11814.30 106 ALLIANZ MALAYSIA 1945.03
32 MALAYSIA AIRPORTS HDG. 11091.99 107 SHELL REFINING CO.FOM 1908.00
33 GAMUDA 11002.95 108 SUPERMAX 1884.03
34 UEM SUNRISE 10708.34 109 SCOMI ENERGY SERVICES 1861.71
35 KLCC PROPERTY HOLDINGS 10561.20 110 TASEK 1839.48
36 DIALOG GROUP 8774.59 111 MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS 1770.00
37 MMC 8769.76 112 YINSON HOLDINGS 1740.26
38 BATU KAWAN 8544.63 113 PERISAI PTL.TEKNOLOGI 1724.40
39 GENTING PLANTATIONS 8377.67 114 SYARIKAT TAKAFUL MAL. 1677.02
40 IJM 8308.25 115 COASTAL CONTRACTS 1657.61
41 SP SETIA 7400.72 116 TH PLANTATIONS 1655.24
42 ALLIANCE FINANCIAL GP. 7368.98 117 SELANGOR PROPERTIES 1649.36
43 LAFARGE MALAYSIA 7281.88 118 STAR PUBLICATIONS (MAL.) 1647.00
44 BIMB HOLDINGS 6780.52 119 NCB HOLDINGS 1645.89
45 FRASER & NEAVE HOLDINGS 6755.43 120 MUDAJAYA GROUP BHD. 1599.96
46 HAP SENG CONSOLIDATED 6632.79 121 OSK HOLDINGS 1598.95
47 AFFIN HOLDINGS 6202.49 122 MY EG SERVICES 1598.80
48 AIRASIA 6118.27 123 HONG LEONG INDUSTRIES 1587.05
49 BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS 5812.07 124 JOBSTREET 1577.13
50 MALAYSIA BUILDING SOC. 5794.14 125 TA ANN HOLDINGS 1545.97
51 MALAYSIA MAR.& HVY.ENGR. HDG. 5600.00 126 TA GLOBAL 1491.88
52 BERJAYA SPORTS TOTO 5471.67 127 DATASONIC GROUP 1478.25
53 DRB-HICOM 5451.73 128 TUNE INS HOLDINGS 1465.93
54 UNITED PLANTATIONS 5411.48 129 UNITED MALACCA 1464.22
55 HARTALEGA HOLDINGS 5390.98 130 TDM 1407.58
56 ORIENTAL HOLDINGS 5267.14 131 KIAN JOO CAN FACTORY 1385.8
57 AEON CO.(M) 4914.00 132 KRETAM HOLDINGS 1367.06
58 GUINNESS ANCHOR 4833.57 133 PANASONIC MNFG.MAL. 1355.85
59 SUNWAY 4687.98 134 AXIS REAL EST.INV.TST. 1351.43
60 MAGNUM 4543.29 135 TROPICANA 1351.02
61 KULIM (MALAYSIA) 4451.54 136 YTL HOSPITALITY REIT 1337.63
62 BURSA MALAYSIA 4383.39 137 PUNCAK NIAGA HOLDINGS 1336.60
63 BERJAYA LAND 4225.28 138 TA ENTERPRISE 1335.29
64 TAN CHONG MOTOR HOLDINGS 4159.68 139 SCIENTEX 1308.70
65 IGB REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST 4072.92 140 JCY INTERNATIONAL 1298.85
66 IJM LAND 3981.18 141 WAH SEONG 1278.56
67 KPJ HEALTHCARE 3979.14 142 ALAM MARITIM RES.BHD. 1258.04
68 LPI CAPITAL 3859.89 143 MBM RESOURCES 1254.18
69 PAVILION REIT.TST. 3852.39 144 GOLDIS 1245.41
70 CARLSBERG BREWERY MAL. 3752.39 145 MPHB CAPITAL 1201.20
71 IGB 3712.25 146 ATLAN HOLDINGS 1192.15
72 SUNWAY RLST.INV.TRUST 3625.37 147 PADINI HOLDINGS 1190.81
73 MSM MAL.HOLDINGS 3514.90 148 PRESS METAL 1181.70
74 TOP GLOVE 3493.59 149 APM AUTOMOTIVE HDG. 1167.26




G. Minor changes in the voluntary disclosure index 
Initial After 
23. Adoption/supporting mechanism to 
enhance ethical and productive practices 
 
Adoption/supporting mechanism to 
enhance ethical and/or productive 
practices 
 
59. Technical failure ─ discussion on 
hiring and retaining highly-trained and 
experienced staff/developing control 
quality system and equipment 
maintenance/implementing software that 
allows better design and manufacturing 
process 
 
Discussions on hiring and retaining highly- 
trained and experienced staff/developing 
control quality system and equipment 
maintenance/implementing software that 










H. Listed Family-controlled companies – from TOP 150 in FTSE Bursa Malaysia as at December 31, 
2013 
Company’s Name IOI Corporation Top Glove Berjaya Sports Toto Tan Chong Motor QL Resources Kuala Lumpur 
Kepong 
Keck Seng (M) 




























Number of share 




620,219,962 4,294,836,000 672,000,000 832,020,000 1,067,504,692 361,477,110 
Number of shares 
(%)  
45.48% 41.72% 58.7% 47.38% 46.6% 46.51% 68.77% 
Information on 
substantial interest 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number family 
members on the 
board 
4 members 3 members 3 members 2 members 7 members 2 members 3 members 
Position of the 
family member(s) 
in the composition 
of the board  
Executive Chairman-
1 







Executive Director - 




Director - 1 
Executive 




























Table continued  
 





Mah Sing Kossan Rubber Oriental Holdings  TSH Resources Cahaya Mata 
Sarawak 



























Number of share 
capital issued and 
fully paid 
438,253,000 680,154,880 839,868,000 639,468,000 620,394,000 896,942,633 339,704,000 
Number of shares 
(%)  
64.72% 37.27% 59.82% 51.34% 57.18% 35.94% 68.31% 
Information on 
substantial interest 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number family 
members on the 
board 
3 members 3 members 2 members 5 members 7 members 3 members 2 members 
Position of the 
family member(s) 
in the composition 
of the board  
Chairman - 1 
Nonindependent 
Nonexecutive 
director - 1 
Nonindependent 
Nonexecutive - 1 
Executive Chairman 
& Group Managing 
Director - 1 
Group Executive 
Director - 1 
Nonexecutive 









Executive Director - 1 
Executive Director - 4 
Executive 












Director - 1 
Group Executive 





Chairman - 1 
Group Executive 












Company’s Name JayaTiasa Holdings 
Industry Plantation oil palms 
& wood- based 






Number of share 
capital issued and 
fully paid 
973,718,000 







members on the 
board 
4 members 
Position of the 
family member(s) 
in the composition 









I. Descriptive analysis – T-test results for each items within 




General corporate and strategic information Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Financial highlights – at least 5 years 1 5 1.77 1.425
Discussion of company’s new major products/services/projects 1 5 1.16 .645
Information on new product development 1 5 1.23 .686
Discussion of recent industry trends 1 4 1.23 .588
Statement and/or information of ways to improve product and service 
quality
1 5 1.23 .658
General statement of corporate strategy 1 5 1.15 .466
Information relating to the general outlook of the economy 1 4 1.21 .563
Discussion of competitive environment 1 4 1.11 .417
A statement of corporate goals 1 4 1.21 .551
Vision and mission statement 1 5 1.26 .581
Description of marketing and distribution network for products/services 1 5 1.29 .807
Awareness of responsibilties to the stakeholders 1 4 1.16 .489
Discussions on specific actions taken during the year to achieve the 
corporate goal
1 5 1.32 .758
Impact of strategy on current results 1 5 1.21 .578
Discussion about major regional economic development pertaining to 
product and business
1 4 1.20 .554
Impact of competition on current market 1 5 1.18 .576
Firm’s contribution to the national economy 1 4 1.07 .322
Corporate achievement 1 5 1.20 .542
Business activities related to Shariah matters (if applicable) 1 3 1.03 .226
Halal status of the product (if applicable) 1 5 1.05 .369
Declaration of activities that involve alcohol and gambling as part of 
business (if applicable) 
1 2 1.00 .041
Industry specialised operational statistics 1 5 1.28 .881
Adoption/use of supporting mechanism to enhance ethical and productive 
practices
1 5 1.37 .822
Information about management and shareholders Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Board of directors' responsibilities, experiences, and backgrounds 1 5 1.74 1.378
Details of senior management team 1 5 1.20 .781
Details of Shariah oversight board (if applicable) 1 1 1.00 0.000
Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown 1 4 1.02 .219
Financial information Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Review of financial highlights related to the financial statements 1 5 1.74 1.249
High level operating data and performance measurements that management 
uses
1 5 1.74 1.322
Share price information (trend) 1 4 1.15 .508
Share price information (year-end) 1 5 1.23 .734
Market share in the industry 1 3 1.03 .203
Market capitalisation in the share market (year-end) 1 5 1.13 .531
Any form of financing/investment or funding related to Shariah law (if 
applicable)
1 3 1.01 .147







Corporate social responsibility (CSR) Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation
CSR policy; a statement of compliance 1 5 1.49 .851
Discussion of involvement in community programs (health/education/charity) 1 5 1.66 1.198
Discussion of environmental protection program implemented 1 5 1.22 .668
Discussion of involvement in public/private action designed to protect the 
environment
1 5 1.27 .755
Corporate policy on employees’ benefits 1 4 1.19 .514
Corporate policy on employees’ training 1 5 1.23 .577
Discussion of employees’ benefits 1 5 1.07 .366
Discussion of employees’ training 1 5 1.15 .597
Breakdown of workforce by line of business distribution or categories of 
employees by level of qualifications
1 5 1.15 .646
Amount spent on employees’ benefits and training 1 4 1.13 .496
Retrenchment/redundancy information 1 1 1.00 0.000
Information about employee workplace safety 1 5 1.23 .712
Discussion of health and safety standards 1 5 1.17 .581
Sadaqa/donation (description on the recipients and purpose) (if applicable) 1 2 1.01 .071
Waqf (description on the policy and amount spent) (if applicable) 1 4 1.02 .173
Retirement scheme through foundation or other means 1 3 1.00 .082
Forward-looking and risk review information Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Discussion of opportunities (firm’s prospects in general and business strategy 
on future performance in general)
1 5 1.26 .673
Discussion of  specific external factors affecting firm’s prospects (economy, 
politics, technology)
1 5 1.16 .515
Discussion of future products/services research and development activities with 
planned research and development expenditure
1 5 1.15 .526
Planned advertising and publicity expenditure 1 4 1.02 .158
Nature and cause of risks 1 4 1.10 .380
Identification of major differences between actual business performance and 
previously disclosed opportunities, risks, and management plans
1 4 1.15 .516
Environmental incidents - Implementation of procedures for managing 
materials containing environmentally sensitive substances - convert the 
production processes
1 5 1.19 .664
High degree of government regulation - dicussion on the ways for appropriate 
investment decision
1 5 1.09 .389
Technical failure - discussion on hiring and retaining highly trained and 
experienced staff / developing control quality system and equipment 
maintenance/implementing software that allows better design and 
manufacturing process
1 4 1.10 .406
Natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, flood) - Discussion on engineering, 
administrative and operating staff to identify and develop control program








J. Chi-square, Cross tabulation analysis – Comparative of voluntary disclosure by ownership type for the 




















Count 224 226 450 Count 272 282 554 Count 248 275 523 Count 243 259 502 Count 244 276 520
% of Total 37.3% 37.7% 75.0% % of Total 45.3% 47.0% 92.3% % of Total 41.3% 45.8% 87.2% % of Total 40.5% 43.2% 83.7% % of Total 40.7% 46.0% 86.7%
Count 1 13 14 Count 10 9 19 Count 28 8 36 Count 36 28 64 Count 26 13 39
% of Total .2% 2.2% 2.3% % of Total 1.7% 1.5% 3.2% % of Total 4.7% 1.3% 6.0% % of Total 6.0% 4.7% 10.7% % of Total 4.3% 2.2% 6.5%
Count 1 26 27 Count 9 3 12 Count 18 10 28 Count 20 6 26 Count 23 6 29
% of Total .2% 4.3% 4.5% % of Total 1.5% .5% 2.0% % of Total 3.0% 1.7% 4.7% % of Total 3.3% 1.0% 4.3% % of Total 3.8% 1.0% 4.8%
Count 17 25 42 Count 4 2 6 Count 4 2 6 Count 1 7 8 Count 5 3 8
% of Total 2.8% 4.2% 7.0% % of Total .7% .3% 1.0% % of Total .7% .3% 1.0% % of Total .2% 1.2% 1.3% % of Total .8% .5% 1.3%
Count 57 10 67 Count 5 4 9 Count 2 5 7 Count 300 300 600 Count 2 2 4
% of Total 9.5% 1.7% 11.2% % of Total .8% .7% 1.5% % of Total .3% .8% 1.2% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total .3% .3% .7%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Total
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Count 269 259 528 Count 263 248 511 Count 278 276 554 Count 241 269 510 Count 221 258 479
% of Total 44.8% 43.2% 88.0% % of Total 43.8% 41.3% 85.2% % of Total 46.3% 46.0% 92.3% % of Total 40.2% 44.8% 85.0% % of Total 36.8% 43.0% 79.8%
Count 21 35 56 Count 23 37 60 Count 12 19 31 Count 33 26 59 Count 52 37 89
% of Total 3.5% 5.8% 9.3% % of Total 3.8% 6.2% 10.0% % of Total 2.0% 3.2% 5.2% % of Total 5.5% 4.3% 9.8% % of Total 8.7% 6.2% 14.8%
Count 8 6 14 Count 10 11 21 Count 6 5 11 Count 21 5 26 Count 25 3 28
% of Total 1.3% 1.0% 2.3% % of Total 1.7% 1.8% 3.5% % of Total 1.0% .8% 1.8% % of Total 3.5% .8% 4.3% % of Total 4.2% .5% 4.7%
Count 2 0 2 Count 4 4 8 Count 4 0 4 Count 5 0 5 Count 2 1 3
% of Total .3% 0.0% .3% % of Total .7% .7% 1.3% % of Total .7% 0.0% .7% % of Total .8% 0.0% .8% % of Total .3% .2% .5%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 0 1 1
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 0.0% .2% .2%





% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Total


















Info. is detailed and 
sufficiently provided
Total







Info. is detailed and 
sufficiently provided
TotalTotal







Info. is detailed and 
sufficiently provided
Total



















Count 249 265 514 Count 266 263 529 Count 237 251 488 Count 257 255 512 Count 263 255 518
% of Total 41.5% 44.2% 85.7% % of Total 44.3% 43.8% 88.2% % of Total 39.5% 41.8% 81.3% % of Total 42.8% 42.5% 85.3% % of Total 43.8% 42.5% 86.3%
Count 22 15 37 Count 26 24 50 Count 30 27 57 Count 29 30 59 Count 23 27 50
% of Total 3.7% 2.5% 6.2% % of Total 4.3% 4.0% 8.3% % of Total 5.0% 4.5% 9.5% % of Total 4.8% 5.0% 9.8% % of Total 3.8% 4.5% 8.3%
Count 17 9 26 Count 7 9 16 Count 23 15 38 Count 12 8 20 Count 12 14 26
% of Total 2.8% 1.5% 4.3% % of Total 1.2% 1.5% 2.7% % of Total 3.8% 2.5% 6.3% % of Total 2.0% 1.3% 3.3% % of Total 2.0% 2.3% 4.3%
Count 8 2 10 Count 1 4 5 Count 5 6 11 Count 2 6 8 Count 2 4 6
% of Total 1.3% .3% 1.7% % of Total .2% .7% .8% % of Total .8% 1.0% 1.8% % of Total .3% 1.0% 1.3% % of Total .3% .7% 1.0%
Count 4 9 13 Count 300 300 600 Count 5 1 6 Count 0 1 1 Count 300 300 600
% of Total .7% 1.5% 2.2% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total .8% .2% 1.0% % of Total 0.0% .2% .2% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
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Count 263 269 532 Count 275 294 569 Count 249 269 518 Count 292 298 590 Count 290 299 589
% of Total 43.8% 44.8% 88.7% % of Total 45.8% 49.0% 94.8% % of Total 41.5% 44.8% 86.3% % of Total 48.7% 49.7% 98.3% % of Total 48.3% 49.8% 98.2%
Count 19 21 40 Count 20 3 23 Count 29 23 52 Count 2 1 3 Count 1 0 1
% of Total 3.2% 3.5% 6.7% % of Total 3.3% .5% 3.8% % of Total 4.8% 3.8% 8.7% % of Total .3% .2% .5% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2%
Count 12 7 19 Count 3 3 6 Count 19 7 26 Count 6 1 7 Count 2 1 3
% of Total 2.0% 1.2% 3.2% % of Total .5% .5% 1.0% % of Total 3.2% 1.2% 4.3% % of Total 1.0% .2% 1.2% % of Total .3% .2% .5%
Count 3 3 6 Count 2 0 2 Count 2 1 3 Count 300 300 600 Count 6 0 6
% of Total .5% .5% 1.0% % of Total .3% 0.0% .3% % of Total .3% .2% .5% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 1.0% 0.0% 1.0%
Count 3 0 3 Count 300 300 600 Count 1 0 1 Count 1 0 1
% of Total .5% 0.0% .5% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
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Item 16 * O wnershipType Crosstabulation
OwnershipType
Total
Item 18 * O wnershipType Crosstabulation
OwnershipType
Total















Count 299 300 599 Count 267 268 535 Count 217 251 468 Count 226 226 452 Count 259 292 551
% of Total 49.8% 50.0% 99.8% % of Total 44.5% 44.7% 89.2% % of Total 36.2% 41.8% 78.0% % of Total 37.7% 37.7% 75.3% % of Total 43.2% 48.7% 91.8%
Count 1 0 1 Count 3 8 11 Count 42 29 71 Count 0 2 2 Count 16 8 24
% of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total .5% 1.3% 1.8% % of Total 7.0% 4.8% 11.8% % of Total 0.0% .3% .3% % of Total 2.7% 1.3% 4.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 13 9 22 Count 25 14 39 Count 10 48 58 Count 5 0 5
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 2.2% 1.5% 3.7% % of Total 4.2% 2.3% 6.5% % of Total 1.7% 8.0% 9.7% % of Total .8% 0.0% .8%
Count 6 8 14 Count 10 3 13 Count 10 15 25 Count 20 0 20
% of Total 1.0% 1.3% 2.3% % of Total 1.7% .5% 2.2% % of Total 1.7% 2.5% 4.2% % of Total 3.3% 0.0% 3.3%
Count 11 7 18 Count 6 3 9 Count 54 9 63 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 1.8% 1.2% 3.0% % of Total 1.0% .5% 1.5% % of Total 9.0% 1.5% 10.5% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
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Count 300 300 600 Count 295 299 594 Count 201 221 422 Count 218 220 438 Count 265 287 552
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 49.2% 49.8% 99.0% % of Total 33.5% 36.8% 70.3% % of Total 36.3% 36.7% 73.0% % of Total 44.2% 47.8% 92.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 5 0 5 Count 12 10 22 Count 7 12 19 Count 1 9 10
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total .8% 0.0% .8% % of Total 2.0% 1.7% 3.7% % of Total 1.2% 2.0% 3.2% % of Total .2% 1.5% 1.7%
Count 0 1 1 Count 51 31 82 Count 29 25 54 Count 34 3 37
% of Total 0.0% .2% .2% % of Total 8.5% 5.2% 13.7% % of Total 4.8% 4.2% 9.0% % of Total 5.7% .5% 6.2%
Count 300 300 600 Count 18 21 39 Count 23 18 41 Count 0 1 1
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 3.0% 3.5% 6.5% % of Total 3.8% 3.0% 6.8% % of Total 0.0% .2% .2%
Count 18 17 35 Count 23 25 48 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 3.0% 2.8% 5.8% % of Total 3.8% 4.2% 8.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Total
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Count 260 277 537 Count 295 295 590 Count 272 287 559 Count 298 298 596 Count 295 300 595
% of Total 43.3% 46.2% 89.5% % of Total 49.2% 49.2% 98.3% % of Total 45.3% 47.8% 93.2% % of Total 49.7% 49.7% 99.3% % of Total 49.2% 50.0% 99.2%
Count 4 12 16 Count 1 4 5 Count 8 7 15 Count 0 1 1 Count 1 0 1
% of Total .7% 2.0% 2.7% % of Total .2% .7% .8% % of Total 1.3% 1.2% 2.5% % of Total 0.0% .2% .2% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2%
Count 23 11 34 Count 4 1 5 Count 15 6 21 Count 2 1 3 Count 3 0 3
% of Total 3.8% 1.8% 5.7% % of Total .7% .2% .8% % of Total 2.5% 1.0% 3.5% % of Total .3% .2% .5% % of Total .5% 0.0% .5%
Count 1 0 1 Count 300 300 600 Count 5 0 5 Count 300 300 600 Count 1 0 1
% of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total .8% 0.0% .8% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2%
Count 12 0 12 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 2.0% 0.0% 2.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 300 300 600
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Total











































































Count 199 202 401 Count 204 228 432 Count 258 266 524 Count 253 255 508 Count 258 262 520
% of Total 33.2% 33.7% 66.8% % of Total 34.0% 38.0% 72.0% % of Total 43.0% 44.3% 87.3% % of Total 42.2% 42.5% 84.7% % of Total 43.0% 43.7% 86.7%
Count 54 85 139 Count 27 14 41 Count 16 24 40 Count 24 31 55 Count 21 31 52
% of Total 9.0% 14.2% 23.2% % of Total 4.5% 2.3% 6.8% % of Total 2.7% 4.0% 6.7% % of Total 4.0% 5.2% 9.2% % of Total 3.5% 5.2% 8.7%
Count 28 12 40 Count 40 28 68 Count 16 6 22 Count 11 8 19 Count 19 6 25
% of Total 4.7% 2.0% 6.7% % of Total 6.7% 4.7% 11.3% % of Total 2.7% 1.0% 3.7% % of Total 1.8% 1.3% 3.2% % of Total 3.2% 1.0% 4.2%
Count 5 1 6 Count 6 14 20 Count 6 2 8 Count 3 2 5 Count 2 1 3
% of Total .8% .2% 1.0% % of Total 1.0% 2.3% 3.3% % of Total 1.0% .3% 1.3% % of Total .5% .3% .8% % of Total .3% .2% .5%
Count 14 0 14 Count 23 16 39 Count 4 2 6 Count 9 4 13 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 2.3% 0.0% 2.3% % of Total 3.8% 2.7% 6.5% % of Total .7% .3% 1.0% % of Total 1.5% .7% 2.2% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600







































Info. is detailed and 
sufficiently provided
Highly detailed disclosure

























Count 239 265 504 Count 290 283 573 Count 265 290 555 Count 272 293 565 Count 263 297 560
% of Total 39.8% 44.2% 84.0% % of Total 48.3% 47.2% 95.5% % of Total 44.2% 48.3% 92.5% % of Total 45.3% 48.8% 94.2% % of Total 43.8% 49.5% 93.3%
Count 28 32 60 Count 6 13 19 Count 16 4 20 Count 4 1 5 Count 6 0 6
% of Total 4.7% 5.3% 10.0% % of Total 1.0% 2.2% 3.2% % of Total 2.7% .7% 3.3% % of Total .7% .2% .8% % of Total 1.0% 0.0% 1.0%
Count 29 3 32 Count 0 3 3 Count 7 5 12 Count 12 3 15 Count 28 3 31
% of Total 4.8% .5% 5.3% % of Total 0.0% .5% .5% % of Total 1.2% .8% 2.0% % of Total 2.0% .5% 2.5% % of Total 4.7% .5% 5.2%
Count 3 0 3 Count 3 1 4 Count 6 1 7 Count 3 3 6 Count 3 0 3
% of Total .5% 0.0% .5% % of Total .5% .2% .7% % of Total 1.0% .2% 1.2% % of Total .5% .5% 1.0% % of Total .5% 0.0% .5%
Count 1 0 1 Count 1 0 1 Count 6 0 6 Count 9 0 9 Count 300 300 600
% of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% % of Total 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
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OwnershipType
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Count 300 300 600 Count 249 277 526 Count 261 281 542 Count 300 297 597 Count 294 299 593
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 41.5% 46.2% 87.7% % of Total 43.5% 46.8% 90.3% % of Total 50.0% 49.5% 99.5% % of Total 49.0% 49.8% 98.8%
Count 300 300 600 Count 14 18 32 Count 16 13 29 Count 0 3 3 Count 5 0 5
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 2.3% 3.0% 5.3% % of Total 2.7% 2.2% 4.8% % of Total 0.0% .5% .5% % of Total .8% 0.0% .8%
Count 23 3 26 Count 13 4 17 Count 300 300 600 Count 1 0 1
% of Total 3.8% .5% 4.3% % of Total 2.2% .7% 2.8% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2%
Count 7 1 8 Count 8 2 10 Count 0 1 1
% of Total 1.2% .2% 1.3% % of Total 1.3% .3% 1.7% % of Total 0.0% .2% .2%
Count 7 1 8 Count 2 0 2 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 1.2% .2% 1.3% % of Total .3% 0.0% .3% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Total
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Count 299 300 599 Count 253 253 506 Count 284 252 536 Count 269 276 545 Count 297 296 593
% of Total 49.8% 50.0% 99.8% % of Total 42.2% 42.2% 84.3% % of Total 47.3% 42.0% 89.3% % of Total 44.8% 46.0% 90.8% % of Total 49.5% 49.3% 98.8%
Count 1 0 1 Count 15 29 44 Count 11 34 45 Count 16 15 31 Count 3 3 6
% of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total 2.5% 4.8% 7.3% % of Total 1.8% 5.7% 7.5% % of Total 2.7% 2.5% 5.2% % of Total .5% .5% 1.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 28 14 42 Count 4 6 10 Count 10 5 15 Count 0 1 1
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 4.7% 2.3% 7.0% % of Total .7% 1.0% 1.7% % of Total 1.7% .8% 2.5% % of Total 0.0% .2% .2%
Count 2 2 4 Count 1 7 8 Count 4 4 8 Count 300 300 600
% of Total .3% .3% .7% % of Total .2% 1.2% 1.3% % of Total .7% .7% 1.3% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 2 2 4 Count 0 1 1 Count 1 0 1
% of Total .3% .3% .7% % of Total 0.0% .2% .2% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
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Count 281 277 558 Count 266 277 543 Count 258 283 541 Count 278 289 567 Count 266 292 558
% of Total 46.8% 46.2% 93.0% % of Total 44.3% 46.2% 90.5% % of Total 43.0% 47.2% 90.2% % of Total 46.3% 48.2% 94.5% % of Total 44.3% 48.7% 93.0%
Count 12 15 27 Count 14 16 30 Count 19 9 28 Count 11 7 18 Count 18 8 26
% of Total 2.0% 2.5% 4.5% % of Total 2.3% 2.7% 5.0% % of Total 3.2% 1.5% 4.7% % of Total 1.8% 1.2% 3.0% % of Total 3.0% 1.3% 4.3%
Count 6 8 14 Count 14 6 20 Count 11 6 17 Count 9 4 13 Count 13 0 13
% of Total 1.0% 1.3% 2.3% % of Total 2.3% 1.0% 3.3% % of Total 1.8% 1.0% 2.8% % of Total 1.5% .7% 2.2% % of Total 2.2% 0.0% 2.2%
Count 1 0 1 Count 6 1 7 Count 3 2 5 Count 1 0 1 Count 3 0 3
% of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total 1.0% .2% 1.2% % of Total .5% .3% .8% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total .5% 0.0% .5%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600 Count 9 0 9 Count 1 0 1 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% % of Total .2% 0.0% .2% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Count 300 300 600 Count 300 300 600
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% % of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Total
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Count 297 297 594
% of Total 49.5% 49.5% 99.0%
Count 1 3 4
% of Total .2% .5% .7%
Count 1 0 1
% of Total .2% 0.0% .2%
Count 1 0 1
% of Total .2% 0.0% .2%
Count 300 300 600
% of Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Total















K. Test of data normality – Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Ownership Type MeanCat1 MeanCat2 MeanCat3 MeanCat4 MeanCat5 
N 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Normal Parametersa,b Mean 1.50 1.2139 1.2404 1.2535 1.1852 1.1217 
Std. Deviation .500 .21949 .49456 .33007 .32676 .21371 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .341 .165 .435 .270 .285 .329 
Positive .341 .141 .435 .270 .273 .329 
Negative -.341 -.165 -.313 -.221 -.285 -.285 
Test Statistic .341 .165 .435 .270 .285 .329 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c .000c 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 








L. Mean differences between companies’ industry and voluntary disclosure categories – result from post 
hoc test 
 
***The mean difference is highly significant at the 0.01 level. 
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 































Diversified v.s. Gaming 0.12 0.05** 0.24 0.11 0.20 0.02** 0.08 0.74 -0.05 0.54
Diversified v.s. Plantation 0.07 0.215 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.00*** -0.01 1.00 0.02 0.94
Diversified v.s. Consumer product 0.07 0.09* 0.13 0.27 0.18 0.00*** 0.06 0.63 0.02 0.98
Diversified v.s. Automotive 0.08 0.09* 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.00*** 0.06 0.81 0.02 0.98
Diversified v.s. Property 0.04 0.87 0.11 0.68 0.17 0.01*** 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.98
Plantation v.s. Diversified -0.07 0.22 -0.16 0.15 -0.18 0.00*** 0.01 1.00 0.05 0.54
Plantation v.s Consumer product 0.00 1.00 -0.03 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.39 0.07 0.04**
Plantation v.s. Automotive 0.02 0.99 -0.02 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.07 0.65 0.07 0.19
Plantation v.s. Property -0.03 0.94 -0.05 0.98 -0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.07 0.19
Plantation v.s. Gaming 0.05 0.79 0.08 0.96 0.02 1.00 0.09 0.60 0.07 0.37
Consumer product v.s. Diversified -0.07 0.09 -0.13 0.26 -0.18 0.00*** -0.06 0.63 -0.02 0.94
Consumer product v.s. Plantation 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.99 0.00 1.00 -0.07 0.39 0.07 0.04
Consumer product v.s. Automotive 0.01 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Consumer product v.s. Property -0.03 0.85 -0.02 0.99 0.00 1.00 -0.06 0.70 0.00 1.00
Consumer product v.s. Gaming 0.05 0.84 0.10 0.82 0.02 0.99 0.02 0.99 0.00 1.00
Automotive v.s. Diversified -0.09 0.09 -0.15 0.35 -0.17 0.00*** -0.06 0.81 -0.02 0.98
Automotive v.s. Plantation -0.02 0.99 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.07 0.65 -0.07 0.19
Automotive v.s. Consumer product 0.01 0.99 -0.01 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Automotive v.s. Property -0.05 0.72 -0.03 0.99 0.00 1.00 -0.06 0.84 0.00 1.00
Automotive v.s. Gaming 0.03 0.98 0.09 0.93 0.03 0.99 0.02 0.99 0.00 1.00
Property v.s. Diversified -0.04 0.87 -0.11 0.68 -0.17 0.01*** 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.98
Property v.s. Plantation 0.03 0.94 0.05 0.98 0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.07 0.19
Property v.s. Consumer product 0.03 0.85 0.02 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.06 0.69 0.00 1.00
Property v.s. Automotive 0.05 0.72 0.04 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.84 0.00 1.00
Property v.s. Gaming 0.08 0.40 0.13 0.76 0.03 0.99 0.85 0.76 0.00 1.00
Gaming v.s. Diversified -0.12 0.047* -0.24 0.11 -0.20 0.02** -0.08 0.74 -0.02 0.98
Gaming v.s. Plantation -0.05 0.79 -0.08 0.96 -0.02 1.00 -0.95 0.60 -0.08 0.37
Gaming v.s. Consumer product -0.04 0.84 -0.11 0.82 -0.02 0.99 -0.02 0.99 0.00 1.00
Gaming v.s. Automotive -0.03 0.97 -0.09 0.93 -0.03 0.99 -0.02 0.99 0.00 1.00








M. The mean difference results between companies’ market value and the level of voluntary 
disclosure – result from post hoc analysis 
 
***The mean difference is highly significant at the 0.01 level 
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
*The mean difference is moderately significant at the 0.1 level 
  
N. The mean difference results between companies’ ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure – 
result from post hoc analysis 
 
***The mean difference is highly significant at the 0.01 level. 
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*The mean difference is moderately significant at the 0.1 level. 
Ownership type Total score









Nonfamily-controlled 6.26 1.25 1.32 1.30 1.24 1.14
Family-controlled 5.77 1.17 1.16 1.21 1.13 1.10




























































P. Computation of mean for each voluntary disclosure items for family-controlled companies  
 
 
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 Item 8 Item 9 Item 10 Item 11 Item 12 Item 13 Item 14 Item 15 Item 16 Item 17 Item 18 Item 19 Item 20 Item 21 Item 22 Item 23 Item 24 Item 25 Item 26 Item 27 Item 28 Item 29 Item 30 Item 31 Item 32
Mean 3.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.65 2.45 2.50 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.35 2.25 2.90 2.70 2.35 2.80 2.25 2.70 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.30 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.176 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.207 2.188 2.212 2.221 2.221 2.115 2.207 2.221 2.150 2.227 2.207 2.118 2.221 2.155 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.099 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.227 2.197 2.221 2.221 2.221
Mean 1.35 1.45 1.40 1.20 1.45 1.00 1.20 1.10 1.45 1.25 1.35 1.70 1.25 1.45 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.00 1.15 1.10 1.00 1.00 1.75 1.65 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.80 2.35 1.40 1.40 1.00
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
.745 1.050 1.046 .696 1.050 0.000 .523 .308 .759 .444 .875 1.081 .639 1.050 .639 .813 .754 0.000 .489 .447 0.000 0.000 1.020 1.182 .410 0.000 0.000 1.152 1.531 .754 .754 0.000
Mean 3.25 2.95 2.75 2.65 2.65 2.35 2.55 2.45 2.50 2.50 3.45 2.35 2.35 2.85 2.60 2.50 2.25 2.45 2.25 2.25 2.25 4.10 2.95 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 4.50 4.65 2.25 2.75 2.25
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.337 2.282 2.291 2.033 2.183 2.183 2.089 2.164 2.115 2.115 2.089 2.183 2.207 2.007 2.062 2.115 2.221 2.139 2.221 2.221 2.221 1.944 2.139 2.337 2.221 2.221 2.221 1.539 1.631 2.221 2.099 2.221
Mean 2.80 2.25 2.25 2.60 2.25 2.55 2.70 2.35 2.35 2.50 2.30 2.55 2.30 2.45 2.35 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.05 2.60 2.90 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.75 3.15 2.25 2.25 2.25
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.167 2.221 2.221 2.113 2.221 2.114 2.105 2.183 2.183 2.115 2.203 2.114 2.203 2.139 2.183 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.139 2.088 2.150 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.099 2.231 2.221 2.221 2.221
Mean 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.45 2.30 2.45 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.40 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.30 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.65 2.65 2.25 2.25 2.25
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.183 2.221 2.221 2.139 2.203 2.139 2.183 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.186 2.203 2.203 2.203 2.162 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.203 2.099 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.110 2.134 2.221 2.221 2.221
Mean 1.75 1.15 1.45 1.10 1.10 1.00 1.35 1.25 1.05 1.20 1.30 1.30 1.45 1.15 1.60 1.20 1.00 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.65 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.90 1.00 1.10 1.00
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
1.333 .366 .759 .447 .447 0.000 .587 .444 .224 .616 .657 .470 .686 .489 .883 .523 0.000 .410 0.000 0.000 0.000 .889 .813 .889 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 .968 0.000 .308 0.000
Mean 1.50 1.10 1.00 1.10 1.15 1.05 1.25 1.15 1.15 1.25 1.05 1.15 1.55 1.55 1.20 1.10 1.00 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.80 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
.889 .447 0.000 .308 .366 .224 .550 .489 .489 .444 .224 .489 .826 .686 .523 .308 0.000 .366 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 .889 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.281 .489 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean 1.90 1.05 1.95 1.75 1.30 1.20 1.30 1.00 1.15 1.35 1.25 1.55 1.50 1.10 1.70 1.05 1.00 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.80 1.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.85 1.90 1.00 1.30 1.00
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
1.294 .224 1.468 1.251 .801 .410 .923 0.000 .489 1.089 .786 1.050 1.147 .308 1.174 .224 0.000 .681 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.322 1.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.531 1.619 0.000 .733 0.000
Mean 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.25 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.30 2.30 2.35 2.30 2.25 2.45 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.55 2.25 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.75 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.099 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.115 2.221 2.162 2.221 2.221 2.203 2.221 2.203 2.203 2.183 2.203 2.221 2.139 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.089 2.221 2.099 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.099 2.099 2.221 2.221 2.221
Mean 2.55 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.40 2.55 2.25 2.55 2.55 2.25 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.25 2.30 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.45 3.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.65 2.50 2.30 2.25 2.25
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.114 2.221 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.186 2.114 2.221 2.089 2.089 2.221 2.162 2.162 2.162 2.186 2.221 2.203 2.183 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.164 2.176 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.134 2.164 2.203 2.221 2.221
Mean 2.90 2.25 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.25 2.35 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.55 2.25 2.65 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.70 3.00 2.25 2.25 2.25
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.150 2.221 2.221 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.183 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.183 2.221 2.207 2.221 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.164 2.221 2.110 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.105 2.176 2.221 2.221 2.221
Mean 2.65 2.25 2.35 2.75 2.25 2.30 2.35 2.45 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.35 2.55 2.40 2.40 2.30 2.25 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.65 2.35 2.40 2.40 2.35
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.084 2.221 2.183 2.149 2.221 2.203 2.183 2.188 2.221 2.221 2.183 2.183 2.188 2.234 2.186 2.203 2.221 2.186 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.099 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.231 2.183 2.162 2.162 2.183
Mean 3.00 2.40 2.45 2.35 2.25 2.55 2.60 2.35 2.30 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.65 2.40 2.50 2.40 2.25 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.40 2.25 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.05 2.85 2.40 2.50 2.40
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.176 2.162 2.188 2.207 2.221 2.139 2.113 2.207 2.203 2.186 2.221 2.221 2.134 2.234 2.140 2.186 2.221 2.207 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.186 2.221 2.099 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.235 2.231 2.234 2.115 2.186
Mean 3.25 2.50 2.30 2.45 2.50 2.80 2.60 2.45 2.55 2.50 3.45 2.35 2.35 2.50 2.45 2.50 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 3.05 2.45 2.25 2.40 3.00 2.65 2.40 2.25 2.30
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.337 2.259 2.203 2.139 2.140 1.936 2.137 2.139 2.089 2.115 2.164 2.207 2.183 2.140 2.212 2.188 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.115 2.350 2.139 2.221 2.234 2.176 2.323 2.162 2.221 2.203
Mean 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.50 2.35 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.40 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.45 2.45 2.25 2.25 2.25
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.099 2.221 2.221 2.183 2.221 2.221 2.162 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.183 2.115 2.207 2.183 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.162 2.099 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.139 2.139 2.221 2.221 2.221
Mean 2.52 2.04 2.10 2.12 2.06 2.07 2.15 2.01 2.04 2.08 2.17 2.10 2.18 2.14 2.14 2.06 1.95 2.05 1.93 1.92 1.92 2.18 2.18 2.51 1.94 1.92 1.93 2.59 2.64 1.98 2.03 1.94
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Std. 
Deviation


































Item 33 Item 34 Item 35 Item 36 Item 37 Item 38 Item 39 Item 40 Item 41 Item 42 Item 43 Item 44 Item 45 Item 46 Item 47 Item 48 Item 49 Item 50 Item 51 Item 52 Item 53 Item 54 Item 55 Item 56 Item 57 Item 58 Item 59 Item 60 Item 61 Average
Mean 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.75 3.25 2.50 2.25 2.65 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.70 4.00 3.65 3.65 3.60 3.65 3.50 3.70 3.50 2.00 2.60
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.221 2.221 2.221 2.099 2.337 2.212 2.221 2.134 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.430 2.248 2.498 2.498 2.501 2.498 2.565 2.430 2.565 2.406
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.80 1.20 1.30 1.15 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.30 1.10 1.00 1.15 1.20 1.15 1.15 1.00 2.75 2.65 2.35 2.30 2.55 2.35 2.55 2.45 2.25 .75 1.44
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
0.000 0.000 0.000 .821 1.436 .523 .733 .489 .550 .444 .786 .733 .447 0.000 .366 .696 .366 .671 0.000 2.099 2.207 2.183 2.203 2.164 2.207 2.235 2.188 2.221 .444
Mean 2.75 2.25 2.25 2.75 3.45 2.65 2.80 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 4.00 3.95 3.75 3.50 3.70 3.95 3.50 3.65 3.55 2.00 2.77
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.099 2.221 2.221 1.970 2.188 2.183 2.238 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.200 2.259 2.337 2.565 2.386 2.139 2.565 2.434 2.523 2.406
Mean 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.65 2.30 2.60 2.50 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.45 2.45 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.85 3.65 3.85 3.50 3.60 3.60 3.65 3.55 3.55 2.00 2.58
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.221 2.221 2.221 2.115 2.110 2.203 2.113 2.115 2.162 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.139 2.139 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.346 2.434 2.368 2.565 2.479 2.479 2.434 2.523 2.523 2.406
Mean 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.55 2.25 2.45 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.65 3.70 3.50 3.55 3.65 3.65 3.50 3.50 3.50 2.00 2.49
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.221 2.221 2.221 2.115 2.164 2.221 2.139 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.434 2.408 2.565 2.523 2.434 2.455 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.406
Mean 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.55 1.75 1.30 1.35 1.30 1.30 1.20 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.35 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.40 2.45 2.25 2.30 2.35 2.45 2.40 2.30 2.30 .75 1.38
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
.444 0.000 0.000 .605 1.118 .657 .671 .470 .571 .616 .489 0.000 0.000 0.000 .587 .946 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.162 2.139 2.221 2.203 2.207 2.164 2.186 2.203 2.203 .444
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.35 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.35 2.50 2.55 2.25 2.30 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 .75 1.28
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
0.000 0.000 0.000 .587 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 .224 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.207 2.115 2.188 2.221 2.203 2.207 2.221 2.221 2.221 .444
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.45 2.05 1.35 1.65 1.35 1.15 1.25 1.25 1.45 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.65 2.80 2.25 2.25 2.45 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.25 .75 1.44
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
0.000 0.000 0.000 .510 1.572 .813 1.348 .813 .366 .716 .639 1.099 0.000 0.000 .883 .489 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.084 2.191 2.221 2.221 2.188 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.221 .444
Mean 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.75 2.50 2.45 2.50 2.50 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.85 3.70 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 2.00 2.52
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.221 2.221 2.221 2.115 2.099 2.115 2.139 2.115 2.115 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.254 2.386 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.406
Mean 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.70 2.80 2.25 2.35 2.25 2.40 2.40 2.30 2.25 2.45 2.25 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.65 3.55 3.85 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.80 3.55 3.55 2.00 2.54
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.221 2.221 2.221 2.055 2.142 2.221 2.183 2.221 2.186 2.186 2.203 2.221 2.188 2.221 2.221 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.455 2.523 2.300 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.353 2.523 2.523 2.406
Mean 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.55 2.65 2.40 2.30 2.60 2.50 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.50 3.60 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.55 1.85 2.50
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.221 2.221 2.221 2.114 2.110 2.162 2.203 2.062 2.115 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.565 2.479 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.523 2.231
Mean 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.35 2.25 2.50 2.25 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.55 3.60 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.55 3.60 3.50 3.50 1.70 2.50
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.183 2.221 2.221 2.183 2.183 2.221 2.164 2.221 2.183 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.183 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.523 2.479 2.565 2.565 2.565 2.523 2.501 2.565 2.565 2.250
Mean 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.55 2.90 2.45 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.45 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.70 3.65 3.65 3.50 3.60 3.65 3.55 3.50 3.55 2.00 2.56
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.221 2.221 2.221 2.089 2.100 2.164 2.221 2.203 2.221 2.139 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.430 2.455 2.455 2.565 2.501 2.455 2.523 2.565 2.523 2.406
Mean 2.35 2.35 2.25 2.70 3.00 2.55 2.40 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.25 2.45 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.75 3.60 3.65 3.50 3.70 3.55 3.60 3.55 3.60 2.00 2.62
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.207 2.207 2.221 2.003 2.271 2.235 2.162 2.203 2.203 2.203 2.221 2.203 2.221 2.221 2.282 2.162 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.468 2.479 2.434 2.565 2.386 2.523 2.479 2.523 2.479 2.406
Mean 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.75 2.60 2.30 2.55 2.35 2.45 2.25 2.40 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.40 2.35 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.70 3.65 3.55 3.50 3.55 3.50 3.70 3.50 3.50 2.00 2.51
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Std. 
Deviation
2.221 2.203 2.221 1.997 2.137 2.203 2.139 2.183 2.139 2.221 2.186 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.162 2.183 2.221 2.221 2.221 2.408 2.434 2.523 2.565 2.523 2.565 2.408 2.565 2.565 2.406
Mean 1.98 1.93 1.92 2.29 2.50 2.08 2.15 2.07 2.04 1.99 1.97 1.97 1.94 1.92 2.02 2.01 1.93 1.93 1.92 3.40 3.40 3.29 3.19 3.27 3.27 3.26 3.22 3.19 1.64 2.25
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Std. 
Deviation


































































.009 .275 .062 .396 .109 .098 .887 .936 .566 .248 .346 .275 .275 .566 .195 .888 .085 .012 .291





* .491 -.026 -.327 -.286 -.071 .262 -.286 -.040 .071 .134 .134 .250 -.083 .053 .033 -.321 -.259
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.009 .040 .063 .926 .234 .302 .800 .346 .302 .887 .800 .635 .635 .369 .770 .851 .908 .243 .352




* 1.000 -.068 .294 -.068 -.134 .134 -.302 .535




.275 .040 .810 .287 .810 .635 .635 .275 .040 .275 .474 .553 .553 .635 .297 .696 .034 .285 1.000
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
-.237 -.026 .294 -.320 1.000 -.320 -.105 -.026 .207 -.105 -.237 .026 .294 .294 -.105 .146 .182 .120 .223 .380
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.396 .926 .287 .245 .245 .710 .926 .459 .710 .396 .926 .287 .287 .710 .605 .517 .671 .423 .163
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
.431 -.327 -.068 -.667
** -.320 1.000 -.218 -.055 .123 -.218 .123 -.218 -.068 -.408 -.218 .219 -.072 -.050 -.034 -.264
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.109 .234 .810 .007 .245 .435 .847 .662 .435 .662 .435 .810 .131 .435 .433 .799 .860 .903 .343
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient




.098 .302 .635 .435 .710 .435 .302 .566 .800 .566 .302 .635 .635 .800 .281 .374 .149 .217 .048
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
-.040 -.071 .134 .218 -.026 -.055 -.286 1.000 -.645
** -.286 .262 -.196 .134 .468 .250 0.000 -.389 -.228 -.068 0.000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.887 .800 .635 .435 .926 .847 .302 .009 .302 .346 .483 .635 .079 .369 1.000 .152 .413 .811 1.000
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
-.023 .262 -.302 -.185 .207 .123 -.161 -.645
** 1.000 -.161 -.023 .040 -.302 -.302 -.161 .131 .279 .368 .134 0.000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.936 .346 .275 .510 .459 .662 .566 .009 .566 .936 .887 .275 .275 .566 .643 .314 .177 .635 1.000




* .327 -.105 -.218 -.071 -.286 -.161 1.000 -.161 .286 -.134 -.134 -.071 -.265 .247 -.293 -.034 0.000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.566 .302 .040 .234 .710 .435 .800 .302 .566 .566 .302 .635 .635 .800 .341 .374 .288 .905 1.000
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
.318 -.040 -.302 .123 -.237 .123 -.161 .262 -.023 -.161 1.000 -.564
* -.302 -.302 .443 .224 .040 .276 .420 -.292
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.248 .887 .275 .662 .396 .662 .566 .346 .936 .566 .029 .275 .275 .098 .423 .888 .320 .119 .291
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
-.262 .071 .200 .055 .026 -.218 .286 -.196 .040 .286 -.564




.346 .800 .474 .847 .926 .435 .302 .483 .887 .302 .029 .079 .635 .369 .229 .152 .562 .811 .048
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
-.302 .134 .167 -.068 .294 -.068 -.134 .134 -.302 -.134 -.302 -.468 1.000 .583






.275 .635 .553 .810 .287 .810 .635 .635 .275 .635 .275 .079 .022 .635 .061 .143 .034 .043 .241
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
-.302 .134 .167 .272 .294 -.408 -.134 .468 -.302 -.134 -.302 -.134 .583




.275 .635 .553 .326 .287 .131 .635 .079 .275 .635 .275 .635 .022 .635 .061 .143 .034 .285 1.000
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Correlation 
Coefficient
-.161 .250 -.134 .327 -.105 -.218 -.071 .250 -.161 -.071 .443 -.250 -.134 -.134 1.000 .066 .247 .065 -.034 0.000
Sig. (2-
tailed)
.566 .369 .635 .234 .710 .435 .800 .369 .566 .800 .098 .369 .635 .635 .815 .374 .817 .905 1.000
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).





































R. List of interviewees  
ID Position Years in the 
Profession 
Classification 
P1 Chief Executive Officer 11 to 20 Analyst 
P2 Deputy Director of Research 0 to 10 Equity investor 
P3 Manager - Risk and 
Governance 
0 to 10 Services provider 
P4 Audit Manager 0 to 10 Services provider 
P5 Business Consultant 0 to 10 Services provider 
P6 Business Owner 11 to 20 Services provider 
P7 Manager - Company 
Secretary 
0 to 10 Services provider 
P8 Managing Director 11 to 20 Corporate finance 
advisor 
P9 Director More than 31 
years 
Equity investor 
P10 Relationship Manager 0 to 10  Financial provider 
P11 General Manager 0 to 10 Provider of goods and 
services 
P12 Executive Director Securities 
Malaysia 
21 to 30 Regulator 
P13 Deputy Director - Institute of 
Integrity Malaysia 
0 to 10 Government agency 





P15 Assistant Manager 10 to 20 Services provider 
P16 Audit Director 11 to 20 Services provider 
P17 Audit Associate 0 to 10 Services provider 
P18 Manager - Securities 
Malaysia 
0 to 10 Regulator 
P19 Dean of Institute More than 31 
years 
Researcher 
P20 Managing Director 21 to 30 Provider of goods and 
services 
P21 Senior Research Analyst 0 to 10 Analyst 
P22 Senior Executive 0 to 10 Analyst 
P23 Chief Executive Officer 0 to 10 Trading company 
P24 Senior Manager 11 to 20 Professional body 
P25 Manager 11 to 20 Auditor 
P26 Head of Risk and Shariah 
Compliance 
11 to 20 Financial provider 
P27 Head of Institute More than 31 
years 
Researcher 
P28 Director of Corporate 
Management and 
Communication 
11 to 20 Government agencies 
P29 Assistant Vice President 0 to 10 Analyst 





P31 Project Manager 0 to 10 Provider of goods and 
services 
P32 Finance Manager 11 to 20 Government agencies 
P33 Head Group Risk 11 to 20 Services provider 
P34 Manager - Market 
Surveillance 
11 to 20 Regulator 
P35 Director of Private Sector 0 to 10 Analyst - Government 
agency 
P36 Associate Professor 0 to 10 Researcher 
P37 Senior Vice President - 
Corporate Financing 
11 to 20 Services provider 
P38 Director 0 to 10 Regulator 
P39 Assistant Editor 11 to 20 Media 
P40 Assistant Vice President - 
Wealth Management  
0 to 10 Fund manager 
P41 Chief Executive Officer 0 to 10 Services provider 
 
 
